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BIOGRAPHIES 
PROFESSOR JOHN P. FREEMAN 
John P. Freeman is a Professor of Law at the University of South 
Carolina School of Law. He teaches courses on business and 
corporate law and legal ethics. He has a special interest in 
securities regulation and is a nationally recognized expert on 
federal anti-fraud statutes in corporate and commercial 
litigation. He received his B.A. degree in 1967, J.D. degree in 
1970 from the University of Notre Dame, and his LL.M. degree from 
the University of Pennsylvania in 1976. Professor Freeman served 
as Special Counsel for the Securities and Exchange Commission's 
Division of Investment Management and was the first Chairman of 
the South Carolina Supreme Court's Commission on Continuing 
Lawyer Competence. He has written numerous law review articles 
and spoken many times at seminars on the subject of legal ethics. 
ELIZABETH M. HANCOCK, ESQ • 
Elizabeth Hancock has been an Assistant Solicitor for the Fifth 
Judicial Circuit since 1990. She handles all Richland and 
Kershaw Counties' civil forfeiture cases. She received her B.A. 
in Government in 1981 from the University of Texas and received 
her J.D. degree from the University of South Carolina School of 
Law in 1986. Upon graduating from law school, she clerked for 
the Honorable c. Anthony Harris, holding that position for three 
(3) years. Mrs. Hancock serves on the S.C. Bar Association Youth 
Drug and Alcohol Abuse Committee. 
A. SEAN KITTRELL, ESQ. 
A. Sean Kittrell is a Deputy Attorney General with the State 
Grand Jury Division of The Office of the Attorney General. He 
was graduated from the University of South Carolina School of Law 
in 1984, and clerked for the Honorable John Hamilton Smith for 
almost two years before entering private practice in Charleston 
with Regan and Williams. While there, he also worked as a part-
time Assistant Solicitor for the Ninth Judicial Circuit. In 
late 1986, he began working full time as an Assistant Solicitor, 
taking a leave of absence for 18 months in order to work as a 
Legislative Assistant to Senator Ernest F. Hollings in 
Washington, D.C. Upon his return, he prosecuted drug cases until 
he left to work in the State Grand Jury Section of the Attorney 
General's Office . 
ROBERT E. KNEECE, JR. ESQ. 
Robert E. Kneece, Jr. entered Clemson University in 1977 and was 
graduated from the University of South Carolina with a B.A. in 
Political Science in 1981. He received his J.D. degree from the 
University of South Carolina School of Law in 1984. Upon 
graduating from law school, he clerked for the Honorable Don s. 
Rushing, Resident Circuit Judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit 
from 1984-1985 and was Staff Attorney for the South Carolina 
Senate Research Office from 1985-19 87. Since 1987, Mr. Kneece 
has been a partner with Kneece, Kneece, and Brown. Mr. Kneece lS 
a member of the Ameri c an Ba r Assoc i at ion, South Carolina Bar 
Association (Criminal Law Committee a nd Insurance Programs 
Committee), Richland County Bar Association, and Columbia 
Criminal Defense Group. 
THE HONORABLE L. HENRY McKELLER 
L. Henry McKeller was elected Circuit Court Judge at-large, Seat 
No. 9 in February, 1991. He received his B.A. from the 
University of South Caro l ina in 1967 and received his J.D. d egree 
from the University of South Carolina School of Law in 197 4 . 
He was Mayor of the Town of Arcadia Lakes from 1977-1985. 
TRACY A. MEYERS, ESQ. 
Tracy A. Meyers has been an Assistant Attorney General with the 
State Grand Jury Division of the Office of the Attorney General 
since 1991. She received her B.A. in Finance (with honors) from 
the University of Georgia in 1983. She worked as an Electronic 
Banking Officer (Department Head) at the Citizen and Southern 
National Bank for five years before entering the University of 
South Carolina School of Law where she received her J.D. degree 
in 1991. While in law school, she served as Associate Editor of 
the University of South Carolina Law Review and A Legal Writing 
Instructor. Ms. Meyers was a member of the Order of the Coif, 
Order of the Wig and Robe, and the Student Bar Association. 
KENNETH M. SUGGS, ESQ.- SEE SECTION C 
NANCY C. WICKER, ESQ. 
Nancy C. Wicker graduated from the University of South Carolina 
in 1976 with a Bachelor of Arts degree, cum laude, in Government 
and International studies and received her J.D. degree from the 
University of South Carolina School of Law in 1979. She was an 
Assistant Solicitor with the Fifth Judicial Circuit Solicitor's 
Office from 1980-1987. From 1985 -1987, she was First Assistant 
Solicitor. In 1987, she entered private practice with Leventis, 
Wicker, Callison & Ragsdale. Her practice emphasizes litigation 
and particularly civil and criminal defense of police officers. 
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PoisoNs AND CoNTROLLED SuBSTANCEs § 44-53-520 
§ 44-53-485. Handling of seized controlled substances; usc of 
photographs or videotapes of substances at trial; admissibility of 
evidence. . . ,. 
(A) Controlled substances seized pursuant to this article must be inventoried, 
reported, audited, handled, tested, stored, preserved, or destroyed pursuant to 
procedures promulgated by the South Carolina Law Enf?rcement Division. 
(B) The chief law enforcement official of the scizi:1g agency, his designee, or 
the clerk of court, after one year following the conviction, guilty plea, plea by 
nolo contendere, or other disposition of the criminal case, may order the 
destruction or other lawful disposition of the substances unnecessary for 
evidentiary purposes in accordance. with procedures promtdgated by the 
division. 
(C) The chief law enforcement official of the seizing agency or his designee, 
after a reasonable period of time following the seizure, may order th e 
destruction or other lawful disposition of substances that do not come within 
the jurisdiction of court . 
(D) When large amounts of substances are seized and storage is impr~tn ical, 
a law enforcement officer, onJy With the prior Wrilten approval ~l!ld ('OllSClll of' 
the solicitor, may substitute photographs Or videotapes of the SltiJS!;lll CeS at 
trial so long as a rcpn:sentative sample is analyzed for proof' or the lll ;l llcr th ;lt 
the sul>st;llle<.:s actually arc prcsenc. When substitutions arc us ed , the chid ' Ll w 
enforcement official or his designee may authorize the de s lnt c ti o tt ol' the 
substances ten days following seizure. 
(E) In all subsequent court proceedings following the disposition o f' lit e c tse, 
all evidence presented at the original proceedings is admissible thmugh 
introduction of the certified record of the case. 
IIISTOR.Y: 1992 Act No. 387, § 2, elf May 15, 1992 . 
Cross references-
Auth orit y of I.aw Enforcement Divi~ion to promulgate regulations to providc uniform prc•ccclttres 
fi>r scilllrt:, invcntory, reporting, t:!C. of controlled substances, ~ ct: § ·H-53 - 1 ~0 . 
§ 44-53-500. Procedure for issuance and execution of administrative 
inspection warrants . 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINIONS 
Administrative inspection warrants issued 
punu;tnl to Sec tions 4-1-53-1300, -14-53-500, 
and .J H-1-50(2-1) <trc distinguishable from search 
warran t~. ;tnd, tltcrcfore , arc n ot required 10 
conform to search warrant fo rms a~ approved 
by the State Attorney General·~ Office pursuam 
to Section 17-13-HiO of tltc Code. l ~JH7 Op All)' 
Cen, No. 87 -2!}, p H7. 
§ 44-53-510. Repealed by I !)87 Act No. I ~8 § G, efr.Jullc H. I !J87 . 
§ 44-53-520. Forfeitures. 
(a) The following arc subject to forfeiture: 
(1) all controlled substances \vhich have been matlltfactured, distril>utcd , 
dispensed, or acquired in violation of this article; 
(~) all raw materials,· products, and equipment of any kind which arc 
used, or which have been positioned for usc, in manubctttring, 
producing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or 
exporting any controlled substance in violation of this article; 
(3) all property which is used, or which has been positioned for usc, as ::1 
container for property described in items (l) or (2); 
For latest statutes or assistance call 1-800-527-0430 309 
§ 44-53-520 HEALTH 
(4) All property, both real and personal, which in any manner is 
knowingly used to facilitate production, manufacturing, distribution, 
sale , importation , exportation, or trafficking in various conti·olled 
.substances as defined in this article; 
(5) all books, records, and research products and materials , includin g 
formulas , microfilm , tapes, and data which are used, or whi ch ha ve 
been positioned for use, in violation or th.s article; 
(() ) :dl conveyances including, hut not limited to, trailen, aircraft , moto r 
vehicl es, and watcrgoing vessels which arc used or intended for usc 
unlawfully to conceal, contain, or transport or bcilitatc the unlawful 
co ncealment, possession, containment, manufacture, o r transporta-
tion of controlled substances and their coinpounds, except as 
o thcrwi .~c provided , must he l"orf'cited to the State . No ll)()tor vehicle 
lll ay be forfeited to the Stale under thi s item unless it is used , 
intcnucd for use, or in any manner facilitates a violation o f Section 
'' 'l-53 -370(a), involving at least one pound or more or marijuana, 
o ne pound or more of hashish, more than four grains of opium, 
more than two grains of heroin, more than four grains of morphine, 
more than ten grains of cocaine, more than fifty microg1·ams of 
lysergic acid dieth ylamide (LSD) or its compounds , more than ten 
grains of crack, or more than one gram of icc or crank, as defined in 
Section 44-53-110 , or unless it is used, intended for usc, or in any 
manner facilitates a violation of Section 44-53-370(c); 
(7) all property including, but not limited to, monies, negotiable 
instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or 
intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled 
substance, and all proceeds including, but not limited to , monies , 
and real and personal property traceable to any exchange; 
(8 ) all monies seized in close proximity to forfeitable controlled 
substances, drug manufacturing, or distributing paraphernalia, or in 
close proximity to forfeitable reconls of the importation, manufactur-
ing, or distribution of controlled substances and all monies seized at 
the time of arrest or search ·involving violation of this article. If the 
person from whom the monies were taken can establish to the 
satisfaction of a court of co.mpetent jurisdiction that the monies 
seized arc no t products of illegal acts, the nronies lllUSt be retumcd 
pur~uant to court order. 
(b) An y property subject to forfeiture under this article may be seized by the 
department having authority upon warrant issued by an y co urt having 
jmisdictio n over the pro perty. Seizure without process may be made if: 
( 1) the seizure is incident to an arrest or a search under a search warrant 
or an ' inspection under an admiuistrative inspection warrant; 
(~) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior 
judgment in favor of the State in a criminal injunction or forfeiture 
proceeding based upon this article; 
(:\) the department has probable cause to believe that the property is 
directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or 
('I) the department has probable cause to believe that the property was 
used or is intended to be used in violation of this article. 
(c) In the event of seizure pursuant to subsection (b), proceedings under 
310 For lntest statutes or assistance call 1-800-527-0430 
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POISONS AND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES § 44-53-520 
§ 44-53-530 regarding forfeiture and disposition must be instituted within a 
reasonable time. 
(d) Any property taken or detained under this section is not subject to 
replevin but is considered to be in the custody of the department making the 
seizure subject only to the orders of the court' having jurisdiction over the 
forfeiture proceedings. Property described in § 44-53-520(a) is forfe ited and 
transferred to the government at .the moment of illegal use. Sei zure and 
forfeiture pmccedings confirm the transfer. 
(e) Controlled substances listed in Schedule I that are possessed, transfc.:rred, 
sold, or offered for sale in violation of this article are contraband and must be 
seized and summarily forfeited to the State. Controlled substances listed in 
Schedule I, which are seized or come into the p o ssession of the State, the 
owners of which are unkno wn, are contraband and must be summaril y fo r feited 
to the State . 
(f) Species of plants from which controlled substan ces in Sch edules I and II 
may be derived which have been planted o r cultivat e d in violati o n of this 
article, or of which the owners or cultivators arc unknown , o r which arc wild 
growths, may be seized and summarily forfeited to the State. 
(g) The failure, upon demand by the department having authority to make 
the demand, of the person in occupancy or in control of land or premises upon 
which the species of plants are growing or being stored to produce an 
appropriate registration, o r proof that he is the holder thereof, co ns titut es 
authority for the seizure and forfeiture of the plants. 
(h) For the purposes of this section, whenever the seizure of an y pro pert y 
subject to seizure is accomplished as a result of a joint effort by more than o ne 
law enforcement agency, the bw enforcement agency initiating the inves ti gation 
is considered to be the agency making the seizure. 
(i) Law enforcement agencies seizing property under this se([ion shall take 
reasonable steps to maintain the property. ECJuipmcnt and convey:1!l ces sei zc:d 
must he removed to an appropriate place for storage. Any monies seized mus t 
be deposited in an interest bearing account pending final dispositi o n hy the 
court unless the seizing agen cy determines th e moni es to be o r an ev identi a l 
nature and provides for security in another manner . 
(j) When property and monies of any value as defin e d i11 thi s se cti o n or 
an ything- el se of any v;litle is sei zed, the !Jw enf'o rcelllCilt agency ll Ltkittg tit<: 
seizure , within ten da ys o r a rc;tsonahlc peri od o f tim e after the sv i!llrc, ~ lt ; dl 
subm it a report to the appro pri ;tt e prosecuti o n ;tg en cy . 
(I ) The rc: po rt shall pro vide the fo ll ow ing inf'o mL tti on wit it rt ·s p ct l to 
the pro perty seized : 
(a) desc ripti o n; 
(b ) circumstances of seizure; 
(c) present custodian and where the property 1s being s to red or It s 
location; 
(d) name of owner; 
(e) name of lienholder, if an y; 
(f) seizing agency; and 
(g) the type and quantity of lhe controlled substance involved. 
(2) If the property is a conveyance, the report shall include the: 
(a) make, model, serial number, and year of the conveyance; 
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(b) person 111 whose name the conveyance is registered; and 
(c) name of any lienholders. 
(3) In addition to the report provided for in items (l) and (2), the law 
enforcement agency shall prepare for dissemination to the public 
upon request a report providing the following information: 
(a) a description of the quantity and mture of the property and 
money seized; 
(b) the seizing agency; 
(c) the type and quantity of the controlled substance involved; 
(d) the make, model, and year of a conveyance; and 
(e) the law enforcement agency responsible for the property or 
conveyance seized . 
(k) Property or conveyances seized b y a law enforcement ;-~gency or 
department must nut be used by officers for personal purposes . 
liiSTOR.Y: 1986 Act No. 404, § 2, cff May 6, 1986; 1986 Act No. 540, Part II, § 40, effective 
June 18, 1986, and became law without the Governor's signature; 1990 Act No. 604, §§ I, 
11, eff June 25, 1990; 1992 Act No. 333, §§I, 2, eff May 4, 1992. 
Editor's Note-
Section 3 of 1990 Act No. 604, elf june 25, 1990, provides as follows : 
"(A) For the purpose of the disposition of property, includin~ cash, seized and f(nfe iteu pursuant 
to the provisions of Sections •H-53-520 anu 44-53-530 of th e I 97G Code, from Jul y I, I !190, 
through june 30, I 992, Section 41-53-530 of the I !J7G Colle u oes not apply anu subsection (ll) 
of this section applies. 
(U)( I) Forfeit ure of property defined in Section 44-53-520 of the 1 !J7G Code must be accomplished 
br petition of the Att<Jrney General or his designee or the circuit solicitor or his designee to the 
court of common pleas for the jurisdiction where the items were seized. The petition must be 
submitted to the court within a reasonable time period following seizure and shall set forth the 
facts upon which the seizure w;~s made. The petition shall describe the propert)' and include the 
names of all owners of record and lienholders of record . The petition shall identify ;~ny other 
persons known to the petitioner to have interests in the property. l'etitiom for the forfeiture of 
co n veyances sh;:lll ;~lso include the following information: the make, model, and year of the 
conveyance, the person in whose n;~mc the conveyance is registered, and the person who holds 
the title to the conveyance. The petition shall set forth the type and quantity of the controlled 
substance involved .. \ ropy of the petition must be sent to each law enforcement ;,gency which 
has notified the petitioner of its involvement .in effecting the seizure. 
Notice of hearing or rule to show cause must be direct ed to all persons with interests in the 
property listed in the petition including law enforcement agencies which h;~ve notified the 
petitioner of" their in vo lvement in effecting the seizure. Owners of record and lienholders of 
record may be served by certified m;~il, to the last known ;~ddress as appears in the reco rds of the 
~ovcrnm e rll;,l ;,gency which records the title or lien . 
The judt~e sh;dl determine whether the property i.~ subject to f"orfi.:iturc and o rder the forfeiture 
co nfirmed. If the judge finds a forfeiture, he shall then determine the licnlrulder 's interest ;~s 
provided in this article. The judge sha ll determine whether any property must be returned to :1 
Ltw enforcement agency pursuant to Section 44-53-582 of the I 976 Code. 
If" there is;~ dispute as to the division of the proceeds of forfeited property among participating 
l:m enf"o rrernent agenci~s. thi s issue must be detennined by the judge. The proceeds !"rom a s:1le 
of" property, conVe)':lnCCS, and eqtripment lllUSt be disposeU of pursuant to item (5} Of" this 
~ubsectior1. 
:\ll property. conveyances, and equipment which will not be reduced to proceeds rna)' be 
1 r;ur s fcrrcd to the law enforcement :ll{ency or agencies or to the proscnrtion agency. Upon 
;rgn·enrent of the law enforcement agency or agencies and the prosecution agenc)'. conveyances 
ami equipme nt may be tr;~nsf"crred to ;~ny other appropriate agency. Property transkr red mtrst 
not be used to supplant operating funds within the current or future budgets. 
(:2) If the prop crt)' is seized by ;~ stale law enforcement agency and is not transfi.:rrcd b)· the court 
to th e sci7.ing agency, the judge shall order it transferred to the Division of General Services for 
sale . Proceeds m;~y be used by the division lor payment of all proper expemcs of the proceedings 
for the forfeiture and sale of the property, including the expenses of seiwrc, maintenance, ;~nd 
cmtody and other costs incurred by the implementation of this section. The net proceeds from 
;my sale must be remitted to the State Treasurer as provided in item (7) of this subsection. The 
Divi .~ion of General Services m;~y authorize payment of like expenses in t·ases where monies, 
negotiable instruments, or secll!·itics arc seized and forfeited . 
312 For latest statutes or assistance call 1·800-527-0430 
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(3) If the property is seized by a loc;d law enforcement agency and is not tr.msferred by the court 
10 the agency, the judge shall order it sold at public auction by the seizing agency as provided by 
law. Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, proceeds from the sale may be uset.l by the 
agency for pa}'lnent of all proper expenses of the proceeding for the forfeiture and sale of the 
property, including the expenses of the seizure, maintenance, and custody and other costs 
incurred by thc implementation of this section. The net proceeds from· the sale must be disposed 
of as provided by this section. 
(4) Any forfeiture may be effected by consent order approved by "the court without filing or 
serving pleadings or notices provided that all owners and otl er persons with intercsts in thc 
property, including participating law enforcement agencies, entitled to notice undcr this section, 
except lienholders and agencies, consent to the forfeiture. Disposition of the propcrty may bc 
accomplished by consent of the petitioner and those agencies it1volvcd . Persons entitled to 
notice under this section may consent to some issues and have the judge determine the rcmaining 
ISSUeS . 
All proceeds of property and cash forfcited by consent order must be disposed of as providct.l in 
item (5) c,f this subsection. 
(5) All re ;d or personal propcrty, conveyances, ;md equipment of any value dclincd in Scrtion 
· 1 · 1-53-5~0 of the 1076 Code when rcduced to procceds, any cash more thnn one thou ~ :IIHI 
do llars , anr negotiable instrumcnts, and nny securitics which arc scized <:llld forf"citcd mmt hc 
disposcd of as follows: 
(a) scvetll)'-livc percent to the law enforcement agency or agcncies; 
(b) twenty pcrrcnt to the prosecuting agency; and 
(c) live pcrccnt must be remittcd to the St;tte Treasurcr and deposited to the rrcclit of tlte 
gener:d fnnd of thc State. 
((j) Thc first onc thousand dollars or anr cash seized and forfeited pursuant l<l this arti r k 
rcmains with and is the property of the law enforccmcnt agencr which cll"ccted tlte ~eizure tndc~~ 
otherwise agreed to by the law enforcement ngency and prosecuting ngenq•. 
(7) :\II forkited monies and proceeds from the sale of forfeited propert)' as dclined in Sertion 
· 1 · 1-53-5~0 of the 1 !l7G Code must he retained by the governing body of the local 1:1\\" cnl"orcement 
agcncy or prosecution agency and deposited in a sepnrate, special account in the name or eacl1 
appropri :ue ;~genc)'. These accounts may he drawn on and used only by the law cnrorcetncnt 
;~gcncy or prosecution agency for which the account was est;~blished . For l<~w cnl"orcement 
agencies, the accounts must be used for drug enforcement activities <:~nd for prosecution agencies, 
the accounts must be used in matters relating to the prosecution of drug offenses and litigation 
of drug related matters . 
These accounts must not be used to suppbnt operating funds in the current or fttture budgets . 
Any expenditures from these accouuts for an item that would be a recurring expense mu~t be 
approved by the governing body before purchase or, in the case of a state l<1w enforcen1cnt 
ngency or prosecution agency, approved as provided by law. 
In the case of a state law enforcement arency or state prosecution agency, monies ;u1d proceeds 
must he n:mitted to the State Treasurer whc, shall establish sepnrate, special accounts as provided 
in this section for local agencies. 
All expenditures from these accounts must be Jocutnented, and the document;ttion made 
available for audit purposes." 
Section I 7 of I 990 Act No. 604, elf June ~5. 1990, provides ns follows: 
"This act takes effect upon approval by the Governor. A person nrrested, chnrgcd, or indicted 
\UHler those provi .~ions or law amended by thi~ act lliiiSt he tried and sentenccd and :1 n y 
administrative penalty or suspension exacted as provided by the law in force at the time of the 
commission or the crime." 
Effect of Amendment-
The first 1981i :unendme11t made grammatical changes; added "producing," in (;1)(~); added 
(<~)(3) ;~nd rcnumhered former (a)(::l)-(7) ns (a)(-1)-(8); substantially revised (a)(.J) and (a)(li)-(8); 
substituted "property" for "item" or "items" in subsections (h). (d), and (h)-(j); suhstit111cd 
"warrant" for "process" in subsection (h); substituted "within a reasonable time" i<ll· "protnptly'" 
in subsection (c); added the provisions in subsection (d) relntive to property desnihccl in § ·H -5:1-
520(a); rewrote the provision in subsection (i) relative to maintennnce of sei:tcd "pmpert )' " ;nul 
revised provisions formerly applicable to monies, negotiable instruments, and scntritics so ;1 s to 
appl)' only to nl'lllies; and, in subsection (j), added "and tl·~ Division of General Services" :md 
rewrote the pr01·isions relative to the contents of reports. 
The second 191l6 amendment revised item (·I) of subsection (:1) hy suhstitutin~ ··,vhidt in any 
mannn is knowingly ttsed to facilitate" for "which facilitates", and by substituting '"iuq>ollalion. 
exportation, or traOicking in" for "possession, cont<Jinment, conceal ment, importation . export:ttion . 
tr<~nspurtation, or delivery or·. 
The 19~0 <tmendment revised item G of subsection (a) and subsection (j). 
The I 992 amendment, in subsection (j), designated portions of the text as items ( 1) and (:!) . and 
relettered the subitems thereunder, and added item (3); and ndded subsection (k). 
Cross refcrcncl!s-
l)isposition of forfeited propert)'. sec § 44-5:1-530 . 
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Research and Practice · Rcfcrcnccs-
1•1 S.C. juri~ . Lis Pendens !i '1.7 . 
Annotations-
Forfeiture of mone y to state or loc;-~1 authorities based on its association with or proximity to 
other contr;,IJ ;md . 3H ,\LR4th 40G. 
Forkit ;• hilitl" of propert r held in marital estate under Unifonn Controlled Substan ct·s Act o r 
simil ;11· s t;ltlltt·. !!·1 ALR·Ith (i'l.O . 
I{ cal Jl' o p e tt y as subject of forl'eiture undtT Uniform Contrnlled Suhstatl Ct's Act or similar 
s t;lltlles. Hfi ALIUth V!l!>. 
Tim<"l incss o f imtitution of proceeding~ for · forl'citme under Unil(mn Controlled Snb ~ t a nces Act 
o r .~imiL• r ·' t;1t11te. 00 i\I.IUth ·H.J:l. 
Efl(:rt o f lo dt"itur e proceedings uudcr Unilinm Controlled Sul>s tatHTS Ar t Pr sir11ilar ~ tatu t e o n 
li e n ag;•imt pt o pcrt y subject to linl'eiturc. I ALR5th 317 . 
forl e ita hilit 1· of property. under Uniform Controlled Subst;~n ces Act or similar statut e , where 
propert y or Cl'i d t·n ce supporting lin!Citurc was illegally sei1.cd. I AI.R5th :l4!i . 
App lic;lt iu n o f forl'citure provisions of Unili>rm Contro lled Subs tances Act or ~imil ;u · s tatute 
where d t 11g~ ,,·e tT pmsessed for personalu~e. 1 ALR5th 375. 
Sei7.Ut'C o r fo rlcitut c o f real property used in illegal possession. m;m11fa cture, processing. 
pur c h;~ se. or s;~ le o f co ntrolled substances under § 511 (;-~) (7) o f Compre he11si ve Dru g Ab11 se 
Preve n ti o n an d Co n trol Act of 1970 (21 USCS § 88l(a)(7)). 104 ALR Fed '1. 88. 
CASE NOTES 
§ 14-53 -5 20 docs not violate the "takings" 
clause of the constitution by providing that 
p ropert y which facilitate~ trafficking in various 
controlled s ub .H;~nccs is subject to sei1.ure and 
forfeitur e, s ince forfeiture is within the lcgiti-
mate exercise of the police power, not the 
power of eminent dom;~in , ;JtHl is directed to 
the prevention of serious public harm . Myers v 
Rcall'roperty <It 1518 Holmes Street (1991, SC) 
4 II SE'l.d '209. 
ATIORNEY GENERAL'S OPINIONS 
Under South Carolina Hazardous Waste 
Management Act, confiscated 55 g<~llon drum 
of ether . apparently used as part of illicit drug 
manufacturing process, is defined as "uncon· 
trolled h;~ z ardous waste". Under such circum-
st<Jnccs. Co ntingency Fund may be utili1.cd for 
dispns;-~1 or such waste . 1984 Op Atty Gen. No . 
H·1-I:JO, p. :101. 
\Vhcn bw enforcement agency retains 
IT hi clc thcr t' is no requirement to pay state or 
~o l ic it or · ~ ollin· their percentages until vehicle 
is di sp mcd o r b y agency. I D91 Op Ally Gen No 
91-·1:1, p II~ . 
Where Jaw enforcement agency is awarded 
sever;~ ! low- pri ced vehicles, there appears to be 
no p ro h ibi ti o n ag;~inst agency trading such 
\· c hi cle~ for o ne or more newer vehicles. 1991 
Op Att y Gcn No 91 -·13 , p 112 . 
Whether sheriff in making purchases with 
proceeds from sale of vehicles sei1.ed durin~ 
drug operations is required to obt;~in approv;-~1 
of county council would depend upon whether 
such expenditure constitutes a "recurring 
expcmc." IH!.J I Op Ally Gen No !l I -·1R, p I '1.3 . 
There is no requirement mandating county 
counril <~pproval where vehicle seized durin~-: 
drug opcr;~rion is traded for arwrhcr vehicle . 
I !J!J I Op 1\tty Gen No !.J 1-·Hl , p I ~:1. 
funds derived from drug forfeitures and 
seizures could be used to purch<~sc handguns 
for deputic.~ involved in drug ;~rrc~ts, eradica-
tion, and/or· deterrent activities, ina~much ;~s 
such h;~tH.lguns will be tr.~ed for· dn11-: cnl'orce-
rrrcnt ;~ctivities . I !.1\J I Op t\tt)" Gen , No !J 1-50, p 
13 1. 
§ 44-53-530. Forfeiture procedures; disposition of forfeited items; 
disposition of proceeds of sales. 
(a) Forfeiture of properly defined in Section 44-53-520 must be accomplished 
by petition of the Attorney General or his designee or the circuit solicitor or 
his designee to the court of common pleas for the jurisdiction where the items 
were seized. The petition must be . submitted to the court within a reasonable 
time period following seizure and shall set forth the facts upon which the 
seizure was made. The · petition shall describe the property and include the 
names of all owners of record and lienholders of record. The · petition shall 
identif)' any other . persons known to the petitioner to have interests in the 
property. Petitions for the forfeiture . of conveyances shall also include: the 
make. model, and year of the conveyance, the person in whose name the 
conveyance is registered, and the person who holds the title to the conveyance. 
The petition shall set forth the type and quantity of-the .controlled substance 
314 For latest statutes or assistance call 1-800-527-0430 
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involved . A copy of the petition must be sent to each law enforcement ag·ency 
which has notified the petitione1· of its involvement in effecting the seizure. 
Notice of hearing or rule to show cause must be directed to all persons with 
interests in the property li s ted in the petition, including law enforcement 
agencies which have notified the petitioner of their involvement in effecting the 
seizure. Owners of record and lienholders of record . may be served by certified 
mail, to the last known address as appears in the rc.:ords of th e govcrnmcnt;d 
agency which records the titl e or lien. 
The judge shall determine whether the property is subject to forfeiture <l nd 
order the forfeiture confirmed. If the judge finds a forfeiture, he shall then 
determine the lienholder's interest as provided in this article. The judge shall 
determine whet h er any property must be returned to a law enforcement agency 
pursuant to Se ct ion 4-l-5 3-58 2 . 
If there is a dispute as to the division of the proceeds ol forfeited propert>' 
among participating law enforcement agencies , this issue must be determined 
by the j u d g e . The pro c c e d s from a sale o C prop crt y, con v <.:)' < 111 c e s , and 
equipment must be disposed of pursuant to subsection (c) of this section. 
All property, conveyances, and equipment which will not be redu ced to 
proceeds may be transferred to the law enforcement agency or ;1gencies or to 
the prosecution agency. Upon agreement of the law cnforceilll'IH ;1ge ncy or 
agencies and the prosecution agency, conveyances and equipment may be 
transferred to any other appropriate agency. Property transferred must not be 
used to supplant operating funds within the current or future budgets. 
(b) If the property is seized by a state law enforcement agency and is not 
transferred by the court to the seizing agency, the judge shall order it 
transferred to the Division of General Services for sale. Proceeds may be used 
by the division for payment of all proper expenses of the proceedings for the 
forfeiture and sale of the property, including the :expenses of seiwre, 
maintenance, and custody, and other costs incurred by the implementation of 
this section. The net proceeds from any sale must be remitted to the State 
Treasurer as provided in subsection (g) of this section. The Division of General 
Services may authorize payment of like expenses in cases where monies, 
negotiable instruments, or securities arc seized and forfeited . 
(c) If the property is seized by a local law enforcement ag·e ncy and is not 
transferred by the court to the agency, the jt1dgc shall order it sold at public 
auction by the seizing agency as provided by law. Notwithst:lncling any ot her 
provision of the law, proceeds from the sale may be used by the agency for 
payment of all proper expenses of the proceeding for the forfeit me ;md s;t!c of 
the property, includir.g th e expenses of the seizure, maintenan ce, ;uHl cus tod )· 
and other costs incurred by the implementation of this section . The net 
proceeds from the sale m11st he disposed of as provided by this section . 
(d) Any forfeiture may be dl'ectcd by consent order approved by the cottrt 
without filing or serving pleadings or notices· provided that all owners <llld 
other persons with interests in the property, including participating b\\' 
enforcement agencies, entitled to notice under this section, except lienholders 
and agen cies , consent to the forfeiture. Disposition of the property may be 
accomplished by consent of the petitioner and those agencies invol\'cd. Persons 
entitled to notice under this section may consent to some issues and han· the 
judge determine the remaining issues. 
All pro ceeds of property and cash forfeited by consent order I \lit s t he 
disposed of as provided in subsection (c) of this section. 
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§ 44-53-s:w I lEALTII 
(c) All re;tl or personal p1·operty, conveyances, and equipm<.:nt of" any value 
defined in Section 44-53-520, when reduced to proceeds, any cash more than 
one thousand dollars, any negotiable instruments, and any securities \\'hich arc 
seized and forfeited must be disposed of as follows: 
( I ) SC\'Clll y-five percent to the law enforcentent agenc y or agen cies; 
(~) twent y percent to the prosecuting agency; and 
(:\) li ve percent must he remitted to the Stale Treasurer a nd d e posited 
to the credit of the general fund of the State . 
(I) Th e firs t o ne thousand dollars of any cash seized and fo rfeit ed pursuant 
to th is a rti cle remains with and is the propert y of" the law enf"oJTe nt e nt agen cy 
whi ch crrec ted the seizure unless otherwise agreed to by the law (' llfo rcement 
;1gen cy and prosecuting agency. 
(g) All fo rfeit ed monies and proceeds fro m th e s;d e of forkited p1 ope rt )' ;1s 
ddinecl in Section '14-53-520 must be retain ed by the gove m ing body or the 
lo cal l;nv enforcement agei1cy or prosecution agenc y and d e p os it e d in a 
separate , special account in the name of each appro priate ;tge rr cy. Th ese 
accounts ma y be drawn on and used only b y the la w enfo rce rn en t ag-e ncy o r 
prosecution agency for which the account was established . ror law enforcement 
agen cies , the accounts must be used for drug enforcement activities and for 
pro secuti o n ag e ncies, the accounts must' be used in matters rei at ing to the 
prosecuti o n o f drug offenses and litigation of drug-related 111alle rs . 
Th es e accounts must not be used to supplant operating luncls in th <.: current 
o r future budgets. Expenditures from these accounts for an item that would be 
a recurring expense must be approved by the governing body before purchase 
or. in the case of a state law enforcement agency or prose cution agency, 
approved as provided by law. 
In the case of a slate law enforcement agency or state prosecution agency, 
monies and proceeds· must be remitted to the State Treasurer who shall 
establish separate, special accounts as r .rovided in this section fo r loca l ag encies. 
All expenditures from these accounts must be documented. and the 
documentation made available for audit purposes and upon request b y a person 
under the provisions of Chapter 4 of Title 30, the Freedom of lnfonnatiun Act. 
(h) The usc o1 all property forfeited pursuant to Section ·l•l-53-520 and 
retained by the law enforcement agency must be documented and the 
documentation available upon request by a p<.:rs o n subject to the provisions of 
C hapter 'I o f Title 30. 
(i) An expenditure from these accounts must be made in acco rd ance with th e 
established procurement procedures of the jurisdictio n where the acco un t is 
establi shed . 
(j) A la w enforcement ag<.:ncy may draw from the ac co unt a n am o unt 
necessary to maintain a confidential financial account to be used in the purchase 
of information or evidence rcbting to an investigation, to purchase services, or 
to provide compensation in matters which arc confidential .md in support of 
law enforcement activity. The disbursement of funds f1·om the co nfidential 
financial account must be made in accordance with procedur<.:s approved by th<.: 
South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (division). All records o f" disburse-
ment must be maintained and made available for audit purposes as provided in 
this section. 
All expenditures fi·om these accounts must be fully documented ami audited 
annually with the gen<.:ral fund or the appropriate jurisdiction . 
316 For latest stntutcs or assistance cnll 1-800·527-0430 
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(k) In all cases where the criminal offense giving rise to the forfeiture of 
property described in Section 44-53-520 is prosecuted in a state court, the 
forfeiture proceeding must be accomplished in the court of common pleas for 
the jurisdiction where the items were seized. 
HISTORY: 1986 Act No. 404, § 3, elf May 6, 1986; 1990 Act No. 604, § 2, elf June 25, 1990; 
1992 Act No. 333, § 3, elf May 4, 1992. 
Editor's Note-
Section 3 of 1990 Act No. 604, eff.June 25, 1990, provides as follows : 
"(A) For the purpose of the disposition of property, including cash, seized <lnd forfeited pursu:1111 
to the provisions of Sections 44-5:!-520 and 44-53-530 of the 1976 Code, from .)11ly I, I UDO , 
through June 30, 1992, Section .:H-53-530 of the 1976 Code docs not apply and subsection (B) of 
this section applies . 
(B)( I) Forfeiture of property defined in Section 44-53-520 o f the 1976 Code must be accomplished 
by petition of the Allorney General or his designee or the circuit solicitor or his designee to the 
court of common pleas for the jurisdic tion where the items were seized. The petition must be 
submitted to the rourt within a reasonable time period following seizure and shall set forth the 
facts upon which the seizure was made. The petition shall describe the proper!)' and include the 
n<lmes of all owners of record and lienholders of record. TIH: petition shall identify ;~ny other 
persons known 10 the petitioner to have interests in the proper!)'. Petitions for tl1<: forfl:itun: of 
conveyances shall abo include the following informa ti on ; the m<lke, model. a nd yt:a r of the 
conveyance, the person in whose name the conveyance is registered, and the person who holds 
the title to the conveyance. The petition shall set forth the type and Cjllantit y of th e co ntrolled 
substance involved. A copy of the petition must be sent to each law enforcement :q~ency " ·hi ch 
has notified the petitioner of its involvement in eOccting the seiwre. 
Notice o f hearing or rule to show cause must be directed to all persons with intnnts in th e 
propert y listed in the petition including law enforcement agencies which h:1vL· n oti fied the 
petitioner of tiH:ir involvement in cll'cuing the seizure . Owners of record and lienholder, of 
record ma y he sen·ed by certified 1nail. to the last known ;~ddress as appears in the n·corcb of the 
goverumeutal :q;eucy which records the title or lien. 
The judge skdl determine whether tl1e property is subject to forf'citure ;~nd ordn the fo1 feit111 -c 
confinned. If the judge finds a forfeiture, he shall then determine the lienholder' ' interes t :1s 
provided in this article. The judge shall determine whethcr any propcrty nHISl he rcturned to ;1 
law enforrnnerll agency pursuant to Section ·14-53-582 of the I D7fi Code. 
If there is ;1 disputc as to the divi,iou of the procceds of forf'citcd propert y amon~ p:lrticip;lling-
law cnforcnnent ;q;cncies. this issuc must he determined by the judf{e. The proceeds from :1 'ak 
of propert y, COIIVeyances, :tnd eq1ripment IIlllS( be disposcd of pursu;IJll to itcnl (:>) of this 
suhsec1io11. 
All propnty , co uveyanccs. ;uHI cquiprnent which will not he reduced to pronTds 1n:1y he 
Lrausf'crrcd to the law enforTcnwrll agency or agencies or to the prosecution ;q.:enry. Upon 
agreeutent of the law enforcemerll :tf{eiiC)' or agencies and the prosenlli u n agcnq·. r<HI\'cyann·s 
and C'fuipment ma>' be transferred to any other appropriate agcncy. Property tr;1mf'crrcd must 
not be mcd to s1rpplant oper;1ting funds within the curn:rll or futurc budgets . 
(2) If thc property is scized by a stale law enforcement agcncy and is not transferred by the court 
to thc seizing ;~gency, the judge sh:dl order it transf'crred to !he Division of C:encr:d Sen·ices li>r 
sale. Proceeds may be used by the division for payment of all propcr expenses or tlw proccedings 
for the forfeiture and sale or the propcrty, inchrding thc cxpcnses of seizure, .lllaint e nance. :lnd 
custody :uHI other costs incurTed by tht· implementation of this section. The ;let proceeds rrorn 
;uty sale IIIIlS( he remitted to thc Stale Treasurer as provided in ilcrn (7) or this sul>section. The 
Division of Ccner;d Services lll:ly ;ullllorizc p:l)'lllelll or likt· expenses in C:ISes 1\' i> crc rnonin. 
nq;-o1i ;1bk i.1,11 IIIIH'IIIS, or securities ;1re se ized and forfeiled. 
(:1) If tl~t · propnty is .se izL·d by a loc:d l;1w enforcement a~cnrr ;utd is not tr;u1s l'nr<"d l>r the r<•UII 
to the :1genry. the judge shall order it sold :11 public auuion b y the sei1in~ :1g ency ;" prm·idnl ll\· 
law. Notwilhst:uuliug any othn provi,ion of the law, pro<.:ecds from the s:de tn ;n· lw used I>>· the 
ag-enry f(>r pay1uent of all propn expenses of the proceeding for the forf'ci1urc and s:dc of the 
property, incltuling- the expenses of thc seizure, maiuten;IJI<.:(', and n1stodr :tnd other costs 
incurred by the in1plcment;llion of this section . The uct proceeds from the s;de 11111st he disposed 
of as provided by this section. 
(·I) Any forfcitiiiT may be cfkcted by ronscnt order approved by the court \\' ithoul filin~ or 
serving pleading-s or notices provided that all oivners and other persons with interests in the 
propcny, including- participating law enforceme111 agencies, entitled to notice 11ndcr this section. 
exrept lienholders and ag<.·ncies, <:onsent to tht• f(>rfciture . Dispositiou of the propnty may be 
arrontplished by conscnt of the petitioner and those ag-encies involved . Persons entitled to 
~wtirc undn this scrtion may conscut 10 some issucs and have the judge determine the rcmainiug-
ISSIICS . 
All prorcecls of property and rash forkitcd by ronseut ordt·r must he disposccl of as provided in 
item (!i) of this subsection. 
(.'i) :\II real 01· personal property, com·eyances, and cquipmcnt of any value ddined in Section 
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§ 44-53-530 HEALTH 
·14-53-520 of the 197G Code when reduced to proceeds, any cash more than one thousand 
dollars , any negotiable instruments, and any securities which arc seized and forfeited must be 
disposed of as follows: 
(a) sevent y- five percent to the law enforceme;ll agency or agencies; 
(h) twe1Hy pncent to the prosecuting agency; and 
(c) live pncent must be remitted to tht• .State Treasmer and deposited to the nedit of the 
general fund of the .Stat<.'. 
(!i) The fir s t !lllt' thnn~and dollars of :my cash H'i7.ed and forkited pursuant to this article 
remains with and is the property of the law enforcement agen<.:• which clkcted the sci1.1n c unks~ 
otherwise agreed to by the law enforcement agency and prosecuting agency. 
(7) ,\JI forfeited monies and pro<.:eeds from the sale of forfeited property as defined in Section 
·1 •1-5:1 -520 of the I!J7G Code must be retained by the govcruing body of the local law enl'orrc:mcnt 
agency or prosecution agency and deposited in a separate, special a<.:count in the name of each 
appropriate agency. These accounts may be drawn on and used only by the law enfon-cment 
ag e ncy or prosecution agency for which the acrount was established . For law cnl'on:cn1ent 
:1gcncies. the a<.:cou11ts mu.q be used for drug c11forrcmcnt activities a11d for prosecutio n age11 Cie.-. 
the accou nts n111st he med in matters relating to the prosecution of' drug ofkn 5es :uHI litig<~ti o n 
or drug related matters. 
These accou11ts must 11ot be uscu to supplant operating l'u11ds in the currc11t or future budg ets. 
''"Y expcnditur cs li·om these accounts for an item that would be a recurring cxpc11sc must be 
approved by the governing body before purchase or, in the case of a state law c11forccmcnt 
:1gcncy or prose<.:ution agency, <~pproved as provided by law. 
In the case of a ~tate law enforcement agency or state prosecution agency, monies and procectls 
nltTSt be T'Cnlitted to the State Tre<~surer who shall establish separate, special accounts as provitled 
in 1 hi s sc<.:t ion for local agencies . 
,\II t·x pcndittn-cs from these accounts must be docunrcnted. and .the dot:lllllCiltatioll made 
av ;Tilal>le for audit pmposes ." 
Section 17 of 1990 Act No. 604, ell' .June 25, I !J!JO, provides as fi>llows: 
"This act takes dl'cct upon approval by the Govcmor. A person arrested, rhargcd, or indictetl 
untlcr those provisions of law amended by this act must be tried and sentenced and an)• 
admini .~trativc penalty or suspension exacted as provided by the law in forct· at the time of the 
COllllllission of the crime." 
Effect of Amendments-
The 1986 amendment substantially rewrote this section. 
The 1990 amendment revised this section. 
The 1992 amcntlmcnt redesignated the last paragraph of subsection (a) as s ubse<.:ti o11 (d); 
deleted former subsections (b), (c) :md (d); and added subscctiom (b), (c), ;md (c) through (k) . 
Cross references-
Reimbursement to Crimcstoppcrs, Inc. from monies forl'citcd pursu;~nt to this section, sec 
§ ·14-53-583 . 
Notice of a hearing or rule to show cause with respc<.:t to an ;~pplication by innocent owners for 
the return of seized items, sec § 44-53-586 . 
Hescarch and Practice References-
H S.C . Juris . Li s Pendens § 27. 
t\nnual Surn·y of South Carolina Law: Criminal L,w. 3H SC L Rev 81 (Autun111 I DRfi l . 
Annotations-
Forfcitability of property held in rnarital estate imdcr Unif'onn Controlkcl SITiJsr:t~llTs ,\u or 
similar statute. 8·1 ALR4th 620. 
Validit)' and construction of provisions of Uniform Controlled Subs tan ces .-\ 1 I pro,·iding f'or 
forf'citure hearing before law enfor<.:cmcnl ofliccr. 84 ALR4th G37. 
Tinrelincs .~ of institution or proceedings for forfeiture under Uniform Controlled Sul>stanrcs t\Cl 
or ~imilar statute. 90 ALR4th 493. 
Efl'c<.:t of forf'citurc proceedings under Uniform Controlled Substanct:s Act or similar statute 011 
lien agaimt property subject to forl'citurc. I ALR5th 317. 
Forfeitability of property, under Uniform Controlled Suhstan<.:cs A<.:t or similar sratutc , where 
property or nidcn<.:c supporting forfeiture was illcg:dly sei1.cd . I ALR5th 3 ·Hi. 
Application or forfeiture provisions of Uniform Controlled Substan<.:es Act or sir~tilar st;ttute 
where drugs were possessed lor personal usc. I ALR5th 375 . 
Seizure or forfeiture of real property used in illegal possession, manufacture, processing. 
purchase , or sale of controlled substances under § 511 (a)(7) of Comprchcnsin· Drug Abuse 
l're\Tiltioll ami Control Act of 1970 (21 USCS § 88l(a)(7)) . 10·1 ALR Fed 288. 
CASE NOTES 
A corporation was not an innocent owner 
of a boat under § 44-53 -530 (4)(a) where a 
corporate ofliccr, operating tht• boat consistent 
with the work of the. corporation, was apprc-
318 For latest statutes or assistance call 1-800·527-0430 
PoiSONS AND CoNTROLLED SuBSTANCES § 44-53-577 
hcnded with a load of marijuana on board upon · 
returning from a trip 10 Florida .. Even if the 
officer was not acting on behalf of the corpora-
Lion in hauling the marijuana, he was acting as 
<111 officer of the corporation when he surren-
dered the bo<Jl to himself as an individual and 
then used it Lo smuggle drugs . According!)', the 
bo<Jt would be forfeited to the stale. South 
Carolina Law Enforcement Div. \'The "l\lichael 
& I.<Jnce" etc. (I 985) 28 ·1 SC 308. 3~7 SE~d 
327. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINIONS 
A vehicle transferred to a law enforcement 
agency pursuant to a forfeiture proceeding 
becomes the proptTl)'. of the agency with special 
limiL<~Lions on its usc according Lo the forfeiture 
statute; however, if the vehicle becomes surplus 
properLy, its disposition is governed by the 
agency's surplus disposition procedures; prop-
erty obtained by an agency pursuant to a 
consent order is to he treated the same as if it 
was obt;tincd in a contested forfeiture proceed-
ing. 10H!J Op Att y <~en, No. 80-·1 ~L p I H . 
In absence of local restrictions, police 
agency may usc first $1,000 of each cash dnag 
fnrlciturc for general bw enforcement expenses 
such as equipment, vehicles, weapons, training, 
etc.; remaining money acquired pursuant to 
prO\'isions or Section -t-I-53-5H8 IllUSl be used 
''exclusively by law enforcemen t in the co ntrol 
of drug ofl'enses". 1090 Op ALLy Gen No. !l0-8 . 
Sheriff may spend first $1,000 of cash drug 
forfeiture withottl county council's approval; 
however, money cannot be spent in manner 
inconsistent with state regulations or county 
provisions restricting usc of public funds , and 
remaining money becomes part of governing' 
body's funds and subject to distribution as 
;~pproved by such body. I 990 Op A tty Gcn No. 
90-8. 
§ 44-53-540. Burden of proof. 
Annotations-
When law enforcement agency retains 
vehicle there is no requiremclll 10 pay slate or 
solicitor's otlicc their percentages until vclticlt: 
is disposed of by agency. 19DI Op ALLY Gen No 
·. 91--t:-1, p 112. 
Where law enforcement agency is ;ll,·artlt-d 
several low-priced vehicles, there appears to be 
no prohibition ag;iitist agen cr tradin g- sucl t 
vehicle~ for one or m o re newer vel ticks. I ~ ) ~ ) I 
Op Atty Ccn No 01--1:1, p II~ . 
Whether ~hcriiT in making pua·ehases wlllt 
i>ro cee d~ from sale or vehiclo seized dta rin ,; 
drug operation~ is required to oht;titt ;tpprov; tl 
of county council would depend upon whetltn 
such expenditure constitute~ ;1 "r e u trrin g 
expense." 1091 Op Atty Gen No ~ll- - I H, p 1 :!~1. 
There is no requirement mandating- cntt tll \' 
council approval where vehicle ~eized dnring 
drug operation is traded for another vehicle. 
19~)} Op J\tty Ccn No 01-·IH , p 1~ :1 . 
Funds derived from drug forfeitures and 
seizures could be used to purchase handguns 
for deputies involved in drug arrests, cradi c t-
tion, and/or deterrent activities, inasmn ch ;~s 
such handguns will be used for drug cnrnrrc-
mem ;~ctivities. 1001 Op Att y Ccn . No ~) 1-!iO, p 
131. 
Burden,)( proof ;~s to entrapment defense-state cases. !)~ r\l.R-tth 77.'1. 
§ 44-53-577. Illegal acts involving persons under seventeen years of 
age; penalties; separate offense. 
(A) It is unlawful for any person at least seventeen years of age to knowingl y 
and intentionally: 
(I) usc, solicit, dirc.:ct, hire, persuade, indu ce.:, entice, coerce, or c1nplo v ;t 
person l!JI(Jer SCVCiltl'cn years or age.: to violate.: Sc.:ctiOll · l·l -~1 :1-:170 Ill 
·1·1- fU-375( B); 
(~) rc.: cc ivc.: a contro lled substance from a person UJH.kr snTsllccsJ yc;t rs 
or age.: in violation or this chapter; or 
(3) co nspire to use, solicit, direct. hi1-c, persuade.:, induce, c.:nticc , col' sTc. 
or employ a person undc.:r seventeen years or age IO \'ioLttl' Sct 'l iOII 
'l-1-5:3-370 or '14-5:1-375(13) . 
(B) Any person who violates sui>senion (A)(l), (r\)(~). or (:\)(:1) is guilt y ol ' ;t 
felony and, upon COllVielion, llli!St be punished by a tCr!ll of' illlprisotllllt 'l ll of 
not less 1han five years nor more I han fifteen years . A violation of' 1his sect io11 
cons titutes a separate oll'cnse . 
HISTORY: 1990 Act No. 604, § 12, eff June 25, 1990. 
Editor's Note-
Section 17 o[ 1990 Act No. 604, cll'.lttnt· ~!'i. I !l!JO, provides as rollows: 
For lntcst stntutcs or usslstnncc coli t -800-517-0430 319 
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ASSET FORFEITURE SEMINAR: 
11 FOR THE PROSECUTOR11 
NUTS AND BOLTS 
by 
Elizabeth M. Hancock, Assistant Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
SECTION. A 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
CIVIL FORFEITURE PROCEDURES 
I. SEIZURE OF PROPERTY 
A. Without warrant: 
1. At arrest or upon search of person or property. 
2. When exigent circumstances occur . 
3. After a seizure law suit has been completed and a 
judgement favorable to the state has been rendered. 
B. With warrant: 
1 . Probable cause for the seizure established. 
2. Officer draws up Affidavit of Seizure which outlines 
t h e facts establishing probable cause . 
3 . Notice of Seizure and Hearing and Seizure Warrant drafted 
and presented to Circuit Judge with the attached Affidavit. 
II. MAINTENANCE OF PROPERTY PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE 
A. Cash must be placed in interest bearing account unless it is to 
be used as evidence. (Photograph the cash before depositing in 
bank account for evidentiary purposes.) 
B. Equipment and conveyances must be placed in a secure storage 
area after thorough inventory. 
C. Personal property must be placed in a secure area and appraised 
e i f possible. 
D. Real property (to seize contents, must state in caption). 
1. Title search 
2. File lis pendens 
3. Appraisal 
4. Insure through the S.C. Insurance Reserve Fund (they will 
e no longer insure contents, so place contents in secure 
• 
• 
• 
storage area) . 
5 . Videotape all contents. 
6 . Turn off unnecessary utilities. 
7. Boa rd up windows. 
8. Occupancy Agreement and Order may be executed, allowing 
owner to occupy property if owner maintains insurance, 
mortgage, tax payments, etc. 
E. Caveat - Never seize: 
1. Live animals. 
2. Airplanes without a flight log. 
3. Real property with hazardous waste . 
III. INITIAL ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS 
A. Within ten (10) days or a reasonable time after seizure, the 
seizing agency must .f; 1.e ~ r~o:r:t with the office of the 
prosecutor who is tonanale the forfeiture in court. The 
A-1 
IV. 
seizing agency must produce a plausible reason as to why the 
initial report of seizure was not filed with the prosecuting 
agency within ten (10) days. Failure to do so may result in 
the law enforcement agency not receiving any portion of the 
forfeiture proceeds, and may be a valid defense to forfeiture. 
The report must contain: 
1. a description of the property. 
2. circumstances of seizure. 
3. present custodian of property. 
4. ~ocation of property pending outcome of suit. 
5. owner's name. 
6. lienholder's name. 
7. ~eizing agency. 
8. type of controlled substance. 
9. amount of controlled substance. 
In addition, if the property is a conveyance, the report must 
also state: 
10. make, model, serial number and year of make. 
11. registered owner's name. 
B. File DAG 71 Form if forfeiture is being taken federally. 
PRE-FILING CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Complete pre-seizure planning 
1. Identify all owners, including lienholders or mortgagees 
of record. 
2. Compare outstanding liens and mortgages to the appraised 
value of the property to determine if the forfeiture makes 
sense. 
3. Check SLED analysis to ensure that the required minimum 
amount of drugs was present for conveyance forfeitures. 
B. Explore the possibility of settlement. 
C. Identify possible defenses. 
D. Identify all law enforcement agencies who have an interest in 
the property and prepare a written agreement specifying the 
distribution of assets. 
E. Notify solicitor handling parallel criminal case of pending 
forfeiture. 
V. CONSENT ORDERS 
A. An owner may forfeit defendant property by consent at time of 
arrest but be aware of ethical considerations. 
1. Officer should have a witness. 
2. No promises can be made by officer. 
3. A written affidavit outlining circumstances surrounding 
the signing of the Consent Order should be attached. 
B. It is preferable to have the prosecutor draw up all Consent 
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Orders . 
C. Settlement may be reached by owner's consent to forfeit an 
amount of money in lieu of a vehicle, real property or other 
personal property. 
VI. DEFAULT JUDGMENTS 
A. File an Affidavit and Order for Default if no answer is 
received from an owner after the thirty (30) day period 
(exceptions may exist). 
B. Make sure the owner or interested party had proper notice. 
VII. INITIATION OF LAW SUIT 
A. Summons and Complaint should be drafted by the prosecutor. The 
Complaint should state the following: 
1. factual basis for seizure. 
2. how the property was illegally used (i.e. which of the 
eight statutory categories the property falls under). 
3. a complete description of the property . 
4. names of all owners of record. 
5. names of all lienholders of record. 
6. names of any other interested pers ons. 
7. type of controlled substance. 
8. amount of controlled substance. 
9. make, model and year (if a conveyance). 
10. registered owner (if a conveyance) . 
11. name of person holding title (if a conveyance or real 
property). 
12. prayer for relief: 
a. judicial order for public auction (if the intention is 
to convert the property into proceeds in that manner). 
b. judicial order transferring property to appropriate 
law enforcment, prosecution or other agency if the 
property is to be retained. 
c. judicial order for transfer to General Services (if a 
state law enforcement agency seized the property). 
B. A Rule to Show Cause can be drafted and presented to the 
appropriate circuit judge for signature if a jury trial is not 
e requested. The Rule to Show Cause will establish a hearing 
date. However, if no Rule is filed, the case will automatically 
be put on the non-jury docket (if no jury trial is requested), 
but this process may take longer for the case to reach trial. 
• 
• 
c. The Summons and Complaint, Notice of Seizure and Hearing, Seizure 
Warrant, and Rule to Show Cause should be filed in the Clerk of 
Court's Office for the Court of Common Pleas. See Rules 3(a); 
7(a) South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. There is a $55.00 
required filing fee which may be billed to the seizing agency by 
the Clerk's Office, if it is agreeable with the Clerk of Court. 
A-3 
D. If an owner of the property is imprisoned or is a juvenile, a 
Notice to Appoint a Guardian Ad Litem should also be filed and 
served with the pleadings. A juvenile's parent or guardian, if 
known, should also be served with the Notice to Appoint a 
Guardian ad Litem. If after thirty (30) days the owner has not 
given notice to the prosecutor that a Guardian Ad Litem has been 
appointed, a Petition and Order for the appointment of a Guardian 
Ad Litem should be filed. 
VIII. NOTICE - PARTIES TO BE SERVED 
A. A copy of the Seizure Warrant, Notice of Seizure and Hearing, 
Rule to Show Cause, and the Summons and Complaint, and Notice of 
Guardian Ad Litem if applicable, must be served on: 
1. the appropriate law enforcment agencies. 
2. the property which is the subject of the suit. 
3. any interested parties named in the complaint. 
4. owners of record. 
5. lienholders of record. 
B. Service must be done by certified mail to the last known 
address found in the office recording the title or lien, 
relative to owners and lienholders. Boxes on the green 
certifiedt ~ ma.iiT'··bard mu'st be checked requesting name and address 
to whom delivered and restricted delivery. Actual service is 
preferred. 
C. Service may also be accomplished by publication in the county 
where the defendant property is located. 
D. After service of process is complete, proof of that service 
should also be timely filed with Clerk of Court's office. 
IX. PRETRIAL DISCOVERY 
x. 
A. Rules of Civil Procedure provide for pretrial discovery: 
1. documents. 
2. names and potential testimony of experts. 
3. other tangible exhibits and evidence. 
4. depositions. 
5. interrogatories. 
6. requests for production. 
7. requests for admission. 
8. protection from discovery from opposing side. 
B. Discovery is a very powerful weapon available to the civil 
attorney. Always use as many of these tools as possible to 
prepare your case. 
PRETRIAL MOTIONS 
A. Motion for Summary Judgment. 
B. Innocent owner petition for return of seized property. 
A-4 
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XI. TRIAL 
A. Non-jury or jury trial. 
B. Subpoena power to compel witness attendance. 
C. Owner has no constitutional right to be present. 
D. Owner has no constitutional right not to be called as a witness 
by prosecutor. 
E. Stipulations 
F. Resolution of conflict concerning disposition of proceeds. 
XII. JUDICIAL ORDER AFTER TRIAL 
A. Order should contain the following information: 
1. Names of parties present and their attorneys. 
2. Procedural history of case. 
a. service of process. 
b. factual finding that adequate and proper service was 
e made. 
c. law enforcement agencies A_nit..,-\_q_:t;..ing, s~j<;ur~ . . , ,_ 
3. Brief factual background. 
4. Description of property. 
5. Listing of agencies applying for proceeds or property. 
6. Order transferring title. 
7. Order directing forfeiture and disposition; satisfaction 
4t of liens. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
8. Return of Crimestopper money. 
9. Return of agency buy money. 
10. Ordering of public auction by agency. 
11. Ordering of transfer of title to appropriate agency. 
XIII. DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY 
A. Disposition is contingent upon whether the law enforcement 
agencies intend to keep the property or whether or not they 
intend to convert it to cash. 
B. Retention of property 
1. May be transferred to the prosecution or seizing agencies . 
Upon agreement, the property may then be transferred to 
another appropriate agency. 
C. Reduction of property to proceeds 
1. Judicial order to have property sold by agency at public 
auction. 
2. Property may be sold by means other than public auction, 
e.g. residence may be listed with a real estate agent. 
Caveat: Make sure there is no appearance of impropriety. 
Real Estate Agent should have no personal or professional 
ties with the seizing or prosecuting agencies. 
A-5 
3. Expenses of seizure, maintenance and sale. 
4. Net proceeds divided: 
a. 75% to seizing law enforcement agencies. 
b. 20% to prosecution agency. 
c. 05% to State Treasurer. 
D. If cash is involved in an amount less than $1,000, the seizing 
agency is entitled to keep the entire amount after forfeiture 
proceedings are complete, unless otherwise agreed to share 
with the prosecuting agency. 
E. If a state law enforcement agency is involved, and the property 
is to be reduced to proceeds, the judge must order the item to 
be transferred to the Division of General Services for sale. 
F. The governing body of the agency must establish a separate, 
special account in the name of the agency receiving the 
proceeds, and the amounts within such accounts may only be used 
by the agency for drug enforcement activities. All expenditures 
must be documented for later audits. 
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The following legislation and case law update was compiled by Gary 
W. Schons, Deputy Attorney General, Special Prosecutions Unit, San 
Diego, California. Mr. Schons speaks regularly for the National 
College of District Attorneys (NCDA) on the subject of civil 
forfeitures. Mr. Schons kindly gave his consent to di ssemi nate 
this information to you . 
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Californ;!.a Cases 
'I . :; 
'' 
: ' · · Published OpinJ.ons · · . 
. . i . . 
People v. Superior Court (Brent) . 
5 DCA, F016015 1 2 . Cal.App.4th .675 · . . 
IU 42'1 
Peopla's writ challenging the application of·the 
Exclusionary Rule in a section 11470 proceeding and the . 
eff&ct of illegal ueizure on civil discovery (Hfruit of the 
poisonous treen) in~ Kern County case. ~he Court of Appeal 
danied the petition on procedural grounds, stating that the 
People's writ was filed outside the 30-day period provided 
by Health and Safety Code aection l1488.4(h) and that the 
late filing is juriediction~lly fatal. (Author's notet 
Respectfully, tha Court of Appeal stretched to avoid · 
deciding the -applicability of the Exclusionary Rule. The 
People wore not taking a writ from a motion brought pursuant 
to section ll48S.4(g) -- the probable cause hearin9 · 
provision -- but from an .in limine motion suppressing 
avidenca. While the caae ha8 little precedential value, · it 
should serve as a warning that adverBe rulings in pretrial 
motions should be quickly challenged.) 
i A:-7 . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
.1.0;.d:.J 
People v, Real Prop$rty Loc~ted At 25551 Hinoa Drive 
4 OCA, G01070, 2 Cal.App.4th 767 
Cl~irnant 1 s appeal after t~ial cou~ forfeited escrow 
proceeds from the sale of a residence seized pursuant to 
ll470(g), ~orfeiture waa based on the allegation that the 
property waa related to a violation of. aection 11366, 
maintaining a place ' for purpo~es of salee. While the action 
was pending, the claimant sold the home, and the People 
seized the escrow proceeds and then withdrew the lis pendens 
in order to allow the sale to conclude. On appeal, the 
claimant asserted that the Court had no jurisdiction over 
the proceed5 £rom the Bale of the property. The claimant 
also contended that ~he conduct giving rise to the violation 
of Heelth and Safety Code 6ection · l~366 took place before 
subdivision (g) was amended to eliminate the criminal 
conviction requirement, . and that to dispense with the 
criminal cq.ry.i,p,1.ipQ- 1f~~irement was an ex post facto 
application or·tlie law< ·'·-Finally, the claimant contended 
that the evidence was insufficient to show a violation of 
Health and Safety Code sec~ion .11366. 
·The court of Appeal rejected all of claimant's contentions. 
The Court held that there was jurisdiction ove~ the proceeds 
of the sale. b~cause they .had been actuaJ.ly seized and 
because the s~atu~e :forfe~ts "all right, title and interest 
in any p:ro·perty, " meaning the ·equity. Second, the Court 
held that .because forfeiture ·is a civil proceeding, the ex 
post facto provisions :of the . constitution do not apply. In ··· 
obiter dicta, .the Court warned that the civil nature of the 
forfeiture statutes nopen up a 'V'e~itable Pandora 1 s box of 
discovery, ;~ which their 'meaning our' investigators, their 
confidential informants and their very files may be fair 
game." Fin~lly, the Court held that the evidence was 
sufficient .to show a violation of Health and Safety Code 
section 11366, that · the :residance waa maintained for · 
purposes . of' sale !based upon . one sale to a 'confidential 
informant and other e~idence and statements by the claimant 
· ·r;howing continuous use of the p)Zoperty for purposes of a ale 
over ~ two-:-yea.r per~od. · · · · · 
Completed Hatters Of Inte~eat - Non-Published Opinions 
· . . ' 
Bepeda v. Superior Co~rt 
2 DCA,. Div. · 6, B065697 
(Opinion ordered depublished by ' the· California Supreme 
Court.) 
···~Zepeda sought a writ to overturn the trial court's order 
·removing the Public Defender in a forfeiture proceeding. 
(See Govt. Code, S 27706.) ·. :. The Court granted the petition 
. , , I •. 
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and ruled that the District Attorney had no standing to 
challenge the Public Defender 1 5 decieion to represent a 
forfait~e claimant becauee the trial court had no authority 
to review the Public Defender's decision to extGnd such 
representation. (Note' Zepeda waa a companion case to 
People v. Superior Court (Carothers) in which the California 
Supreme Court had granted a hearing and remanded to the 
Court of Appeal for decision. The Court reached a sLrnilar 
conclueion in the Carothers case. Th~ People's Petition for 
Review in the California Supreme Cou~t was denied.) 
People v. Superior Court (Poljte) 
1 PCA, Piv, ___ ,.~050072 
People's writ challenging the trial court'~ ruling that 
. Health and Safety Code section ll488.5(g) did not require 
.the Court to grant a stay of the forfeiture proceeding, 
· includin9 discovery;· upon motion of the prosecution pending 
.. the reeolut'lbh'-'o:t'':'ia:• :te'l~:i'ted criminal proceeding. The . 
Petition tor Review was denied by summary orde~ without 
prejudice to the People to seek to prevent discovery in 
other -ways, such as (1) requesting that the Court exercise 
its inhe~ent powers under the discovery ~awa to stay 
discovery; (2) making specific objections to discovery; and 
(3) seeking-protective orders. 
Meltzer & L~ing, v ~ · i;upe~ior , court 
l DCA, Div~ · __;_, A057577 
.. 
In an unpublished opinion, the appellate court granted 
claimant's , Petition for Wr,it ot Mandate which souyht review 
of a trial court order denying claimant's motion for return 
of property~ The case involved the seizure of $9,000 in 
alleged drug proceeds which had been paid to an attorney in 
Santa Cruz County. The seizure order was issued by a judge 
in Contra Costa. :County where the ;underlying drug activity 
occurred. · _The appella~e court ruled that the Contra Costa 
Superior Court ·had no jurisdiction to issue an order for the 
eeizure of property in another county, i.e., a judge can 
issue a seizure order only for property located in the 
county where the judge sits. · 
People v. l9Bi DeLorean, . et al. (Laughridgs) 
3 DCA, C0l0d6 . 
ClaiJnant 1 IS appeal from · (t ·judgment of forfeiture following a jury tri~l.- in San _Joaquin County. on appeal, Laughridge 
challenged the adJnission ·of co-conspirators .~ statements on 
the basis :that hi8 connection , to the conspiracy wao not 
shown, and th~ admiseion of evidence of prior narcotics 
dealinqu on his part. The ·Court of AppGal affirmed the · 
judgment, finding thatthe co-conspirators' statements were 
properly admitted based upon circumstantial evidence, such 
as obDerv~d ; activity ; of co-conspirators atter,npting to 
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contact Laughridge incident to the exchange of narcotics. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeal held that evidence of 
prior narcotics dealings was admissible to show that 
Laughridge was involved in narcotics activity and, 
thGrefore, the . 11 proceeds 1' were derived from narcotic~;~ 
dealing. 
Pending Cases Of Nota 
N~air v. County of Sacramento 
3 DCA, C011501 •' 
ClaLmnnt's ~ppaal from a default judgment of forfeiture in 
Sacramento County. Claimant makes the standard CCP section 
473 equitable relief argumQnt (s~e Peop~e v. One Pnrce~ of 
Land (Wal~n.~~~ _{.,199)): .· -~~~5 Cal.App. 3d 57 9) and a contention 
that the fb~daf :tlai~~filing period is violative of due 
process. Pending decision. 
Federal Cases 
I . . 
u.s. v. One PBrcel of Real Prope:,:ty •• ~ Plat 20 
(1st Cir~ 1992) 960P_' .• 2d . :200 · · ' 
Court holds that cultivation of marijuana even if for 
personal use authorizes forfeit~e of real property pursuant 
to 18 u.s.c. section 881(a)(7), 
u.s. v. Certain Redl Property , .. JB Whalere Cove Drivs 
· . (2d Cir. 1992) . 954 F~2d 29 
Court holds that two minor sales of cocaine . inside a 
condominium, standing alone, wa5 aufficient to justify 
forfeiture pursuant to 21 u.s.c. · section S8l(a)(7). Court 
turther rejected application of Halper double jeopardy 
analysis to civil forfeiture. · . 
Court rejected .a substantive . dua pr_ocess challenge to the 
forfeiture on the basis that the informant induced the 
claimant to conduct the drug transaction in the condominium 
(entrapment) . 
U.s. v. Eng · 
(2d Cir. 1991) 951 F.2d 461 
Court holds that the 11 fugil;ive disentitlernent" doctrine bars 
a claimant· from contesting forfeiture while the claimant is 
fighting extradition to the United States • 
., .: , . : .i . 
,, 
.. 
Schrob ~. C~tterson 
(Jd Cir. l991) 946 F,2d 1402 
The Court decided that a prosecutor was protected by 
absolute immunity ·for ~nitiating a forfeiture complaint, 
applying for a seizure warrant and tor actions and 
I ~U . '-IC::( 
statements before the Court in support of the complaint and 
se~zure warrant. However, the prosecutor 1 s mana9ement and 
negotiations concerning the return of the seized property, 
including a demand for release from personal liability and 
for making false statements to the press and public, were 
administrative functions and, therefore, entitled only to .. , ' : t' ·.•• .>J 
qualified immunity protections. ·-· 
U. S. v. R D l, Box 1 , Thompson Town 
(3d Cir. 1991} 952 F.2d 53 
Court holds that .. r13al property pledged to obtain a horne 
equity loa~rLtovfina~G~.~.~a ·l drug purchase was subject to 
forfeiture even though the loan proceeds ware never used to 
make the drug deal and were rQturned to the bank. 
Curio~sly, this case was based upon a theory that the real 
property facilitated a narcotic& violation and not that it 
was property intended to be gxchanged. 
. ·. 
Miami Cou'nty !fynic:ipe.l Court · v. Wr.i.ght •• 
(6th Cir. ' 1992) 963 F.:Zd '876 
• I 
When a state .officerseizes property which is eventually 
turned over to federal authorities for an 11 adoptive" 
se~zure, the officer acts as a state officer and not a 
federal officer. · 
u.s. v. $l2,J!i0 
( 8th Cir. 19 9 2 ) · 9 5.6 F, 2d 8 0 l 
Court holds that deposit of funds into federal asset 
forfeiture fund did not deprive the appellate court of 
jurisdiction because the Court had in personam jurisdiction 
ovex the parties. The Court further held that the 
government's transfer of the money into the fund one day 
after entry of ·judgment, in violation of the lO-day 
automatic stay rule under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
oonatituted an improper removal of the res from the 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
The Court further held that the seizure of cash by a state 
officer and transfer to OEA for a "adoptive" seizure was 
proper and that there wa.s no "dual jurisdictlon'' impediment 
to federal juri8diction. . . 
' ' 
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u.s. v. Park 
(Sth .Ci~. 19911 94~ F.2d ,;3o 
Court hold8 that forfeiture of $48,000 taken from drug '·· 
courier did not prevent · criminal prosecution based upon 
double je~pardy. 
. . 
u.S, v. Ja..mes Dl!Iliel Property . ' 
(9th Cir. 1992) ~ F.2d ____ 
The Ninth Circuit joined with the Second Circuit's ruling in 
LivonJ.a Road and··hald that pre-se.lll:ure notice and hearing 
was required prior to the seizura of residen t ial r ea l 
property. However, the CoUrt held that the mere fact of 
illegal seizure did not immunize the property from 
forfeitu:r-e. 
. : .:... ... . ' .. ' ·. ~ ~ . . . 
u.s. v. Hd'Cal/J..ifti • ~ ·.::]d~ · ·: ; 
(9th Cir. 1992) 959 F.2d 796 
The Court held that the ueizur0 and forfeiture of property 
used to grow marijuana did not provide ·a double jeopardy 
protection against the subsequent prosecution of the owner 
for manufacturing marijuana. Thus, the Court .rejected the 
application of HalpGr to civil forfeit~re. 
u.s. ~. $639,558 . 
(D.C. Cir~ · 1992) . 955 F.2d 71~ : . 
The court held that although the seizure of property 
resulting from an illegal search does not immunize the 
property from forfeiture, that in this case involvinQ.cash 
saiz.ad from defendant'·s briefcase, there was no untainted 
evidence arid, therefore, the forfeiture case was dismissed. 
U. s. " , Borro.meo · 
(~th Cir. · ~991) 945 ~.2d 750 
The Court ' held that the claimant, who was married to but 
separated . from the spouse who owned the subject property, 
showed •excueable neglectu in fai l ing to timely f ile a cla im 
opposing forfeiture. (The Court excoriated the Assistant 
.United States Attorney for failure to r eturn 11 s everal 
telephone CallS ·, II) . 
u.s. v. $38,570 u.s. Currency 
(5th Cir, 1992) 950 F.2d 1108 
' 
The Court held that a drug courier's companion's claim that 
"I own the money,n without more, failed to establish 
standing sufficient to permit a ·challenge to thG forfeitura 
action • 
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U.S. v. 1977 ·Porschs Carrera 
(5th Cir • . l991) 946 F.2d 30. 
The Court held that an atto'rney ~ho w~s aa~·igned the 
automobile ~nd failed to perfect an ownership interest under 
state law by recording tha interest could not qualify as a 
~innocent owner• because the attorney'e intereet waa not 
valid as against third parties under state law. . 
·u:s; v · ... ·one P~rcel "ot .. Property ·Locll.ted. at . 
. R R 2, Independence · · · ···- · · 
. . 
.. .. ~ ... . . . .. 
(8th Cir. 1992) 959 F.2d 101 
1\ 
The Court upheld an order of the trial .. court .st~iki.r1g 'an 
unverified answer to a forfeiture petition. Of note, . the 
Court held that the filing of a 43-page copy of the · 
Pittsburgh ··Preas ··nawspnper articles did not coneti tute an 
answer, ·rr:·-' FL.- "·:l ·i· ~ , .. ,.,,~~r- ·~:: 1 . ;; 
The Court further held that a child has rro standing to 
oontest the forfeiture of property owned~y his mother. 
u.s. v. 2204 Barb~ra Lane 
(llth Cir. l992) 960 F.2d 125 
I. ., 
The Court held that the clairnant 1 s fail~re to respond to 
requeatu for admissions conclusively established the truth 
of the admist5ions and, therefore,provided a sufficient 
baeis for forfeiture. 
U.S. v, $38,570 u.s. Currency 
(5th Cir. 1992) 950 F.2d 1108 
The Court holds that the filing of a claim l5 days after the 
elapse of the 10-day period provided for by statute was 
untimely and that the ·claim should be stricken. 
' j 
TJ. S. v. One 1988 Dodge Pickup 
(5th Cir. 1992) 959 , F.2d .37 · 
. . . . ' 
Upon showing that claimant had notice of intention to move 
f or default judgment of forfeiture, the failure.to · file a 
claim in response thereto was sufficiant baaia to deny the 
motion to set aside a default judgment. 
u.s. v. $67,220 .i.n u.s. currency 
(6th Cir. 1992) 957 F.2d 280 
Tha Court hel.d that on the issue t-;£ probable caUls~ · t.or 
tortei ture, the determination . is . bas.ed upon the evidence 
adduced at : the hearing. : .. ~he . Court .noted . u of couree, a . 
government cannot atar.t a forfeiture proceeding in bad faith 
and with wild allegations· based on the hope that something 
will turn up to juetify it~ suit • , , , Once a ·forfeiture 
··: 
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proceeding is brought, if further evidenae·is legally · 
obtained to justify the government's bel~e£, there is no 
pel:suasi ve reason to l:>a_r its use. " 
• • • • ,. • " T , ' ' • 
u.s. v.· Certrdn Real and Person~l Propert:y Belonging t:o 
' Ronald Jerome Hayes 
(11th Cir. 1991) ~43 7;2d 1292 
I 
The Court rejected the claim by the grufi dealer's spous~ 
tha s an innace ·t a e -=When t e police arrived to 
search the res ence, she elected to leave. The evidence 
also showed that the husband used the home regularly for 
illegal drug transactions. Accordingly, the evidence 
supported the notion that the spouse wa~ no.t i9norant of the 
. . circun:tstances. surrounding her husband's a ctivities .• 
. U.S.' v. one Parcel of Land Located llt 7.126 Highway 45 North (7th Cir~ - 1992) __ , .· ... F.'2d __ 
. ';: .,..H ::: ~.-.-~: l(: ~·::i. 
The Court held that the drug activities of a son who was a 
one-third owner of a corporation which owned the defendant 
property was not· imputed t 'o the corporation and, therefore, 
the two-thirds interest owned by the parent corporate owners 
·was .not subject to forfeiture . 
In re $lSO,S00 ' 1n u.s: currency 
(E.D.:Pa.. l9~~) : 777 F.Supp; · 418 · 
The Court held that the initiation of an administrative 
[non-judicial] forf~iture proceeding precluded the trial 
court from ordering return of the property purauant to rule 
4l(e) (the federal eguivalent of Pen. Code, S 1539). · 
' 
u.s: ·v. Ths ·Rsal Property a.nd Premises Known as 
4408 Hillside Court (4th Cir. 1992) _ F.2d __ · 
The Court held t~t a claimant could not assert the Fifth 
Amendment in order t 'o avoid answering questions at t1. 
·· deposition and then fila an affidavit denying allegations of 
·· invol varnant with drl.lg eale$ in o~dgr ·to avoid summary 
· judgmont. · ~hQ - Court held .that the trial court was not 
required ~ua sponte to acco~odate·the appellant 1 s assertion 
of the Fifth ·Amendment privilege. 
U.S. v. The Rel:l Property and ·Premiseo Known as 
5528 Belle Pond Drlve 
(E.D.va. 1991) 783 :r.supp. 253 
. . . : . . . 
The Court upheld the fo~feitu~e of a computer which 
contained ,data regarding the ;g.rowing characteristics of 
marijuana plarita. · 
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u.s. v. All As~&ts of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc • 
. (2d Cir. 1992) _ F.2d __ . 
I ~U . '-IC: 'r 
In a case involving the seizure and closing of a business, 
the Court held that notice and an opportunity for hearing 
within a aho~t period of time after seizure was sufficient 
to satisfy due process ~equirernonts. 
Sc:artJbln v. DEA 
.· , (5th __ Cir. _1992) 96 6 P'. 2d 989 
In thi8 case, 8tate agents seized $12,360 pursuant to a 
· state search warrant ~nd " listod the money in the r e turn to 
the warrant. Three days after tho search , t he state 
officers transferred the money in the form of a cashier 1 s 
check to the Drug Enforcement Adrnini~tration for nadoptiven 
eei~ure and. forfeiture.· · The federal oourt ruled that DEA 
.. had no juU,~ci.i~~i~n,_.,~g~ :·~1or£ei t the property because i t 
remained within the ' jur~sdiotion of the state court pursuant 
to the search warrant until that cont~ol and juriadiction 
was relinquished by the state court. 
u.s . v. ;psposi to 
.(2d Cir. 1992) __ F.2d 
I 
on appeal, the Court overturned an orde.r directing the 
interlocutory sale of a residence • . The Court held that the 
interlocutory sale provisions o£ federal law (aupplernental 
rule E(9)(b)) did not permit an interlocutory sale because 
the p~operty was not perishable, liable to deteriorate or 
decay, and tha amount to be 8pent on repair& was not 
disproportionate to the value of the property. 
u.s. v. One .1987 ~eep Wrangler 
(2d Cir. 1992) F.2d 
DEA accepted a state seizure of the vehicle, initiated 
administrative proceedings and then released the vehicle to 
the claimant. DBA then re-seized the vehicle and re-
initiated administrative proceedings. The Court held that 
the · initial ·release o! the vehicle by DEA in order to 
accommodate the state court 1 s jurisdiction did not deprive 
DEA of jurisdiction to re-i~itiate administrative 
procQQdings. 
Federal Case~ · Pending 
. . ... 
u.s. v. A Parcal of Land Known as 92 Buena V..ist:a Avenue 
Supreme Court No. 97-7Bl ((3d Cir. 1991) 937 F.2d 98) 
'rhe issue . p~esented . is "'hether a peraon who receives a gift 
of money ·derived from drug traffieking and usos that money 
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to purchase real property is entitled to asaert 8n "innocent 
owner" defense in an action seeking forfeiture of the real 
property. An implicit issue is the ''standing" of a donee of 
drug proceeds, The case was argued in the United States 
Supreme court on Tuesday, October 13. 
!, ' ' 
Leqislaticm 
As reported in the last issue of ll470 News, SB 1705 (Maddy) 
failed .to pass out ot the Assembly Committee on Public 
Safety and was referred to interim hearing. That interim 
hearing is now scheduled to take place in the Capitol on 
Thursday, November 5, beginning at 10 a.m. The subject of 
that heaxing will be SB 1705 in its most recent incarnation. 
That legislation made the following significant amendments 
in the asset ·forfeiture provisions of the Health and Safety 
Code~ . . ';' ~ : .. -: ~ :_-" ·· ::; , ~ ·. · -;<L · · =· : 
11470(b) - Adds "cultivating and harvesting" to the bases 
for the forfeiture of raw,rnaterials, products and equipment. 
li470(e)(l) -Eliminates the "family car Qxcaption" to the 
vehicle forfeiture provi~ion. 
·· 11470(f),- l3xtends the five-year limitation on "proceeds" 
forfeit~res to ten years, 
11470(g)- Adda .the 11whole tx-act 11 langua9~ · of federal .law to 
the real property forfeiture provision and providQS for the 
forfeiture of real prope4ty which is involved in the 
cultivation of 100 or more marijuana plants. Fuxther, the 
~family residence" exemption to forfeiture of real property 
il5 eliminated. 
11470(i) [new] - The "innocent owner" defense to forfeiture, 
incorporating existing standards of know or have reason to 
know and bona fide purchaser are incorporated. 
11470{j) (new] .;. The elimination of the criminal conviction 
requirement ·is .restated in this ,provioion of the code. 
11471 - Adds a provision to the statute to make it explicit 
that property is subject to sei~ure upon probable cause to 
believe that it is subject to forfeiture. 
11472 - Provides that a search warrant may issue for the 
seizure of property wconstituting evidence which tends to 
show property is EJUbject to.forfeiture." 
Further provides that property subject to forfeiture seized 
pursuant to a search warrant is not aubject to the 
provisions of Penal Code section 1524, et seq. 
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11486 - Subdivisions (a) and (b) of e~isting section 11488 
regarding 8eizure ~uthority and notific~tion to the 
~ranchiee Ta~ Board, respectively, are eliminated as being 
duplicative of other provisions of existing law. 
Subdivision (d) of existing section 11488 providing for the 
presumption of ownership to a person to whom a receipt is 
issued is eliminated. 
11488.4(d) - The amendment provides that whenever an 
interest in property is required to be on record with a 
9overnmental office or agency that notice is deemed to be 
eerved if mailed•'to the interest holder at the address 
appearing in the official government record • 
11488.4(q)(2) -~he existing provision providing a probable 
cause hearing to a criminal defendant/claimant is eliminated 
as bein9-unriecessary.'·'The subdivision is further amended to 
provide tnat F~uf-~order:··returning property for lack of 
probable cause shall not terminate the proceedings and the 
Court may grant protecttve orders to preserve jurisdiction. 
r 
11488.S(b)(2) [new] -This provision establishes a m9ans to 
obtain a default when a claimant fails to answer after 
filing a claim. 
.. 
ll488.5(d) (new] -This provision adds a new "standingn 
hearing procedure. The provision authorizes the People to 
challenge a clai.mant' s "standing'' to maintain the forfeiture 
action and provides for a pretrial adjudication of the 
issue. · 
ll488.5(f){1} [new] ~The propo$ed amendment is based upon 
the Drug Enforcement Administration Model Forfeiture of Drug 
Profits Act which has been adoptad in numerous states. It 
provides that money and other negotiable instruments found 
in close proximity to druga or drug paraphernalia are 
rebuttably presumed to be subject to forfeiture. 
11488.5(£)(2) [new]- The propoaed amen~ent is adopted from 
21 u.s.c. section 853{d) and creates a rebuttable 
presumption that money acquired during the period o£ drug 
dealing i.e subject to forfeiture on the "exchange" or 
"proceeds trac~a~abla to an exchang-an basis -- Mnet worth 
analysis." 
114SB.S(f){3) [ne~]- ~he proposed amendment is basad on 
United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama (2d Cir. 1986) 797 
F.2d 1154. The provision provia~s that there is a 
presumption'that the whole or remainder of any property is 
forfeit if, any ~art .or interest in the property is or was 
subject to forfeiture under subaiviaion (f) of section 
11470. J::easentially, the presumption ehifts the burden of 
p~oof to the claimant to show that property which has been 
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comminqled with proven drug proceeds has an independent, 
untainted source • 
.. 11488.6 ·- Delated.· 
The Sunset is extended five additional years, to 1999. 
,, 
.. 
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR CIVIL FORFEITURE 
. . , . A;N LIGHT OF u.s. ~. ~Plru . · · 
I;NTBODUCTIOft 
"
1 {The] comparative absence of· . 
procedural safeguards in [civil] forfeiture 
actions has attracted increa~ingly critical 
attention' in recent years aa government 
officials have .stepped up the U6e of· 
forfeiture a~ a means of curbing drug 
trnfficking and the use of narcotics.N 
{~nited States v. One 1995 M~rcedes-Benz , 917 
F.2d 415, 420 {9th Cir. 1990), quoting Note, 
Constitutional Rlght§_and Civil Fo~f~iture 
Actiona, .. BS. ,Colum~_. L •. Rev • . 390, 391 (1988).) 
I~L.J . 4 0: r 
1- -, · r.-1 .... ~. . !" ,,-,,. r l•:-'~ Notwithsuridin~( thls' obse;r:vation, with the exception of the 
due process rights to notice and an opportunity for hearing, the 
courts h~ve ~ecognized few, if any, constitutional· constraints on 
the government in seeking civil forfeiture. (See, gene~ally, 
Calero-Toledo v. P~~rson Yacht Leasing Copmany, 416 u.s. 663 
.( 19 7 4),) Thus 1 .the following constraints on criminal prosecution 
do not apply: · .• • · 
:Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule (United 
States y. Janis, 428.U~S~ .433 1 447 n. 17 (1976))*1.1 
Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination shield · 
(Qnited States v. Ona Parcel of_PropertY L. · ~ 
at 15 §lack Ledg2_Dr., S97 F.2d 97 (2d Cir .~ 
1990}; sae, also, Baxter v. Palmigiano, 42s· ·· ·. 
u . s . 3 o a < 19 1 6 ) _. } . ·. 
1. The oourts have consistently cited One 1958 Plymq~~h 
SGdl:ln v. Pennsylvania, 300 u.s .. 6.93 (1965) for the proposition 
that the Fourth Ame ndment Exclus~onary Rule uppliaa in a civil 
forfeiture proceeding. (See, e.g.,- Ynited R~ates v. One 1985 
MQrc9des-Benz, 917 F.2d 415, 4l9 (9th Cir. 1990).) The author 
balieves that the courta hcve misread the Plym~uth Sedan 
decis.i.on, and if 9iven the opportunity to consider the ·issue in 
light of itG juriaprudenGe ·in Janis, United States v. Calandra, 
414 u.s. 338 (1974) and INS v. Lope~-Mendoza, 468 u.s. 1032 
(1984), tha Supreme· Court would reject :the application of the 
:rule in a civil forfeiture proceeding, . {See United §tates v. one 
1988 :Ford Mustang, .728 F.Supp. 435 (N,O.Ill. · 1989).) .' 
0 • • • 
l 
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Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy protection 
(United States v. One Assortment of 8~ 
Firearm~, 465 U.S. 354 (1984); Vnited States 
~· A Paxxel of ~and Wi~h a Blgg. Located 
Xhereon, 884 F.2d 41 (lot Cir. 1989).) 
Fifth Amendment ·· E;71; Post Facto prohibition 
(United Qtgtes v. O.K.~. AppalQgs~s, lnc., 
829 F.2d 532 · (5th Cir. 1987).) 
. . ' ... 
Sixth Arnendment" c:onfrontation .rights (,Ynited 
St~~~s y, Property 5nown as __ 6109 G~upb Rd . , 
885 F.2d 619 (3d Cir~ . 1989).) 
,., ': , 
Sixth· Amendment right ' to compulsory prooasG 
(United States v. $64.000 in U;S• Cur~ency, 
7 22 .F. 2d . 239 - -{ 5th··- Cir. 1984).} · · 
~~- ·· ·i 1.1- ·~l j · I· ~ ·,·:::c !.~T~ .! ' 
Sixth·Amendment .right to appo~nted counsel 
{United States v. $55,51~.05 in u.s. 
c:urren~, 728 F.2d l92 {3d Ci:r. l9B4).) 
·:· Eighth Amendffient ·protection against cruel · and 
·unusual punishment (United States v. One 
107.9 Ac;9 parcel, 898 F.2d 396 (3Q Cir • 
1990); United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 661 
F.2d 232 (9th Cir. _ 1988).) .· . 
• .: :, • I ' ' • • ~ ' • 
Nevertheless, ··a leading expert has observ-edl . ,. . 
~[Vnited States v. Halper) has made the 
enforcement of ciYil forfeiture statutes 
problematic whenever there is a criminal 
prosecution of the .claimant based on the same 
conduct." · ··{Smith, l?ro§es;utiQn and Defense of 
ZQrfeiture Cas~s, ~ 12.10 (1991).) · 
THE HALPER DBCISIQR 
I~U . '-IC:'r' 
In United States y. Halper, 490 u.s. 435 {1989), the Court . 
considered; · 
"[W)hether and under what circumstances a 
· civil penalty may constitute 'punishment' for 
the purpo~es of-double jeopardy analysia,u 
Halper had been conviet~d of submLtting 65 false .claims for 
government reimbursement -in violation o£ :18 u.s.c. section 287, 
with a total loss of $585 ~ ··· Halper . was sentenced to two years in 
prison and fined $5,000. · ·The -Unitecl States then bx-ought an 
2 
. / . 
' ' 
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action under the Civil False Claims Act (31 u.s.c. §S 3729-3731) 
which provides for a civil penalty of $2,000 per violation. 
Halper's potential liability was $130,000 {65 x $2,000), even 
thouqh the actual loss to tqe government was only $585. The 
District Court ' held that such a civil penalty would violate the 
double jeopardy because it was entirely unrelated to the actual 
damaqes suffersad by the .goverrunent·(i.e., it had no "rational 
relation" to the ·actual loss, exceeding it by a factor of 220). 
~he District Court limited the government to double its damages 
($1,170) and the costs of the civil action. The yovernment took 
a direct appeal to the United .States Supreme Court. 
The obviou& issue before the Court was whether the civ~l 
penalties under the Fal6e Claims Act constituted impermissible 
~ double *puni&hment• for · p~poaes of the double jeopardy clause. 
ThQ government argried~ 
l. ·- .. ~~e: , .. ~O.~~l~ .. ~eopardy Clause protects only 
against -a §econg criminal penalty; 
_2. Criminal penal ties are imposed only in 
criminal p~oceedin9s; and 
3 •. Penal ties ·under the · False Claims Act are 
civil. (t.q., pnited states v~ wa~d, 440 
u.s. 242 (1980).) 
The court ·first ruled that a ·civil panalty which roughly 
approxim~tes the government's loss . doas not riae to the level of 
"punishment" for purposes of the .Double Jeopardy Clause. 
(Helvering v-. Mitchell, . 303 u.s. 391 (1938), United States ex, 
rel. Ma:I;"cus v. ·Hess, ·· 317 u.s. 537 {l94.;J}; Rex Trailer Company v. 
Ynited States, 3so ·u.s. 148 · {1956).) 
. • .. 
nThe relevant teaching of ·these cases is that 
the government is entitled to rough remedial 
justice, that is, ' it may demand compensation 
according to somewhat imprecise formulas, 
such as reasonable liquidated damages or a 
fixed surn · plus double damages, without being 
deerned 'to .have imposed a second punishment 
for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis. 
These eases QO not tell us • . • what the 
Constitution commands when one of those 
imprecise formulas authori~es a suppos~dly 
remedial sanction that does not ~emotely 
a~proximate the government's damages and 
actual costs, and rough justice becomes clear 
injustice.~ . (Halper, p. 44~.) 
The Court then turned to the ultimate guestion which was 
·'· 
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"undG.r what ci:rcurnstancas a civil penalty may constitute 
punia~~nt for purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause.~ (~) 
I~U . -tO:::: I 
Significantly, . the Court jettisoned the ''abstract approach" 
to characterizing actions a·s civil or criminal for purposes of 
the application of constitutional and other procedural 
safeguaids. (See, e.g ~ , United St~~s v. Ward, supra.) Thusr 
statutory language, structure, and legislative intent (the 
traditional civil, quasi-criminal, criminal battleground), must 
give way to the ~humane interests" safeguarded by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. The Court went on to.hold that labels · 
ncriminal• and ~civil~ , are not of paramount importance. · The 
Court recognized that civil proceedings may advance puni tive as 
well as remeO.ial goals and that both punitive and remedial goals 
are ae~ed hy criminal penalties • 
"[T]ha· deter.mination whether a given civil 
sanct±onrcon~ti~utes punishment in the 
relevant sense requires a particularizad · 
assessment of the penalty imposed and the 
p~~poses that the penalty may fairly be said 
to serve.' (Halper, p. 448.) 
Unfortunately, the court then wrote the following internally 
inconsistent passage. . 1 •• , • , • 
' . 
n[I]t follows that a civil s~nction that 
cannot fairly be said .§olelv to serve a 
remedial purpo8e, but rather can only.be 
explained as ~ serving either retributive 
or deterrent purposes, is punishment ..•. 
We therefo4e hold that under the Double 
.. Jeopaidy Clause a defendant who already haa 
been punished in a criminal prosecution may 
not be subjected to an additional civil 
sanction to the extent that the second 
sanction may ' not fairly..bg ..s=lmrSlct~rized as 
remedial, but only as deterrent.Q£ 
retribytJpn.• {Halp2r, pp. 448-449.) 
Obviously, in the battle in the civil forfeiture arena over 
wh9th9r such sta'tutea· are remedial,. puni ti v·~, or, more l ikely, 
both, these two passages give little comfort to Gither Gide . 
The Court ultimately propounded the following test! 
"The rule is ' on9 of ' rgason: whaJ;e a defendant 
previously has sustained a crimin~l p~nalty 
and . the civil penalty sought in the . 
subsequent p~oceeding bears no rational 
relation to the qoal of ~ompensating the 
gQYernrnent for its loss, but rath$r BRQaAr§ 
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to qualify as 'punishment' in the plain 
meaning of the ·word [then the Double Jeopardy 
Clause is invokedJ." (Halper, at p. 449.) 
I'!U . '-fC. I l> .l.u 
Seizing on this language, some experts have predicted that 
Halper has sounded the death knell for civil forfeiture actions: 
· #With respect to civil forfeitures, for 
example, it is only necessary to point out 
· that they are never brought fox the purpose 
of 'making the government whole .' •. " (Smith, 
.s upr~ •. ) ,: . . 
HALPER'S APPLICATION TQ CIVI~ FOBFEifURE 
... 
This :reading Rf - ~ha , Halper decision in the context of civil 
forfeiture actions is .flawed for two reasona; 
l, ' Civil forfeiture has ,a dual remeclial purpose--
2. 
A. 
B. 
To compensate tha government for the costs of 
investigation and enforcement as well as the 
indirect costs occasioned by·the underlying 
conduct, e.g.,, the .indirect costs of drug-related 
crime (treatment, rehabilitation, and prevention) 
or environmsnt crime {damage to wildlife or the 
_ecosystem). (See United States v. Walke6 940 F.2d 
442 (9th Cir. · 1991); United States v. A Pargal o' 
~, 884 F.2d 41 (lat Cir. 1989); United States 
y, W.R,'W. CorE•r 731 F.Supp. 237 (E.D.Mich. 1990); 
pnited ~tates v. U.S. rishing Vesael Maylin, 725 
F.Supp •. l222 (S.D,Fla•. 1989) ); AND 
,. 
· To lessen the ·economic power of organized crime 
and drug entexpri6es by stripping away the tools 
and profits of such conduct. (~aplin & Drysda~e 
v. United State§, 491 -U.S. 617, 630 (1989).) 
Civil forfeiture bears a -"rational· relation 1' to the 
undorlying conduct ,' the injury threatened o:l: drunage 
done and the government's right to compensation. The 
simple re~~on is that forfeitu~e ia l;mite~ to property 
intentionally used to perpetrate the underlying conduct 
(facilitation) or the profits of · that conduct 
(proceeds). (See pnited States v. Certain Rea~ 
Pzoperty and Premiser;, 747 F.Supp. 173 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); 
Un~ted States y. One 1972 Dat§un, , 378 F,Supp. 1200 
(D.N.H~ 1974); Peo~le v. Supe;ior Court (Clement~, 200 
Cal.App.3~ 431 (1988)•) 
. 5 
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This second · point was perhaps best made in the Confiecation 
Act cases decided by the United States Suprema Court in 1871 . 
(Mcveigh y~ United S~ates, - 78 U.S. 258 {1671); Miller v. United 
States, 78 u~s. 268 (187.1); l'Yler y. pefree§, 78 u.s. 331 
(1871).) . · .. . . . . 
. . . 
The Confiscation Act of ~uly 17, 1962 provided for the 
forfeiture o! all the property of Confederate officera · and office 
holders and those who gave aid and comfort to the Confederacy • 
The Court upheld the ~~em forfeiture provisions of the act on 
the basis that it was a legitimate exercise of the government's 
war powers to reduce the powe~ of the enemy. 
However, Justices Pield and Clifford dissented on the 9round 
that the purpose of the forfeiture provisions was ·to punish 
certain clasu;gs of . persons .who . had committed overt ~eta of. 
treason. Thes~ .~~~~~ :f~ ,ii_~~i:;~#. ::~ote that the !n. 1.:ruJl nature of the 
forfeiture act~on .. did not · save it from being impermissible 
crLminal punishment. However, in a part of the dissent with 
which the majority did not disagl:ee, Justices Field and Clifford 
wrote of the distinction between traditional in ~ torfeiture 
and the kind of forfeiture exacted by the Confiscation Act • 
. "The in~uiry, then, arises, whether 
p~oceed~ngs in rem for the confiscation . of 
the property of partie~ charged to be guilty 
of certain' overt acts of treason, can be 
maintained ~ithout .their previous conviction 
for the all~g~d offenses • . • • 
u 
• t • • 
•The inquiry is prompted fro~ the supposed 
analogy of these cases to proceedings in rem 
for the confiscation of property for offenses 
against the revenue laws, or the laws for the 
.suppression of the slave trade. But in these 
cases, and in all cases wh<are proceedings in 
rem are ·authorized for a disregard of some 
municipal or public law the offenqg 
constituting the ~rounct 2f condernnatign 
inures as it W£69 in the tb~nq itself. The 
~inq is the instrument of wrong ~nd iA 
forfeited by · reason of the unlawful use mage 
of.it o; the ~nlawfui condition in which it 
!s pl~CQd.• {Miller v. united States, 78 
u.s. at p. · 321.) 
Halper then w~ll not stahd as an impediment to the remedy of J.n .Dll!l. civil · forfeiture. 'l'he limited remedial purpose of the 
statute at issua . in the Halper case-- to make the . government 
6 .. 
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whole fo~ fr4udulent activity -- doe5 not begin to comprehend the 
tull remedial purposes of the civil forfeiture statutes, 
particul~rly 21 u.s.c. section 881 and parallel state statutes. 
{See United Sta~es v. 228 Acre~, 916 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. · l990); 
Un~ted States v. ?rice, 914 F.2d 1507 (D.c. Cir. 1990); ' United 
State~ v. D.X,Gr Ap2aloosas. Inc,, 829 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(each finding a remedLal purpose in the -proceeds" provisions of 
the federal forfeiture ~tatutesJ; United States v. One 107.9 Acre 
Parcel, 899 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Santoro, 
866 F.2d l538 (4th Cir. 1989); Pn~ted States v. Tax Lot lSQO, 861 
F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1989) (each finding a remedial purpose in the 
•whole tract~ real property forfeiture provisions of the federal 
forfeiture 3tatute&).)' · 
Second, unlike the civil penalty provisions at issue in 
Halper, civil forfeiture is dependent upon the connection between 
the property t .o ,be. __ forfei ted .. and the unde;clying conduct qi ving 
rise to forfeitp~~ F -:..:"- ~: "J~c-+..lJ.~ation.t or "proceeds." It is this 
long8tanding and '· tr'aditional ·notion of ·.in_ .nm1 forfeiture which 
distinguishes this civil remedy from the civil fine in Halpe~. 
(See United States v. one Assortment of 89 F'ir~a:gns, 465 U.S. 354 
(1984); Calero-Toledo y, Pearson Yacht Leasing ~9mpanv, 416 U.S. 
663 (1974).) ' 
The "humane interests" of the_Double Jeopardy Clause are not 
o:f:fended by the taking of property,. regardless of its value, . · 
which has been intentionally used in or acquired from · the 
commission of a cri.lriinal offense. · The forfeiture is directly 
tied to the . choice and conduc.t of the perpetrator. 
' . 
Indeed, had the Supreme court intended its Double Jeopardy 
analysis in ~alper to apply to a civil forteitu:x:e, overturning 
substantial precedent, . it is inconceivable the Court would have 
failed specifically to mention it. (Halper, pp. 452-453 1 
Kennedy, J. , concurring.} · . · 
· ~PER APPLIED 
~our courts have written on the application of Halper to 
.. civil forfeiture; Three of the four.have held that it simply 
does not apply • . (United Statea v . McCaslin, F.2d (9th 
Cir . 1992); Pnited St~tes v. A Parcel of Land-:- . . 40~on Hill 
~' 884 F.2d 41 (lat Cir. 1989); United States v. u.s. Fishing . 
Vessel Maylin, 725 .t.Supp. J.222 (S.D. Fla. 1969).) McCa§lin is .. 
notable because the · defendant raised Halpe~ as · a defense to a 
criminal prosecution following a civil forfaiture·of .real 
property baaed on the same f~cta and circurnetances ·-- cultivation . 
of marijuana. The Ninth Circuit rejected McCaslin's nslR~r- '. : . 
based Double Jeopardy c::lairn and wrote: . ' I, . 
·, .· · 
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11Halper has no application to the very 
ancient practice by which inst~umentalities 
,·of a crime may be declared forfeit to the 
. :·:· government. · !rhe forfeitura of such · 
· .. -· instrumentalities is '~independent of, and 
wholly una~fected by any criminal proceeding 
in pe~aonarn.•' Calexo-Toledo v. pearson 
Xacht Leasinq ~2..·. (citation omitted] • 
.. · Nin ~uch forfeitures there is ·no 
... ·necessary relation between the value of the 
property forfeited and the loss to the ·· 
.: · goverrunent, nor is thera any necessary 
proportion ~etween the valua of the propa~ty 
forfeited and the criminal uae of the 
, property , • • • Double Jeopardy has no 
· · application. • 
I iU , -1 C..I 
•!• · .' 
. ' I 
. . . - ·, 
. 'l'he zsole ·· court · to "havef'applied Ralpe~ to a civil forfeiture 
i!S the Second Cir'C!:uit ·iil ' Urilted States X• Certain fieal Property 
and Premises Known a5 38 Wbal~rs cove Qrive, ___ F.2d ___ (2d 
Cir. 1991}. 
1he !acts in ~halers Coye are a forfeiture prosecutor's 
worst nightmare. The res was a personal residence valued at 
$145,000, in which the owner, Levin, had a $68,000 equity 
interest. Levin twice sold cocaine inside tns rasidance to a 
confidential informant -for a total sum of $250. Each sale was 
leso than a half qram ot cocaine . . The GvidencG further showed 
that it wao the confidential ~nformant who suggested that Levin's 
house be the site ot the sale . . After making .the two salea, Levin 
refused to conduct further .business with the informant, When 
Levin was arrested three months later, a search of the residence 
was negative for any drugs, paraphernalia, money, weapons, or 
records of drug sales. Levin thereafter pled guilty in state 
court to one count of narcotics distribution for which he 
received a probationary sentence and a fine. Levin further 
cooperated with the authorities. Nevartheleae, .. the government 
initiated an action pursuant to 21 u.s.c. 881(a)(7) to forfeit 
the residence . . The District Court granted the gove~nment's 
motion for summary judgm~nt of forfeiture • 
. . 
.. 
On appeal, . Levln contended that the forfeiture was not 
authorized as there was no "~ubst.anti al connection" between drug 
sales and the residence' that the forfeiture · v.tolated substantive 
due process; that the forfeiture constituted ·impermissible double 
jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment inasmuch aa it 
constituted a criminal penalty; and that the forfeiture amounted 
to cruel and unusual puni5hment under the Eighth Amendment, again 
because it constituted a criminal p~nalty. The Second Circuit 
rejected the first two arguments. · liowever 1 relying in part on 
the Halper decision, the Second Circuit concluded that both tha 
Fifth Amendment. double jeopardy protection and . the Eighth 
8 
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Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment wer& 
~mplicatad by tha civil forfeiture. 
. . . . 
In conducting its Fifth Amendmont doubl8 jeopardy analysis 
applying H,al~r, the Second Circuit noted that Halper "appears to . 
require us to prQsume the forfeiture to be punishment and to 
afford the government an opportunity to prove otherw~se.• The 
Court noted that this *burdana of accounting for a civil sanction 
falls on tha government only in the extreme case. The Cou~t 
conceded that Halper itself had recognized the propriety o£ 
•rough ramadial justice,• reasonable liquidated dama9es and a 
fixad penalty plus doubla or treble dama9es. 
~, ., 
The opinion noted that if euch an "accountinqu is 
appropriate, the court ought to compare the government 1 8 proven 
damages ox costa against the sanction itself, and will find the 
s~nction punitive if it does not fairly equate to the remedial 
purpoae of the· statute. ·· 
'(-\·! r-:1.- ;'"": ! "1 i <"l <l.~,·:t 
The Second Circuit began its analyais in earnest by writing, 
•we read Halp~r to apply to civil forfeitures." The Court then 
noted that .if the forfeiture is "overwhelmingly disproportionate" 
to the ·value of the offense, then the forfeiture will constitute 
punishment, unless the forfeiture serves some civil purpose . 
.. ' 
:the opinion then e~pl~red the ·.tradi tl~nal purposes of in rem 
forfeiture by noting that such form of actions are intended to 
remove instrumentalities of crime from general circulation and 
prevent the future use of such instrumentalities for criminal 
purposes. Additionally, .the Court noted that ·in rem forfeitures 
were designed in pa.x:t . to compensate the government for the costs 
of investigation and enforcement as well as to compensate for 
direct damages suffered by the government as a form of liquidated 
damages. However, the Court went on to note that forfeiture is 
not civil if it is used to deter or for purposes of retribution. 
Nevertheless, the Court recognized that forfeiture could be civil 
and still have collateral deterrent effect. This led the Court 
to the conclusion that the inquiry should focus on whether the 
forfeitur.e is fully justified by civil remedial purposos or can 
only be explained with reference to .punitive goals. 
Inexplicably, the Court stated that this inquiry should 
focus on the effects of the forfeiture on the cJ,.airnant. The 
Court went on to .write that forfeiture will not be presumed to be 
punitive if the property has been used substantially to 
accomplish an illQga~ purpose, i.e., as an inst~umentality. 
However, if not used as an inst~entality, i.e., a proceed, the 
Court will compare the value of the property versus the value of 
the underlying criminal act which gives rise to a forfeiture and 
then account for s~ch things ~s the costs of investigation, the 
damag-es of misconduct, ancl .the govarnment 1 s :.''overhead." 
9 .. 
•'. 
-· 
A-27 . (: 
. I . .' . ~- ; . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
.. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
I::J..J/ I::J...)/ ':;1...) 'I' I H r L -r:tl:i -> r'4tJ4'r' ':il I~U . 4 C:'! 
Applying this novel, if not bizarre, analyais, th~ court 
noted that the government seamed to concede that Levin's property : 
was not an instrumentality of the drug offenses. (A stxange 
concession in light of tha sole statutory basis for forfeiture.) 
Further, the Court noted that Levin's ~quity value in the home 
($68,000) exceeded by a factor of 300 the value of the drugs sold 
($250). Accordingly, the Court concluded that the forfeiture was 
punitive and, therefore,. constituted punishment fox: purposes of 
the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy • 
The forfeiture was saved in the Whalers Cove case only 
because Levin had been proeecuted by the state for his criminal 
violations, while the··fedeJ:al goverrunsnt initi ated the forfeiture 
action. Therefore 1 under the doctJ:ine of dual s overeignty , 
double jeopardy wa5 not implicated. (Heath y. Al a ba ma 474 u.s . 
82, 87-89 (1985).) ~he Court further rejected the Eighth 
Amendment claim that the forfei.ture, albeit punishment, did not 
violate the prolilbit.i'on·· agilinst cruel and unusua l pun i shment 
because the for-fe..ftui:'e ·• faiTeO. to pass the test of being ngrossly 
disproportionate" as se~ torth in Solen v. Helm, 463 u.s. 277, 
290-292 (1963). 
Proving that all is not well that ends well, the second 
Circuit's decision in Nh~lers Cove suggests what a tortu~ed path 
lies ahead for ·any court which would seek to apply tha HAlper 
reasonin9 to a civil forfeiture. •• 
.; · 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
In The Supreme Court 
T. Travis Medlock as Attorney 
General, State of South 
Carolina, 
v . 
1985 Ford F-150 Pick Up 
VIN 1FTDF15YGFNA22049, 
One Thousand One Hundred 
Forty Three and No/100 
(S1,143.00) United states 
Currency and Six Thousand 
Six Hundred Eighty and 
No/100 ($6,680.00) United 
States Currency, 
Appeal from York County 
Robert L. McFadden, Judge 
Opinion No. 23626 
Respondent, 
Appellants. 
Heard February 18, 1992 - Filed April 13, 1992 
Melvin L. 
Childers. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED 
Roberts, of York, . for ovme r, Robert 
{1- 1 
Attorney General T. Travis Medlock, Chief Deputy 
Attorneys General Edwin E. Evans and Cameron M. Currie , 
and State Attorney Georgia L. Lewis, for Respondent. 
HARWELL, C.J.: i'ie a.re present<::: •J w .LC 11 C i 1C:: (iu<::: .st i.c,;-, c,f: 
whether an owner of property subject to forfeiture pursuant to S.C. 
Code Ann. §§ 44-53-520 and -530 (Supp. 1991 ) 1 is entitled to a jury 
1 S . C. Code Ann. § 44-53-520 (Supp. 1991) defines items 
subject to forfeiture when seized pursuant to a drug offense. 
These generally include controlled substances; raw materials, 
products, and equipment used in processing and delivering 
controlled substances; containers; real and personal property 
knowingly used to produce or distribute controlled substances; 
books, records, formulas, etc.; conveyances, such as motor vehicles 
or boats used to transport controlled substances; money or other 
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trial. The forfeiture judge held that the owner of the property 
subject to forfeiture in this action, Robert Earl Childers, was not 
entitled to a jury trial. We reverse. 
I. FACTS 
Childers was convicted in January 1990 for conspiracy to 
traffic in illega.l narcotics. A forfeiture hearing was held in 
circuit court in December 1990 to confirm the forfeiture of certain 
property, designated above as "appellants," to the State. Childers 
demanded a jury trial. His request was denied by the forfeiture 
judge, and the forfeiture was confirmed. 
II. DISCUSSION 
We emphasize at the outset that the property subject to 
forfeiture in this case is not a controlled substance or other item 
which is the subject matter of the crime itself. Nor is it a 
special instrument tailored to the commission of a crime. See 
Commonwealth v. One 1972 Chevrolet Van, 385 Mass. 198, 431 N.E.2d 
209 (1982) (distinguishing contraband and special tools adapted for 
criminal activity). Rather, the property at issue here is property 
that normally i s used for lawful purposes. 
A. Right to Jury Trial 
Childers asserts that the forfeiture judge erred in 
denying him a jury trial. We agree. 
The South Carolina Constitution provides that "the right 
of trial by jury shall be preserved inviolate." S.C. Const. C.:!:'t. 
I, § 14. We have interpreted this section to mean that the right 
to a trial by jury is guaranteed in every case where the right to 
a jury was secured at the time of the adoption of our Constitution 
in 1868. C.\v. MattheivS Contractina Co. v. South Carolina Tax 
Commission, 267 S.C. 548, 230 S.E.2d 223 (1976). 
We have addressed the right to a jury trial in forfeiture 
proceedings. In State v. Simons, 29 S.C.L. (2 Speers) 761 (1844), 
we held that the Act of 1835, which purported to allow forfeiture 
of property after. a hearing before two magistrates and five 
freeholders, ~as unconstitutional and void because it ''[undertook] 
to clothe a forum with the power of depriving [the owner] of her 
property, which is not sustained by the law existing at the 
adoption of the constitution, and which does not proceed by the 
things of value furnished in exchange · for a controlled substance, 
as well as proceeds of an exchange, such as personal or real 
property; and all other money found near forfeitable items: 
S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-530 (Supp. 1991) provides for 
forfeiture procedures, the disposition of forfeited items, and the 
disposition of proceeds of sales. 
1 0 
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MEDLOCK v. 1985 FORD F150 PICK UP, etc., et al. 
common law mode of trial by jury 
Follin & Fourgeaud v. Coogan, 46 S.C.L. 
v. M'Claws, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 93 (1 789) 
juries in forfeiture proceedings). 
" Id. at 768. See also 
(12 Rich.) 44 (1859); Ham 
(referr i ng to pr e sence of 
This does not end our {nquiry , however. S i mo ns d iscussed 
the right to a jury trial in a forfeiture action wh i ch proc eeded i n 
personam. Section 44-53-530 contemplates an action in rem, which 
is a civil proceeding against the property itself. See S t ate v. 
Petty, 270 S.C. 206, 241 S.E.2d 561 (1978). We discern, however, 
that the character of the action as one triable at common law is 
not changed because the action proceeds in rem and not in oersonam. 
The right to a jury trial encompasses forms o f action that ha v e 
arisen since the adoption of the Constitution in those cases where 
the later actions are of a like nature to actions which were 
triable at common law prior . to adoption of the Cons t itution. 
Accord, State v . 1920 Studebaker Touring Car, 120 Or. 254, 25i P . 
701 (1926). 
Furthermore, it appears tha t defendant owners a r e deni e d 
the right to replevy against the State for propert y wro ng f u ll y 
forfeited. 2 Seized items are 
not subject to replevin but [are ] considered 
to be in the custody of the department making 
the seizure subject only to the orders of the 
court having jurisdiction over the forfeiture 
proceedings. Property described in § 44-53-
520(a) is forfeited and transferred to the 
government at the moment of illegal use . 
Seizure and forfeiture proceedings confirm the 
transfer. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-520(d) (S u pp . 19 91) . S .C . Cod e A::n . § 44 -
53-586 (Supp. 1991) provides for the return of seized items onl y t o 
"innocent owners." Construing .sections 44-53-586 and 44-53-520(d) 
together, it appears that the only persons who may apply for the 
return of items seized pursuant section 44-53-520 are third parties 
who hold an interest in the property, and who did not con s ent to , 
were not privy to, or ¢lid not have k now ledg e of th e u s e o f th e 
property which made it subject to sei z ure o r fo-r f ~i t u :- e. r:: ~. 
United States v. Federal National Mo r t gaae Ass o ci a tion, 946 F.2d 
264 (4th Cir. 1991). This lack of a remedy in replevin serves to 
further convince us that the right to a jury trial is crucial . 
2 An owner generally has the right to replevy against the 
State for property wrongfully detained. See, ~, r1oore v. 
Ewbanks, 66 S.C. 374, 44 S.E. 971 (1903); Ex Parte Keeler, 45 S.C. 
537, 23 S.E. 865 (1896). As originally enacted, section 44-53-520 
provided that only the controlled substances, raw materials, 
equipment, containers, and other items directly implicated in the 
commission of the drug violation were not subject to replevin. See 
S.C. Code Ann. § 32-1510.64 (Supp. 1975). 
(a) 3 
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Accordingly, we hold that defendant owners possess a right to a 
jury trial where the property subject to for f eiture under sections 
44-53-520 and -530 is property normally used for lawful purposes. 
B. Constitutionalit y 
Having determined that a defendant o wner is entitled to 
a jury -trial when the property subject to the forfeiture provisions 
• 
• 
of sections 44-53-520 and -530 is property normally used for lawful • 
purposes, we now must determine whether the forfeiture procedure 
articulated in section 44-53-530(a) can withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. · 
Section 44-53-530(a) provides, in relevant part, that: 
The judge shall determine whether the e 
property is subject to forfeiture and order 
the forfeiture confirmed. If the judge finds 
a forfeiture, he shall then determine the 
lienholder's interest as provided in this 
article. The judge shall determine whether 
any property must be returned to a law 
enforcement agency pursuant to Section 44-53- e 
582. 
Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the terms of 
the statute must be given their l~teral meaning. Duke Power Co. v. 
South Carolina Tax Commission, 292 S.C . 64, 354 S.E.2d 902 (1987) . 
A trial by judge has been defined as "[t]rial before judge alone, 
in contrast to before jury and judge . " Black's Law Dictionary 1505 • 
(6th ed. 1990). We find that the section 44-53-530(a) is 
unambiguous, and that the legislature intended for forfeiture 
proceedings pursuant to sections 44-53-520 and -5 3 0 to be held 
before a judge alone. 
The legislature cannot abrogate the right t o a jury trial e 
simply by designating a proceeding as a civil action without a 
jury. 1972 Chevrolet Van, 385 Mass. at 202, 431 N.E.2d at 212. 3 
We hold that section 44-53-530(a) is unconstitutional to the e x tent 
that it denies a defendant owner the right to a j ur y t rial in those 
cases where the property sub j e ct t o f o rfe itu ~ e ~c ~~a~l; is us2d f o r 
lawful proposes. In so holding, we join t he maj o rit y of 
jurisdictions that recognize the right to a jury trial in e 
proceedings to enforce civil forfeiture statutes when the property 
subject to forfeiture is property normally used for lawful 
purposes. See In re 1978 Chevrolet Van, 493 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 
1986), and the cases enumerated therein. 
3 The General Assembly possesses the authority to propose • 
a constitutional amendment which, if adopted by the electorate, 
would abolish the right to a jury trial in forfeiture proceedings. 
S.C. Const. art. XVI, § 1. 
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MEDLOCK v. 1985 FORD F150 PICK UP, etc., et al. 
The order of the forfeiture judge denying Childers's 
request for a jury trial is reversed, and the case remanded for a 
new trial . 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
CHANDLER, FINNEY, TOAL and MOORE, JJ., concur . 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINJ\ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Donald v. Myers, as Solicitor of the 
Eleventh Judicinl circuit, State of 
South Carolina, Appellant, 
v. 
Real Property at 1518 Holmes Stroat (Happy Town 
Part of Lot 6 Block C) Designated by Lexington 
county Tax Map Number 004644-03-19, Located in 
''Happy Town•• Near: the City of West ColWl\bia, 
Lexington County, South Carolina, and All Buildings, 
Appurtenances and Improvements .Thereon, Deeded to 
Sam Johnson, on June 25, 1945~ and All Personal 
Property and Monies Looatod Thereon, and 
San Johnson Personally, and Security Federal 
Savings and ~oan Association of Columbia, ft 
-· · 
Corporation, · Respondents. 
ant1 
Donald v •. Mye.rs, as Solicitor of the 
Eleventh Judicial Circuit, State of 
South Carolina, Appellant. 
v • . 
Real Property at 1520 Holmes Street (Happy Town 
Part of Lts 5 and 6 Block C) Designated by Lexin9ton 
County Tax Map Number 004644•03-20, Locate~ in 
•Happy Town• Near the City of west Columbia, 
Lexington County, and All· Buildings, ~ppurtenances 
and lmprovemonts . Thereon, Deeded to Rebecca Johnson, 
on February 13, 1984, and All Pex-sonal Property and 
MOnies Located ThorQon, and Rebecor . Johnson 
Personally, Respondents. 
and 
Donald v. Myer8, as Solicitor of the 
Eleventh Judicial Circuit, State of 
south carolina, Appellant, 
v. 
Real Property at 1522 Holmes Street (Happy Town 
Part of Lot~ 4 ' and 5) D~si9nated by Lexington County 
Tax Map NumbBr 004644-03-21, Located in "Happy Town" 
Near the City of West Columbia, Lexington County, 
South Car~lina, and hll Buildin9e, Appurtenances 
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MYERS, ete. •• llBM. PROPERTY AT 1518 llOI.HKS STRRET, 
etc., ot al~ and 4 other caaea 
and Improvements Thereon, Ooeded to Rebecca Johnson, 
on May 28, 1976, and All Personal Property and 
Monies Located Thereon, and Rebecca Johnson 
Personally, Respondents. 
and 
Donald v. Myers, as Solicitor of the 
nleventh Judicial Circuit, StatG of 
South Carolina, Appellant, 
v. 
Real Property .4 Miles south of Highway 378, 
• 4 Milos West of Leaphart St.ree·t (Lots 3 and 3B, 
63 x 115) Pesignated by ~~~~~g~on county Tax Map 
Number 994644-03-032, Located in "Happy Town" Near 
the City o .f West Columbia, Lexington County, 
south Carolina, and All Buildings, Appurtenances 
and Improvements Thereon, Deeded to Samuel Johnson 
and Rebocca Johnson, on July 24, 1972, and All 
Personal Proporty and Monies ·Located Thereon, and 
Samuel Johnson and Rebecca Johnson Personally, 
Respondents. 
~ppeal from Lexington County 
Wal te.r J. Bristow, Jr. , Special Circuit Judge 
· Opinion No. 2l49l 
Hoard June 11, 1991 - Piled October 14 1 1991 
AFFIRMF.D IN PART7 
REVERSlm IN PART, 
Attorney General '1', Travis Modlock, Chief Deputy Attorney 
General Edwin B. Evans, and Stata Attornoy Georgia L, Lewis, 
&11 of Columbia, Assistant Solicitor Thomas E. Pope, ot 
Lexington, for Appellant. 
Desa A. Balla~d and L. Joel Chastain, both of Ness, Motley, 
Loadholt, Richardson ' Poole, of Barnwellr H. Patterson 
MoWhir:ter, of McWhirter & Associates, of Lexinqton1 and 
.Joeaph M. McCulloch, :Jr., of lJolt, Popowski, Mcculloch & 
Strom, of Columbia, for Respondents • 
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HYBU, etc. v. REAL rRciPF.Rn ·AT 1S18 HOJ.M!S STUET, 
otc., et al. and -4 other ca•e• 
CHANDLER, A.J.t This ·appeal involves the 
constitutionality of ~outh . Caroli.(la Civil Forfeiture 
Statute, s. c. Code Ann. S44-S3-520, et seq. (Cum. supp. 
1990). Circuit court found no due process violation but 
held that operation of the statute constitutes a "takinq• of 
property without juat compensation. 
WA affirm in part and reverse in part. 
PACTS 
From Nov(tmhor, 1gog ul'\t:.:ll f"l.lb.z;-uary 1 1,,0, Lhe L6X1.ngton 
County Shariff's Depa~tmen~ conducted an undercover 
fnv~oti9ation o f drug t~atticking in an area o~ West 
Columbia known bliJ "Happx_ _ :r_~w~. • AR a result or ttta 
inv6atiqation, "aflidavits ' !or : seizure" w~re file~ pursuant 
to S.C. Co~& Ann. §44-53-500, ulle9ing that dru~ 
traffiekin9 wa~ taking placo on real property and residences 
nwn~4 by Jto•pondent~. circuit cou~t iaaue~ ex parte notices 
and oei•ure warrants, ~aHulting in confi•c~~ion of 
~lll)~~ndents 1 prnp&rt ie15 .• 
'rhereafte:r 1 noapondentG filod motions to quowh 1 
all~q!n~ that the oivil !or.£aiture stAtUte violates the due 
pr.ooess and taking• clausos o! the south carolims 
Constitution. 
1 s. c. Code Ann. 9~4-53-520 provide», in part• 
(a) The £o11owin9 nre subjoct to for(eit~r~: 
(3) All proporty which in any manner ' 
faoilitntoa tr$ffioking in variou~ 
controlled oubstnncea ••• or ie "Do~, 
or intenacd for uae, a~ a oontaine~ 
• • • 
(b) 11.ny .it.Am subject · to a forf.etiture under 
t.hia article rnoy be sei~ed by t.he· d"partment: 
hav.in9 autho~ity upon procesa issued by any 
nmtrt havinq juri•~Hotion ovor Lha !tom. 
Gaimuro without prooe"" ma:r be nllu1e lf r 
(3) The depa:rtmont ha• prob~b~o QQU~e 
t.o believe that the itozn ia directly 
or ;i.ndireot.l.y ·dantiJerous to h•alth or 
safety7 or 
(4) Th~ department hne probable cau~e 
to believe that the !tom was used or 
i$ intended to be used in violation of 
this article. 
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After a hearing, Circuit court found no due . process 
violation, hut bel~ that the statute, as applied, effects a 
taking without just compensation. 
partt 
ISSUES 
Does the civil forfeiture &tatuta violate 
(A) The Takings Clause? 
(B) Tho Due Process Clause? 
A, Takinqa Cla~se 
South Car6lina Con~titution, Art. I, S13, provides, in 
- . ") r. •• ~ .... • 1 
Bxoept as otherwise provided in this 
Conetitution, private property shall 
not be taken for ••• public use 
without just compensation beinq first 
. made therefor, 
P . tl :l 
This Court has long recognized that the State's 
axercise of eminent domain ie distinguished from its 
exercise of the police power. ••[J)ust compensation is 
required in the case of the exercise of eminent domain but 
not for the loss by the property owner which results from 
the constitutional exercise of the police power." S. c. 
State Highway Dept. v. Wilson, 254 s.c. 360, 365, 175 S.E.2d 
39i, 394 (1970) (EJllphe1sis supplied). Sae also Richards v. 
City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 539, 88 S.n.~ ftb3 (19S5)J Edens 
v. cfty of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956). 
The United Statos Supreme court has reoogni~ed that a 
state, in exorcising its police power, may apply forfeiture 
statutes to property used in violation of state laws. See 
Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 47 ' S.Ct. 133, 71 L.Mo 
35~ 11926). More recently, in CalQrO-Toledo v. Pearson 
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U,S. 663, §~ s.ct. 2~Ao, 46 L.Ed.2d 
452 (1974), the Court upheld a Puerto Rican forfeiture 
statute against a takings challenge, statingt 
••• state lawmakers, in the exer-
cise of the police ~w&r, were 
free to determine t~t certain 
Us$& of property were undesirable 
• • • (citation omitted) •••• 
Plainly, the Puerto Rican forfeiture 
statutes further the punitive and 
deterrent purposes that have bel!n 
found sufficient to uphold, against 
constitutional challen9e, the 
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applioation of other forfeiture 
statutes to the property of innocents. 
416 u.s. at 686, 40 L.Ed.2d at 470. (~phasis supplied). 
We find that forfeiture is directed to the pre~cntion 
of serious public harm, and is within the legitimato 
exercise of the police power. Accordingly, here, no taking 
occurred.2 
B. Dua Process 
ha Dn nddltionftl suutalninq qround, Respondents assert 
th8t the seizure violated )he Due Process clause of tho 
South Carolina Constitution., __ .as no pre-seizure notice was 
eorved, nor any opportunity to be heard afforded. We 
disagree. 
In Moora v. Timrnorman', 276 S.C. 104, 109, 276 S.E.2d 
290, 293 {1981) we heldz ' 
if all property geized is intended 
to be subject to forfeiture, then the 
parties claiming an interest in the 
property must bo afforded the baeio 
duo process notice and hearin~ ••• 
(they] must ba given an opportunity 
to come forward and show, i£ [they) 
can, why the res should not be 
forfeited and-aisposed of as provided 
for by law. (Emphasis supplied). 
Implicit in this holding is that notice and hearing must be 
afforded after the property is seized. 
We find no authority that seizure of real property 
requires pre-seizure notice and hearing. Indead, the u. s. 
Supreme Court in Caloro-'l'oledo recognized that seizure for 
the purpose of forfeiture npresents an •extcaordinary• 
situation in which postponement of notice and hearing until 
2 We reject Respondante' contention that seizure of 
their properties amounts to a taking ae thoy m;l bo 
"innocent owners.• This argument was ~pecifically re acted 
by th& U. S. Supreme Court in · ca lero-Toledo. Moreover, 
assuming they are able to demonstrate that they are 1 in 
fact., innocent owners, they may be entitled to return of the 
property under s. C. Code Ann. §44-53-586 (Cum. Supp. 1990). 
3 s. c. Const., A~t. I, ·sl. 
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after eei~ure (does] not deny due process." 416 u.s. at 
680, ~s.ct. at 2090, 40 L.Ed.2d at 466. Moreover, courts 
have consistently--riald that. poet-eeiture procedures are 
sufficient. See, e.g., Allen v. Tucker, 715 F.Supp. 266 
(E.D. Mo. 19~ u.s. v. 26.07~ Acres, 687 F.Supp. 1005 
(E.D. N.C. 1988) J U. S. v. A Sin le 'ramil Residence, 803 
F.2d 625 (11th Cir. 86 • In Allen, the court state : 
A claimant's contention that his 
procedural due process rights have 
been violated without a hearing 
prior to thG taking of his property 
is untenable whon the claimant is 
afforded the full weight of ju41cial 
process in proceedinc;Js, such a9 these 
preeently before,. tho .court, to 
determine if t.~e claimant's property 
was properly forfeited. 
715 F.Supp. at 268 (citation omitted). 
South Caro11na requires that, onoa property is seized, 
the court issue its rule to show cause to all persons with 
an interest in the property. S. C .. Coda Ann. §44-53-530 (1) 
(Cum. supp. 1990). Thorenfter., the judga must conduct a 
hearing to determine whether th9 property is, in fact, 
subject to forfeiture. MorGover, any · •• innocent owner may 
petition for return of the seized property by demonstratinq 
that he did not oonsont to, qr havo knowledge of tho use of 
the property.~ s. c. Code Ann. §44-53-596 (Cum. Supp • 
1990). Lastly, Rule 65, s.c.R.C.P., authorizes property 
owners, who can demonstrate irreparable injury, to move for 
a tomporary restraining order or injunction. 
We, like the major! ty of jurisdictions, find these 
procedures satisfy due process requirements • 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse so much of the order of the Circuit court as 
holds that tho forfeiture constituted a taking; we affirm 
its ruling on due process • 
AFFIRMED IN PARTJ REVERSED IN PART. 
GRBGOlY, c.J •• HARWELL and TO~, · JJ., concur. 
conc:urri.ng in part and diDBonting in part • 
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*1 The Government filed an in rem action against the parcel of land on 
which respondent's home is located, alleging that she had purchased the 
property with funds given her by Joseph Brenna that were ' 'the proceeds 
traceable" to illegal drug trafficking, and that the property was therefore 
subject to seizure and forfeiture under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act of 1970, 21 U. s. c. s ' 881(a) (6). The District Court ruled, 
among other things, that respondent, who claims that she had no knowledge of 
the origins of the funds used to buy her house, could not invoke the 
• 
• 
' 'innocent owner" . defense ins 881(a)(6), which provides that ' 'no property e 
shall be forfeited •.. , to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of 
any act ••• established by that owner to have been committed ... without the 
knowledge or consent of that owner." The Court of Appeals remanded on 
interlocutory appeal, rejecting the District .Court's reasoning that the 
innocent owner defense may be invoked only by persons who are bona fide 
purchasers for value and by those who acqu.ired their property interests before 
the acts giving rise to the forfeiture took place. 
Held: The judgment is affirmed. 
937 F. 2d 98, affirmed. 
JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE O'CONNOR, and JUSTICE 
SOUTER, concluded that an owner's lack of knowledge of the fact that her home 
had been purchased with the proceeds o f illegal drug transactions constitutes a 
defense to a forfeiture proceeding under the statute. Pp. 5-18. 
(a) The task of construing the statute must be approached with caution. 
Although customs, piracy, and revenue laws have long provided for the official 
seizure and forfeiture of tangible property used in the commission of criminal 
activity, the statute marked an important expansion of governmental power by 
authorizing the forfeiture of proceeds from the sale of illegal goods and by 
creating an express and novel protection for innocent owners. Pp. 5-10. 
(b) The statute's use of the unqualified term ' 'owner" in three places is 
sufficiently unambiguous to foreclose any contention that the protection 
afforded to innocent owners is limited to bona fide purchasers. That the funds 
respondent used to purchase her home were a gift does not, therefore, 
disqualify her from claiming that she is such an owner. Pp. 10-11. 
(c) Contrary to the Government's contention, the statute did not vest 
• 
• 
• 
ownership in the United States at the moment when the proceeds of the illegal 
drug transaction were used to pay the purchase price of the property at issue, 
thereby preventing respondent from ever becoming an ' 'owner." Neither of e 
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the ' 'relation back" doctrines relied on by the Government-the doctrine 
embodied ins 881(h), which provides that' '[a]11 right, title and interest in 
• property described in subsection (a) ... shall vest in the United States upon 
commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section," or the 
common-law doctrine, under which a forfeiture decree effectively vests title to 
the offending res in the Government as of the date of the offending conduct-
makes the Government an owner of property before forfeiture has been decreed. 
Assuming that the common-law doctrine applies, it is clear that the fictional 
and . retroactive vesting of title thereunder is not self-executing, but occurs 
• only when the Government wins a judgment of forfeiture. Until then, someone 
else owns the property and may invoke any available defense, including the 
assertion that she is an innocent owner. A reading of s 881(h) demonstrates 
that it did not dispense with, but merely codified, the common-law doctrine and 
leads to the same result. The legislative history reveals that s 881(h) 
applies only to property that is subject to civil forfeiture under s 881(a). 
Although proceeds traceable to illegal drug transactions are, ins 881(h)'s 
• words, ' 'property described in subsection" (a)(6), the latter subsection 
exempts from civil forfeiture proceeds owned by one unaware of their criminal 
source and therefore must allow an assertion of the innocent owner defense 
before s 881 (h) applies. Pp. 11-17. 
*2 (d) This Court need not resolve, ihter alia, the parties' dispute as to 
the point at which guilty knowledge of the tainted character of property will 
deprive a party of an innocent owner defense, because respondent has assumed 
e the burden of convincing the trier of fact that she had no knowledge of the 
alleged source of Brenna's gift when she received it. Pp. 17-18. 
JUSTICE SCALIA, joined by JUSTICE THOMAS, concluded: 
1. While it is true that s 881(a)(6)'s ' 'innocent owner" exception produces 
the same result as would an ' 'innocent owner" exception to traditional common-
law forfeiture (with its relation-back principle), that conclusion cannot be 
based upon the plurality's implausible reading of the phrase ' 'property 
e described in subsection (a)." Rather, the result reached in this case is 
correct because s 881(h) is best read as an expression of the traditional 
relation-back doctrine, which is a doctrine of retroactive vesting of title 
that takes effect only upon entry of the judicial order of forfeiture or 
condemnation. Under the alternative reading-that s 881(h) provides for 
immediate, undecreed, secret vesting of title in the United states at the time 
of the illegal transaction-either the plain language of s 881(a)(6)'s innocent-
• owner provision must be slighted or the provision must be deprived of all 
effect. Additionally, the traditional relation-back principle is the only 
interpretation of s 881(h) that makes sense within the structure of the 
applicable customs forfeiture procedures, under which the Government does not 
gain title until there is a forfeiture decree, and provides the only 
explanation for the textual distinction · between s 881(a)(6)'s innocent 
' 'owner" and s 853's innocent ' 'transferee" prov1s1ons. Pp. 1-8. 
• 2. There is no proper basis for the plurality's conclusion that respondent has 
assumed the burden of proving that she had no knowledge of the alleged source 
of Brenna's gift when she received it, as opposed to when the illegal acts 
giving rise to forfeiture occurred. The issue of what is the relevant time for 
purposes of determining lack of knowledge is not fairly included in the 
question on which the Court granted certiorari, and the Court need not resolve 
COPR. (C) WEST 1993 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
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STEVENS, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in 
which BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, and SOUTER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an 
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined. KENNEDY, J., • 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, c. J., and WHITE, J., joined. 
JUSTICE STEVENS announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, 
in which JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE O'CONNOR, and JUSTICE SOUTER join. 
The question presented is whether an owner's lack of knowledge of the fact 
that her horne had been purchased with the proceeds of illegal drug transactions • 
constitutes a defense to a forfeiture proceeding under The Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, s 511(a), 84 Stat. 1276, as 
amended, 21 u. s. c. s 881(a)(6). [FN1] 
I 
*3 On April 3, 1989, the Government filed an in rem action against the 
parcel of land in Rumson, New Jersey, on which respondent's horne is located. 
The verified complaint alleged that the property had been purchased in 1982 by • 
respondent with funds provided by Joseph Brenna that were "the proceeds 
traceable to an [unlawful] exchange for a controlled substance," App. 13, and 
that the property was therefore subject to seizure and forfeiture under s 
881(a) (6). Id., at 15. [FN2] · 
On April 12, 1989, in an ex parte proceeding, the District Court determined 
that there was probable cause to believe the premises were subject to 
forfeiture, and issued a summons and warrant for arrest authorizing the United • 
States Marshal to take possession of the premises. Respondent thereafter 
asserted a claim to the property, was granted the right to defend the action, 
[FN3] and filed a motion f or summary judgment. 
During pretrial proceedings, the following facts were established. In 1982, 
Joseph Brenna gave respondent approximately $240,000 to purchase the home that 
she and her three children have occupied ever since. Respondent is the sole 
owner of the property. From 1981 until their separation in 1987, she maintained• 
an intimate personal relationship with Brenna. There is probable cause to 
believe that the funds used to buy the house were proceeds of illegal drug 
trafficking, but respondent swears that she had no knowledge of its origins. 
Among the grounds advanced in support of her motion for summary judgment was 
the claim that she was an "innocent owner" within the meaning of s 881(a)(6). 
The District Court rejected this defense for two reasons: First it ruled that 
"the innocent owner defense may only be invoked by those who can demonstrate • 
that they are bona fide purchasers for value" (emphasis in original). [FN4] 
Second, the court read the statute to offer the innocent owner defense only to 
persons who acquired an interest in the property before the acts giving rise to 
the forfeiture took place. [FN5] 
Respondent was allowed to take an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. s. 
c. s 1292(b). One of the controlling questions of law presented to the Court • 
of Appeals was: 
"Whether an innocent owner defense may be asserted by a person who is not a 
bona fide purchaser for value concerning a parcel of land where the government 
has established probable cause to believe that the parcel of land was purchased 
with monies traceable to drug proceeds." 742 F. Supp. 189, 192 (NJ 1990). 
Answering that question in the affirmative, the court of Appeals remanded the 
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case to the District Court to determine whether respondent was, in fact, an 
innocent owner. The Court of Appeals refused to limit the innocent owner 
defense to bona fide purchasers for value because the plain language of the 
e statute contains no such limitation, [FN6] because it read the legislative 
history as indicating that the term ''owner" should be broadly construed, [FN7) 
and because the difference between the text of s BB1(a)(6) and the text of the 
criminal forfeiture statute evidenced cong~essional intent not to restrict the 
civil section in the same way. [FNB] 
*4 . The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that respondent could 
not be an innocent owner unless she acquired the property before the drug 
e transaction occurred. In advancing that argument the Government had relied on 
the "relation back" doctrine embodied ins 881(h), which provides that "(a]11 
right, title and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this 
section shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise 
to forfeiture under this section." The court held that the relation back 
doctrine applied only to "property described in subsection (a)" and that the 
property at issue would not fit that description if respondent could establish 
e her innocent owner defense. The court concluded that the Government's 
interpretation of s BB1(h) "would essentially serve to emasculate the innocent 
owner defense provided for in section BB1(a)(6). No one obtaining property 
after the occurrence of the drug transaction-including a bona fide purchaser 
for value-would be eligible to offer an innocent owner defense on his 
behalf." 937 F. 2d 98, 102 (tA3 1991) at 9a~ 
The conflict between the decision of the Court of Appeals and decisions of the 
• Fourth and Tenth Circuits, see In re One 1985 Nissan, 889 F. 2d 1317 (CA4 
1989); Eggleston v. Colorado, 873 F. 2d 242, 245-248 (CA10 1989), led us to 
grant certiorari, 503 U. s. (1992). We now affirm. 
II 
Laws providing for the official seizure and forfeiture of tangible property 
used in criminal activity have played an important role in the history of our 
• country. Colonial courts regularly exercised jurisdiction to enforce English 
and local statutes authorizing the seizure of ships and goods used in violation 
of customs and revenue laws. [FN9) Indeed, the misuse of the hated general 
warrant is often cited as an important cause of the American Revolution. [FN10] 
The First Congress enacted legislation authorizing the seizure and forfeiture 
of ships and cargos involved in customs offenses. [FN11] Other statutes 
authorized the seizure of ships engaged in piracy. [FN12] When a ship was 
• engaged in acts of "piratical aggression," it was subject to confiscation 
notwithstanding the innocence of the owner of the vessel. [FN13] Later statutes 
involved the seizure and forfeiture of distilleries and other property used to 
defraud the United States of tax revenues from the sale of alcoholic 
beverages. See, e.g., United States v. Stowell, 133 u. s. 1, 11-12 (1890). 
In these cases, as in the piracy cases, the innocence of the owner of premises 
leased to a distill er would not defeat a decree of condemnation based on the 
• fraudulent conduct of the lessee. [FN14] 
• 
• 
In all of these early cases the Government's right to take possession of 
property stemmed from the misuse of the property itself. Indeed, until our 
decision in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. s. 294 {1967), the Government had power 
to seize only property that " 'the private citizen was not permitted to 
possess." ' [FN15] The holding in that case that the Fourth Amendment did not 
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prohibit the seizure of "mere evid~nce" marked an important expansion of 
governmental power. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 u. s. 547, 577-580 
(1978) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
*5 The decision by Congress in 1978 to amend the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1236, to authorize the seizure 
and forfeiture of proceeds of illegal drug transactions, see 92 stat. 3777, 
5 
also marked an important expansion of governmental power. [FN16] Before that 
amendment, the statute had authorized forfeiture of only the illegal substances 
themselves and the instruments by which they were manufactured and 
• 
• 
distributed. [FN17] The original forfeiture provisions of the 1970 statute had• 
closely paralleled the early statutes used to enforce the customs laws, the 
piracy laws, and the revenue laws: They generally authorized the forfeiture of 
property used in the commission of criminal activity, and they contained no 
innocent owner defense. They applied to stolen goods, but they did not apply 
to proceeds from the sale of stolen goods. Because the statute, after its 1978 
amendment, does authorize the forfeiture of such proceeds and also contains an 
express and novel protection for innocent owners, we approach the task of 
construing it with caution. 
III 
The court of Appeals correctly concluded that the protection afforded to 
innocent owners is not limited to bon~ fide purchasers. The text of the 
statute is the strongest support for this conclusion. The statute authorizes 
the forfeiture of moneys exchanged for a controlled substance, and "all 
• 
proceeds traceable to such an exchange," with one unequivocal exception: e 
"[N]o property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the 
interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that 
owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of 
that owner." 21 U. S. C. s 881(a)(6). 
The term "owner" is used three times and each time it is unqualified. Such 
language is sufficiently unambiguous to foreclose any contention that it 
applies only to bona fide purchasers. Presumably that explains why the e 
Government does not now challenge this aspect of the Court of Appeals' ruling. 
That the funds respondent used to purchase her home were a gift does not, 
therefore, disqualify respondent from claiming that she is an owner who had no 
knowledge of the alleged fact that those funds were "proceeds traceable'' to 
illegal sales of controlled substances. Under the terms of the statute, her 
status would be precisely the same if, instead of having received a gift of 
$240,000 from Brenna, she had sold him a house for that price and used the • 
proceeds to buy the property at issue. 
IV 
Although the Government does not challenge our interpretation of the statutory 
term "owner", it insists that respondent is not the "owner" of a house she 
bought in 1982 and has lived in ever since. Indeed, it contends that she never 
has been the owner of this parcel of land because the statute vested ownership • 
in the United States at the moment when the proceeds of an illegal drug 
transaction were used to pay the purchase price. In support of its position, 
the Government relies on both the text of the 1984 amendment to the statute and 
the common-law relation back doctrine. We conclude, however, that neither the 
amendment nor the common-law rule makes the Government an owner of property 
before forfeiture has been decreed. 
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*6 In analyzing the Government's relation back argument, it is important to 
remember that respondent invokes the innocent owner defense against a claim 
that proceeds traceable to an illegal transaction are forfeitable. The 
Government contends that the money that Brenna received in exchange for 
narcotics became Government property at the moment Brenna received it and that 
respondent's house became Government property when that tainted money was used 
in its purchase. Because neither the money nor the house could have 
constituted forfeitable proceeds until after an illegal transaction occurred, 
t he Government's submission would effectively eliminate the innocent owner 
defense in almost every imaginable case in which proceeds could be forfeited. 
It seems unlikely that Congress would create a meaningless defense. Moreover, 
considering that a logical application of the Government's submission would 
result in the forfeiture of property innocently acquired by persons who had 
been paid with illegal proceeds for providing goods or services to drug 
traffickers, [FN18) the burden of persuading us that Congress intended such an 
inequitable result is especially heavy. 
The Government recognizes that the 1984 amendment did not go into effect until 
two years after respondent acquired the property at issue in this case. It 
therefore relies heavily on the common-law relation back doctrine applied to in 
rem forfeitures. That doctrine applied the fiction that property used in 
violation of law was itself the wrongdoer that must be held to account for the 
harms it had caused. [FN19] Because the property, or "res", was treated as the 
wrongdoer, it was appropriate to regard it as the actual party to the in rem 
forfeiture proceeding. Under the relation back doctrine, a decree of 
forfeiture had the effect of vesting title to the offending res in the Govern 
ment as of the date of its offending conduct. Because we are not aware of any 
common-law precedent for treating proceeds traceable to an unlawful exchange as 
a fictional wrongdoer subject to forfeiture, it is not entirely clear that the 
common-law relation back doctrine is applicable. Assuming that the doctrine 
does apply, however, it is nevertheless clear that under the common-law rule 
the fictional and retroactive vesting was not self-executing • 
Chief Justice Marshall explained that forfeiture does not automatically vest 
title to property in the Government: 
"It has been proved, that in all forfeitures accruing at common law, nothing 
vests in the government until some legal step shall be taken for the assertion 
of its right, after which, for many purposes, the doctrine of relation carries 
back the title to the commission of the offence." United States v. Grundy, 
3 Cranch 337, 350-351 (1806}. [FN20] 
The same rule applied when a statute (a statute that contained no specific 
relation back provision) authorized the forfeiture. In a passage to which the 
Government has referred us, [FN21] we stated our understanding of how the 
Government's title to forfeited property relates back to the moment of 
forfeitability: . 
*7 "By the settled doctrine of this court, whenever a statute enacts that 
upon the commission of a certain act specific property used in or connected 
with that act shall be forfeited, the forfeiture takes effect immediately upon 
the commission of the act; the right to the property then vests in the United 
States, although their title is not perfected until judicial condemnation; the 
forfeiture constitutes a statutory transfer of the right to the United states 
at the time the offence is committed; and the condemnation, when obtained, 
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relates back to that time, and avoids all intermediate sales and alienations, 
even to purchasers in good faith." United States v. Stowell, 133 U.s., at 
16-17 (emphases added). 
If the Government wins a judgment of forfeiture under the common-law rule-
which applied to common-law forfeitures and to forfeitures under statutes 
without specific relation back provisions-the vesting of its title in the 
property r elates back to the moment when the property became forfeitable. 
Until the Government does win such a judgment, however, someone else owns the 
property. That person may therefore invoke any defense available to the owner 
of the property before the forfeiture is decreed. 
In this case a statute allows respondent to prove that she is an innocent 
owner. And, as the Chief Justice further explained in Grundy, if a forfeiture 
is authorized by statute, "the rules of the common law may be dispensed with," 
7 U. S., at 351. Congress had the opportunity to dispense with the common-
• 
• 
• 
law doctrine when it enacted s 881(h); as we read that subsection, however, 
Congress merely codified the common-law rule. Because that rule was never 
applied to the forfeiture of proceeds, and because the statute now contains an 
innocent owner defense, it may not be immediately clear that they lead to the • 
same result. 
The 1984 amendment provides: 
"All right, title, and interest in ~roperty described in subsection (a) of 
this section shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving 
rise to forfeiture under this section." · 21 U. s. c. s 881(h). 
Because proceeds traceable to illegal drug transactions are a species of 
"property described in subsection (a)," the Government argues that this 
provision has the effect of preventing such proceeds from becoming the property 
of anyone other than the United States. The argument fails. 
• 
Although proceeds subject to s 881(h) are "described" in the first part of 
subsection (a)(6), the last clause of that subsection exempts certain proceeds-
proceeds owned by one unaware of their criminal source-from forfeiture. As the 
Senate Report on the 1984 amendment correctly observed, the amendment applies • 
only to "property which is subject to civil forfeiture under section 881(a)." 
[FN22] Under s 881(a)(6), the property of one who can satisfy the innocent 
owner defense is not subject to civil forfeiture. Because the success of any 
defense available under s 881(a) will necessarily determine whether s 881(h) 
applies, s 881(a)(6) must allow an assertion of the defense before s 881(h) 
applies. [ FN23] 
*8 Therefore, when Congress enacted this innocent owner defense, and then e 
specifically inserted this relation back provision into the statute, it did not 
disturb the common-law rights of either owners of forfeitable property or the 
Government. The common-law rule had always allowed owners to invoke defenses 
made available to them before the Government's title vested, and a f ter title 
did vest, the common-law rule had always related that title back to the date of 
the commission of the act that made the specific property forfeitable. our 
decision denies the Government no benefits of the relation back doctrine. The • 
Government cannot profit from the common-law doctrine of relation back until it 
has obtained a judgment of forfeiture. And it cannot profit from the statutory 
version of that doctrine in s 881(h) until respondent has had the chance to 
invoke and offer evidence to support the innocent owner defense under s 
881(a)(6). 
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As a postscript we identify two issues that the parties have addressed, but 
that need not be decided • 
8 
The Government has argued that the Court of Appeals' construction of the 
statute is highly implausible because it would enable a transferee of the 
proceeds of an illegal exchange to qualify as an innocent owner if she was 
unaware of the illegal transaction when it occurred but learned about it before 
she accepted the forfeitable proceeds. Respondent disputes this reading of the 
statute and argues that both legislative history and common sense suggest that 
the transferee's lack of knowledge must be established as of the time the 
proceeds at issue are transferred. [FN24] Moreover, whether or not the text of 
the statute is sufficiently ambiguous to justify resort to the legislative 
history, equitable doctrines may foreclose the assertion of an innocent owner 
defense by a party with guilty knowledge of the tainted character of the 
property. In all events, we need not resolve this issue in this case; 
respondent has assumed the burden of convincing the trier of fact that she had 
no knowledge of the alleged source of Brenna's gift in 1982, when she received 
it. [FN25] In its order denying respondent's motion for summary judgment, the 
District Court assumed that respondent could prove what she had alleged, as did 
the Court of Appeals in allowing the Lnterlocutory appeal from that order. We 
merely decide, as did both of those courts, whether her asserted defense was 
insufficient as a matter of law. [FN26) 
At oral argument, the Government also suggested that the statutory reference 
to "all proceeds traceable to such an exchange" is subject to a narrowing 
construction that might avoid some of the harsh consequences suggested in the 
various amici briefs expressing concerns about the impact of the statute on 
real estate titles. See Tr. of oral Arg. 5-10, 19-25. If a house were 
received in exchange for a quantity of illegal substances and that house were 
in turn exchanged for another house, would the traceable proceeds consist of 
the first house, the second house, or both, with the Government having an 
election between the two? Questions of this character are not embraced within 
the issues that we granted certiorari to resolve, however, and for that reason, 
see Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. s., (1992) (slip op., at 13-16), we express no 
opinion concerning the proper construction of that statutory term. 
*9 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
It is so ordered • 
FN1. The statute provides: 
"The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no 
property right shall exist in them: 
11 (6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of 
value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a 
controlled substance in violation of [21 U. s. c. ss 801-904), all 
proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable 
instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any 
violation of this subcbapter, except that no property shall be forfeited 
under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason 
of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or 
omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner." 
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FN2. See n. 1, supra. The complaint also alleged that the property had 
been used in 1986 to facilitate the distribution of proceeds of an illegal • 
drug transaction, and was therefore subject to forfeiture pursuant to s 
881{a)(7), which provides: 
"The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United states and no 
property right shall exist in them: 
11 (7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including 
any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any e 
appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in 
any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a 
violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's 
imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this 
paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act 
or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted 
without the knowledge or consent of that owner." e 
No issue concerning the Government's claim under subparagraph (7) is 
presented before us. 
FN3. The United States Marshals Service entered into an agreement with 
respondent that allows her to remain in possession of the property pending 
the outcome of the litigation • . 
FN4. "I find that the claimant cannot successfully invoke the 'innocent 
owner' defense here, because she admits that she received the proceeds to 
purchase the premises as a gift from Mr. Brenna. More particularly, I find 
that where, as here, the government has demonstrated probable cause to 
believe that property is traceable to proceeds from drug transactions, the 
innocent owner defense may only be invoked by those who can demonstrate 
that they are bona fide purchasers for value." 738 F. Supp. 854, 860 
(NJ 1990). 
FN5. "In particular, the 'innocent owner defense' at issue provides that 
'no property shall be forfeited ... to the extent of the interest of an 
owner, by reason of any act or omission ... committed or omitted without 
the knowledge or consent of that owner.' 21 u. s. c. s 
881{a){6) (emphasis supplied). This language implies that the acts or 
omissions giving rise to forfeiture must be committed after the third party 
acquires a legitimate ownership interest in the property." Ibid. (Emphasis 
in original.) 
FN6. "Despite the appeal of this analysis, the plain language of the 
innocent owner provision speaks only in terms of an 'owner' and in no way 
limits the term 'owner' to a bona fide purchaser for value." 937 F. 2d 
98, 101 (CA3 1991). 
FN7. "Furthermore, in United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 
6109 Grubb Road, 886 F. 2d 618 {3d Cir. 1989), we determined, after 
reviewing the legislative history of section 881(a)(6), that 'the term 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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"owner" should be broadly interpreted to include any person with a 
recognizable legal or equitable interest in the property seized.' Id. 
at 625 n. 4 (quoting 1978 U. s. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 9522-23) ." 
Id., at 101-102. 
FN8. "Moreover, as the district court pointed out, the criminal forfeiture 
statute, section 853, is explicitly limited to bona fide purchasers for 
value, while in section 881 Congress omitted such limiting language. We 
believe that such a difference was intended by Congress." Ibid . 
FN9. "Long before the adoption of the Constitution the common law courtsin 
the· Colonies-and later in the states during the period of Confederation-
were exercising jurisdiction in rem in the enforcement of forfeiture 
statutes. Like the Exchequer, in cases of seizure on navigable waters they 
exercised a jurisdiction concurrently with the courts of admiralty. But 
the vice-admiralty courts in the Colonies did not begin to function with 
any real continuity until about 1700 or shortly afterward. See Andrews, 
Vice-Admiralty Courts in the Colonies, in Records of the Vice-Admiralty 
Court of Rhode Island, 1617-1752 (ed. Towle, 1936), p. 1; Andrews, The 
Colonial Period of American History, vol. 4, ch. 8; Harper, The English 
Navigation Laws, ch. 15; Osgood, 'the American Colonies in the 18th 
century, val. 1, pp. 185-222, 299-303. By that time, the jurisdiction of 
common law courts to condemn ships and cargoes for violation of the 
Navigation Acts had been firmly established, apparently without question, 
and was regularly exercised throughout the colonies. In general the suits 
were brought against the vessel or article to be condemned, were tried by 
jury, closely followed the procedure in Exchequer, and if successful 
resulted in judgments of forfeiture or condemnation with a provision for 
sale." C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U. s. 133, 139-140 
(1943) (footnotes omitted) . 
FN10. Writing for the Court in stanford v. Texas, 379 u. s. 476, 481-
482 (1965). Justice Stewart explained: "Vivid in the memory of the newly 
independent Americans were those general warrants known as writs of 
assistance under which officers of the Crown had so bedeviled the 
colonists. The hated writs of assistance had given customs officials 
blanket authority to search where they pleased for goods imported in 
violation of the British tax laws. They were denounced by James Otis as 
'the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English 
liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an 
English law book,' because they placed 'the liberty of every man in the 
hands of every petty officer.' The historic occasion of that denunciation, 
in 1761 at Boston, has been characterized as 'perhaps the most prominent 
event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions 
of the mother country. "Then and there," said John Adams, "then and there 
was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims 
of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born."' Boyd 
v. United States, 116 u. s. 616, 625." 
FN11. see e.g., ss 12, 36, 1 Stat~ 39, 47; ss 13, 14, 22, 27, 67, 1 
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Stat. 157-159, 161, 163-164, 176. 
FN12. See The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1, 8 (1827). 
FN13. "The next question is, whether the innocence of the owners can 
withdraw the ship from the penalty of confiscation under the act of 
• 
• 
Congress. Here, again, it may be remarked that the act makes no exception 
whatsoever, whether the aggression be with or without the co-operation of 
the owners. The vessel which commits the aggression is treated as the 
offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture 
attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of e 
the owner. The vessel or boat (says the act of Congress) from which such 
piratical aggression, & c., shall have been first attempted or made shall 
be condemned. Nor is there any thing new in a provision of this sort. It 
is not an uncommon course in the admiralty, acting under the law of 
nations, to treat the vessel in which or by which, or by the master or crew 
thereof, a wrong or offense has been done as the offender, without any 
regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the ownere 
thereof. And this is done from the necessity of the case, as the only 
adequate means of suppressing the offense or wrong, or insuring an 
indemnity to the injured party. The doctrine also is familiarly applied to 
cases of smuggling and other misconduct under our revenue laws; and has 
been applied to other kindred c ases, such as cases arising on embargo and 
non-intercourse acts. In short, the acts of the master and crew, in cases 
of this sort, bind the interest of the owner of the ship, whether he be • 
innocent or guilty; and he impliedly submits to whatever the law denounces 
as a forfeiture attached to the ship by reason of their unlawful or wanton 
wrongs." United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 2 How. 210, 233-234 (1844). 
FN14. "Beyond controversy, the title of the premises and property was in 
the claimant; and it is equally certain that he leased the same to the 
lessee for the purposes of a distillery, and with the knowledge that the 
lessee intended to use the premises to carry on that business, and that he 
did use the same for that purpose. 
• 
"Fraud is not imputed to the owner of the premises; but the evidence and 
the verdict of the jury warrant the conclusion that the frauds charged in 
the information were satisfactorily proved, from which it follows that the 
decree of condemnation is correct, if it be true, as heretofore explained, e 
that it was the property and not the claimant that was put to trial under 
the pleadings; and we are also of the opinion that the theory adopted by 
the court below, that, if the lessee of the premises and the operator of 
the distillery committed the alleged frauds, the government was entitled to 
a verdict, even though the jury were of the opinion that the claimant was 
ignorant of the fraudulent acts or omissions of the distiller." Dobbins's 
Distillery v. United States, 96 u. s. 395, 403-404 (1878). 
• 
FN15. "Thus stolen property-the fruits of crime-was always subject to 
seizure. And the power to search for stolen property was gradually 
extended to cover 'any property which the private citizen was not permitted 
to 'possess,' which included instrumentalities of crime (because of the 
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early notion that items used in crime were forfeited to the State) and 
contraband. Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the criminal 
Law, 49 calif. L. Rev. 474, 475. No separate governmental interest in 
seizing evidence to apprehend and convict criminals was recognized; it was 
required that some property interest be asserted. The remedial structure 
also reflected these dual premises. Trespass, replevin, and the other 
means of redress for persons aggrieved by searches and seizures, depended 
upon proof of a superior property interest. And since a lawful seizure 
presupposed a superior claim, it was inconceivable that a person could 
recover property lawfully seized." Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. s. 294, 
303-304 (1967). 
FN16. A precedent for this expansion had been established in 1970 by the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), see 18 u. s. 
C. s 1963(a). Even RICO, however, did not specifically provide for the 
forfeiture of "proceeds" until 1984, when Congress added s 1963(a)(3) to 
resolve any doubt whether it intended the statute to reach so far. See s . 
Rep. No. 98-225, pp. 191-200 (1983); Russello v. United States, 464 U. 
s. 16 (1983). 
FN17. Section 511(a) of the 1970 Act, 84 Stat. 1276, provided: 
"The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no 
property right shall exist in them: 
"(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, 
dispensed, or acquired in violation of this title. 
"(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, 
or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, 
importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this 
title. 
"(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for 
property described in paragraph (1) or (2) • 
11 (4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are 
used, or are intended for use, to transport , or in any manner to facilitate 
the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property 
described in paragraph (1) or (2), except that-
"(A) no conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the 
transaction of business as a common carrier shall be forfeited under the 
provisions of this section unless it shall appear that the owner or other 
person in charge of such conveyance was a consenting party or privy toa 
violation of this title or title III; and 
"(B) no conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section 
by reason of any act or omission established by the owner thereof to have 
been committed or omitted by any person other than such owner while such 
conveyance was unlawfully in the possession of a person other than the 
owner in violation of the criminal laws of the United States, or of any 
State. 
"(5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, 
tapes, and data which are used, or intended for use, in violation of this 
title." 
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FN18. At oral argument the Government suggested that a narrow 
interpretation of the word "proceeds" would "probably" prevent this 
absurdity, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. The Government's brief, however, took 
the unequivocal position that the statute withholds the innocent owner • 
defense from anyone who acquires proceeds after the illegal transaction 
took place. See Brief for United States 10, 21, 25, 27. 
FN19. See Calera-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.s. 663, 
680-684 (1974). 1 
FN20. In his dissent, JUSTICE KENNEDY advocates the adoption of a new 
common law rule that would avoid the need to construe the terms of the 
statute that created the Government's right to forfeit proceeds of drug 
transactions. Under his suggested self-executing rule, patterned after an 
amalgam of the law of trusts and the law of secured transactions, the 
Government would be treated as the owner of a secured or beneficial 
interest in forfeitable proceeds even before a decree of forfeiture is 
entered. The various authorities that he cites support the proposition 
that if such an interest exists, it may be extinguished by a sale to a bona 
fide purchaser; they provide no support for the assumption that such an 
interest springs into existence iridependently. As a matter of common law, 
his proposal is inconsistent with Chief Justice Marshall's statement that 
"nothing vests in the government until some legal step shall be taken," and 
• 
• 
with the cases cited by JUSTICE SCALIA, post, at 2. As a matter of e 
statutory law, it is improper to rely on s 881(a) as the source of the 
government's interest in proceeds without also giving effect to the 
statutory language defining the scope of that interest. That a statutory 
provision contains "puzzling" language, or seems unwise, is not an 
appropriate reason for simply ignoring its text. 
JUSTICE KENNEDY'S dramatic suggestion that our construction of the 1984 
amendment "rips out," post, at 7, the "centerpiece of the nation'sdrug 
enforcement laws," post, at 5, rests on what he characterizes as the "safe" 
assumption that the innocent owner defense would be available to "an 
associate" of a criminal who could "shelter the proceeds from forfeiture, 
to be reacquired once he is clear from law enforcement authorities." Post, 
at 6. As a matter of fact, forfeitable proceeds are much more likely to be 
possessed by drug dealers themselves than by transferees sufficiently 
remote to qualify as innocent owners; · as a matter of law, it is quite 
clear that neither an "associate" in the criminal enterprise nor a 
temporary custodian of drug proceeds would qualify as an innocent owner; 
indeed, neither would a sham bona fide purchaser. 
FN21. See Pet. for Cert. 9-10; Brief for United States 17. 
FN22. The Report provides: 
"Section 306 also adds two new subsections at the end of section 881. The 
first provides that all right, title, and interest in property which is 
subject to civil forfeiture under section 881(a) vests in the United States 
upon the commission of the acts giving rise to the forfeiture." s. Rep. 
No. 98-225, p. 215 (1983) (emphasis added). 
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FN23. The logic of the Government's argument would apparently apply as 
well to the innocent owner defense added to the statute in 1988. That 
amendment provides, in part: 
"[N]o conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of 
an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by 
that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, 
consent, or willful blindness of the owner." s 6075(3)(C), 102 Stat. 
4324. That amendment presumably was enacted to protect lessors like the 
owner whose yacht was forfeited in a proceeding that led this Court to 
observe: 
"It therefore has been implied that it would be difficult t o reject the 
constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had 
been taken from him without his privity or consent. See, id., at 364; 
Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.s., at 512; United States 
v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U. s., at 333; Van Oster v. Kansas, 
272 U. s., at 467. Similarly, the same might be said of an owner who 
proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful 
activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected 
to prevent the proscribed use of his property; for, in that circumstance, 
it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate 
purposes and was not unduly oppressive. Cf. Armstrong v. United states, 
364 u. s. 40, 49 (1960)." Calera-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 
416 u. s. 663, 689-690 (1974). (footnote omitted) . 
FN24. See Brief for Respondent 31-32, 37-38; Tr. of oral Arg. 38. The 
several amici make the same point, see Brief for American Bankers 
Association as Amicus curiae 15; Brief for Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation as Amicus curiae 11-12; Brief for American Land Title 
Association et al. as Amici Curiae 11-12; Brief for Dade County Tax 
Collector et al. as Amici Curiae 16-17 . 
FN25. "The statute should be read to require that the owner assert his 
lack of knowledge of the criminal transaction at the time of the transfer. 
Since Goodwin did not have any knowledge of the alleged criminal 
transaction until long after the transfer, she should be protected by the 
innocent owner clause." Brief for Respondent 37-38 • 
FN26. If she can show that she was unaware of the illegal source of the 
funds at the time Brenna transferred them to her, then she was necessarily 
unaware that they were the profits of an illegal transaction at the time of 
the transaction itself. 
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring in the judgment • 
*10 I am in accord with much of the plurality's reasoning, but cannot join 
its opinion for two reasons. First, while I agree that the "innocent owner" 
exception in this case produces the same result as would an "innocent owner" 
exception to traditional common-law forfeiture (with its relation-back 
principle), I do not reach that conclusion through the plurality's reading of 
the phrase "property described in subsection (a)," see ante, at 14-16, which 
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seems to me implausible. Secondly, I see no proper basis for the plurality's 
concluding that "respondent has assumed the burden of convincing the trier of 
fact that she had no knowledge of the alleged source of Brenna's gift in 1982, 
when she received it," ante, at 18. • 
I 
The Government's argument in this case has rested on the fundamental 
misconception that, under the common-law relation-back doctrine, all rights and 
legal title to the property pass to the United States "at the moment of illegal 
use." Brief for United States 16. Because the Government believes that the 
doctrine operates at the time of the illegal act, it finds the term "relation • 
back" to be "something of a misnomer." Ibid. But the name of the doctrine is 
not wrong; the Government's understanding of it is. It is a doctrine of 
retroactive vesting of title that operates only upon entry of the judicial 
order of forfeiture or condemnation: "[T)he decree of condemnation when 
entered relates back to the time of the commission of the wrongful acts, and 
takes date from the wrongful acts and not from the date of t he sentence or 
decree." Henderson's Distilled Spirits, 14 Wall. 44, 56 (1871). "While, • 
under the statute in question, a judgment of forfeiture relates back to the 
date of the offense as proved, that result follows only from an effective 
judgment of condemnation." Motlow v. state ex rel. Koeln, 295 u. s. 97, 99 
(1935). The relation-back rule applies only "in cases where the [Government's] 
title ha[s] been consummated by seizure, suit, and judgment, or decree of 
condemnation," Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454, 460 (1869), whereupon "the 
doctrine of relation carries back the title to the commission of the offense," e 
United States v. Grundy, 3 Cranch 337, 350-351 (1806) (Marshall, c. J.) 
(emphasis added). See also United States v. Stowell, 133 u. s. 1, 16-17 
(1890), quoted ante, at 13-14. 
Though I disagree with the Government as to the meaning of the common-law 
doctrine, I agree with the Government that the doctrine is embodied in the 
statute at issue here. The plurality, if I understand it correctly, does not 
say that, but merely asserts that in the present case the consequence of • 
applying the statutory language is to produce the same result that an "innocent 
owner" exception under the common-law rule would produce. Title 21 U. s. 
C. s 881(h) provides: "All right, title, and interest in property described in 
subsection (a) of this section shall vest in the United States upon commission 
of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section." The plurality would 
read the phrase "property described in subsection (a)" as not encompassing any 
property that is protected from forfeiture by the "innocent owner" provision • 
of s 881(a)(6). It proceeds to reason that since, therefore, the application 
of (a){6) must be determined before (h) can be fully applied, respondent must 
be considered an "owner" under that provision-just as she would have been 
considered an "owner" (prior to decree of forfeiture) at common law. 
*11 I would not agree with the plurality's conclusion, even if I agreed 
with the premises upon which it is based. The fact that application of (a)(6) • 
must be determined before (h) can be fully applied simply does not establish 
that the word "owner" in (a)(6) must be deemed to include (as it would at 
common law) anyone who held title prior to the actual decree of forfeiture. To 
assume that is simply to beg the question. Besides the fact that its 
conclusion is a non sequitur, the plurality's premises are mistaken. To begin 
with, the innocent-owner provision in (a)(6) does not insulate any "property 
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described" in (a)(6) from forfeiture; it protects only the "interest" of 
certain owners in any of the described property. But even if it could be 
regarded as insulating some "property described" from forfeiture, that property 
would still be covered by subsection (h), which refers to "property described," 
not "property forfeited." In sum, I do not see how the plurality can, solely 
by focusing on the phrase "property described in subsection (a)," establish 
that the word "owner" in subsection (a) includes persons holding title after 
the forfeiture-producing offense. 
The Government agrees with m~ that s 88l(h) "covers all ' property described in 
subsection (a),' including property so described t hat is nonetheless exempted 
from forfeiture because of the innocent owner defense." Brief for United 
States 29. That position is quite incompatible, however, with the Government's 
contention that s 88l(h) operates at the time of the wrongful act, since if 
both were true no one would be protected under the plain language of the 
innocent-owner provision. In the Govern ment's view , the term "owner" in s 
88l(a)(6) refers to individuals "who owned the seize d assets before those 
assets were ever tainted by involvement in drug transactions." Id., at 21 • 
But if s 88l(h) operates immediately to vest in the Government legal title to 
all property described ins 88l(a), even that class of "owners" would be 
immediately divested of their property interests and would be at most "former 
owners" at the time of forfeiture proceedings. Because of this difficulty, the 
Government is forced to argue that the word "owner" ins 88l(a)(6) should be 
interpreted to mean "former owner." Reply Brief for United States 5. Thus, 
if s 88l(h) operates at the time of the illegal transaction as the Government 
contends, either the plain language of the innocent-owner provision must be 
slighted or the provision must be deprived of all effect. This problem does 
not exist if s 881(h) is read to be, not an unheard-of provision for immediate, 
undecreed, secret vesting of title in the United States, but rather an 
expression of the traditional relation-back doctrine-stating when title shall 
vest if forfeiture is decreed. On that hypothesis, the person holding legal 
title is genuinely the "owner" at the time (prior to the decree of forfeiture) 
that the court applies s 881(a)(6)'s innocent-owner provision. 
*12 I acknowledge that there is some textual difficulty with the 
interpretation I propose as well: s 881(h) says that title "shall vest in the 
United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture," and I am 
reading it to say that title "shall vest in the United States upon forfeiture, 
effective as of commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture." The former 
is certainly an imprecise way of saying the latter. But it is, I think, an 
imprecision one might expect in a legal culture familiar with retroactive 
forfeiture, and less of an imprecision than any of the other suggested 
interpretations require. Moreover, this· interpretation locates the imprecision 
within a phrase where clear evidence of imprecision exists, since s 881(h)'s 
statement that "all right ••• shall vest in the United States" flatly 
contradicts the statement in s 881(a) that "[t]he following shall be subject to 
forfeiture to the United States." What . the United States already owns cannot 
be forfeited to it. 
This interpretation of s 881(h) is the only one that makes sense within the 
structure of the statutory forfeiture procedures. Subsection 881(d) provides 
that forfeitures under s 881 are governed by the procedures applicable to 
"summary and judicial forfeiture, and condemnation of property for violation of 
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the customs laws," set forth in 19 U. s. c. s 1602 et seq. It is clear from 
these procedures that the Government does not gain title to the property until 
there is a decree of forfeiture. Section 1604, for example, requires the 
Attorney General to commence proceedings in district court where such 
proceedings are "necessary" "for the recovery'' of a forfeiture. See United 
States v. $8,850, 461 U. s. 555, 557-558, and n. 2 (1983) (detailing 
circumstances requiring judicial forfeiture proceedings). If, however, legal 
title to the property actually vested in the United States at the time of the 
illegal act, judicial forfeiture proceedings would never be "necessary." Under 
the customs forfeiture procedures the United States can, in certain limited 
circumstances, obtain title to property by an executive declaration of 
forfeiture. The statute provides that such an executive "declaration of 
forfeiture ... shall have the same force and effect as a final decree and order 
of forfeiture in a judicial forfeiture proceeding in a district court of the 
United States," and then specifies what that effect is: "Title shall be deemed 
to vest in the United States .•. from the date of the act for which the 
forfeiture was incurred." 19 u. s. c. s 1609(b) (emphasis added). Finally, 
if the Government's construction of s 881(h) were correct, the statute-of-
limitations provision, 19 u. s. c. s 1621, [FN1] would need to state that 
title reverts to the former owners of the property, rather than (as it does) 
simply limit the right of the United States to institute an "action to recover" 
a forfeiture. (FN2] 
• 
• 
• 
The traditional operation of the relation-back doctrine also explains the 
textual difference between s 881(a)(6)'s innocent-"owner" and s 853's innocent-• 
"transferee" provisions-a difference on which the Government relies heavily. 
See Brief for United States 31-35; Reply Brief for United States 10-11. 
Section 853, which provides for forfeiture of drug-related assets in connection 
with criminal convictions, uses the term "transferee"-not "owner"-to protect 
the interests of persons who acquire property after the illegal act has 
occurred. (FN3] The Govern ment contends that the reason for this variance is 
that the term "owner" simply does not cover persons acquiring interests after • 
the illegal act. That explanation arrives under a cloud of suspicion, since it 
is impossible to imagine (and the Government was unable to suggest) why 
Congress would provide greater protection for postoffense owners (or 
"transferees") in the context of criminal forfeitures. The real explanation, I 
think, is that the term "owner" could not accurately be used in the context 
of s 853 because third parties can assert their property rights under that 
section only "(f]ollowing the entry of an order of forfeiture." 21 U. s. 
c. s 853(n). See also s 853(k) {prohibiting third parties from intervening to 
vindicate their property interests except as provided in subsection (n)). Thus, 
at the time the third-party interests are being adjudicated, the relation-back 
doctrine has already operated to carry back the title of the United States to 
the time of the act giving rise to the forfeiture, and the third parties have 
• 
been divested of their property interests. See s 853{c) (codifying the e 
relation-back principle for criminal forfeiture). Indeed, if the court finds 
that the transferee has a valid claim under the statute, it must "amend the 
order of forfeiture." s 853{n){6). · . 
*13 The owner/transferee distinction is found in other provisions 
throughout the United States Code, and the traditional relation-back doctrine 
provides the only explanation for it. While Congress has provided for the 
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protection of "owners" in many other forfeiture statutes, see, e.g., 15 u. 
s. c. s 715f(a) (allowing court to order the return of oil subject to 
forfeiture "to the owner thereof"); 16 U. s. c. s 2409(c) (permitting the 
e "owner" of property seized for forfeiture to recover it, pendente lite, by 
posting bond); s 2439(c) (same); 18 u. s. c. s 512(a) (permitting the 
"owner" of motor vehicle with altered identification number to avoid forfeiture 
by proving lack of knowledge), it consistently protects "transferees" in 
criminal forfeiture statutes that follow the procedure set forth in s 853: 
forfeiture first, claims of third parties second. See 18 u. s. c. s 1467 
(criminal forfeitures for obscenity ); 18 U. s. c. s 1963 (1988 ed. and supp. 
e III) (criminal RICO forfeitures); 18 u. s. c. s 2253 (1988 ed. and Supp. 
III) (criminal forfeitures for sexual exploitation of children). [FN4] 
I think the result reached today is correct because the relation-back 
principle recited in s 88l(h) is the familiar, traditional one, and the term 
"owner" ins B81(a)(6) bears its ordinary meaning. 
II 
I cannot join the piurality's c onclusion that respondent has assumed the 
• burden of proving that "she had no knowledge of the alleged source of Brenna's 
gift in 1982, when she received it." Ante, at 18. To support this, the 
plurality cites a passage from respondent's brief taking the position that the 
owner's lack of knowledge of the crimihal activity should be tested "at the 
time of the transfer,n Brief for Respondent 37-38. The fact of the matter is 
that both parties took positions before this court that may be against their 
• interests on remand. The Government may find inconvenient its contention that 
"the statutory test for innocence ..• looks to the claimant's awareness of the 
illegal acts giving rise to forfeiture at the time they occur." Reply Brief 
for United States 8. Which, if either, party will be estopped from changing 
position is an issue that we should not address for two simple reasons: (1) 
Neither party has yet attempted to change position. (2) The issue is not fairly 
included within the question on which the Court granted certiorari. (That 
e question was, "Whether a person who receives a gift of money derived from drug 
trafficking and uses that money to purchase real property is entitled to assert 
an 'innocent owner' defense in an action seeking civil forfeiture of the real 
property." Pet. for Cert. i. The plurality's reformulation of the question in 
the first sentence of the opinion is inexplicable.) 
This question of the relevant time for purposes of determining knowledge was 
not a separate issue in the case, but arose indirectly, by way of argumentation 
e on the relation-back point. The Government argued that since (as it believed) 
knowledge had to be measured at the time of the illegal act, s 881(h) must be 
interpreted to vest title in the United states immediately, because otherwise 
the statute would produce the following "untenable result": A subsequent owner 
who knew of the illegal act at the time he acquired the property, but did not 
know of it at the time the act was committed, would be entitled to the 
innocent-owner defense. Brief for United states 25. That argument can be 
e rejected by deciding either that the Government's view of the timing of 
knowledge is wrong, or that, even if it may be right, the problem it creates is 
not so severe as to compel a ruling for the Government on the relation-back 
issue. (I take the latter course: I do not find inconceivable the possibility 
that post-illegal-act transferees with post-illegal-act knowledge of the 
earlier illegality are provided a defense against forfeiture. The Government 
COPR. (C) WEST 1993 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
• 
(a) 29 
• 
• 
S.Ct. AUTHORIZED FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY PAGE 19 
(CITE AS: 1993 WL 44241, *13 (U.S.)) 
would still be entitled to the property held by the drug dealer and by close 
friends and relatives who are unable to meet their burden of proof as to 
ignorance of the illegal act when it occurred.) But it entirely escapes me how 
the Government's argument, an argument in principle, can be answered by simply e 
saying that, in the present case, respondent has committed herself to prove 
that she had no knowledge of the source of the funds at the time she received 
them. 
*14 For the reasons stated, I concur in the judgment. 
FN1. In the proceedings below, the Government argued that s 1621 was the 
relevant statute of limitations for s 881 and the Court of Appeals agreed. e 
See Brief for United States, Plaintiff-Appellee in No. 90-5823(CA3), pp. 
19-23; App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a-15a. That ruling was not appealed and 
is consistent with other authority. See United States v. One Parcel of 
Real Property, 2401 s. Claremont, Independence, Mo., 724 F. Supp. 670, 
673 (WD Mo. 1989). See also United States v. $8,850, 461 u. s. 555, 
563, n. 13 (1983) (forfeiture statute not specifying procedures to be used 
held to incorporate statute of limitations ins 1621). e 
FN2. Section 881(d) provides that the customs procedures are applicable 
only to the extent "not inconsistent with the provisions [of s 881]"-so one 
might argue that the provisions I have discussed in this paragraph, to the 
extent contrary to the Government's interpretation of s 881(h), are simply 
inapplicable. That disposition is theoretically possible but not likely, 
since it produces massive displacement of not merely the details but the • 
fundamental structure of the referenced forfeiture procedures. 
FN3. Title 21 U. s. c. s 853(c) provides: "All right, title, and 
interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section vests in 
the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture 
under this section. Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a• 
person other than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of 
forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United States, 
unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (n) 
of this section that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property 
who at the time of purchase wasreasonably without cause to believe that the 
property was subject to forfeiture under this section." 
FN4. It is worth observing that, if the Government's view of the relation-• 
back principle were correct, the protection provided for transferees in the 
last-mentioned statute would be utterly illusory. The property subject to 
forfeiture under 18 U. s. C. s 2253 (1988 ed. and supp. III) is also 
covered by a parallel civil forfeiture statute that follows the pattern 
of s 881: It protects only the rights of "owners," and has an express 
relation-back provision. See 18 U. s. c. ss 2254(a) , 2254(g) (1988 e 
ed. and Supp. III). Under the Government's view, whenever the United States 
would be unable to obtain property through the criminal forfeiture 
mechanism because of the innocent-~transferee" defense, it could simply 
move against the same property in a civil forfeiture proceeding, which 
gives a defense only to "owners." See also 18 u. s. c. s 981 (1988 ed. 
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and Supp. III) (civil forfeiture provision), 18 U. S. C. s 982 (1988 
ed., Supp. III} (parallel criminal forfeiture statute incorporating by 
reference the procedures in 21 u.s. c. s 853) . 
JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE WHITE join, 
dissenting. 
*15 Once this case left the District Court, the appellate courts and all 
counsel began to grapple with the wrong issue, one that need not be addressed. 
The right question, I submit, is not whether the donee's ownership meets the 
statutory test of innocence. 21 U. s. C. s 881(a)(6). Instead, the 
threshold and dispositive inquiry is whether the donee had any ownership rights 
that required a separate forfeiture, given that her title was defective and 
subject to the Government's claim from the outset. We must ask whether a 
wrongdoer holding a forfeitable asset, property in which the United States has 
an undoubted superior claim, can defeat that claim by a transfer for no value. 
Under settled principles of property transfers, trusts and commercial 
transactions, the answer is no. We need not address the donee's position 
except to acknowledge that she has whatever right the donor had, a right which 
falls before the Government's superior claim. In this case, forfeiture is 
determined by the title and ownership of the asset in the hands of the donor, 
not the donee. The position of respondent as the present holder of the asset 
and her knowledge, or lack of knowledge, regarding any drug offenses are, under 
these facts, but abstract inquiries, unnecessary to the resolution of the case. 
I 
We can begin with the state of affairs when the alleged drug dealer held the 
funds he was later to transfer to respondent. Those moneys were proceeds of 
unlawful drug transactions and in the dealer's hands were, without question, 
subject to forfeiture under s 881(a}(6}. The dealer did not just know of the 
illegal acts; he performed them. As the case is presented to us, any defense 
of his based on lack of knowledge is not a possibility. As long as the dealer 
held the illegal asset, it was subject to forfeiture and to the claim of the 
United States, which had a superior interest in the property. 
Suppose the drug dealer with unlawful proceeds had encountered a swindler who, 
knowing nothing of the dealer's drug offenses, defrauded him of the forfeitable 
property. In an action by the Government against the property, it need not 
seek to forfeit any ownership interest of the swindler. In the in rem 
proceeding the Government would need to establish only the forfeitable 
character of the property in the hands of the dealer and then trace the 
property to the swindler who, having no higher or better title to i nterpose, 
must yield to the Government's interest. In this context we would not 
entertain an argument that the swindler could keep the property because he had 
no knowledge of the illegal drug transaction. The defect in title arose in the 
hands of the first holder and. was not eliminated by the transfer procured 
through fraud. Thus the only possible "interest of an owner," s 881(a)(6), 
that the swindler could hold was one inferior to the interest of the United 
States. 
Here, of course, the holder is a donee, not a swindler, but the result is the 
same. As against a claimant with a superior right enforceable against the 
donor, a donee has no defense save as might exist, say, under a statute of 
limitations. The case would be different, of course, if the donee had in turn 
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transferred the property to a bona fide purchaser for full consideration. The 
voidable title in the asset at that point would become unassailable in the 
purchaser, subject to any heightened rules of innocence the Government might • 
lawfully impose under the forfeiture laws. But there is no bona fide purchaser 
here. 
*16 The matter not having been argued before us in these terms, perhaps it 
is premature to say whether the controlling law for transferring and tracing 
property rights of the United States under s 881 is federal common law, see 
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 u. s. 500 (1988): Clearfield Trust 
co. v. United States, 318 U. s. 363 (1943), or the law of the State • 
governing the transfer under normal conflict-of-law rules, which here appears 
to be New Jersey. That matter could be explored on remand if the parties 
thought anything turned upon it, though the result likely would be the same 
under either source of law because the controlling principles are so well 
settled. 
The controlling principles are established by the law of voidable title, a 
centuries-old concept now codified in 49 States as part of their adoption of e 
the Uniform Commercial Code. 1 J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 
1, 186-191 (3d ed. 1988). These principles should control the inquiry into 
whether property once "subject to forfeiture to the United States," s 881(a), 
remains so after subsequent transactions. Cf. R. Brown, Personal Property s 
70, pp. 237-238 (2d ed. 1955); Restatement (Second) of Trusts ss 284, 287, 
289, pp. 47-48, 54-56 (1959); Restatement (Second) of Property s 34.9, p. 338 
(1992). The primary rules of voidable title are manageable and few in number. e 
The first is that one who purchases property in good faith and for value from 
the holder of voidable title obtains good title. The second rule, reciprocal 
to the first, is that one who acquires property from a holder of voidable title 
other than by a good faith purchase for value obtains nothing beyond what the 
transferor held. The third rule is that a transferee who acquires property 
from a good faith purchaser for value or one of his lawful successors obtains 
good title, even if the transferee did not pay value or act in good faith. Se~ 
Ames, Purchase for Value Without Notice, 1 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1887); Uniform 
Commercial Codes 2-403(1) (Official Draft 1978); Uniform Commercial Codes 2-
403(1) (Official Draft 1957); Uniform Commercial Codes 2-403(1) (Official 
Draft 1952). See also 4 A. Scott & W. Fratcher, Law of Trusts ss 284-289, pp. 
35-70 (4th ed. 1989); Searey, Purchase for Value Without Notice, 23 Yale L. 
J. 447 (1914). 
Applying these rules to a transferee of proceeds from a drug sale, it follows • 
that the transferee must be, or take from, a bona fide purchaser for value to 
assert an innocent owner defense under s 881(a)(6). Bona fide purchasers for 
value or their lawful successors, having engaged in or benefited from a 
transaction that the law accepts as capable of creating property rights instead 
of merely transferring possession, are entitled to test their claim of 
ownership under s 881(a)(6) against what the Government alleges to be its own • 
superior right. The outcome, that one who had defective title can create good 
title in the new holder by transfer for value, is not to be condemned as some 
bizarre surprise. This is not alchemy. It is the common law. See Independent 
Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 274 U. s. 640, 647 (1927); United States 
v. Chase National Bank, 252 u. s. 485, 494 (1920); Wright-Blodgett Co. v. 
United States, 236 U. s. 397, 403 (1915). By contrast, the donee of drug 
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trafficking proceeds has no valid claim to the proceeds, not because she has 
done anything wrong but because she stands. in the shoes of one who has. It is 
the nature of the donor's interest, which the donee has assumed, that renders 
the property subject to forfeiture. Cf. Otis v. Otis, 167 Mass. 245, 246 
(1897) (Holmes, J.) ("A person to whose hands a trust fund comes by conveyance 
from the original trustee is charge able as a trustee in his turn, if he takes 
it without consideration, whether he has notice of the trust or not. This has 
been settled for three hundred years, since the time of uses"). 
*17 When the Government seeks forfeiture of an asset in the hands of a 
donee, its forfeiture claim rests on defects in the title of the asset in the 
hands of the donor. The transferee has no ownership superior to the 
transferor's which must be forfeited, so her knowledge of the drug transaction, 
or lack thereof, is quite irrelevant, as are the arcane questions concerning 
the textual application of s BBl(a) to someone in a donee's position. The so-
called innocent owner provisions of s 881(a)(6) have ample scope in other 
instances, say where a holder who once had valid ownership in property is 
alleged to have consented to its use to facilitate a drug transaction . 
Furthermore, whether respondent's marital rights were present value or an 
antecedent debt and whether either could provide the necessary cons i derat ion 
for a bona fide purchase are questions that could be explored en remand, were 
my theory of the case to control. ' 
II 
As my opening premise is so different from the one the plurality adopts, I do 
not address the difficult, and quite unnecessary, puzzles encountered in its 
opinion and in the concurring opinion of JUSTICE SCALIA. It is my obligation 
to say, however, that the plurality's opinion leaves the forfeiture scheme that 
is the centerpiece of the Nation's drug enforcement laws in quite a mess. 
The practical difficulties created by the plurality's interpretat i on of s 881 
are immense, and we should not assume Congress intended such results when it 
enacted s 88l(a)(6). To start, the plurality's interpretation of s 8 8l(a)(6) 
conflicts with the principal purpose we have identified for forfeiture under 
the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act, which is "the des ire to les sen the 
economic power of .•• drug enterprises.". Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 
491 U. S. 617, 630 (1989). When a criminal transfers d rug transaction 
proceeds to a good faith purchaser for value, one would presume he does so 
because he considers what he receives from the purchas e r to be of equal or 
greater value than what he gives to the purchaser, or because he is attempting 
to launder the proceeds by exchanging them for other property of ncar equa l 
value. In either case, the criminal's economic powe~ is diminished b y seiz i ng 
from him whatever he received in the exchange with the good faith purchaser . 
On the other hand, when a criminal transfers drug transaction proceeds to 
another without receiving value in return, he doe s so, l t is safe to a ss ume , 
e i ther to use his new-found, albeit illegal, wealth to bene fit an associate or 
to shelter the proceeds from forfeiture, to be reacquire d once he i s clear f rom 
law enforcement authorities. In these cas~s, the criminal's economi c power 
cannot be clim.in.i.shed by seLdng what he recei ved .i.n the d onative E: Xcliuuyr.:;:, [u.r: 
he recei veu nu ·tangibl e v alue. If the Gove rllme nL i s t o u.t a l 11 LL'=.! t..:.timi1ml 1 s 
economic power:· , it.. mus·L be able t.o p.ie n .;e dortali v8 L.tu!l;:;; i: L:n:> awl .L 8CclpLu.t c Lhe 
p.t-operty given in the excha nge. It is s e r ious awl su.rpr isin g Lhc.J. L Lln:: 
plu.t·ali Ly lucldy denies t he Gov e:r·ruueut the r: ighL. Lu pu.t. su8 Lilt..! Si:J.Hlc uwue .t. ;:;; l·1iEJ 
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~·--· AUTHORIZED FOR EDUCATIONAL USE 0NLi f~C£ 2j 
(CITE AS: 1993 WL 44241, *17 (U.S.)) 
claims that under traditional and well-settled principles any other claimant or 
trust beneficiary or rightful owner could assert against a possessor who took 
for no value and who has no title or interest greater than that of the 
• 
transferor. e 
*18 Another oddity now given to us by the plurality's interpretation lS 
that a gratuitous transferee must forfeit the proceeds of a drug deal if she 
knew of the drug deal before she received the proceeds but not if she 
discovered it a moment after. Yet in the latter instance, the donee, having 
given no value, is in no different position from the donee who had knowledge 
all along, save perhaps that she might have had a brief expectation the gift 
was clean. By contrast, the good faith purchaser for value who, after an e 
exchange of assets, finds out about his trading partner's illegal conduct has 
undergone a significant change in circumstances: He has paid fair value for 
those proceeds in a transaction which, as a practical matter in most cases, he 
cannot reverse. 
III 
The statutory puzzle the plurality and concurrence find so engaging is created 
because of a false premise, the premise that the possessor of an asset subject e 
to forfeiture does not stand in the position of the transferor but must be 
charged with some guilty knowledge of her own. Forfeiture proceedings, though, 
are directed at an asset, and a donee in general has no more thQn the ownership 
rights of the donor. By denying this simple principle, the plurality rips out 
the most effective enforcement provisions in all of the drug forfeiture laws. 
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and with all due respect, . 
I dissent from the judgment of the Court. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
COUNTY OF SPARTANBURG 
HOLMAN C. GOSSETT, JR., 
as Solicitor, Seventh 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARSHALL RAY PHILLIPS, 
AND $2,640.00. 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________________________ ) 
This matter came before me 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
91-CP-42-627 · 
~; 
rr-, 
- ·· :...":: 
r ·· 
.... , 
... ~ 
on Monday, June 
Motion by the Defendant to dismicc the complaint of the 
c:I1 
C...:> 
f'..J 
l._ 
c: 
::z: 
N 
.c-
·:-) 
~: r 
.~ ~ r-,, 
. ' . 
· . . 
. . .. f . 
The record presented to the Court reflects that on April 18 1 1991 1 
the Defendant, Marshall Ray Phillips, was ·arrected and moniec from 
his person and his residence that. totaled $2 1 610. 0 0 were s ei=: ed 
from him on that date. On September 30, 1991 a complaint was filed 
by the Plaintiff in this . Court ( 91-CP-4 2-2 40 9) regarding the 
forfeiture of an automobile arising out of facts involving this 
same incident. The action now before the Court was filed on 
Ma r.c:h 10, 19 9 2 for forfeiture of the monies involved in this 
matter. 
The Defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint alleging 
that the petition has not been filed wiLh Lhe Cuur:t within a 
reasonable time period following seizure ac required under 
S.C. Code §44-53-530. The Defendant also cites the case of Morandi 
v. U.S. 747 F. Supp 667 (SD Fla., 1990) as supl?orL [or: LhaL 
proposition. Morandi quotes the four port test laid out by the 
u.s. Supreme Court in U.S. v. $8,850.00 in United States currency, 
10 3 S. Ct. 2 005, ( 19 OJ) whi.ch establit~hea the criteria for due 
J-23 
(b) 1 
process analysis as it r.·elates to a delay in proceeding in a civil 
forfeiture ma t:.Le1.·. The Court lays out four areas o[ analysis in 
dete.nniu.i..ng whether the due proceaa rightc of the Defendant have 
been violated by a delay in filing a. forfeiture action. They are: 
1. The lanyLh of the delay; 
2. The,reaeon for the delay; 
3. The claimant's assertion of his right; X r"T I t:C; ("') 
~ .. ~ ~; r-
1 .-~ · . .. n-, 
r· c... · '~ - :·, 
c :··1-:-- ·· 
:• · ~ .. . 
4. The prejudice to the claimant. 
and conslderation __ .. of~h~· , . :. 
• .. .. j '"t ' 
Upon examination of the pleadings 
arguements and representations of both counsels the Court ~ke~th'e ,_· :,· ,:: 
following findings. 
c· ·, . I'" " 
The court finds that a time delay i~ f¥ii~c~ OJ .J;:- ':._:'::::-;: 
co --; 
this action (91-CP-42-627) for the forfeiture of monies, n not in 
and of itself determinative of the issues. However the Court finds 
that there has been a failure of proof on the p~rt of the State to 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
submit an explanation or reason for the delay in bringing this e 
action. While the Seventh Cir.·cui L Solicitor' a Off ice acted 
appropriately in filing this action after receiviny not:.ice of 
receipt of tbe funds by the Spartanburg County Sheriff's 
Department, there hae been no explanation offered to t~is Court ac • 
to why notice regarding the propoced automobile forfeiture waa 
forwarded Lo Ll1e ~olicitor•a Offi~e go aa to allow Lhem to file a 
complaint in that action on September 30, 1991 but that no notice e 
was sant :t·egarding cash that was on hand with the Spartanburg 
County Sheriff's Department that may also have been an appropriate 
subject for a forfeiture action. Therefore becouse no reuaon can 
be cited by the Plaintiff in this action to explain or justify the • 
delay of 10 months in bringing this case, I fi11d that the Plaintiff 
J-24 (b) 2 • 
• 
• 
has failed to provide a reason for the delay . The Defendant, 
Marshall Ray Phillips, through his attorney has acoerted that he 
has been prejudiced .in this delay by not being given adequate 
notice to locate witnesses and that those witnesses have now become 
• unavailable and that their unavailability would prejudice his 
ability to phow the source of the funds. While the Court finds 
thiA prejudice to be minimal, the Defendant hac presented to the 
e ·Court sufficient prejudice to prevail under the guidelines as laid 
out by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. $8,850.00 in U.S. currencv 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
and finds the analysis in it and Morandi controlling and pursuasive 
in this ca~;e. Accordingly, the Court finds that the State has 
failed to meet its burden of proof under §44-53-530 of the S.C. 
Code requiring a petition to be sumitted to the Court within o 
reasonable time period following seizure. It is therefore; 
ORDERED that this action be and .is hereby dismissed . It is 
furtheL·; 
ORDERED that "the funds $2,640~00 seized by the State in this 
matter are ordered returned to the Defendant, Marshall Ray Phillips 
immediately. 
AND IT IS SO ORDERED. r 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL S~ DAY OF JUNE, 1992. 
Spartanb1.1rg, SC 
:;· G · 8 E4 
. Burnett 
dge, Common -Pleas Cou 
eventh Judicial Circuit 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA AFFIDAVIT FOR SEIZURE 
COUNTY OF 
PERSONALLY appeared before me 
--------------------------------' who, being 
duly sworn, says that he/she is a and that the 
subject property is: (Check appropriate categories) 
(1) all controlled substances which have been manufactured, 
distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of Article 3, 
Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as 
amended; 
(2) all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are 
used, or which have been positioned for use, in manufacturing, 
producing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or 
exporting any controlled substance in violation of Article 3; 
(3) all property which is used, or which has been positioned for use, 
as a container for property described in Article 3, all raw materials, 
products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or which have 
been positioned for use, in manufacturing, producing, compounding, 
processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled 
substance; 
(4) all property both real and personal, which in any manner is 
knowingly used to facilitate production, manufacturing, distribution, 
sale, importation, exportation, or trafficking in various controlled 
substances as defined in Article 3; 
(5) all books, records, and research products and materials, 
including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data which are used, or 
which have been positioned for use, in violation of Article 3; 
(6) all conveyances including, but not limited to, trailers, 
aircraft, motor vehicles, and watergoing vessels which are used or 
int~ndeq for use unlawfully to conceal, contain, or transport or 
facilitate the unlawful concealment, possession, containment, or 
transportation of controlled substances and their compounds, except as 
otherwise provided, must be forfeited to the State; 
(7) all property including, but not limited to, monies, negotiable 
instrum~ts, securities, or other things of value furnished or 
intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled 
substance, and all proceeds including, but not limited to, monies, and 
real and personal property traceable to any exchange; 
(8) all monies seized in close proximity to forfeitable controlled 
substances, drug manufacturing, or distributing paraphernalia, or in 
close proximity to forfeitable records of the importation, 
manufacturing, or distribution of controlled substances and all monies 
seized at the time of arrest or search involving violation of 
Article 3. 
(c) 1 
1 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
• 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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I The property is described as follows: 
Said property is subject to seizure and forfeiture pursuant to Sections 
44-53-520 and 44-53-530 Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976) as amended . 
The deponent says that the following facta are the basis of his allegation 
that the property described above was used unlawfully and is subject to 
seizure. (Please include weights, drug type, dates, etc.) 
AFFIANT 
SWORN To and Subscribed before me 
this day of , 19 
r 
(L. S.) 
Notary Public for South Carolina 
My Conunission Expires: 
(c)2 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEIZURE 
COUNTY OF KERSHAW 
Personally appeared before me Special Agent Harold 
Cassady, who, being duly sworn, says that he is a Member of 
the Governor's Raid Team of South Carolina Law Enforcement 
Division, and that the subject property is: (Check 
appropriate categories) 
1. controlled substance (s) which have been 
manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired 
in violation of Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, 
Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended. 
2. raw materials, products, and equipment of any 
kind which are used, or which have been positioned 
for use, in manufacturing, producing, compounding, 
processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any 
controlled substances in violation of Article 3, 
Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South 
Carolina (1976), as amended. 
3. property which is used, or which has been 
positioned for use, as a container for property 
described in items (1) and (2) above. 
4. property which in any manner is knowingly used 
to facilitate production, manufacturing, 
distribution, sale, importation, exportation, or 
trafficking of various controlled substances as 
defined in Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of 
Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended. 
5. books, records, . and research products and 
materials, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, 
and data which are used, or which have been 
positioned for use, in violation of Article 3, 
Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South 
carolina (1976), as amended. 
6. a conveyance which was used or intended for use 
unlawfully to conceal, contain, or transport or 
facilitate the unlawful concealment, possession, 
containment, or transportation of controlled 
substances, and their compounds. 
7. monies, negotiable instruments, securities, or 
other things of value furnished or intended to be 
furnished by any person in exchange for a 
controlled substance. 
(c) 3 
~. 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
#1 
8. proceeds, including, but not limited to, 
monies, and real and personal property traceable to 
an exchange for controlled substances . 
9. monies seized in close proximity to forfeitable 
controlled substances, or drug manufacturing or 
distributing paraphernalia, or monies seiz e d in 
close proximity to forfeitable records of the 
importation, manufacturing, or distribution of 
controlled substances, or monies seized at the time 
of arrest or search involving violation of Article 
3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South 
Carolina {1976), as amended. 
The property is described as follows: 
1987 Honda 4-door VIN# JHMEC5827HS001533 Tag #ETG233 
Gold in Color 
#2 1972 Chevrolet Custom Deluxe f 20 Pickup 
VIN# CCE232B106214 Tag #FFZ325 
#3 
#4 
Green in Color with Altec Utility Body 
1982 Toyota Land Cruiser 4WD 
VIN# JT3FJ60G5C0030725 No Tag (old tag #BXF897) 
Beige in Color 4DR 
1 Yanmar Tractor Model #YM2260 22HP 
Serial #41770 4WD 
Red in Color with 1 King Kutter 5ft. mowing deck yellow 
in color Tri-Blade 
#5 1 Toro Riding Lawnmower 8-32 Model 59111 
Serial #9001630 Red in Color 8HP-32" cut 
#6 1 Winpower Tractor Driven Alternator (120/240 Volts) 
Model #15/10PCTD Serial #890102-8 
Red in Color on Two Wheel Trailer 
#7 1 Marquette Model 10-120 A.C. Arc Welder 
Serial #63233 Red in Color 
#8 1 Makita Electric Planer Model #2030 
Serial #12735E iso 83-10 Brown in Color 
#9 1 The Lienbach Line Scoop Pan for Tractor 
Yellow in Color 3 Point Hitch 
#10 1 Fork Lift for Tractor 
Red in Color 3 Point Hitch 
#11 Post Hole Diggers/Yellow in Color 3 Point Hitch 
(c) 4 
,------ --- - -
#12 1 Utility Trailer 
White in Color 
Two Wheel Toyota Truck Bed 
#13 1 Fuel Tank for Pick-up Truck (fits in bed) 
#14 1 Portable Air Tank (Red) 5-10 gal. 
#15 1 Delta Shaper 1HP 
Serial #86J42797 
#16 1 Whirlpool Jacuzzi 
CAT #43-375 
Sandorn MFG. 
#17 Thompson Center Arms Rochester,New Hampshire 
Serial #206887 Cal. 54 Black Power 
#18 The Sportmaster Model 512-P 
#19 
Remington .22 Short-Long~Long Rifle (no serial #) 
Remington 870 Wingmaster 
2 3/4 & 3 in. Full Choke 
I 
Magnum 12 gauge 
Serial #T854234M 
#20 Armi Tanfoglio Giuseppe Made in Italy 
Model GT 26 Serial #S10978 Cal .. 25 Auto 
Excam, Hialeah Fla. 
Said property is subject to seizure and forfeiture 
pursuant to Sections 44-53-520 and 44-53-530 Code of Laws of 
South Carolina {1976}, as amended. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The deponent says that the following facts are the basis e 
of his allegation that t he property described above was used 
unlawfully a nd is subject to seizure: 
1. 
2 • 
3 • 
That during this time, I Special Agent Harold Cassady, of 
Governor's Raid Team, received specialized instruction in 
the area of illegal cultivation of marijuana, including 
both outdoor and indoor cultivation. 
That in March, 1992, I received information from the Drug 
Enforcement Administration of the United States 
Department of Justice (hereinafter referred to as DEA} 
that a Rock savage and a Lida N. Fielding savage of the 
Liberty Hill area of Kershaw County may be involved in 
the illegal cultivation and manufacturing or marijuana 
indoors. 
That one indication of an illegal indoor marijuana grow 
is excessive usage of electricity to operate the 
necessary grow lights, ballasts, exhaust fans, pumps, 
timers and other types of equipment used in the indoor 
cultivation and manufacture of marijuana. 
(c) 5 
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4. That on April 13, 1992, as a result of a subpoena 
requesting certain electric bill records on the residence 
of Rock and Lida N. Savage, a billing summary of the 
electric usage at the aforementioned residence was 
received from Lynches Riv~r Electric Cooperative, Inc. of 
Pageland, South Carolina. 
5. That the billing summary of the electricity usage of the 
Savage residence revealed an unusually high electric bill 
for the aforementioned residence, that being consistent 
with indoor cultivation and manufacture of marijuana. 
6. That on April 29, 1992, information was received from the 
Lynches River Electric Cooperative, Inc. that their 
records did not indicate on "all electric" classification 
for the Savage residence, indicating that the electricity 
usage for the residence could not be attributed to the 
use of "all electric" appliance and heating and cooling 
systems. 
7. That on May 4, 1992, the affiant and Special Agent David 
Mattox of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, 
Special Agent J. Darrell Betsill of the Governor' s Raid 
Team, and Investigator Mac McLeod of the Kershaw c ounty 
Sheriff's Department traveled to an area near the Sa vage 
residence to perform a surveillance of the residence and 
outbuildings with a Thermal Imager (a passive, 
nonintrusive, infrared detection device), used to detect 
differences in temperature at surface levels. 
8. That the results of the surveillance conducted on May 4, 
1992 with the use of the Thermal Imager indicated an 
abnormal difference in surface temperatures in various 
areas of the residence, consistent with the indoor 
cultivation of marijuana. 
9. That on May 10, 1992, another surveillance of the 
property using the Thermal Imager by Special Agent David 
Mattox, Special Agent Darrell Betsill, and the affiant, 
again indicated an abnormal difference in surface 
temperatures in various areas of the residence. 
10. That during the surveillance of the property on May 10, 
1992, Special Agent David Mattox and the affiant observed 
plastic PVC pipe extending approximately 200 yards from 
the rear of the residence to an area in the woodline 
behind the residence. 
11. That during this surveillance, Special Agent David Mattox 
and the affiant smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana 
in the area of the property. 
(c) 6 
12. The information has been received from the DEA that 
materials have been purchased from SGS, Inc. (also known 
as Superior Growers Supply) on at least fourteen separate 
occasions, beginning in 1989 and prior to January, 1992, 
in the name of Rock Savage of Richards Lane in Liberty 
Hill, South Carolina and that materials have been 
purchased from SGS on at least thirteen separate 
occasions, beginning in 1989 and prior to January, 1992, 
in the name of Lida Feilding (now Lida Savage) of 
Richards Lane in Liberty Hill, South Carolina. 
13. That according to a listing of companies in Sinsemilla 
Tips, a publication for the promotion of illegal 
cultivation and manufacture of marijuana, Superior 
Growers Supply, (also known as SGS, Inc.) of East 
Lansing, Michigan, is a supplier of C02 systems, sodium 
and halide lamps, and fertilizers, both chemical and 
organic. 
14. That C02 systems, sodium and halide lamps, and 
fertilizers, both chemical and organic, are used in the 
illegal cultivation and indoor manufacture or marijuana. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
That during the investigation, it was discovered from 
public records that Rock and Lida Savage own the property 
described in items 16 and 17. It is believed that this 
property is being used for the illegal cultivation and 
manufacture of marijuana. 
That, according to records contained in the office of the 
Clerk of Court for Kershaw County, South Carolina, Rock 
Savage purchased 42.44 acres, with improvements thereon, 
on April, 1985, and conveyed a 1/2 survivorship interest 
in the identical property to Lida N. Savage in 1988. 
That a plat of the property, known as Tract B, is dated 
October 12, 1977, and is recorded in Plat Book 36, at 
page 417, in the office of the Clerk of Court for Kershaw 
County, South carolina. 
befpre me 
1 1992. 
-ri-F'T'-7-?f---
AFFI 
(L.S.) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
arolina 
My Commission Expires: ?-/~ -~ 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEIZURE 
COUNTY OF KERSHAW 
In March of 1992 this year, this writer received information from the 
Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice 
that a Rock Savage and Lida N. Fielding of Liberty Hill area of Kershaw 
County may be involved in the illegal cultivation and manufacturing of 
marijuana indoors. On April 13, 1992, as a result of certain billing 
records this writer received through subpoena from the Lynches River 
Electric Cooperative, Inc. for the residence of Rock and Lida N. Savage. 
The billing summary of the electricity usage from the Savage residence 
revealed an unusually high electric bil l. This being consistent with 
indoor cultivation and manufacture of ma rijuana . 
On April 29, 1992, this writer received information from the Lynches 
River Electric Cooperative, Inc. that their records did not indicate an 
"All Electric" classification for the Savage residence. On May 4, 1992, 
this writer along with S/A David Mattox, S/A J.D. Betsill, Inv. Frank 
McLeod of the Kershaw County Sheriff's Department, and Sgt. Joel Gainey of 
the Kershaw County Sheriff's Department traveled to an area near the 
Savage residence to perform a surveilla.nce of the residence and out 
buildings with a Thermal Imager. As a result of the surveillance, this 
writer and the other agents concluded that there were abnormal differences 
in surface temperatures in various areas of the residence. 
On May 10, 1992, this writer and S/A Mattox, Betsill, McLeod and 
Gainey performed another surveillance of the Savage property with the 
Thermal Imager and once again it was indicated that there were abnormal 
differences in surface temperatures of various areas of the residence. 
On May 11, 1992, this writer obtained a Search Warrant for the 
residence, vehicles and property of Rock and Lida N. Savage. At 
approximately 1:20 p.m. this writer along with S/A Darrell Betsill held a 
briefing at the Kershaw County Sheriff's Department to agents of the 
Governor's Raid TEAM, SLED and the Kershaw County Deputies who would be 
involved in the execution of the Search Warrant. At approximately 1:55 
p.m. this writer, along with the other agents, entered the Savage 
residence to find no one home. At this time the residence was secured. 
At 2:05 p.m this writer, along with S/A Betsill, S/A Chastain and S/A 
Stokes found a hidden room in the basement of the Savage residence which 
contained a highly sophisticated hydroponic system in which is used to 
illegally cultivate and manufacture marijuana indoors. At this time there 
were twenty-eight (28) growing green leafy plants which were in eight (8) 
wooden benches which contained Europonic strips and pods, forty-one (41) 
cut stems in moist Europonic pods, thirty (30) extra three (3) foot grodan 
Europonic strips not used, one (1) large bag in which was clear plastic 
containing one hundred fourteen (114) dry Europonic pods with stems, 
forty-nine (49) dry Europonic used pods and green leafy material, three 
thousand (3,000) watt metal halide fixtures with bulb and ballast, one (1) 
four thousand (4,000) watt high pressure fixture with bulb and ballast, 
three (3) Europonic pump boxes with thermometers, reflective paper on 
walls, two (2) fans used in an exhaust method, one (1) automatic light 
(c) 8 
"\ 
mover, Europonic nutrient concentrate, two (2) boxes of miscellaneous 
grodan strips and one (1) set of triple beam scales. Inv. Mac McLeod 
found a small amount of green leafy plant like material and seeds in the 
bedroom nightstand of Rock and Lida N. Savage. At approximately 2:10 p.m. 
that same day Rock Savage arrived at the residence. He was then advised 
by this writer that he was under arrest and Miranda Rights were read. 
During this process, Savage was advised by S/A Betsill of the Search 
Warrant and the grounds that lead to the Affidavit and signing of the 
Warrant. He acknowledged that he understood everything and made a written 
voluntary statement to this writer. Lida N~ Savage was later arrested by 
this writer at the Kershaw County Sheriff's Department. 
SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME 
this f day of July, 1992. 
Y PUBLIC 
Commission Expires: 
(c) 9 
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AGENCY'S INITIAL REPORT OF SEIZURE 
NAME AND ADDRESS OF SEIZING AGENCY: 
IMPORTANT: This report MUST be filed with the Prosecuting Agency. 
This report must be filed within ten (10) days of the seizure unless a 
special need exists for the delay. If the filing of the report is 
delayed, please explain on a separate sheet of paper. 
1. Identify the property seized: 
NOTE: If the property seized is a conveyance, please identify make, 
e model, and year. If the property seized is cash, list denominations and 
how packaged and if hit by drug dog. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
a. Description of property: 
b. Owner(s)/Address: 
c. Indicate if Juvenile: 
d. Indicate if owner is in jail, if so, where incarcerated: 
e. Indicate defense attorney, if known: 
f. Lienholder(s)/Address/Amount of Lien: 
g. Other persons who are known to have an interest in the seized 
property (names and addresses): 
(d) 1 
• 
h. Approximate value of the seized item(s): 
"; 
~ . 
2. Describe the circumstances of the seizure, including statutory 
ground(s) of seizure: 
3. Current location and custodian of the property: 
• 
• 
4. Steps taken to secure property, including custodian if applicable: e 
5. Has the Solicitor been notified? 
6. If controlled substances were involved, please provide information 
as to the type and QUANTITY of the controlled substance(s): 
Authorized Representative for: 
Agency . 
Date: 
Place: 
(d) 2 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
' 
,. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
RICHLAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT 
CASH SEIZURE WORKSHEET 
PERSON CASH SEIZED FROM _____________________ D_O_B ______________ __ 
CHARGES ON OWNER/CLAIMANT __________________________________ __ 
ESTIMATED TYPE AND WEIGHT OF DRUGS ________________________ ___ 
DATE OF ARREST/ SEIZURE ____________________________________ ___ 
AMOUNT OF CURRENCY $ ______________ __ 
CASE AGENT ________________________ ___ 
CHECK APPLICABLE STATEMENTS BELOW TO ASSIST IN SEIZURE 
___ was money furnished, or intended to be furnished in 
exchange for a controlled substance(buy-bust or reversal) 
___ was money seized at time of arrest of owner 
___ was money seized from a search warrant where drugs found 
___ was money found near drugs or records of drug transactions 
was money seized near drug distribution or manufacturing 
paraphernalia 
___ does owner of money have prior drug record or arrest 
___ was drug detection dog used to check cash for drug odor 
___ did dog "hit" on the cash 
___ did the owner give false information, such as name, 
address, phone number, date of birth, etc ... 
e ___ is the owner employed 
___ did owner exhibit evasive behavior or supply supply 
incomplete answers concerning ownership of the money 
___ was the cash hidden in an unusual location 
e ___ was the money banded in stacks with rubber bands 
• 
• 
___ was the money in small denominations 
___ does owner claim any legitimate source of income 
___ was defendant "holding" money for someone else 
(complete other side) 
(e) 1 
)0 
\ _j 
___ did defendant fur n i sh information on how to contact owner 
does defendant have prior drug record, and claims money 
belongs to someone else 
___ was money found in container such as shoe box, duffel bag, 
or liquor bottle bag 
BRIEF SUMMARY OF CASE TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE 
CASE AGENT 
FOWARD COPY OF THIS REPORT TO ASSET INVESTIGATOR WITHIN 
THREE WORKING DAYS OF ARREST AND/OR SEIZURE. 
(e) 2 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
RICHLAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT 
VEHICLE FORFEITURE CHECKLIST 
DEFENDANT/S __________________________________ ~D~O~B ____________ _ 
CHARGE/S----------------------------------------------------
ESTIMATED TYPE AND WEIGHT OF DRUGS ________________________ ___ 
DATE OF ARREST ____________ __ 
CASE AGENT ______________________ __ 
VEHICLE: DESCRIPTION 
MAKE _______________ YEAR~ ___________ MODEL ____________ __ 
TAG NUMBER/YEAR/STATE ______________________ EXPIRED? Y/N 
REGISTERED OWNER·-------------------------------------------
ADDRESS OF OWNER __________________________________________ __ 
LIENHOLDER & ADDRESS 
VEHICLE STORED AT? COMPOUND Y/N IF NOT, WHERE STORED ____________________________________ ___ 
CHECK APPLICABLE STATEMENTS BELOW TO ASSIST IN SEIZURE 
___ was vehicle used to transport drugs 
___ were drugs sold out of vehicle 
___ was vehicle used as a decoy or escort in drug deal 
___ was vehicle used to meet agent or informant to set up deal 
___ was vehicle used to transport money for drug deal 
___ was recorded or marked money found in vehicle 
___ was driver using vehicle when arrested in reverse sting 
operation, or attempted possession case . 
___ was vehicle used as a look-out or counter surveillance 
___ does the owner have prior record for drug offense 
___ did an informant say vehicle was bought with drug proceeds 
___ is the vehicle registered to a parent or relative of 
defendant 
(complete other side) 
(e) 3 
___ has aefendant driven vehicle often, as observed by agents 
has the defendant had vehicle repaired, modified, or 
recieved traffic tickets in it. 
BRIEF SUMMARY OF CASE TO ESTABLISH PBOPABLE CoUSE FOB SIEZUEE 
CASE AGENT 
FOWARD COPY OF THIS REPORT TO ASSET INVESTIGATOR WITHIN 
THREE WORKING DAYS OF ARREST AND SEIZURE, ALONG WITH COPY 
OF TOW SLIP. 
(e) 4 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
·I 
,. 
• 
----- ----------- --
RICHLAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT 
PERSONAL PROPERTY FORFEITURE WORKSHEET 
BASIS FOR SEIZURE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY IS SECTION 44-53-
~20, •ubeections {3) and (4) . 
(a) The following are subject to forfeiture: 
(3) ALL PROPERTY WHICH IS USED, OR WHICH HAS BEEN 
POSITIONED FOR USE, AS A CONTAINER FOR PROPERTY AS 
DESCRIBED IN SECTION 44-53-520, (1) AND (2), being 
all controlled substances, raw materials, products, 
e or equipment of any kind, which are used, or intended 
for use in the manufacturing, producing, compounding, 
processing, delivering, importing or exporting any 
controlled substance in violation of this article: 
(4) ALL PROPERTY. BOTH REAL AND PERSON6L, WHICH IN 
ANY MANNER IS KNOWINGLY USED TO FACILITATE PRODUCTION, 
e MANUFACTURING, DISTRIBUTION. SALE. IMPORTATION, 
EXPORTATION, OR TRAFFICKING IN VARIOUS CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCES, AS DEFINED IN THIS ARTICLE; 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
EX6MPLES OF THIS TYPE PROPERTY; 
l) SAFES, LOCK BOXES, FILE CABINETS, REFRIGERATORS, FREEZERS, 
FOOT LOCKERS, LUGGAGE, AND OTHER CONTAINERS USED TO 
CONCEAL AND STORE DRUGS. 
2) PROPERTY USED BY THE DRUG OFFENDER TO FACILITATE DRUG 
TRAFFICKING AND DISTRIBUTION, SUCH AS TELEPHONES, BOTH 
REGULAR AND CELLULAR, MOBILE RADIO AND WALKIE TALKIES, 
COMPUTORS, FAX MACHINES, WEAPONS, AND OTHER PROPERTY . 
NOTE: MANY OTHER ITEMS NOT INCLUDED IN THIS LIST THAT MAY 
BE FORFEITABLE. 
CASE AGENT ________________________________ __ 
DATE OF SEIZURE __________________________ __ 
OWNER/DEFENDANT _______________________________ D_O_B __________ ___ 
PLACE OF SEIZURE--------------------------------------------
CHARGES ________________________ / ____________________________ __ 
ESTIMATED WEIGHT/TYPE OF DRUGS ____________________________ ____ 
(complete other side) 
(e) 5 
' ,, 
j 
BRIEF NARRATIVE RELATING HOW ITEM ( S) RELATE TO ILLEGAL DRUG 
CHARGES OR TRANSACTION: 
CASE AGENT 
COMPLETE THIS FORM AND R..ETt1RH TO ASSET AGENT AS SOON AS 
POSSIBLE, FOR SEIZURE/FORFEITURE INVESTIGATION. 
(e) 6 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
RICHLAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT 
REAL PROPERTY SEIZURE WORKSHEET 
BASIS FOR SEIZURE OF REAL PROPERTY IS SECTION 44-53-520(4), 
WHICH STATES: 
(a) the following are subject to forfeiture; 
(4) ALL PROPERTY, BOTH REAL AND PERSONAL, WHICH IN ANY 
MANNER IS KNOWINGLY USED TO FACILITATE PRODUCTION, 
MANUFACTURE, DISTRIBUTION, SALE, IMPORTATION, 
EXPORTATION, OR TRAFFICKING IN VARIOUS CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCES AS DEFINED IN THIS ARTICLE . 
CASE AGENT ______________________________________________________________ _ 
ADDRESS OF PROPERTY/RESIDENCE ____ '----------------------------------
DATE OF ARREST/SEARCH OF PROPERTY ____________________ _____ 
NAME OF DEFENDANT ________________________________ ~~------------------
OWNER OF PROPERTY __________________________________ ______ 
CRIMINAL CHARGES ________________________________________________ _ 
LIENHOLDER OR 
MORTGAGE HOLDER & ADDRESS 
ESTIMATED TYPE/WEIGHT OF. DRUGS ______________________ __ 
CHECK THE FOLLOWING APPLICABLE STATEMENTS TO ASSIST IN 
ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR SEIZURE: 
_DRUGS WERE SEIZED IN RESIDENCE. 
___ DRUGS WERE BOUGHT OUT OF RESIDENCE 
e ___ ONLY ONCE 
• 
• 
___ MULTIPLE TIMES 
_U.C. AGENT BOUGHT OUT OF RESIDENCE 
___ INFORMANT BOUGHT DRUGS FROM RESIDENCE. 
(complete other side) 
(e) 7 
___ RECORDS OF DRUG DISTRIBUTIONS WERE SEIZED 
___ WEAPONS WERE SEIZED FROM RESIDENCE 
___ OWNER HAS PRIOR ARRESTS/CONVICTIONS FOR DRUG VIOLATIONS 
___ CASH WAS SEIZED FROM THE RESIDENCE 
___ RECORDED BUY MONEY WAS SEIZED FROM RESIDENCE 
DRUG DISTRIBUTION PARAPHERNALIA WAS SEIZED 
--- I 
___ SCALES, CUTTING AGENTS,BAGGIES, ETC ... WERE SEIZED 
___ PHONE CALLS WERE MADE BY INFORMANT OR AGENT TO RESIDENCE 
___ PHOTOGRAPHS OR VIDEO TAKEN AT SCENE 
___ SEARCH WARRANT SERVED ON RESIDENCE 
___ OWNER WAS ARRESTED AT TIME OF SEARCH AT RESIDENCE 
GIVE SHORT NARRATIVE BELOW ABOUT CASE, AND HOW RESIDENCE WAS 
USED TO FACILITATE DRUG TRANSACTIONS. 
CASE AGENT 
RETURN THIS REPORT TO ASSET AGENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO 
ASSIST IN ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR SEIZURE. ALL OTHER 
DOCUMENTS RELATED TO SEIZURE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO AGENT STONE 
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, ALSO. 
(e) 8 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• ASSET FORFEITURE CHECKLIST 
I • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
1. case Name 
2. co-Defendants 
3. Date of Arrest 
4. Cr i minal File Open 
5. Police Reports Available 
6. Agency's Initial Report of 
Seizure Received 
7. Affidavit of Seizure 
i-. Sttbpocnas for PaAk 
9. Tax Information 
10. Real Property 
a. RMC Records Examination 
(real property/title search) 
b. Lis Pendens 
c. Appraisal 
d. Insurance 
e. Occupancy Order and Agreement 
11. Seizure Warrant and Notice of 
Seizure Executed by Judge 
12. Investigation of Potential 
Lienholders and Interested Parties Completed 
13. Summons and Complaint: 
a. Drafted 
b. Filed With Clerk of Court 
c. Served Appropriate Parties 
d. Affidavit of Service Filed 
14 . Service by Publication 
15. Notice of GAL 
16. Petition for Appointment of 
Guardian ad Litem Order 
17. Defendant's Answer 
18. Answer to Counterclaim 
19. Deposition & Subpoena Duces Tecum 
20. Interrogatories, etc . 
21. Order of Forfeiture 
22. Consent Order 
23. Default Order 
/0 A-
(f) 1 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA } 
} 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND } 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Four Hundred Dollars 
($400.00) in u.s. Currency, 
One (1) RJK Nine Millimeter 
Pistol, and John Doe, an 
Interested Party, 
Defendant. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
,.' ' 
.· · ... 
SEIZURE WARRANT :-) . 
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! · ' 
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. 
.. ' 
TO: ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 
ITS COUNTIES, MUNICIPALITIES, OR OTHER SUBDIVISIONS: 
It appears to the court from facts set forth in the attached 
affidavit, which is incorporated herein by reference, that the 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
property described therein was used or intended to be used on the e 1 
dates shown in violation of Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code 
of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended. 
Now, therefore, you a re authorized to seize such property, 
• secure it and keep it under your control until lawful disposition 
of such property is ordered by the court of competent jurisdiction 
upon petition to have it declared forfeited under provisions of 
Section 44-53-530, Code of Laws of South Carolina ( 1976), as e 
amended. 
• 
(g) 1 • 
•• 
AND IT IS SO AUTHORIZED. 
• 
Given at Columbia, South Carolina this ;L~ day of February, 
1993. ~rdt~ 
JU GE, IFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
• 
l e 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
(g) 2 
• 
/1 ~') 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA } 
} 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND } 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) 
in u.s. Currency, One (1) RJK 
Nine Millimeter Pistol, and 
John Doe, an Interested Party, 
Defendant. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
I'.' 
·' '• 
NOTICE OF SEIZURE _,._, 
AND 1::·;y: , . -_r. 
NOTICE OF HEARf'NG ;·:? 
<..... .r 
-l 
t.\ • 
•·" ... , . ~ 
•u=;·l' 
'..1 
I~.,., , 1'1 
·I H 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the following described property 
• 
• 
• 
• 
has been seized and is subject to proceedings for forfeiture to the e 
State of South Carolina pursuant to Section 44-53-530, Code of Laws 
of South Carolina (1976), as amended. The property affected by 
said seizure and forfeiture proceeding is described as follows: 
• Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) in u.s. Currency and 
One (1) RJK Nine Millimeter Pistol. 
A hearing will be held on the thirtieth (30th) day after 
service hereof or as soon thereafter as may be scheduled by the • 
court. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
Deee~er ~' 1992 /4 
®T~~~IRCUIT 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
• 
• 
(g) 3 
• 
•• 
• 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEIZURE 
PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE ME, Agent Allen Stone who, 
being duly sworn, says that he is an Investigator with the 
Richland County Sheriff's Department, and that the described 
property is forfeitable to the State of South Carolina, 
under Statute 44-53-520(a) and Statute 44-53-530 for one or 
more of the following Statutory causes: 
1. All conveyances including, but not limited to, 
trailers, aircraft, motor vehicles, and watergoing vessels 
which are used, or intended for use unlawfully to conceal, 
contain, or transport or facilitate the unlawful concealment, 
possession, containment, manufacture, or transportation of 
controlled substances and their compounds, except as 
otherwise provided, must be forfeited to the state; 
2. All raw materials, products, and equipment of any 
kind which are used, or intended for use, in the 
manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, 
importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation 
of this article; 
3. All property, both real and personal, which in any 
manner is knowingly used to facilitate production, 
manufacturing, distribution, sale, importation, exportation, 
or trafficking in various controlled substances as defined in 
this article; 
4. All property including, but not limited to, monies, 
negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value, 
furnished, or intended to be furnished, by any person in 
exchange for a controlled substance, and all proceeds 
including, but not limited to, monies, and real and person 1 
property traceable to any exchange; 
~ PROPERTY IS DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
FOUR HUNDRED DOLLARS, U.S. CURRENCY. 
ONE R J K NINE MILLIMETER PISTOL, UNREADABLE SERIEL NUMBER 
THE FOLLOWING FACTS ARE THE BASIS FOR THE ALLEGATIONS 
THAT SAID PROPERTY IS FORFIETABLE UNDER STATUTES AND 
SUBSECTIONS ABOVE: On January 23, 1993, agents of 
the Richland County Sheriff's Department Narcotics division 
recieved information that drugs were being sold on Harlem 
Street, a known area for street sales of drugs. Sergeant 
Andy Jones observed a subject conducting a drug transaction, 
and when he approached the subject, the subject ran. 
Sergeant found $400.00 in small bills and the R J K 9MM 
pistol on ground, near where the subject was standing. 
Agents know from experience that drug dealers often 
(g) 4 
' ... 
abandon weapons and cash proceeds from the sale of drugs, due 
to possibility of marked or recorded buy money, and the 
threat of arrest for an illegal weapon. 
From the Affiant's experience investigating illegal drug 
trafficking and financial transactions and asset forfeitures 
associated with drug trafficking, and formal training in both 
fields of Law Enforcement, it is believed that the Personal 
property, described weapon and u.s currency, are forfeitable 
to and by the State of south Carolina as stated in Code of 
Laws of South Carolina, Sections 44-53-520, 1976 as amended. 
SWORN AND SUSCRIBED BEFORE M~ 
THIS~DAY 0~~,1993 
"{?&rJ.._, Cf?, ~ 
NOTARY PUBLIC FO SOUT CAROLINA 
My Commission Expires 1-1~-~0] 
(g) 5 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
Four Hundred Dollars 
($400.00) in u.s. Currency, 
One (1) RJK Nine Millimeter 
Pistol, and John Doe, an 
Interested Party, 
Defendant. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
I . 
~::c. 
·' '' :~:.1) I. 
SUMMONS 
,.., .. ·~ 
TO: THE DEFENDANT ABOVE-NAMED: John Doe, Address Unknown, 
,, .... , .. , 
! \\ 
,.,,,I' I 
r ·~··~ .. :\ d \J ~ 
·! '''"'\\ 
'•\,:t . •, \o·' 
and Allen Stone, Richland County Sheriff's Department, 
Persons Known to Have an Interest in the Defendant Property; 
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to answer the complaint 
in this proceeding, a copy of which is herewith served upon you, 
and to serve a copy of your answer to the said complaint on Fifth 
Circuit Solicitor's Office at 1701 Main Street, Columbia, South 
Carolina within thirty (30) days after service hereof, exclusive of 
the date of such service, and if you fail to answer the complaint 
within the time aforesaid, judgment by default will be rendered 
against you for the relief. 
February QUo , 1993 . 
&,JJ ~ka.ch m -~ IZA~TH M. ~COCK 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1701 Main Street 
Columbia, SC 29201 
(g) 6 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
Four Hundred Dollars 
($400.00) in u.s. Currency, 
One (1) RJK Nine Millimeter 
Pistol, and John Doe, an 
Interested Party, 
Defendant. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
. } 
} 
} 
} 
} 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
I' I' 
'1. ·· ' 
•.J ) 
c ... ) 
- ·11" 
·-··'" 
..... , 
'·· .• ; 
,··· ·· : ·. \ "· ... ) 
COMPLAINT FOR FORFEITURE 
•\:.·· · .. : ' -1.1 
:x.;·: ~~~/!. '\:'·· ( _,) 
c ... ) .r:-
······ ··\ _J 
Plaintiff would respectfully show the Court: 
• 
• 
,., .1\o \ P 
11' ,,~-· 'I \ 
'·. 1\ :_ 
• 
• 
I. • 
Plaintiff is the Solicitor for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of 
the State of South Carolina, and is authorized by Section 44-53-
530, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended to initiate 
this complaint for the forfeiture of the Defendant property. 
II. 
The Defendant property is Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) in 
u.s. Currency and one (1) RJK Nine Millimeter Pistol. 
III. 
The Defendant currency and the Defendant firearm were used to 
facilitate the sale and distribution of a controlled substance, 
• 
• 
were furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for and/or • 
were proceeds from the sale of a controlled substance, in violation 
of Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of tws of South Carolina 
(1976), as amended. 
(g) 7 
• 
• 
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I ,. 
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I 
I 
I 
! 
• 
,. 
I 
IV . 
On January 23, 1993, agents of the Richland County Sheriff's 
Department received information that drugs were being sold on 
Harlem Street, an area known . for high levels of drug traffic. 
Agents observed a subject conducting a street transaction and when 
agents approached, the subject fled. Agents recovered $400 and a 
RJK 9mm pistol where the subject had been standing. 
v. 
Because the Defendant currency and the Defendant firearm were 
used to ·facilitate the sale and distribution of a controlled 
substance, were furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange 
for and/or were proceeds from the sale of a controlled substance, 
such Defendants are subject to seizure and forfeiture under the 
provisions of South Carolina Code Ann. Section 44-53-520(a)(4) and 
(a) (7) • 
VI. 
By reason of these premises, the Defendant property is 
forfeited to the State of South Carolina. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that: 
The Defendant property be d~clared forfeited to the Richland 
County Sherfff' s Department pursuant to Section 44-53-530, et. 
seq., of the Code of Laws of South carolina (1976), as amended. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
February a-(p , 19 9 3 
EfJi~~ ,~ JJ:ho~AI ca;tc.. 
Assistant Solicitor (g) 8 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
.\ 
I 
-' 
b 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
C'\1~ 
~~) -: .·· 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
I "\ '" 1 ! . I 
SEIZURE WARRANT 
, . 
" 
n 
( ..J 
Three Thousand Six Hundred } 
Seventy-Five Dollars } 
{$3,675.00) in U.S. Currency,} 
Nine Dollars and Seventy-Six } 
Cents in U.S. Currency Coins,} 
One (1) 1/2 Penny, Hand-Held } 
'") :::-. . --~ 
c 
' 
--o c j 
c-; :;r.J 
·' I <.. -) 
-J 
Portable Scales, Electric } .,-
-n i , . 
-· 
' 
J Heat Sealing Machine, } 
Minolta 8mm Camcorder, Serial} 
#U1002630, Aiwa Stereo } 
G ) 
(,,") ' CJ t --
Recording Super Bass, S~rial } 
#1794865, Minolta AC Adaptor } 
With Charger, Serial #009037-} 
65, Sega Portable Video Game,} 
Serial #KZ0622452, Cobra } 
Radar Detector, Serial #7300-} 
8812; Panasonic Rechargeable } 
Battery, Serial #PE11A890515,} 
Sony Sports Walkman, Serial } 
#UNK, Sega Game Gear, Serial } 
#010046199, One (1) Gold } 
Colored Watch, Santiago } 
Salcedo, Michael Samuels, and} 
Juan Rodriguez, Interested } 
Parties, } 
Defendant. 
} 
} 
.. .. 
<.~ -' N --~ 
~ -J 
TO: ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 
ITS COUNTIES, MUNICIPALITIES, OR OTHER SUBDIVISIONS: 
It appears to the court from facts set forth in the attached 
affidavit, which is incorporated herein by reference, that the 
property described therein was used or intended to be used on the 
dates shown in violation of Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code 
of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended. 
(g) 9 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Now, therefore, you are authorized to seize such property, 
secure it and keep it under your control until lawful disposition 
of such property is ordered by the court of competent jurisdiction 
upon petition to have i t declared forfeited under provisions of 
Section 44-53-530, Code of Laws of South Carolina ( 1976), as 
amended. 
AND IT IS SO AUTHORIZED. 
Given at Columbia, South Carolina this 3/ day of March, 
1993. 
FTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
(g) 10 
\ ' 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Three Thousand Six Hundred } 
Seventy-Five Dollars } 
{$3,675.00) in U.S. Currency,} 
Nine Dollars and Seventy-Six } 
Cents in u.s. Currency Coins,} 
One (1) 1/2 Penny, Hand-Held } 
Portable Scales, Electric } 
Heat Sealing Machine, } , 
Minolta 8mm Camcorder, Serial} 
iU1002630, Aiwa St~reo } 
Recording Super Bass, Serial } 
#1794865, Minolta AC Adaptor } 
With Charger, Serial #009037-} 
65, Sega Portable Video Game,} 
Serial iKZ0622452, · Cobra } 
Radar Detector, Serial #7300-} 
8812, Panasonic . Rechargeable} 
Battery, Serial iPE11A890515,} 
Sony Sports Walkman, Serial } 
iUNK, Sega Game Gear, Serial } 
#010046199, One (1) Gold } 
Colored Watch, Santiago } 
Salcedo, Michael Samuels, and} 
Juan Rodriguez, Interested } 
Parties, } 
Defendant. 
} 
} 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
NOTICE OF SEIZURE 
AND 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the following described property 
has been seized and is subject to proceedings for forfeiture to the 
State of South Carolina pursuant to Section 44-53-530, Code of Laws 
of South Carolina (1976), as amended. The property affected by 
said seizure and forfeiture proceeding is described as follows: 
Three Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars {$3,675.00) in U.S. 
Currency, Nine Dollars and Seventy-Six Cents in U.S. Currency 
(g) 11 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Coins, One (1) 1/2 Penny, Hand-Held Portable Scales, Electric Heat 
Sealing Machine, Minolta 8mm Camcorder, Serial #Ul002630, Aiwa 
Stereo Recording Super Bass, Serial #1794865, Minolta AC Adaptor 
With Charger, Serial #00903765, Sega Portable Video Game, Serial 
#KZ0622452, Cobra Radar Detector, Serial #73008812, Panasonic 
Rechargeable Battery, Serial #PE11A890515, Sony Sports Walkman, 
Serial #UNK, Sega Game Gear, Serial #010046199, and One (1) Gold 
Colored Watch. · -
A hearing will be held on the thirtieth (30th) day after 
service hereof or as soon thereafter as may be scheduled by the 
court. 
Columbial South Carolina 
March 121 , 1993 
JUDGE, IFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
(g) 12 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEIZURE 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
PERSONALLY appeared before me Sandy M. Laney 
duly sworn, says that he is a Police Officer 
1-1ho. be in,g 
and that 
the subJect property is: (Check appropriate categories) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
l. All controlled substance (s) which have been manufactured. 
distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of 
Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of La1-1s of South 
Carolina (1986), as amended. 
~- All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind 
which are used, or which have been positioned for use, 
in manufacturing, producing. compounding, processing, 
delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled 
substances in violations of this article . 
:5. All properL.Y wiucn is useci, or wnicn nas oeen PUti i iJ..i.uw:::::u 
for use, as a container for property described in items 
(1) and (2) above. 
4. 
S. 
0. 
All property, both real and personal, which in any manner 
is knowingly used to facilitate production. 
manufacturing, distribution, sale. importation. 
controlled substances as defined in this article . 
All books, records, and research products and materials. 
including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data which are 
used, in violation of this article. 
All conveyances including, but not limited t0 , trailers. 
aircraft, motor vehicles, and waterg•:>ing 'ress-?~s whi..:r1 
are used or intended for use unlawfully tc· cc..ncea.:., 
contain, or transporT. or facilitate the unlawf~~ 
concealment, possession, containment, or transportatio~ 
of controlled substances and their compo unds. ex~ept a~ 
otherwise provided, mu~t be forfeited to the State; 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
7. All property including, bu L. not l imi te rJ t<). m•:·n i-::-s 
negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of e 
value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person 
X ~-
in exchange for a controlled substance, and all proce~ds 
including, but not limited to, monies, and 1·-=a.l ar,d 
personal property traceable to any exchange; 
All monies seized in close proximity t•J :o:·rfe it.::.::.~._: 
controlled substances, drug manufacL.uring, or 
distributing paraphernalia. or in clos~ Pt"•J:d mi ":~/ ::.•:• 
forfeitable records of the importation, manufacturi~e. 
or distribution of controlled substances and a l l moni~s 
seized at the time of arrest or search ~nvolving 
violation 6f this arL.icl~. 
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• 
• 
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• 
) 
' 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
~he proper~y is described as follows: 
SEE A'ITACHMENT 
Said property is subject to seizure and forf·:=-i ture pur:::.•~!'t t•:• 
Sections 44-53-520 and 44-53-530 Code of Laws of South Carolina 
(1976), as amended. 
Th~ ci~ponsnt aaya that the following facts are the basis of his 
alles·atic)n that the propert~o-· dea(~ribed 3.bo.:•ve w.:; :-2 'J:=ed. unl.:;r;?.u J.l:.· 
an6 is subject to seizure: 
SEE A'ITACHMENT 
1£ controlled substances were seized atate typ~ ana quant~t7 . 
Marijuana, Less than 1 Grami Heroin, Less than Gram; Cocaine. In excess_ 
of 6 Grams 
Carolina 
My C0mmission Expires: () ..3 - {.! 4 - c } 
(g) 14 
Attachment Affadavit for Seizure 
On 1-16-93 at 3301 N. Main Street, Columbia, SC, Columbia Police Officer J. 
P. Auld was attempting to have an illegally parked vehicle towed. During 
such time, Mr. Juan Rodriguez approached the officer and when asked, 
affirmed he was the driver of the vehicle (1979 Cadillac, VIN 
6B69T99276124). Mr. Rodriguez was asked by the officer to unlock the door. 
Mr. Rodriguez then opened the door at which time the officer smelled an 
odor of Ether emanating from inside. Officer Auld then detained Mr. 
Rodriguez and advised hi m of his .Miranda rights. He. also asked Mr. 
Rodriguez for consent to search the vehicle; to which the suspect gave. 
A search of the interior resulted in the seizure of a hand rolled cigarette 
with a substance which field tested positive as Marijuana. At that time, 
Mr. Rodriguez was arrested. An inventory search incident to arrest resulted 
in a white rock like substance which field tested positive as Cocaine being 
seized from a brown and black suitcase in the trunk. Officer Auld then 
requested the assistance of Columbia Narcotics officers. 
Officer J. L. Brown responded to the office~'s request, and upon arrival 
determined that Mr. Rodriguez was staying at the Parkview Inn in Room 207. 
He then obtained from Mr. Rodriguez a consent to search the room. When 
officers entered the room which was occupied by Mr. Salcedo and Mr. 
Samuels, a white powder residue was observed on the bedspread in plain 
view. Said substance was field tested positive as Cocaine. Both Mr. Salcedo 
and Mr. Samuels were arrested for Possession of Cocaine. Officers also 
seized from inside a pocket of a pair of pants belonging to Mr . Salcedo one 
small plastic bag with a white powder substance which field tested positive 
as Heroin. An additional 6 Grams of white powder substance was . seized from 
within the room. A set of portable scales, an electric heat sealing machine 
and a quantity of baking powder was also seized, items believed to have 
been used for the manufacturing, producing, compounding, processing and 
delivery of controlled substances. $3675.00 in US Currency belonging to Mr. 
Salcedo was seized in close proximity to forfeitable controlled substances 
and are the proceeds of his illegal narcotic activities. The other 
referenced items were seized in close proximity to forfeitable controlled 
substances and are believed to be the proceeds of the suspects' illegal 
narcotic activities. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Three Thousand Six Hundred } 
Seventy-Five Dollars } 
($3,675.00) in u.s. Currency,} 
Nine Dollars and Seventy-Six } 
Cents in u.s. Currency Coins,} 
One (1) 1/2 Penny, Hand-Held } 
Portable Scales, Electric } 
Heat Sealing Machine, } , 
Minolta 8mm Camcorder, Serial} 
#Ul002630, Aiwa Stereo } 
Recording Super Bass, Serial } 
#1794865, Minolta AC Adaptor } 
With Charger, Serial #009037-} 
65, Sega Portable Video Game,} 
Serial #KZ0622452, Cobra } 
Radar Detector, Serial #7300-} 
8812, Panasonic Rechargeable } 
Battery, Serial #PE11A890515,} 
Sony Sports Walkman, Serial } 
#UNK, Sega Game Gear, Serial } 
#010046199, One (1) Gold } 
Colored Watch, Santiago } 
Salcedo, Michael Samuels, and} 
Juan Rodriguez, Interested } 
Parties, } 
Defendant . 
} 
} 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT · 
SUMMONS 
TO: THE DEFENDANT ABOVE-NAMED: Santiago Salcedo, 657 Rogers 
Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, Michael Samuel, 188 Hawthorne 
Street, Brooklyn, New York, Juan Rodriguez, 32 Jerome Street, 
Brooklyn, New York; and Sandy Laney, Columbia Police 
Department, Persons Known to Have an Interest in the 
Defendant Property; 
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to answer the complaint 
in this proceeding, a copy of which is herewith served upon you, 
and to serve a copy of your answer to the said complaint on Fifth 
(g) 16 
Circuit Solicitor's Office at 1701 Main Street, Columbia, South 
Carolina within thirty (30) days after service hereof, exclusive of 
the date of such service, and if you fail to answer the complaint 
~ ) within the time aforesaid, judgment by default will be rendered 
.. 
:J 
against you for the relief. 
March Z..,'j ' 1993 
f)~ kJ u1 m , ±la Alt'od< .... EL~TH M. 'HANCOCK 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1701 Main Street 
Columbia, SC 29201 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
. } 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Three Thousand Six Hundred } 
Seventy-Five Dollars } 
{$3,675.00) in u.s. Currency,} 
Nine Dollars and Seventy-Six } 
Cents in U.S. Currency Coins,} 
One (1) 1/2 Penny, Hand-Held } 
Portable Scales, Electric } 
Heat Sealing Machine, } 
Minolta 8mm Camcorder, Serial} 
#U1002630, Aiwa Stereo } 
Recording Super Bass, Serial } 
#1794865, Minolta AC Adaptor } 
With Charger, Serial #009037-} 
65, Sega Portable Video Game,} 
Serial · #KZ0622452, .Cobra } -
Radar Detector, Serial #7300-} 
8812, Panasonic Rechargeable } 
Battery, Serial #PE11A890515,} 
Sony Sports Walkman, Serial } 
#UNK, Sega Game Gear, Serial } 
#010046199, One (1) Gold } 
Colored Watch, Santiago } 
Salcedo, Michael Samuels, and} 
Juan Rodriguez, Interested } 
Parties, } 
Defendant. 
} 
} 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT ' 
COMPLAINT FOR FORFEITURE 
Plaintiff would respectfully show the Court: 
I . 
Plaintiff is the Solicitor for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of 
the State of South carolina, and is authorized by Section 44-53-
530, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended to initiate 
this complaint for the forfeiture of the Defendant property . 
(g) 18 
II. 
The Defendant property is Three Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-
Five Dollars ($3,675.00) in U.S. Currency, Nine Dolla r s and 
Seventy-Six Cents in U.S. Currency Coins, One (1) 1/2 Penny, Hand-
Held Portable Scales, Electric Heat Sealing Machine, Minolta Bmm 
Camcorder, Serial #U1002630 1 Aiwa Stereo Re cording Super Bass 1 
Serial #1794865, Minolta AC Adaptor With Charger, Serial #00903765, 
Sega Portable Video Game, Serial #KZ0622452, Cobra Radar Detector, 
Serial #73008812, Panasonic Rechargeable Battery, Serial 
#PE11A890515, Sony Sports Wa l kman, Serial #UNK, Sega Game Gear, 
Serial #010046199, and One (1) Gold Colored Watch. 
III. 
The Defendant scales and heat sealing machine were used to 
process a controlled substance, and were used to facilitate the 
sale and distribute · of a controlled substance in violation of 
Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South Carolina 
(1976), as amended. 
The Defendant currency, assorted electronic equipment, and 
gold watch were used to facilitate the sale and distribution of a 
controlled substance, were furnished or intended to be furnished in 
exchange for and/or were proceeds from the sale of a controlled 
substance, were seized in close proximity to a controlled 
substance, and were seized at the time of arrest involving a 
controlled substance in violation of Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 
44, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended. 
IV. 
On January 16, 1993, a 1979 Cadillac was being towed for 
illegal parking and obstructing a roadway at 3301 N. Main Street in 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
Richland County. Juan Rodriguez approached the vehicle and asked 
• 
why it was being towed. The Columbia Police Department officer on 
the scene informed Rodriguez it was blocking the roadway and 
Rodriguez admitted to being the driver. Rodriguez then produced 
ownership papers, showing that the vehicl e was registered to David 
Ramirez of Brooklyn, New York and an expired drivers license. The 
officer explained that the vehicle would still be towed and asked 
Rodriguez to unlock the driver's door. As Rodriguez opened the 
• door, the officer detected a strong odor of ether, a chemical which 
is used in the production of crack cocaine. The officer obtained 
Rodriguez's consent to search the vehicle and discovered a 
• 
marijuana cigarette in the ashtray. Rodriguez was then arrested . 
An inventory search incident to arrest led to the seizure of one 
(1) rock of crack cocaine from the Defendant vehicle's trunk. 
Columbia Police Department officers arrived on the scene and 
• determined that Rodriguez was staying at the Parkview Inn, Room 
207. Rodriguez consented to a search of Room 207. Law enforcement 
officers entered Room 207 after knocking and identifying 
• 
themselves. The room was occupied by Santiago Salcedo and Michael 
Samuels. A white powder residue, which tested positive as cocaine, 
was observed on the bedspread in plairi view. At that time Salcedo 
and Samuels were arrested for Possession of Cocaine . 
• A small plastic bag of heroin; less than one (1) gram, was 
seized from Salcedo's pants. Six (6) grams of cocaine was also 
seized from the room. A set of portable scales, an electric heat 
• 
sealing machine and a quantity of baking powder, items which are 
commonly used i n the manufacture and distribution of controlled 
(g) 20 
• 
• 
substances, were also seized. 
Salcedo was in possession of Three Thousand Six Hundred 
• 
Seventy-Five Dollars ($3,675.00) in u.s. Currency, Two Thousand 
\ Dollars ($2,000.00) of which was in $20.00 bills and was found in ~ 
~ a black vinyl pouch which also contained a small amount of white 
• powder. Fifteen Hundred Dollars {$1,500.00) in u.s. Currency was 
found in Salcedo's wallet along with a small amount of white powder 
residue filled tested positive as cocaine. One Hundred Twenty 
Dollars ($120.00) in U.S $20.00 bills was found in Salcedo's • 
pockets. 
The remaining defendant property described above was seized 
from Room 207 and is drug proceeds or property used or intended to 
• be used as ·an exchange for a controlled substance. 
Rodriguez was charged with P~ssession of Marijuana, Possession 
With Intent to Distribute Cocaine, Possession With Intent to 
Distribut~ Cocaine Within 1/2 Mile Radius of a City Park. Salcedo • 
was charged with Possession With Intent to Distribute Cocaine, 
Possession With Intent to Distribute Cocaine Within 1/2 Mile Radius 
o f a City Park, and Possession of Heroin. Samuels was charged with 
• 
Possession With Intent to Distribute Cocaine and Possession With 
Intent to Distribute Cocaine Within 1/2 Mile Radius of a City Park. 
v. 
• Because the Defendant scales and heat sealing machine were 
used to process a controlled substance, and were used to facilitate 
the sale and distribute of a controlled substance, such Defendants 
are subject to seizure and forfeiture under the provisions of South 
• 
Carolina Code Ann. Section 44-53-520(a)(2) and (a)(4). 
(g) 21 
• 
I. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Because the Defendant currency, assorted electronic equipment, 
and gold watch were used to facilitate the sale and distribution of 
a controlled substance, were furnished or intended to be furnished 
in exchange for and/or were proceeds from the sale of a controlled 
substance, were seized in close proximity to a controlled 
substance, and were seized at the time of arrest involving a 
controlled substance, such Defendants are subject to seizure and 
forfeiture under the provisions of South Carolina Code Ann. Section 
4 4-5 3-5 2 0 (a) ( 4) , (a) ( 7) and (a) ( 8) . 
VI. 
By reason of these premises, the Defendant property is 
forfeited to the State of South Carolina . 
WHEREFORE; Plaintiff prays that: 
The Defendant property be declared forfeited to the Columbia 
Police Department pursuant to Section 44-53-530, et. seq., of the 
Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
March l '-\ , 1993 
ELIZ HANCOCK 
Assistant Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
(g) 22 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Three Thousand Six Hundred } 
Seventy-Five Dollars } 
($3,675.00) in U.S. Currency,} 
Nine Dollars and Seventy-Six } 
Cents in u.s. Currency Coins,} 
One (1) 1/2 Penny, Hand-Held } 
Portable Scales, Electric } 
Heat Sealing Machine, } , 
Minolta 8mm Camcorder, Serial} 
#Ul002630, Aiwa Stereo } 
Recording Super Bass, Serial } 
#1794865, Minolta AC Adaptor } 
With Charger, Serial #009037-} 
65, Sega Portable Video Game,} 
Serial #KZ0622452, Cobra } -
Radar Detector, Serial #7300-} 
8812, Panasonic Rechargeable } 
Battery, Serial #PE11A890515,} 
Sony Sports Walkman, Serial } 
#UNK, Sega Game Gear, Serial } 
#010046199, One (1) Gold } 
Colored Watch, Santiago } 
Salcedo, Michael Samuels, and} 
Juan Rodriguez, Interested } 
Parties, } 
Defendant. 
TO: JUAN RODRIGUEZ 
} 
} 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT · 
NOTICE 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that unless you apply within 
thirty (30) days from the date of service hereof, exclusive of the 
day of service, and have a suitable person appointed Guardian ad 
Litem for Juan Rodriguez, an incarcerated person, and give notice 
thereof to Elizabeth M. Hancock, Assistant Solicitor, Fifth 
Judicial Circuit, within thirty (30) days from the date of service 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
hereof, exclusive of the day of service, the Plaintiff will apply 
to the Court and have a suitable person appointed as Guardian ad 
Litem. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
March &5 , 1993 
Assistant Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
Cg) A 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Three Thousand Six Hundred } 
Seventy-Five Dollars } 
($3,675.00) in U.S. Currency,} 
Nine Dollars and Seventy-Six } 
Cents in U.S. Currency Coins,} 
One (1) 1/2 Penny, Hand-Held } 
Portable Scales, Electric } 
Heat Sealing Machine, } 
Minolta 8mm Camcorder, Serial} 
#U1002630, Aiwa Stereo } 
Recording Super Bass, Serial } 
#1794865, Minolta AC Adaptor } 
With Charger, Serial #009037-} 
65, Sega Portable Video Game,} 
Serial #KZ0622452, Cobra } 
Radar Detector, Serial #7300-} 
8812, Panasonic Rechargeable } 
Battery, Serial #PE11A890515,} 
Sony Sports Walkman, Serial } 
#UNK, Sega Game Gear, Serial } 
#010046199, One (1) Gold } 
Colored Watch, Santiago } 
Salcedo, Michael Samuels, and} 
Juan Rodriguez, Interested } 
Parties, } 
Defendant. 
TO: MICHAEL SAMUELS 
} 
} 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT · 
NOTICE 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that unless you apply within 
thirty (30) days from the date of service hereof, exclusive of the 
day of service, and have a suitable person appointed Guardian ad 
Litem for Michael Samuels, an incarcerated person, and give notice 
thereof to Elizabeth M. Hancock, Assistant Solicitor, Fifth 
Judicial Circuit, within thirty (30) days from the date of service 
(g) 25 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
hereof, exclusive of the day of service, the Plaintiff will apply 
.to the Court and have a suitable person appointed as Guardian ad 
Litem. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
March Z:..tj' , 19 9 3 
Etfz~Hill~c~~ 
Assistant Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
(g) 26 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Less Than One (1) Gram of } 
Cocaine, 1979 Cadillac, VIN } 
#6B69T99276124, and David } 
Ramirez, an Interested Party,} 
Defendant. 
} 
} 
SEIZURE WARRANT - ' c:: '. 
( ' • ., ••. r 
' . 
C > 
"v> ~·- · 
- n 
-::!. 
.r. 
.. 
. 0 N 
_ ,_ ,_o 
-I 
TO: ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 
ITS COUNTIES, MUNICIPALITIES, OR OTHER SUBDIVI S IONS: 
I: , 
~.... .., 
;. I '--"" • 
t ...... .., 
.. · ..
. .,.,..: .... 
1 • •; U 
j 
~~ ~. ~ 
~ ~ " 
r.'--11 
~·' 
It appears to the court from facts set forth in the attached 
affidavit, which is incorporated herein by reference, that the 
property described therein was used or intended to be used on the 
dates shown in violation of Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code 
of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended. 
Now, therefore, you are authorized to seize such property, 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
secure it and keep it under your control until lawful disposition • 
of such property is ordered by the court of competent jurisdiction 
upon petition to have it declared forfeited under provisions of 
Section 44-53-530, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as 
amended. 
AND IT IS SO AUTHORIZED. 
Given at Columbia, 
1993. 
South Carolina this o/ day of March, 
~GE, FI~~~CIAL CIRCUIT 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
• 
• 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Less Than One (1) Gram of } 
Cocaine, 1979 Cadillac, VIN } 
i6B69T99276124, and David } 
Ramirez, an Interested Party,} 
Defendant. 
} 
} 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT : 
NOTICE OF SEIZURE 
AND 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the following described property 
has been seized and is subject to proceedings for forfeiture to the 
State of South Carolina pursuant to Section 44-53-5 30, Code of Laws 
of South Carolina ( 197 6), as amended. . The property affected by 
said seizure and forfeiture proceeding is described as follows: 
1979 Cadillac, VIN #6B69T99276124 
A hearing will be held on the thirtieth (30th) day after 
service hereof or as soon thereafter as may be scheduled by the 
court. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
March ~ , 1993 
UDGE, IFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
RICHLAND COUNTY OF 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEIZURE 
PERSONALLY appeared before me Sandy M. Laney 
duly sworn, says that he is a Police Officer 
, who, being 
and that 
the subject . property is: (Check appropriate categories) 
X 
X 
l. 
,, 
(.. 
X 
___ · :.L 
X 4. 
S. 
X 
o. 
X 
7. 
X ~. 
All controlled substance (s) which have be~n manufactured . 
distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of 
Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South 
Carolina (1986), as amended. 
All raw materials, products, and equipment 0f any kind 
which are used, or whic~ have been positioned for us~. 
in manu£ actur ing, · pro due ing, compounding, process inc;, 
delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled 
substances in violations of this article. 
,, 
1\l.l proper"ty whJ.ch is useci I or wnicn nas oeen pu.~ l'J.LUlleU 
for use, as a container for property described in items 
( 1) and (2) above. 
All property, both real and personal, which in any manner 
is knowingly used to facilitate production. 
manufacturing, distribution, sale, importation. 
controlled substances as de1ined in this article. 
All books, records, and research products and materials. 
including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data which are 
used, in violation of this article . 
All conveyancei including, but not limited t0 , trailers. 
aircraft, motor ve hie les, and wa te rg0 ing v.=:ss..:-l.s whi·: h 
a1·e used or intended · for· Ltse unlawfully tc' c0nc~a:, 
contain, or transport or facilitate the unlawf~l 
concealment, possession, containment, or transportati·:·n 
of controlled substances and their compounds, e ~ce pt a~ 
otherwise provided, must be forfeited to the State; 
All property including, but not limito::':l to. m·::ni..::s 
negotiable instruments. securities, or other thin .. ~;= c·f 
value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person 
in exchange for a controlled substance, and all prqce~cts 
including, but not limited tc•, monies, and 1·eal ar:d 
personal property traceable to any exchange; 
All monies seized in ·~los~ pro:r:imi ty t•) f·:·l·f·'?i taolo.:: 
controlled substartces, drug manufacturing, or 
distributing paraphernalia, or in •::los~ ~t··:>:dm5. t~/ ::. .:• 
forfeitable records of the importati•:•n, m~nufa·:::turi'ng, 
or distribution of control l ed substances and all moni~= 
seized at the time of a rrest or search involvin~ 
violation of this arti~le. 
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• 
• 
The property is desctibed as · follows: 
SEE ATTACHMENT 
Said property is subject to seizure and forf·?i tu1·e pur::u.:a!'t t~ : · 
Sections 44-53-520 and 44-53-530 Code of Laws of South Carolina 
(1976l I as amended. 
Th~ d~ponQnt aaya that the following facts are the basis of his 
allegation that the propert;r· deacrib~d ab.:1vo:, H.::; ::z 1.1::-=·:t tmL.Ht f l.\ ]. l:.· 
and is subject to seizure: 
SEE ATTACHMENT ,r 
1£ controlled substances were seized state type and quantity . 
Marijuana, Less than 1 Gram; Heroin, Less than 1 Gram; Cocaine. In excess. 
of 6 Grams 
SWORN To and subscribed before 
this dUA day of '>ba'1t..-t.y ... .)v<-V I 91 q q 3 
__ .!,_1!~~, <:..=.!...lJ....:.J,.,d~cr;...::,_/ --1....4.~u::..:::'=/'-yr1,./~o-=-=-____ ( L. :; . 
Carolina 
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Attachment Affadavit for Seizure 
On 1-16-93 at 3301 N. Main Street, Columbia, SC, Columbia Police Officer J. 
P. Auld was attempting to have an illegally parked vehicle towed. During 
such time, Mr. Juan Rodriguez approached the officer and when asked, 
affirmed he was the driver of the vehicle (1979 Cadillac, VIN 
6B69T99276124). Mr. Rodriguez was asked by the officer to unlock the door. 
Mr. Rodriguez then opened the door at which t ime the officer smelled an 
odor of Ether emanating from inside. Officer Auld then detained Mr. 
Rodriguez and advised him of his Miranda rights. He also asked Mr. 
Rodriguez for consent to search the vehicle, to. which the suspect gave. 
A search of the interior resulted in the seizure of a hand rolled cigarette 
with a substance which field tested positive as Marijuana. At that time, 
Mr. Rodriguez was arrested. An inventory search incident to arrest resulted 
in a white rock like substance which field tested positive as Cocaine being 
seized from a brown and black suitcase in the trunk. Officer Auld then 
requested the assistance of Columbia Narcotics officers. 
Officer J. L. Brown responded to the officer's request, and upon arrival 
determined . that Mr. Rodriguez was staying at the Parkview Inn in Room 207. 
He then obtained from Mr. Rodriguez a consent to search the room. When 
officers entered the room which was occupied by Mr. Salcedo and Mr. 
Samuels, a white powder residue was observed on the bedspread in plain 
view. Said substance was field tested positive as Cocaine. Both Mr. Salcedo 
and Mr. Samuels were arrested for Possession of Cocaine. Officers also 
seized from inside a pocket of a pair of pants belonging to Mr. Salcedo one 
small plastic bag with a white powder substance which field tested positive 
as Heroin. An additional 6 Grams of white powder substance was seized from 
within the room. A set of portable scales, an electric heat sealing machine 
and a quantity of baking powder was also seized, items believed to have 
been used for the manufacturing, producing, compounding, processing and 
delivery of controlled substances. $3675.00 in US Currency belonging to Mr. 
Salcedo was seized in close proximity to forfeitable controlled substances 
and are the proceeds of his illegal narcotic activities. The other 
referenced items were seized in close proximity to forfeitable controlled 
substances and are believed to be the proceeds of the suspects' illegal 
narcotic activities. 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA } 
} 
} 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Less Than One (1) Gram of } 
Cocaine, 1979 Cadillac, VIN } 
#6B69T99276124, and David } 
Ramirez, an Interested Party,} 
Defendant. 
} 
} 
SUMMONS 
TO: THE DEFENDANT ABOVE-NAMED: David Ramirez, 643 Marcy Avenue, 
Brooklyn, New York; and Sandy Laney, Columbia Police 
Department, Persons Known to Have an Interest in the 
Defendant Property; 
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to answer the complaint 
in this proceeding, a copy of which is herewith served upon you, 
and to serve a copy of your ·answer to the said complaint on Fifth 
Circuit Solicitor's Office at 1701 Main Street, Columbia, South 
Carolina within thirty (30) days after service hereof, exclusive of 
I 
the date of such service, and if you fail to answer the complaint 
within the time aforesaid, judgment by default will be rendered 
against you for the relief. 
March 1..C) ' 1993 
~!4\l.bA cn~.ad<.. E IZAETHM:' HANCOCK 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1701 Main Street 
Columbia~ Sc 29201 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} ' 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Less Than One {1) Gram of } 
Cocaine, 1979 Cadillac, VIN } 
#6B69T99276124, and David } 
Ramirez, an Interested Party,} 
I } 
Defendant. } 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
COMPLAINT FOR FORFEITURE 
I 
Plaintiff would respectfully show the Court: 
I . 
Plaintiff is the Solicitor for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of 
the State of South Carolina, and is authorized by Section 44-53-
530, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended to initiate 
this complaint for the forfeiture of the Defendant property. 
II. 
The Defendant property is a 1979 Cadillac, VIN #6B69T99276124. 
III. 
The Defendant vehicle was used to facilitate the sale and 
distribution of a controlled substance, was used as a container for 
a controlled substance, and was used as a conveyance to contain, 
control, transport, and possess a controlled substance, in 
violation of Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South 
Carolina (1976), as amended. 
IV. 
On January 16, 1993, the Defendant 1979 Cadillac was being 
towed for illegal parking and obstructing a roadway at 3301 N. Main 
(g) 33 
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• 
Street in Richland County. Juan Rodriguez approached the Defendant 
• 
vehicle and asked why it was being towed. The Columbia Police 
Department officer on the scene informed Rodriguez it was blocking 
the roadway and Rodriguez admitted to being the driver. Rodriguez 
then produced ownership papers, showing that the vehicle was 
• registered to David Ramirez of Brooklyn, New York and an expired 
drivers license. The officer explained that the Defendant vehicle 
would still be towed and asked Rodriguez to unlock the driver's 
• door. As Rodriguez opened the door, the officer detected a strong 
odor of ether, a chemical which is used in the production of crack 
cocaine. The officer obtained Rodriguez's consent to search the 
• 
Defendant vehicle and discovered a marijuana cigarette in the 
ashtray. 
I 
Rodriguez was then arrested. An inventory search 
incident to arrest led to the seizure of one (1) rock of crack 
cocaine from the Defendant vehicle's trunk . 
• Columbia Police Department officers arrived on the scene and 
determined that Rodriguez was staying at the Parkview Inn, Room 
207. Rodriguez consented to a search of Room 207. Law enforcement 
• 
officers entered Room 207 after knocking and identifying 
themselves. The room was occupied by Santiago Salcedo and Michael 
Samuels. A white powder residue, which tested positive as cocaine, 
was observed on the bedspread in plain view. At that time Salcedo 
• and Samuels were arrested for Possession of Cocaine. 
A small plastic bag of heroin, less than one (1) gram, was 
seized from Salcedo's pants. Six (6) grams of cocaine was also 
• 
seized from the room. A set of portable scales, an electric heat 
sealing machine and a quantity of baking powder, items which are 
(g) 34 
• 
. . • 
commonly used in the manufacture and distribution of controlled 
substances, were also seized . • 
Salcedo was in possession of Three Thousand Six Hundred 
I 
Seventy-Five Dollars ($3,675.00) in U.S. Currency, Two Thousand 
Dollars ($2,000.00) of which was in $20.00 bills and was found in 
• 
a black vinyl pouch which also contained a small amount of white 
powder. Fifteen Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00) in u.s. Currency was 
found in Salcedo's wallet along with a small amount of white powder 
• residue which field tested positive as cocaine. One Hundred Twenty 
Dollars ($120.00) in U.S $20.00 bills was found in Salcedo's 
pockets. 
Assorted jewelry and Eighty-Nine Dollars and N1 neteen Cents • 
($89.19) was seized from Juan Rodriguez. Rodriguez forfeited the 
vehicle to the State of South Carolina by a Consent Order, filed on 
February 17, 1993, Judgement #187753. 
• Rodriguez was charged with Possession of Marijuana, Possession 
With Intent to Distribute Cocaine, Possession With Intent to 
Distribute Cocaine Within 1/2 Mile Radius of a City Park. Salcedo 
was charged with Possession With Intent to Distribute Cocaine, • 
Possession With Intent to Distribute Cocaine Within 1/2 Mile Radius 
of a City Park, and Possession of Heroin. Samuels was charged with 
Possession With Intent to Distribute Cocaine and Possession With e 
Intent to Distribute Cocaine Within 1/2 Mile Radius of a City Park. 
v. 
Because the Defendant vehicle was used to facilitate the sale 
and distribution of a controlled substance, was used as a container • 
for a controlled substance, and was used as a conveyance to 
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contain, control, transport, and possess a controlled substance, 
such Defendant is subject to seizure and forfeiture under the 
provisions of South Carolina Code Ann. Section 44-53-520(a) (2), 
(a) ( 3) , (a) ( 4) , and (a) ( 6) . 
VI. 
By reason of these premises, the Defendant property is 
forfeited to the State of South Carolina. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that: 
The Defendant property be declared forfeited to the Columbia 
Police Department pursuant to Section 44-53-530, et. seq., of the 
Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
March ~~ , 1993 
ar ru, w1!L:td<--
ELIZA ETH M. HANCOCK 
Assistant Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA } 
} 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND } 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
1985 Chevrolet 2-Door, VIN } 
Number 1GlJE27P6F7163510, One } 
Hundred Sixty Dollars ($160.00)} 
in U.S. Currency, and Clifton } 
Richmond, an Interested Party, } 
Defendant. 
} 
} 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
SEIZURE WARRANT 
(.") ' 
· . . ( 
~ ) J I . (._: 
-· ~-
-1 
, ... ) 
i ., ) 
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•.' 
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•• c\ 
• 
• 
' . =-
• 
TO: ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, ITS COUNTIES, • 
MUNICIPALITIES, OR OTHER SUBDIVISIONS: 
It appears to the Court f rom facts set forth in the attached affidavit, 
which is incorporated herein by reference, that the property described therein 
was used or intended to be used on the dates shown in violation of Article 3, 
• 
Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended. 
Now, therefore, you are authorized to seize such property, secure it and 
keep it under your control until lawful disposition of such property is ordered 
• by the court of competent jurisdiction upon petition to have it declared 
forfeited under provisions of Section 44-53-530, Code of Laws of South Carolina 
(1976), as amended. 
AND IT IS SO AUTHORIZED. • 
Given at Columbia, South Carolina this ~ 1 day of October, 1992. 
f!b.:rF!i~ CIRCUIT 
• STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA } 
} 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND } 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fift h Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
1985 Chevrolet 2-Door, VIN } 
Number 1G1JE27P6F7163510, One } 
Hundred Sixty Dollars ($160.00)} 
in u.s. Currency, and Clifton } 
Richmond, an Interested Party, } 
Defendant. 
} 
} 
NOTICE OF SEIZURE 
AND 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the following described property has been 
seized and is subject to proceedings . for forfeiture to the State of South 
Carolina pursuant to Section 44-53-530, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), 
as amended. The property affected by said seizure and forfeiture proceeding is 
described as follows: 
1985 Chevrolet 2-Door, VIN Number 1G1JE27P6F7163510 and One Hundred 
Sixty Dollars ($160.00). 
A hearing will'be held on the thirtieth day after service hereof or as 
soon thereafter as may be scheduled by the court . 
Columbia, South Carolina 
October ? ) 1992 
JUDGE, FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROL INA ) 
) 
CCUNTI OF f?:c&Hla~D ) AFFIDAVIT FOR SEIZURE 
PERSONALLY apFe&red before me .h-.t'~Wf'Lfrtt12N~· :who, being 
duly sworn, says that he is A Me~k:r1 :tbLtez: c£Rcf'L and 
that the subject property is~ (Check appropriate categories) 
.t/ 1. controlled · substance(s) which have been 
----- manufactured, dietributed, dispensed, or acquired in 
violation of Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of 
Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended. 
2. raw materials, products, and equipment of any 
kind which are used, or which have been positioned for 
u~e, in manufacturing, producing, compounding, process- . . . 
ing, delivering, ~mporting, or exporting any controlled .. 
substances in violation of Article 3, Chapter 53, Title.· 
44, Code of Laws· of South Carolina (1976), aa amended. 
I 
3. jroperty which is used, or which baa been .. 
positione fer use, as a container for property de-
•c~ibed in items (1) and (2) above. · . 
4. •. property 1jhich in any manner is knowingly used 
to facilitate production, manufacturina, diatribution, 
sale, importatton, exportation, or trafficking of 
varioua controlled substances as defined in Article 3, 
Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South Carolina 
(1976), as amended. · 
, S. books, records, and re!earch products . and _ 
materials, including formulas, microfilm. ·tapes, and 
·· data which are used, or which have been -pos1tioned_for_. _ _ 
use, in violation of Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, 
Code of Law~ of South .Carolina (1976), as amended. · 
6. , a conveyance ..,hicb was . used or intended for 
use unlawfully to conceal, contain, or tranaport or 
facilitate tbe unlawful :concealment, pos1e1aion, 
containment, or transportation of controlled aub-
stances, and their cc=pounds. 
7. mo~iee, ~egotiable inst~e~ts, securitie!, or 
other things of value furnished or intended to be 
furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled 
substance. 
. 8. proceeds, including, b~t not l~ted to, 
monies, and real and personal property traceable to an 
exchange for controlled substances. 
(g) 39 
. , 
9. mon!.es !'!izt-d in cloe'! proximity to forfeit·· 
able contra lled 1ub stances, or drug IDAilufac:turin& or 
cistributing paraphernalia, or monies seized in clo•• 
proximity to forfeitable recorda of the importation, 
~nufacturing, or distribution of controlled aub-
s taoces, or monies · seized at the time of 'arreet or 
sea reb involving violation of Article 3, Chapter ·53, 
Title 44, Code of Laws of South C&rolina (1976), •• 
amended. · 
The property is described as follows: 
. . 
f"l85, CRr=ccLf+J .;4 PCOt2-t <2~ CJ) <'cLQ(L.) ~EA(2£Yib L)c!Jlt-
1<21:SEs:X7PbF1!b3510 ANO ~t..Xt± ~ tA6 CXS'R5 · 
.. 
. .. -· ··------
• . .. 
Said property ia subj~ct to seiz~e and forfeiture purauant .· 
to Sections 44-53-520 and · 44-53-530 Code of Lava of ·.South 
. f 
Carolina (1976), as amended. 
The depooent says that the following facta are the baaia . of 
- .. 
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ll'\. AFFIANt 
• Sw~RN Tc and Subscribed before me 
t.his /~ day of fo;1 , 19J("..Af 
• (L. S.) 
~~+-~~~c~~~o-u-c~~a-r-olina 
-· - .. - . . . . --- ---· -. ·- ·- - · 
-·-- - .- .. - ... 
y Con::mis s ion Expirea~9 J<J'i,(, 
• 
. ' ~ 
• 
• 
. . 
.. t.• 
•• 
•• 
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~TATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
(~OUWi'Y 0~ rtl..AND AFF ID AVIT FOR SEI ZURE 
fERSON ALLY appeared 
duly sworn, says that he 
t1)e subject property is: 
~efore ~ 1 ¥1{' ~~ who, be in-s 
lS Q .. V~  .3.nd tba-:: 
(Check appropr~egories ) ~ 
~-
rJ 
.;, . 
All controlled substance Cs) which have been manufact u re d. 
dis~ributed, dispensed, or acquired in vi olati o n o £ 
Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws o f Soutj 
Carolina (1986), as amended . 
All raw materials, products, and equipment of ~ n y ~in~ 
which are used, or which have been positioned fo r us~. 
in manu£ actur ing, producing, compounding, process i:1s, 
delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled 
substances in violations of this article . 
All property which is used, or which has been positione~ 
for use, as a · container for property described in it0 ms 
(l) and (2) above . 
4 . All property, both real and personal, which in any manne.:· 
s . 
ti. 
7. 
!)_ 
is knowingly used to facilitate production . 
manufacturing, distribution. sale. importatio~ . 
controlled substances as defined in this article. 
All books, records, and research products and materials . 
including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data which a re 
used, in violation of this article. 
All conveyances ineluding, but not limited to , trailers . 
aircraft, motor vehicles, and watergoing vesse l s whic ~ 
are used or intended for use unlawfully t o concea .:., 
contain, or transport or facilitate the unlaw£~~ 
concealment, possession, containment, or transportatio~ 
of controlled substances and their compounds, except 3~ 
otherwise provided, must be forfeited to the State; 
All property including, but not limited to. moni~s 
negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of 
value furnished or intended to be furnished by any perso~ 
in exchange for a controlled substance, and all pracee~s 
including, but n•Jt limited to, monies, and real a.:~'"=:. 
personal property traceable to any exchange; 
All monies seized in close proximity to forfei t.a'::o.:. ·.= 
controlled substances, drug manufacturing, or 
distributing paraphernalia, o r in closP. proximi ~:r ~ · 
£e:rfei table records of the importation, manufacturin.:::. 
or distribution of controlled substances and all mon ~c 
seized at the time of arrest or search i nvolv n~ 
violation of this article . 
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The proper~y is described as follows: 
Said property is subject to seizure and forfeiture pur:; u a n t -":: •:· 
Sections 44-53-520 and 44-53-530 Code of Laws of South Caro lina 
(1916l, as amended . 
-~" h,;,. d~r:.,:•n.;;:n·t aa~.ra that the follo>-<ing facts are the bas is o f his 
a l legation that the prc•pert ;.r deac:ribed .;abt.:•vo:: w.'-'1 :.; u:;;e d Lm l.:;n;f ,_,l l :.· 
ana is subject to seizure: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
CYv o'l-1~-96 Pr\ \OO~env'izy_J\uc Qolp, -~c. ~Lc£+cO"JS<t:gJiiA-oLD 
toJfk? Af?!Z.t;~ -fua Mem~~k~ Gwe-h~· 
ttJ~CY"kQ.ou=f'JL \:61xQ£ ~ -k. ~ Q. Q 1 At-s~ of Clkftd\ 
~;t..J\ Eke~ ~~ 1. \L:,o·co · We ~~ ~ez:n:o v ..~a~ 
~E!-JOe.£2 :b::&- \or::D =b ~c -PrJ-:> ul~l ~s-hf\~ · 
substances 
+... -un 
SWOHN 'l'o ~d subscribed 
/71 
tnis 0?. 7 day of 
AFFIANT 
before me 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA } 
} 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND } 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff , 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
1985 Chevrolet 2-Door, VIN } 
Number 1GlJE27P6F7163510, One } 
Hundred Sixty Dollars ($160.00)} 
in u.s. Currency, and Clifton } 
Richmond, an Interested Party, } 
Defendant. 
} 
} 
SUMMONS 
TO: THE DEFENDANT(S) ABOVE-NAMED; Clifton Richmond, Route 4, Box 222, 
Winnsboro, south carolina; and Laura Melbourne, Columbia Police 
Department, Persons Known to Have an Interest in the Defendant Property; 
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to answer the complaint in this 
proceeding, a copy of which is herewith served upon you, and to serve a copy of 
f 
your answer to the said complaint on Fifth Circuit Solicitor's Office at 1701 
Main Street, Columbia, South Carolina within thirty (30) days after service 
hereof, exclusive of the date of such service, and if you fail to answer the 
, 
complaint within the time aforesaid, judgment by default will be rendered 
against you for the relief. 
October ~1 , 1992 
f~!~\oot;b rn.{\,Mc(dL. Eliz~h M. Hancock 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1701 Main Street 
Columbia, South Carolina 
(g) 44 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA } 
} 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND } 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
1985 Chevrolet 2-Door, VIN } 
Number 1G1JE27P6F7163510, One } 
Hundred Sixty Dollars ($160.00)} 
in u.s. Currency, and Clifton } 
Richmond, an Interested Party, } 
Defendant. 
} 
} 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
COMPLAINT FOR FORFEITURE 
Plaintiff would respectfully show the Court: 
I. 
Plaintiff is the Solicitor for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of the State of 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
South Carolina, and is authorized ~y Section 44-53-530, Code of Laws of South e 
Carolina (1976), as amended to initiate this complaint for the forfeiture of 
Defendant property. 
II. 
• The Defendant property is a 1985 Chevrolet 2-Door, VIN t1G1JE27P6F7163510, 
and One Hundred Sixty Dollars ($160.00) in u.s. Currency. 
III. 
The Defendant vehicle was used as a container for a controlled substance, 4t 
was used to facilitate the sale and distribution of a controlled substance, and 
was used as a conveyance to transport a controlled substance in violation of 
Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as 
amended. 
The Defendant currency was furnished or intended to be furnished in 
exchange for and/or was proceeds from the sale of a controlled substance, was 
• (g) 45 
- ---------- - -----
• 
seized in close proximity to a controlled substance, and was seized at t he time 
• of arrest i nvolving a controlled substance i n v i olation of Article 3, Chapter 
53, Ti tle 44, Code of Laws of South Carolina ( 1976), as amended. 
IV. 
. ~ On July 13, 1992, officers of the Columbia Police Department arrested 
' ·~ Clifton Richmond in Richland County for Attempting to Obtain Crack Cocaine. 
Richmond conspired to obtain 30.864 grains of simulated crack cocaine. Pursuant 
to arrest, officers seized the Defendant 1985 Chevrolet and One Hundred Sixty 
• Dollars ($160.00) in u.s. Currency. 
v. 
Because the Defendant was used as a container for a controlled substance, 
• was used to facilitate the sale and distribution of a controlled substance, and 
was used as a conveyance to transport, control, contain, and possess a 
controlled substance, such Defendant is subject to seizure and forfeiture under 
the provisions of South carolina Cpde Ann. Section 44-53-520(a)(3), (a)(4) and 
• (a)(6). 
Because the Defendant currency was furnished or intended to be furnished in 
exchange for and/or,was proceeds from the sale of a controlled substance, was 
• seized in close proximity to a controlled substance, and was seized at the time 
of arrest involving a controlled substance, such Defendant is subject to seizure 
and forfeiture under the provisions of South carolina Code Ann. Section 
• 
44-53-520(a)(4) and (a)(7) . 
VI. 
By reason of these premises, Defendant vehicle is forfeited to the State of 
South Carolina . 
• 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that: 
• 
(g) 46 
The Defendant property be declared forfeited to the Columbia Police Departmen t 
pursuant to Section 44-53-530, et. seq., of the Code of Laws of South Carolina 
(1976), as amended. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
October 12l_, 1992 
~·t!..m.~ 
Eliz th M. Hancock 
Assistant Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
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For Service of: Seizure Warrant, Notice of Seizure and Hearing, Summons & 
Complaint for Forfeiture 
For Service on: (Defendant's Name) 
9 - CP -
RECEIVED 
BY SERVER 
SERVED 
DATE 
DATE 
SERVED ON (NAME) 
SERVED BY 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
PLACE 
PLACE 
TITLE 
DECLARATION OF SERVER 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of South 
Carolina that the foregoing information contained in the Return of Service is 
true and correct. 
Executed on 
DATE SIGNATURE OF SERVER 
ADDRESS OF SERVER 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
(h) 1 
j)-
\ 
I 
For Service of: Seizure Warrant, Notice of Seizure and Hearing, Summons & 
Complaint for Forfeiture 
For Service on: 
9 - CP -
RECEIVED 
BY SERVER 
ATTEMPTED SERVICE 
ATTEMPTED SERVICE BY 
(Defendant ' s Name) 
AFFIDAVIT OF NON-SERVICE 
DATE PLACE 
DATE PLACE 
TITLE 
DECLARATION OF SERVER 
The person named above does not reside at the last known address. After 
searching files with the telephone service and the electric company, no 
forwarding address has been found. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of South 
Carolina that the foregoing information contained in the Return of Affidavit of 
Non-Service is true and correct. 
Executed on 
DATE SIGNATURE OF SERVER 
ADDRESS OF SERVER 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
(i) 1 
), 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
of) 
) 
) 
) 
Approximately One (1) Gram 
Marijuana, Forty-Two (42) 
capsules of Prescription 
Seconal, Fifty-Four (54) 
Tablets of Xanax, Twelve 
Percolet Tablets, One (1) 
(12)) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Blue Waist Blue Pouch, Nine 
Hundred Three Dollars 
($903.00) in u.s. Currency, 
and Shelia D. Pullium, an 
Interested Party, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
BY CERTIFIED MAIL 
Docket No. 92-CP-40-2780 
PERSONALLY, appeared before me, Rhonda P. Shealy, who first being 
sworn deposes and says that she is employed as secretary at the Fifth 
Judicial Circuit Solicitor's Office and that on October 13, 1992, she 
served the Defendant, Shelia D. Pullium, with a copy of the Seizure 
Warrant, Notice of Seizure and Hearing, Summons and Complaint in the 
above-referenced case by certified mail, postage prepaid and addressed 
as follows to her last known address: 
Shelia D. Pullium 
Route 2, Box lOlA 
Westminister, SC 29262 
(j) 1 
She also says that she is not a party in this action nor does she 
have any interest in it. 
SWORN before me this 22-
day of October, 1992. 
My Commission Expires: 7- 2 '2.-1~11 
~#? d;-&a~ 
Rhonda P. Shealyi' 
(j) 2 
• 
• 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
RICHARD A. HARPOOTLIAN, as) 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial ) 
Circuit, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
Less Than One (1) Gram of ) 
Crack Cocaine, Two Hundred) 
Twenty-Eight Dollars ) 
($228.00) in u.s. Currency) 
One (1) Gold-Toned Chain ) 
With Picture Pendant, One ) 
(1) Gold-Toned Chain With ) 
Lion Head Pendant, One (1)) 
North American Arms .22 ) 
Caliber Revolver, Serial ) 
#W10105, and James Nash, ) 
an Interested Party, ) 
) 
Defendant . ) 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
• 
ORDER FOR PUBLICATION 
• 
93-CP-40-0847 
• 
• 
Having read and filed the Petition of Elizabeth M. Hancock, e 
Attorney for the Plaintiff herein, and it appearing that this is an 
action for the civil forfeiture of property situated in Richland 
County, South Carolina, and further that James Nash may not after 
due diligence be located in the party's resident county, State of 
South Carolina, IT IS ORDERED that service in this matter be made 
on James Nash by publishing copies of the Summons, Notice of 
Seizure and Hearing, Notice of Filing of Complaint, and this Order 
in the Star Reporter, which paper is hereby designated as most 
likely to give notice to the responde t, once weekly for 
consecutive weeks. 
Columbij~South Carol i na 
April , 1993 
rbara A. Scott, 
Richland County 
(k) 1 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
RICHARD A. HARPOOTLIAN, as) 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial ) 
Circuit, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
Less Than One (1) Gram of ) 
Crack Cocaine, Two Hundred) 
Twenty-Eight Dollars ) 
($228.00) in U.S. Currency) 
One (1) Gold-Toned Chain ) 
With Picture Pendant, One ) 
(1) Gold-Toned Chain With ) 
Lion Head Pendant, One (1)) 
North American Arms .22 ) 
Caliber Revolver, Serial ) 
#W10105, and James Nash, ) 
an Interested Party, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
PETITION FOR ORDER OF 
PUBLICATION 
93-CP-40-0847 
NOW COMES, Elizabeth M. Hancock, attorney for the Plaintiff 
herein, who respectfully show unto this Court: 
1. This is an action for civil forfeiture of Two Hundred 
Twenty-Eight Dollars ($228.00) in u.s. Currency, One (1) Gold-Toned 
Chain With Picture Pendant, One (1) Gold-Toned Chain With Lion Head 
Pendant, and One (1) North American Arms .22 Caliber Revolver, 
Serial #Wl0105. 
2. Although due and diligent search has been made for James 
Nash, this Service by Publication will give notice to James Nash, 
who may have an interest in the property. 
3. The Plaintiff is informed and believes that it is 
necessary that it obtain jurisdiction of James Nash by service by 
publication and it prays that this Court issue its Order allowing 
(k) 2 
~--------------------------------------------------- ~----
r 
o I 
such service. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court issue its Order 
authorizing service of the Summons, Notice of Seizure and Hearing, 
Notice of Filing of Complaint and Order of Publication herein. 
ColumbiahfSouth Carolina 
April ~' 1993 
(k) 3 
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• 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
RICHARD A. HARPOOTLIAN, as) 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial ) 
Circu i t, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
Less Than One (1) Gram of ) 
Crack Cocaine, Two Hundred) 
Twenty-Eight Dollars ) 
($228 . 00) in u.s. Currency) 
One (1) Gold-Toned Chain ) 
With Picture Pendant, One ) 
(1) Gold-Toned Chain With ) 
Lion Head Pendant, One (1)) 
North American Arms .22 ) 
Caliber Revolver, Serial ) 
#W10105, and James Nash, ) 
an Interested Party, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
TO: JAMES NASH: 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
SUMMONS AND NOTICE 
93-CP-40-0847 
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED AND REQUIRED to answer the Complaint 
in the above-entitled action, a copy of which is hereby served upon 
you, and to serve a copy of your answer on the subscriber at her 
office, Richland County Judicial Center, Suite 302, 1701 Main 
Street, Columbia, South Carolina, 29201 within THIRTY (30) DAYS 
after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service, and 
if you fail to answer within the time aforesaid, Petitioner in this 
action will apply to the 
petition . 
Columbijt~South Carolina 
April , 1993 (k) 4 
• 
TO: JAMES NASH: 
TAKE NOTICE that the original Summons, Complaint and Notice of e 
Seizure and Hearing in the above-entitled action were filed in the 
Office of the Clerk of Court on the 2nd day of March, 1993, the 
subject and prayer of which is to obtain the civil forfeiture of 
property named above. 
Columbia¥{south Carolina 
April ~' 1993 
~Y)_.~ • 
En:zethM: Hancoc 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
(k) 5 • 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF GREENVILLE 
State of South Carolina, ex rel, 
Joseph J . Watson, Solicitor,---
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Four Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-four 
and 00/100 (4 , 984.00) Dollars in 
United States Currency and 
John Arthur Ruiz 
I 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant ( s) . ) 
__________________________________ ) 
TO THE DEFENDANT ( S) ABOVE-NAMED: 
l\v 
91- 72 36 1 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLE AS 
RULE TO SHOW CAUSE 
91-CP-23-2404 
It appears from the complaint in this case that the plaintiff 
seeks forfeiture under law of certain property. Since the relief 
sought is equitable in nature, the matter should be referred to the 
Master in Equity for Greenville County pursuant to Rule 53, 
S.C.R.Civ.P . 
THEREFORE, . IT IS ·oRDERED that the defendant appear before Judge 
Charles B. Simmons, Jr., Master in Equity, Room 208, Greenville County 
Courthouse, Greenville, ·South Carolina, on the da y of 
, 19 , at o'clock . m., or 
_a_s __ s_o __ o_n~t~h-e __ r_e_a~f~t-e-r---a-s---c--ounsel may be heard, to show cause,-rf any y ou 
can, why an order of this court should not be is sued forfeiting the 
defendant property above-named and fully described in the complaint 
and why additional relief, if any requested, should not be granted. 
Any appeals shall be directly to the Supreme Court of South Carolina 
pursuant to Section 14-11-85, S.C. Code of Laws, 1976, as amended. 
Fees and costs to be taxed to non-prevailing party . 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Circuit 
(1) 1 
,, 
\, 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF GREENVILLE 
State of South Carolina, 
ex re 1 , Joseph J. lola tson, 
Solicitor, Thirteenth 
Judicial Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
Seven Hundred Fifty-six and 
00/100 ($756.00) Dollars in 
United States Currency and 
Jimmie Lee Spann, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
90-77680 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION 
90-CP-23-3581 
.. 
TO THE DEFENDANT NAMED ABOVE: JIMMY LEE SPANN 
NOTICE OF MOTION 
. . , :- -: 
. .:. ~ 
Please take notice that Plaintiff has moved before the Court for the 
- ' 
w 
N 
above case to be referred to the Master in . Equity for Greenville County and 
that you or your attorney should appear before the Court ten days after service 
of this Motion, or as soon thereafter as counsel may . be heard, for the purpose 
of presenting evidence, if any you have, relevant to the Motion. If you 
fail to appear, Plaintiff will request the relief prayed for in said Motion. 
MOTION AND ARGUMENT 
The State respectfully moves before this Court to refer the above-captioned 
case to the Master in Equity for Greenville County, South Carolina. 
South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b) provides tha: issues in 
an action may be referred to the Master in the following instances: 
1. By consent of the parties; 
2. By the clerk of court in default cases; 
3. In jury cases, when the issues are complicated; 
4. In all other cases, when the court, upon its own motion or upon 
application of any party, directs a reference. 
The Court, issuing its Rule to Show Cause, directed that this action 
be referred to Judge Charles B. Simmons, Master in Equity on August 2S~)1~90 
in compliance with SCRCP 53(a). The case was referred upon the court's own 
motion. The Attorney General's office, when asked to comment on this practice, 
(1) 2 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• "-• 
• • 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
agreed that forfeitures could be referenced by the court under SCRCP 53, 
see Exhibit 11 A" attached. 
Further, the Defendant never made a timely, written motion regarding 
his objection to the reference prior to the hearing date designated in the 
Rule. The Defendant is at this time in default. 
State law regarding civil forfeiture does not prohibit reference of 
a case to the Master. The South Carolina Code of Laws §44-53-530(a), provides 
for forfeiture to be accomplished by petition to the Court of Common Pleas 
and there is no inference in the reading of the statute that the legislative 
intent was to prohibit a reference. The Co~rt has the power under SCRCP 
53 to refer civil cases to the Master. Nothing in the statute prohibits 
the court from referring cases. In fact, the court has referred all recent 
actions without objection • 
Finally, the reference is proper because this case involves an equitable 
matter. The parties are only seeking to have certain, specific property 
returned or forfeited. There are no damages to be ascertained, and therefore, 
is a proper matter for a court of equity to resolve . 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above argument, the State believes that this case is properly 
before the Master and asks 
G~nville, South Carolina 
~", 1:1-. , 1990 
that this court issue its Order stating 
.. _ . .-..--.--- . 
.. .,. ~ 
, ., ; . . . '-
, .  (~ 
Claire A. Davis-
Assistant Circuit Solicitor 
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit 
same. 
(1) 3 
-. 
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~. -· ~ 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUN TY OF RICHLAND 
) 
) 
) 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
Richard A. Harpoot l ian , as 
Solic i tor , Fi f t h Judicial 
Ci r cui t , 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
91CP4004?9 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
One Thousand Three 
Sixty-Four Dollars 
and Everton Jones, 
Interested Party , 
) 
) 
Hundred ) 
($1 , 364.00)) 
an ) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
N 0 T I C E 
91-CP-40- ... , ... 
.- . 
·. ' 
(/') 
TO : EVERTON JONES, Richland County Detention Center, Columbia, South 
Carolina 
: I 
...... 
-' 
_, 
::) 
,. 
---~~ 
.. ~ 
... ,_ 
' '-) 
'-0 
-, 
-
... .. 
:::n 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that unless you apply within thirty (30) days 
from the date of service hereof, exclusive of the day of service, and have a 
suitable person appointed Guardian ad litem for Everton Jones, an incarcerated 
person, and give notice thereof to Elizabeth M. Hancock, Assistant Solicitor, 
• . 
. :~q 
'11,! 1.1 
:··· :rj 
••; -. ~.,.... I . ·-,~./ 
Fifth Judicial Circuit, within thirty (30) days from the date of service hereof, 
exclusive of the day of service , the plaintiff . will apply to the Court and have 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• • 
• • 
• 
• 
• a suitable person appointed as Guardian ad litem. e 
Columbia, South Carolina 
January ~1 , 1991 
EliZ~. Hancock, Assistant Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit e 
(m) 1 
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• 
• 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
Three Hundred Three Dollars 
($303.00) in U. S. Currency 
and an 
Interested Party, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IN THE COURT OF COHHON PLEAS 
N 0 T I C E 
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT and ··---1111., ~~~'Gonzales Gardens, Columbia, 
South Carolina 29204 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that unless you apply within thirty (30) days 
from the date of service hereof, exclusive of the day of service, and have a 
suitable person appointed Guardian ad litem for the minor mentioned in the 
attached complaint known astlll .... lllllllla, and give notice thereof to 
Elizabeth M. Hancock, Assistant Solicitor, Fifth Judicial Circuit, within thirty 
(30) days, the plaintiff will apply to the Court and have a suitable person 
appointed as Guardian ad litem • 
Columbia, South Carolina 
February ± , 1991 
BY:Eli~cill,~ 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial Circuit 
Solicitor's Office 
(n) 1 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
EX PARTE : 
Assistant Solicitor, Fifth 
Judicial Circuit , 
Petitioner, 
IN RE: 
James C. Anders, as Solicitor, 
Fifth Judicial Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
IN THE COURT OF COHHON PLEAS 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT 
OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM AND ORDER 
Petitioner above-named would respectfully show unto the Court : 
1. That as Assistant Solicitor of the 
Fifth Judicial Circuit, is petitioner in the forfeiture proceeding 
identified hereinabove. 
2. That 
------------------- is an imprisoned person and 
that ____________________ _ 
may have an interest in property identified 
above which is subject of a forfeiture action. 
3. That since 
--------------------- is an imprisoned person, a 
guardian ad litem should be appointed to represent him pursuant to Rule 
17(c), South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. That an imprisoned person, has failed 
to apply to the Court for appointment of a guardian ad litem in this 
action and, therefore, Petitioner has filed this application for such 
appointment pursuant to Rule 17(d)(6), South Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (o) 1 
• • 
• • 
• • 
' 
.. 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• • 
• '-
• 
e 
• 
• • 
I 
• •· 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
·.._ 
5. That 
-----------------------------' Esquire, is a member in 
good standing of the Richland County Bar and is a suitable and proper 
person to be appointed Guardian ad Litem. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court appoint 
---------------------------------• Esquire, as Guardian ad Litem to 
represent an imprisoned person in the 
forfeiture action set forth above . 
Petitioner 
Columbia, South Carolina 
1990. 
0 R D E R 
Upon consideration of the foregoing Petition of --------------------
and it appearing that the appointment of a Guardian ad Litem is both 
necessary and proper, 
IT IS SO ORDERED that -------------------------• Esquire, be and 
hereby is appointed Guardian ad Litem to represent the interest of 
-----------------------• an imprisoned person, in the above-referenced 
forfeiture action. 
PRESIDING JUDGE 
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
Columbia, South Carolina 
This __ day of--------- 1990 
(o) 2 
..-------------------- - - - - ------ ----------
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF KERSHAW 
} 
} 
} 
Ric h ard A. Harpootlian, as } 
So l ic i tor, Fifth J udicial Circuit, } 
} 
Plaintiff, } 
} 
v. } 
} 
Approximately 20-30 pounds of mari-} 
juana, 150 marijuana stems, 49 } 
marijuana pods, 31 growing mari- } 
juana plants, Assorted ledgers and } 
paperwork relating to marijuana, } 
Irrigation equipment used to manu- } 
facture marijuana, High intensity } 
lights and timers used to manu- } 
facture marijuana, Book and records} 
associated with the manufacturing } 
of marijuana, Tribeam scales, } 
Plastic PVC pipe, Wood frames, } 
Assorted Hoses, Fittings, Tanks and} 
Pumps used for the manufacturing } 
of marijuana in residence, All that} 
certain piece, parcel or lot of } 
land lying and being in the County } 
of Kershaw, State of South Carolina} 
containing one (1) acre, more or } 
less, and being bounded as follows:} 
NORTH by the Richards Road; EAST by} 
land of Mrs. F.J. Hay, now or } 
formerly; south by land of Mrs. } 
C. E. Richards now or formerly; and } 
WEST by land of Mrs. C.E. Richards } 
Parcel 2: All that certain piece, } 
parcel or lot of land, lying and } 
being situate in the Liberty Hill } 
Community, Kershaw County, South } 
carolina, being more particularly } 
described as follows: BEGINNING at } 
an iron on the northeastern line } 
of right of way for S.C . Highway } 
No. 97, thence N 51-18 E 1,059.07 } 
feet to a stake; thence s 42-38 E } 
1,817.5 feet to a cedar stake; } 
thence s. 54-18 W 603 feet to a } 
cedar; thence N 85-23 W 309.2 feet 
t o a cedar stake; thense s 61-56 
W 435.1 feet to an iron on the 
} 
} 
} 
right of way line for S.C. Highway } 
No. 97; thence continuing with said} 
highway right of way line N 29-06 W} 
I N THE CIRCUIT COURT 
SEIZURE WARRANT 
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I hereby certify that the foregol n ~ l ~ 
a. true and exact copy of orig ina l ·.~ ! 
file in this office. ~ ~ '~,!. ~~~#<. 
y-')1 Matilda. IV. Go ods ou 
Clerk of Co urt 
lershaw County, S.O. 
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902.3 feet to a point; thence N 31-} 
09 W 102.4 feet to a point; thence } 
N 37-30 W l 0 4.7 feet to a point; } 
thense N 43-18 w 104.5 feet to a } 
point; thence N 49-15 W 104.5 feet } 
to a point; thence N 55-03 W 84.8 } 
feet to a point; thence N 60-43 W } 
105.0 feet to the point of begin- } 
ning. The above described Parce 2 } 
is shown and designated as a tract } 
of 42.44 acres on plat entitled } 
"Property of Stephen McCrae and } 
Virginia L. McCrae" prepared by } 
Tetterton & Riddick, Surveyors, } 
dated October 12, 1977, recorded } 
in the office of the Clerk of } 
Court for Kershaw County in Plat } 
Book 36, at page 417. Parcel 3: } 
All that certain piece, parcel or } 
tract of land, with improvements } 
thereon, in Flat Rock Township, } 
Kershaw County, South Carolina, } 
partly within the unincorporated } 
limits of the Town of Liberty Hill,} 
containing thirty-two and three- } 
fourths (32 3/4) acres, and being } 
bounded as follows: NORTH by } 
property of Mrs. Fred Hay; EAST by } 
property of John G. Richards } 
Estate; SOUTH by Hancock lands; } 
and, WEST by property of Mrs. Lou } 
Johnson. The above described } 
Parcels 1, 2 and 3 are the same } 
conveyed to Rock Savage and } 
Elizabeth Chapman Savage by deed of} 
Virginia L. Mccrae, John Richards } 
McRae and Stephen R. McCrae dated } 
April 22, 1985, and recorded in the} 
office of the Clerk of Court for } 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Kershaw County in Book IV, at page 
1693, on April 22, 1985. Subse-
quent thereto on February 2, 1988, 
Elizabeth Chapman Savage conveyed 
her interest in said property unto 
Rock Savage, which deed was 
recorded in the office of the Clerk} 
of Court for Kershaw County in 
Book JA, at page 2952, also known 
as 2305 Richards Lane, Liberty 
Hill, South Carolina, and Rock 
Savage and Lida Savage, Interested 
Parties, 
Defendant . 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
,(p) 2 
TO: ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, ITS 
COUNTIES, MUNICIPALITIES OR OTHER SUBDIVISIONS: 
It appears to the Court from facts set forth in the attached 
affidavit, which is incorporated herein by reference, that the property 
described therein was used or intended to be used on the dates shown i n 
violation of Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South 
Carolina (1976), as amended. 
Now, therefore, you are authorized to seize such property, secure 
it and keep it under your control until lawful disposition of such 
property is ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon petition 
to have it declared forfeited under provisions of Section 44-53-530, 
Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended. 
AND IT IS SO AUTHORIZED. 
Given at Columbia, South Carolina, this /~ay of May, 1992. 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA } 
} 
COUNTY OF KERSHAW } 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as } 
Solicitor, F i fth Judicial Circuit, } 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
1987 Honda 4-Door, VIN #JHMEC5827H-} 
S001533, 1972 Chevrolet Custom } 
Deluxe/20 Pickup, VIN #CCE232Bl062-} 
14, 1982 Toyota Land Cruiser 4WD, 
VIN tJT3FJ60GSC0030725, Yanmar 
Tractor Model tYM2260, Serial 
} 
} 
} 
#41770, Taro Riding Lawnmower 8-32 } 
Model 59111, Serial #9001630, } 
Winpower Tractor Driven Alternator,} 
Model #15/lOPCTD, Serial #890102-8,} 
Marquette Model 10-120 A.C. Arc } 
Welder, Serial 163233, Makita } 
Electric Planer Model #2030, } 
Serial #1273SE, Lienbach Line Scoop} 
Pan for Tractor, Forklift for } 
Tractor, Post Hole Diggers, 3 Point} 
Hitch, Utility Trailer, Two-Wheel, } 
Fuel Tank for Pick-Up Truck, Port- } 
able Air Tank, Delta Shaper lHP, } 
Serial #86J42797, Whirlpool } 
Jacuzzi, Thompson Center Arms } 
Rochester, New Hampshire, Serial } 
#206887, Sportmaster Model 512-P } 
Remington .22 Short-Long-Long } 
Rifle, Remington 870 Wingmaster } 
Magnum 12 Gauge, Serial #T854234M, } 
Armi Tanfoglio Giuseppe Made in } 
Italy, Model GT 26, Serial #Sl0978,} 
and Rock Savage and Lida Savage, } 
Interested Parties, } 
} 
Defendant. } 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
SEIZURE WARRANT 
-
-I .· 
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n ~ 
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··- J 
b certify that the foregoi ng i s I here Y · · al on 
a. true and exact copy of orlgl n 
file in this offi ce . ~ ~~~ 
Y'1~~w~ 
Matilda W. Goodson 
Clerk of Court 
Iersbaw County, S . C . 
It appears to the Court from facts set for~h in the attached affidavits, 
which is incorporated herein by reference, that the property described therein 
was used or intended to be used on the dates shown i n violation of Article 3, 
Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976) as amended . 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA } 
} 
COUNTY OF KERSHAW } 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as } 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial Circuit, } 
} 
Plaintiff, } 
} 
v. } 
} 
Approximately 20-30 pounds of mari-} 
juana, 150 marijuana stems, 49 } 
marijuana pods, 31 growing mari- } 
juana plants, Assorted ledgers and } 
paperwork relating to marijuana, } 
Irrigation equipment used to manu- } 
facture marijuana, High intensity } 
lights and timers used to manu- } 
facture marijuana, Book and recorda} 
associated with the manufacturing } 
of marijuana, Tribeam scales, } 
Plastic PVC pipe, Wood frames, } 
Assorted Hoses, Fittings, Tanka and} 
Pumps used for the manufacturing } 
of marijuana in residence, All that} 
certain piece, parcel or lot of } 
land lying and being in the County } 
of Kershaw, State of South Carolina} 
containing one (l) acre, more or } 
less, and being bounded as follows:} 
NORTH by the Richards Road; EAST by} 
land of Mrs. F.J. Hay, now or } 
formerly; south by land of Mrs. } 
C.E. Richards now or formerly; and } 
WEST by land of Mrs. C.E. Richards } 
Parcel 2: All that certain piece, } 
parcel or lot of land, lying and } 
being situate in the Liberty Hill } 
Community, Kershaw County, South } 
Carolina, being more particularly } 
described as follows: BEGINNING at } 
an iron on the northeastern line } 
of right of way for S.C. Highway } 
No. 97, thence N 51-18 E 1,059.07 } 
feet to a stake; thence S 42-38 E } 
1,817.5 feet to a cedar stake; 
thence s. 54-18 W 603 feet to a 
} 
} 
cedar; thence N 85-23 W 309.2 feet } 
to a cedar stake; thence s 61-56 } 
W 435.1 feet to an iron on the } 
right of way line for S.C. Highway } 
No. 97; thence continuing with said} 
highway right of way line N 29-06 W} 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
NOTICE OF SEIZURE 
AND HEARING 
- . 
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•. 
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; 
~ J : -- ~ ") 
n D 
\ ') 
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J 
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.. ·'I 
I hereby certify that the foregoing i s 
a true and exac t copy of crigi ne.l on 
file in this off i 0 e. 
CP f'JI"" ·" !-> ~~ , ~~iL-l ~?.' 11, , .;:._;,.-;, -~ ;~ ' ;F ·,~, ..... ~- J.r -1' ,. . ~-~-· . .. .:s - , 
" ~ · "Hlda W. Goodson 
_qerk of Court 
R:ershaw County, S.C. 
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Now, therefore, you are authorized to seize such property, secure it and 
\ keep it under your control until lawfu l disposition of such property is ordered 
by the court of competent jurisdiction upon petition to have it declared 
forfeited u nder provisions of Section 44-53-530, Code of Laws of South Carolina 
(1976) as amended. 
AND IT IS SO AUTHORIZED. 
Given at Columbia, South Carolina this Lk_ day of July, 1992. 
cidJ.. 
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902.3 feet to a point; thence N 31-} 
09 w 102.4 feet to a point; thence } 
N 37-30 W 104 . 7 feet to a point; } 
thence N 43-18 W 104.5 feet to a } 
point; thence N 49-15 W 104.5 feet } 
to a point; thence N 55-03 w 84.8 } 
feet to a point; thence N 60-43 W } 
105.0 feet to the point of begin- } 
ning. The above described Parcel 2} 
is shown and designated as a tract } 
of 42.44 acres on plat entitled } 
"Property of Stephen Mccrae and 
Virginia L. McCrae" prepared by 
Tetterton & Riddick, Surveyors, 
dated October 12, 1977, recorded 
in the office of the Clerk of 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Court for Kershaw County in Plat } 
Book 36, at page 417. Parcel 3: } 
All t hat certain piece, parcel or } 
trac t of land, with improvements } 
thereon, in Flat Rock Township, } 
Kershaw County, South Carolina, } 
partly within the unincorporated } 
limits of the Town of Liberty Hill,} 
containing thirty-two and three- } 
fourths (32 3/4) acres, and being } 
bounded as follows: NORTH by } 
property of Mrs. Fred Hay; EAST by } 
property of John G. Richard s } 
Estate; SOUTH by Hancock lands; } 
and, WEST by property J f Mrs. Lou } 
Johnson. The above described } 
Parcels 1, 2 and 3 are the same } 
conveyed to Rock savage and } 
Elizabeth Chapman Savage by deed of} 
Virginia L. McCrae, John Richards } 
McRae and Stephen R. McCrae dated } 
April 22, 1985, and recorded in the} 
office of the Clerk of Court for } 
Kershaw County in Book IV, at page } 
1693, on April 22, 1985. Subse- } 
quent thereto on February 2, 1988, } 
Elizabeth Chapman Savage conveyed } 
her interest in said property unto } 
Rock Savage, which deed was } 
recorded in the office of the Clerk} 
of Court for Kershaw County in } 
Book JA, at page 2952, also known } 
as 2305 Richards Lane, Liberty } 
Hill, South Carolina, 1987 Honda 4-} 
Door, VIN fJHMECS827HS001533, 1972 } 
Chevrolet Custom Deluxe/20 Pickup, } 
VIN ICCE232B106214, 1982 Toyota } 
Land Cruiser 4WD, VIN #JT3FJ60GSC- } 
(p) 7 
•• 
• • 
• 
• 
• • 
• • 
•• 
• • 
4 
• 
• • 
• • 
I 
• • 
• • 
• • 
0030725, Yanmar Tractor Model fYM2-} 
260, Serial #41770, Toro Riding } 
Lawnmower 8-32 Model 59111, Serial } 
19001630, Winpower Tractor Driven } 
Alternator Model I15/10PCTD, Serial} 
1890102-8, Marquette Model 10-120 } 
A. C. Arc Welder, Serial 163233, } 
Makita Electric Planer Model 12030,} 
Serial ll2735E, Lienbach Line Scoop} 
Pan for Tractor, Forklift for } 
Tractor, Post Hole . Diggers, 3 Point} 
Hitch, Utility Trailer, Two-Wheel, } 
Fuel Tank for Pick-Up Truck, Port- } 
able Air Tank, Delta Shapter lHP, } 
Serial I86J42797, Whirlpool } 
Jacuzzi, Thompson Center Arms } 
Rochester, New Hampshire, Serial } 
#206887, Sportmaster Model 512-P } 
Remington .22 Short-Long-Long } 
Rifle, Remington 870 Wingmaster } 
Magnum 12 Gauge, Serial IT854234M, } 
Armi Tanfoglio Giuseppe Made in } 
Italy Model GT 26, Serial 1510978, } 
and Rock Savage and Lida Savage, } 
Interested Parties, } 
} 
Defendants. } 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the following described property has been 
seized and is sub j ect to proceedings for forfeiture to the State of south 
Carolina pursuant to Section 44-53-530, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), 
as amended. The property affected by said seizure and forfeiture proceeding is 
described as follows: 
Approximately 20-30 pounds of marijuana, 150 mar~Juana stems, 49 marijuana pods, 
31 growing marijuana plants, Assorted ledgers and paperwork relating to 
marijuana, Irrigation equipment used to manufacture marijuana, High intensity 
lights and timers used to manufacture marijuana, Book and records associated 
with the manufacturing of marijuana, Tribeam scales, Plastic PVC pipe, Wood 
frames, Assorted Hoses, Fittings, Tanks and Pumps used for the manufacturing 
of marijuana in residence, All that certain piece, parcel or lot of land lying 
and being in the County of Kershaw, State of South Carolina containing one (1) 
acre, more or less, and being bounded as follows: NORTH by the Richards Road; 
EAST by land of Mrs. F.J. Hay, now or formerly; south by land of Mrs. C . E. 
Richards now or formerly; and WEST by land of Mrs. C.E. Richards Parcel 2: All 
that certain piece, parcel or lot of land, lying and being situate in the 
Liberty Hill Community, Kershaw County, South Carolina, being more particularly 
described as follows: BEGINNING at an iron on the northeastern line of right of 
way for S . C. Highway No. 97, thence N 51-18 E 1,059.07 feet to a stake; thence S 
42-38 E 1,817.5 feet to a cedar stake; thence s. 54-18 W 603 feet to a cedar; 
(p) 8 
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thence N 85-23 W 309.2 feet to a cedar stake ; t hence S 61-56 W 435.1 f eet to an 
iron on the right of way line for S.C. Highway No . 97; t hence continuing with 
said highway right of way lineN 29-06 W 902.3 feet to a point; thence N 31-0 9 W 
102.4 feet to a point; thence N 37-30 W 104.7 feet to a point; thence N 43- 18 W 
104.5 feet to a point; thence N 49-15 w 104.5 feet to a point; thence N 55-0 3 W 
84.8 feet to a point; thence N 60-43 W 105.0 feet to the point of beginning. 
The above descr i bed Parcel 2 is shown and designated as a tract of 42.44 acres 
on plat entit l ed "Property of Stephen McCrae and Virgin i a L. McCrae" prepared by 
Tetterton & Riddick, Surveyors, dated October 12, 1977, recorded in the office 
of the Clerk of Court for Kershaw County in Plat Book 36, at page 417. Parcel 
3: All that certain piece, parcel or tract of land, with improvements thereon, 
in Flat Rock Township, Kershaw County, South Carolina, partly within the 
unincorporated limits of the Town of Liberty Hill, containing thirty-two and 
three-fourths (32 3/4) acres, and being bounded as follows: NORTH by property 
of Mrs . Fred Hay; EAST by property of John G. Richards Estate; SOUTH by Hancock 
lands; and, WEST by property of Mrs. Lou Johnson. The above described Parcels 
1, 2 and 3 are the same conveyed to Rock Savage and Elizabeth Chapman Savage by 
deed of Virginia L. McCrae, John Richards McRae and Stephen R. McCrae dated 
April 22, 1985, and recorded in the office of the Clerk of Court for Kershaw 
County in Book IV, at ?age 1693, on April 22, 1985. Subsequent thereto on 
February 2, 1988, Elizabeth Chapman Savage conveyed her interest in said 
property unto Rock savage, which deed was recorded in the office of the Clerk 
of court for Kershaw County in Book JA, at page 2952, also known as 2305 
Richards Lane, Liberty Hill, South Carolina, 1987 Honda 4-Door, VIN 
#JHMEC5827HS001533, 1972 Chevrolet Custom Deluxe/20 Pickup, VIN #CCE232Bl06214, 
1982 Toyota Land Cruiser 4WD, VIN fJT3FJ60G5C0030725, Yanmar Tractor Model 
IYM2260, Serial #41770, Taro Riding Lawnmower 8-32 Model 59111, Serial #9001630, 
Winpower Tractor Driven Alternator, Model 115/lOPCTD, Serial #890102-8, 
Marquette Model 10-120 A.C. Arc Welder, Serial 163233, Makita Electric Planer 
Model #2030, Serial f12735E, Lienbach Line Scoop Pan for Tractor, Forklift for 
Tractor, Post Hole Diggers, 3 Point Hitch, Utility Trailer, Two-Wheel, Fuel Tank 
for Pick-Up Truck, Portable Air Tank, Delta Shapter 1HP, Serial #86J42797, 
Whirlpool Jacuzzi, Thompson Center Arms Rochester, New Hampshire, Serial 
1206887, Sportmaster Model 512-P Remington .22 Short-Long-Long Rifle, Remington 
870 Wingmaster Magnum 12 Gauge, Serial tT854234M, and a Armi Tanfoglio Giuseppe 
Made in Ita ly Model GT 26, Serial #510978. 
A hearing will be held on the thirtieth day after service hereof or as soon 
thereafter as may be scheduled~~the cou~(~ r,uoG~TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
Columbia, South Carolina 
July ~' 1992 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF KERSHAW 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Approximately 20-30 pounds of mari-} 
juana, 150 marijuana stems, 49 } 
marijuana pods, 31 growing mari- } 
juana plants, Assorted ledgers and } 
paperwork relating to marijuana, } 
Irrigation equipment used to manu- } 
facture marijuana, High intensity } 
lights and timers used to manu- } 
facture mariju~na, Book and records} 
associated with the manufacturing } 
of marijuana, Tribeam scales, } 
Plastic PVC pipe, Wood frames, } 
Assorted Hoses, Fittings, Tanks and} 
Pumps used for the manufacturing } 
of marijuana in residence, All that} 
certain piece, parcel or lot of } 
land lying and being in the County } 
of Kershaw, State of South Carolina} 
containing one (1) acre, more or } 
less, and being bounded as fol1c~s:} 
NORTH by the Richards Road; EAST by} 
land of Mrs. F.J. Hay, now or } 
formerly; south by land of Mrs. } 
C.E. Richards now or formerly; and } 
WEST by land of Mrs. C.E. Richards } 
Parcel 2: All that certain piece, } 
parcel or loi of land, lying and } 
being situate in the Liberty Hill } 
Community, Kershaw County, South } 
Carolina, being more particularly } 
described as follows: BEGINNING at } 
an iron on the northeastern line 
of right of way for S.C. Highway 
No. 97, thence N 51-lo E 1,059.07 
feet to a stake; thence S 42-38 E 
1,817.5 feet to a cedar stake; 
thence S. 54-18 W 603 feet to a 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
cedar; thence N 85-23 W 309.2 feet } 
to a cedar stake; thence s 61-56 } 
W 435.1 feet to an iron on the } 
right of way line for S.C. Highway } 
No. 97; thence continuing with said} 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
SUMMONS 
(p) 10 
highway right of way line N 29-06 W} 
902.3 feet to a point; thence N 31-} 
09 W 102.4 feet to a point; thence } 
N 37-30 W 104.7 feet to a point; } 
thence N 43-18 W 104.5 feet to a } 
point; thence N 49-15 W 104.5 feet } 
to a point; t he nce N 55-03 W 84.8 } 
feet to a point; thence N 60-43 W } 
105.0 feet to the point of begin- } 
ning. The above described Parcel 2} 
is shown and designated as a tract } 
of 42.44 acres on plat entitled } 
"Property of Stephen McCrae and } 
Virginia L. McCrae" prepared by 
Tetterton & Riddick, Surveyors, 
dated October 12, 1977, recorded 
in the office of the Clerk of 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Court for Kershaw County in Plat } 
Book 36 , at page 417 . Parcel 3: } 
All that certain piece, parcel or } 
tract of land, with improvements } 
thereon, in Flat Rock Township, } 
Kershaw County, South Carolina, } 
partly within the unincorporated } 
limits of the Town of Liberty Hill,} 
containing thirty-two and three- } 
fourths (32 3/4) acres, and being } 
bounded as follows: NORTH by } 
property of Mrs. Fred Hay; EAST by } 
property of John G. Richards } 
Estate; SOUTH by Hancock lands; } 
and, WEST by property of Mrs. Lou } 
Johnson. The above described 
Parcels 1, 2 and 3 are the same 
} 
} 
conveyed to Rock Savage and } 
Elizabeth Chapman Savage by deed of} 
Virginia L. McCrae, John Richards } 
McRae and Stephen R. McCrae dated } 
April 22, 198 5, and recorded in the} 
office of the Clerk of Court for } 
Kershaw County in Book IV, at page } 
1693, on April 22, 1985. Subse- } 
quent thereto on February 2, 1988, } 
Elizabeth Chapman Savage conveyed } 
her interest in said property unto } 
Rock Savage, which deed was } 
recorded in the office of the Clerk} 
of Court for Kershaw County in } 
Book JA, at page 2952, also known } 
as 2305 Richards Lane, Liberty } 
Hill, South carolina, 1987 Honda 4-} 
Door, VIN IJHMEC5827HS001533, 1972 } 
Chevrolet Custom Deluxe/20 Pickup, } 
VIN ICCE232Bl06214, 1982 Toyota } 
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Land Cruiser 4WD, VIN IJT3FJ60G5C- } 
0030725, Yanmar Tractor Model IYM2-} 
260, serial 141770, Tore Riding } 
Lawnmower 8-32 Model 59111, Serial } 
19001630, Winpower Tractor Driven } 
Alternator Model #15/lOPCTD, Serial} 
#890102-8, Marquette Model 10-120 } 
A.C. Arc Welder, Serial #63233, } 
Makita Electric Planer Model 12030,} 
Serial I12735E, Lienbach Line Scoop} 
Pan for Tractor, Forklift for } 
Tractor, Post Hole Diggers, 3 Point} 
Hitch, Utility Trailer, Two-Wheel, } 
Fuel Tank for Pick-Up Truck, Port- } 
able Air Tank, Delta Shapter lHP, } 
Serial f86J42797, Whirlpool } 
Jacuzzi, Thompson Center Arms } 
Rochester, New Hampshire, Serial } 
1206887, Sportmaster Model 512-P } 
Remington .22 Short-Long-Long } ' 
Rifle, Remington 870 Wingmaster } 
Magnum 12 Gauge, Serial IT854234M, } 
Armi Tanfoglio Giuseppe Made in } 
Italy, Model GT 26, Serial IS10978,} 
and Rock Savage and Lida Savage, } 
Interested Parties, } 
} 
Defendants. } 
TO: THE DEFENDANTS ABOVE-NAMED; Rock Savage, 2305 Richards Lane, Liberty 
Hill, South Carolina, Lida Savage, 2305 Richards Lane, Liberty Hill, 
South Carolina; and Joel Gainey, Kershaw County Sheriff's Department, 
and, Harold Cassady, South Carolina Law Enforcement Governor's Raid 
Team, Persons Known to Have an Interest in the Defendant Property; 
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to answer the complaint in this 
proceeding, a copy of which is herewith served upon you, and to serve a copy of 
your answer to the said complaint on Fifth Circuit Solicitor's Office at 1701 
Main Street, Columbia, South Carolina within thirty (30) days after service 
hereof, exclusive of the date of such service, and if you fail to answer the 
complaint within the time aforesaid, judgment by default will be rendered 
against you for the relief. 
July 12._, 1992 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1701 Main Street 
Columbia, South Carolina 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA } 
} 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
COUNTY OF KERSHAW } 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor , F i fth Judic i al 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Approximately 20-30 pounds of mari-} 
juana, 150 marijuana stems, 49 } 
marijuana pods, 31 growing mari- } 
juana plants, Assorted ledgers and } 
paperwork relating to marijuana, } 
Irrigation equipment used to manu- } 
facture marijuana, High intensity } 
lights and timers used to manu- } 
facture marijuana, Book and records} 
associated with the manufacturing } 
of marijuana, Tribeam scales, } 
Plastic PVC pipe, Wood frames, } 
Assorted Hoses, Fittings, Tanks and} 
Pumps used for the manufacturing } 
of marijuana in residence, All that} 
certain piece, parcel or lot of } 
land lying and being in the County } 
of Kershaw, State of South Carolina} 
containing one (1) acre, more or } 
less, and being bounded as follows:} 
NORTH by the Richards Road; EAST by} 
land of Mrs. F.J. Hay, now or } 
formerly; south by land of Mrs. } 
C.E. Richards now or formerly; and } 
WEST by land of Mrs. C.E. Richards } 
Parcel 2: All that certain piece, } 
parcel or lot of land, lying and } 
being situate in the Liberty Hill } 
Community, Kershaw County, South } 
Carolina, being more particularly } 
described as follows: BEGINNING at } 
an iron on the northeastern line 
of right of way for S.C. Highway 
No. 97, thence N 51-18 E 1,059.07 
feet to a stake; thence s 42-38 E 
} 
} 
} 
} 
1,817.5 feet to a cedar stake; } 
thence s. 54-18 w 603 feet to a } 
cedar; thence N 85-23 W 309.2 feet } 
to a cedar stake; thence s 61-56 } 
W 435.1 feet to an iron on the } 
right of way line for S.C. Highway } 
No. 97; thence continuing with said} 
COMPLAINT FOR FORFEITURE 
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highway right of way line N 29-06 W} 
902.3 feet to a point; thence N 31-} 
09 W 10 2 . 4 feet to a point; thence } 
N 37-30 W 104.7 feet to a point; } 
thence N 43-18 W 104.5 feet to a } 
point; thence N 49-15 W 104.5 feet } 
to a po i nt ; t hence N 55-03 w 84.8 } 
feet to a point; thence N 60-43 W } 
105.0 feet to the point of begin- } 
ning. The above described Parcel 2} 
is shown and designated as a tract } 
o f 42.44 acres on plat entitled } 
"Property of Stephen McCrae and } 
Virginia L. McCrae" prepared by } 
Tetterton & Riddick, Surveyors, } 
dated October 12 , 1977, recorded } 
in the office of the Clerk of } 
Court for Kershaw County in Plat } 
Book 36, at page 417. Parcel 3: } 
All that certain piece, parcel or } 
tract of land, with improvements } 
thereon, in Flat Rock Township, } 
Kershaw County, South Carolina, } 
partly within the unincorporated } 
limits of the Town of Liberty Hill,} 
containing thirty-two and three- } 
fourths (32 3/4) acres, and being } 
bounded as follows: NORTH by } 
property of Mrs. Fred Hay; EAST by } 
property of John G. Richards } 
Estate; SOUTH by Hancock lands; } 
and, WEST by property of Mrs. Lou } 
Johnson. The above described } 
Parcels 1, 2 and 3 are the same } 
conveyed to Rock Savage and } 
Elizabeth Chapman Savage by deed of} 
Virginia L. McCrae, John Richards ~ 
McRae and Stephen R. McCrae dated 
April 22, 1985, and recorded in the} 
office of the Clerk of Court for } 
Kershaw County in Book IV, at page } 
1693, on April 22, 1985. Subse- } 
quent thereto on February 2, 1988, } 
Elizabeth Chapman Savage conveyed } 
her interest in said property unto } 
Rock savage, which deed was } 
recorded in the office of the Clerk} 
of Court for Kershaw County in } 
Book JA, at page 2952, also known } 
as 2305 Richards Lane, Liberty } 
Hill, South Carolina, 1987 Honda 4-} 
Door, VIN fJHMEC5827HS001533, 1972 } 
Chevrolet Custom Deluxe/20 Pickup, } 
VIN ICCE232Bl06214, 1982 Toyota } 
( p) 14 
Land Cruiser 4WD, VIN IJT3FJ60G5C- } 
0030725, Yanmar Tractor Model IYM2-} 
260, Serial #41770, Taro Riding } 
Lawnmower 8-32 Model 59111, Serial } 
#9001630, Winpower Tractor Driven } 
Alternator Model 115/lOPCTD, Serial} 
#890102-8, Marquette Model 10-120 } 
A.C. Arc Welder, Serial 163233, } 
Makita Electric Planer Model 12030,} 
Serial ll2735E, Lienbach Line Scoop} 
Pan for Tractor, Forklift for } 
Tractor, Post Hole Diggers, 3 Point} 
Hitch, Utility Trailer, Two-Wheel, } 
Fuel Tank for Pick-Up Truck, Port- } 
able Air Tank, Delta Shapter lHP, } 
Serial f86J42797, Whirlpool } 
Jacuzzi, Thompson Center Arms 
Rochester, New Hampshire, Serial 
#206887, Sportmaster Model 512-P 
} 
} 
} 
Remington . 22 Short-Long-Long } ' 
Rifle, Remington 870 Wingmaster } 
Magnum 12 Gauge, Serial fT854234M, } 
Armi Tanfoglio Giuseppe Made in } 
Italy, Model GT 26, Serial IS10978,} 
and Rock Savage and Lida savage, } 
Interested Parties, } 
Defendants. 
} 
} 
Plaintiff would respectfully show the Court: 
I. 
Plaintiff is the Solicitor for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of the State of 
South Carolina, and is authorized by Section 44-53-530, Code of Laws of South 
Carolina (1976), as amended to initiate this complaint for the forfeiture of 
Defendant property. 
II. 
The Defendant property is approximately 20-30 pounds of marijuana, 150 
marijuana stems, 49 marijuana pods, 31 growing marijuana plants, Assorted 
ledgers and paperwork relating to marijuana, Irrigation equipment used to 
manufacture marijuana, High intensity lights and timers used to manufacture 
marijuana, Book and records associated with the manufacturing of marijuana, 
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Tribeam scales, Plastic PVC pipe, Wood frames, Assorted Hoses, Fittings, Tanks 
and Pumps used for the manufacturing of marijuana in residence, All that certain 
piece, parcel or lot of land lying and being in the County of Kershaw, State of 
South Carolina containing one (l) acre, more or less, and being bounded as 
follows: NORTH by the Richards Road; EAST by land of Mrs. F.J. Hay, now or 
formerly; south by land of Mrs. C.E. Richards now or formerly; and WEST by land 
of Mrs. C.E. Richards Parcel 2: All that certain piece, parcel or lot of land, 
lying and being situate in the Liberty Hill Community, Kershaw County, South 
carolina, being more particularly described as follows: BEGINNING at an iron on 
the northeastern line of right of way for S.C. Highway No. 97, thence N 51-18 E 
1,059.07 feet to a stake; thence S 42-38 E 1,817.5 feet to a cedar stake; thence 
s. 54-18 w 603 feet to a cedar; thence N 85-23 w 309.2 feet to a cedar stake; 
thence s 61-56 w 435.1 feet to an iron on the right of way line for S.C. Highway 
No. 97; thence continuing with said highway right of way line N 29-06 w 902.3 
feet to a point; thence N 31-09 w 102.4 feet to a point; thence N 37-30 w 104.7 
feet to a point; thence N 43-18 w 104.5 feet to a point; thence N 49-15 w 104.5 
feet to a point; thence N 55-03 w 84.8 feet to a point; thence N 60-43 w 105.0 
feet to the point of beginning. The above described Parcel 2 is shown and 
designated as a tract of 42.44 acres on plat entitled "Property of Stephen 
McCrae and Virginia L. McCrae" prepared by Tetterton & Riddick, Surveyors, dated 
October 12, 1977, recorded in the office of the Clerk of Court for Kershaw 
County in Plat Book 36, at page 417. Parcel 3: All that certain piece, parcel 
or tract of land, with improvements thereon, in Flat Rock Township, Kershaw 
County, South carolina, partly within the unincorporated limits of the Town of 
Liberty Hill, containing thirty-two and three-fourths (32 3/4) acres, and being 
bounded as follows: NORTH by property of Mrs. Fred Hay; EAST by property of 
John G. Richards Estate; SOUTH by Hancock lands; and, WEST by property of Mrs. 
(p) 16 
Lou Johnson. The above described Parcels 1, 2 and 3 are the same conveyed to 
Rock Savage and Elizabeth Chapman Savage by deed of Virginia L. McCrae, John 
Richards McRae and Stephen R. McCrae dated April 22, 1985, and recorded in the 
office of the Clerk of Court for Kershaw County in Book IV, at page 1693, on 
April 22, 1985. Subsequent thereto on February 2, 19 8, Elizabeth Chapman 
Savage conveyed her interest in said property unto Rock Savage, which deed was 
recorded in the office of the Clerk of Court for Kershaw County in Book JA, at 
• 
• 
• • 
• • 
page 2952, also known as 2305 Richards Lane, Liberty Hill, South Carolina, 1987 ~ 
Honda 4-Door, VIN tJHMEC5827HS001533, 1972 Chevrolet Custom Deluxe/20 Pickup, 
VIN ICCE232Bl06214, 1982 Toyota Land Cruiser 4WD, VIN IJT3FJ60G5C0030725, Yanmar 
Tractor Model tYM2260, Serial 141770, Taro Riding Lawnmower 8-32 Model 59111, 
Serial 19001630, Winpower Tractor Driven Alternator, Model #15/lOPCTD, serial 
1890102-8, Marquette Model 10-120 A.C. Arc Welder, Serial #63233, Makita 
Electric Planer Model 12030, Serial tl2735E, Lienbach Line Scoop Pan for 
Tractor, Forklift for Tractor, Post Hole Diggers, 3 Point Hitch, Utility : 
Trailer, Two-Wheel, Fuel Tank for Pick-Up Truck, Portable Air Tank, Delta 
Shapter lHP, Serial #86J42797, Whirlpool Jacuzzi, Thompson Center Arms 
Rochester, New Hampshire, Serial #206887, Sportmaster Model 512-P Remington .22 e 
Short-Long-Long Rifle, Remington 870 Wingmaster Magnum 12 Gauge, Serial 
IT854234M, Armi Tanfoglio Giuseppe Made in Italy Model GT 26, Serial IS10978. 
III. 
The 20-30 pounds of marijuana is a controlled substance which was 
manufactured, distributed, dispensed and/or acquired in violation of Article 3, 
Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended. 
The assorted ledgers and paperwork relating to marijuana, irrigation 
equipment used to manufacture marijuana, high intensity lights and timers used 
to manufacture marijuana, book and records associated with the manufacturing of 
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marijuana, Tribeam scales, plastic PVC pipe, wood frames, assorted hoses, 
fittings, tanka and pumps used for the manufacturing of marijuana in the 
residence which has been used or positioned for use, in man ufacturi ng, 
produci ng, c ompounding, processing, delivering, i mporting and/or export i ng a 
controlled substance, were used to facilitate production, manufacture, 
distribute, sale, import, exportation and/or trafficking in a controlled 
substance, and are proceeds traceable to an exchange for a controlled substance 
in violation of Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South Carolina 
(1976), as amended. 
The Savage residence and adjoining property were used as containers for 
controlled substances and were used to facilitate the production, manufacture, 
distribution, sale and trafficking of controlled substances. The residence and 
adjoining property are also proceeds traceable to an exchange for a controlled 
substance in violation of Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South 
carolina (1976), as amended. 
The defendant Honda, Chevrolet Pickup, Toyota Land Cruiser and Yanmar 
Tractor were used or positioned for use as containers for a controlled 
substance, were used to facilitate production, manufacturing, distribution, 
sale, importation, exportation and/or trafficking in a controlled substance and 
were conveyances which were used or intended for use unlawfully to conceal, 
contain, transport or facilitate the unlawful concealment, possession, 
containment, manufacture or transportation of a controlled substance, and are 
proceeds traceable to an exchange for a controlled substance in violation of 
Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as 
amended • 
The defendant lawnmower, alternator, arc welder, electric planer, scoop 
pan, forkl i ft, post hole diggers, utility trailer, fuel tank, air tank, Delta 
( p) 18 
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shaper and whirlpool jacuzzi are proceeds traceable to an exchange for a 
controlled substance in v iolation of Article 3, Chapter 53, Tit l e 44, Code of 
Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended. 
The defendant guns were used to facilitate production, manufacture, 
• • 
• • 
• distribution, sale, importation, exportation and/or trafficking in a controlled ~ 
substance, and are proceeds traceable to an exchange for a controlled substance 
in violation of Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South carolina 
(1976), as amended. 
IV. 
In early 1992 law enforcement officers were actively investigating ongoing 
drug manufacturing and distribution in Kershaw County. Through that 
investigation the Drug Enforcement Administration of the u.s. Department of 
Justice (hereinafter referred to as DEA) discovered that Rock Savage and Lida N. 
Fielding Savage of the Liberty Hill area of Kershaw County may be involved in 
the illegal cultivation and manufacturing of marijuana within their residence. 
In March 1992 the DEA informed the Governor's Raid Team of these find i ngs, 
who in turn sought the help of the Kershaw County Sheriff's Department. On 
April 13, 1992, as a result of a subpoena requesting certain electric bill 
records for the Savage residence, a billing summary of the electric usage of 
that residence was received from Lynches River Electric Cooperative, Inc. The 
summary revealed an unusually high electric bill, which is indicative of the 
indoor manufacture of marijuana. 
On April 29, 1992, information was received from the Lynches River Electric 
Cooperative, Inc. that their records did not indicate an "all electric" 
classification for the Savage residence, indicating that the electric usage for 
the residence could not be attributed to the use of "all electric" appliances 
and heating and cooling systems. 
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On May 4, 1992, law enforcement officers of the Governor ' s Raid Team, 
Kershaw County Sheriff ' s Department, and the South Carolina Law Enforcement 
Division travelled to an area near the Savage residence to perform a 
surve i llance of t he residence and outbuildings with a Thermal Imager, used t o 
detect differences in temperature at surface levels. As a result of the 
surveillance conducted on May 4, 1992, with the use of the Thermal Imager, law 
enforcement agents concluded that there were abnormal differences in surface 
temperatures in various areas of the residence, consistent with the indoor 
cultivation of marijuana. 
On May 10, 1992, another surveillance of the Savage residence using the 
Thermal Imager again indicated abnormal differences in surface temperatures in 
various areas of the residence. During this surveillance law enforcement 
officers observed plastic PVC pipe extending approximately two hundred (200) 
yards from the rear of the residence to an area in the woodline behind the 
residence. Officers also noticed the distinctive odor of marijuana in the area. 
The DEA reported to the Governor's Raid Team that materials had been 
purchased from SGS, Inc. (also known as Superior Growers Supply) on at least 
fo u rteen (14) separate occasions, beginning in 1989 and prior to January 1992, 
in the name of Rock Savage of Richards Lane in Liberty Hill, South Carolina and 
that materials had been purchased from SGS on at least thirteen (13) occasions, 
beginning in 1989 and prior to January 1992, in the name of Lida Fielding (now 
Lida Savage) of Richards Lane in Liberty Hill, South Carolina • 
According to a listing of companies in Sinsemilla Tips, a publication for 
the promotion of illegal cultivation and manufacture of marijuana, Superior 
Growers Supply (SGS, Inc.) of Ea. Lansing, Michigan is a supplier of C02 
systems, sodium and halide lampe, and fertilizers, both chemical and organic, 
which are used in the illegal cultivation and indoor manufacture of marijuana . 
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During this investigation it was discovered from public records that Rock e 
• and Lida Savage own the property at 2305 Richards Lane in Kershaw County. 
According to public record, Rock Savage purchased the defendant real property 
with improvements thereon, in April 1985 and conveyed a one-half (1/2) 
survivorship interest in the identical property to Lida N. Savage in 1988. 
On May 11, 1992, a Search Warrant was obtained for the Savage residence, 
vehicles and o t her property of Rock and Lida N. Savage. At approximately 1:20 
• • 
p.m., law enforcement officers held a briefing at the Kershaw County Sheriff's ~ 
Department. At approximately 1:55 p.m., law enforcement officers entered the 
Savage residence to execute the lawful and valid Search Warrant. No one was 
found in the residence. At this time the residence was secured. At 2:05 p.m. 
law enforcement officers found a hidden room in the basement of the Savage 
residence which contained a highly-sophisticated system which is used to 
illegally cultivate and manufacture marijuana indoors. In the hidden room were 
twenty-eight (28) growing green leafy plants which were on eight (8) wooden 
benches which contained Europonic . strips and pods, forty-one (41) cut stems in 
moist Europonic pods, thirty (30) extra three foot (3') grodan Europonic strips 
unused, one (1) large clear plastic bag contained one hundred fourteen (114) dry 4l 
Europonic pods with stems, forty-nine (49) dry Europonic used pods and green 
leafy material, three thousand (3,000) watt metal halide fixtures with bulb and 
ballast, one (l) four thousand (4,000) watt high pressure fixture with bulb and 
ballast, three (3) Europonic pump boxes with thermometers, reflective paper on 
the walls, two (2) fans used in an exhaust method, one (1) automatic light 
mover, Europonic nutrient concentrate, two (2) boxes of miscellaneous grodan 
strips and one (1) set of triple beam scales. Law enforcement officers also 
found a small amount of green leafy plant-like material and seeds in the master 
bedroom nightstand of Rock and Lida N. Savage. 
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At approximately 2:10 p.m. that same day, Rock Savage arrived at the 
residence. Mr. Savage was t hen adv ised that he was under arrest and Miranda 
Rights were read to him . During this process, Sav age was advised of the Search 
Warrant and the bases for the Affidavit and Search Warrant. Mr. Savage 
acknowledged that he understood his rights and the bases for the Search Warrant 
and made a written voluntary statement. Lida N. Savage was later arrested at 
the Kershaw County Sheriff's Department. 
Pursuant to the arrests of Rock and Lida N. Savage, the above-captioned 
property was seized. On May 15, 1992, a Seizure Warrant was issued by the 
Honorable Don s. Rushing, authorizing the seizure of 20-30 pounds of marijuana, 
miscellaneous property related to the manufacture of marijuana and of the Savage 
residence at 2305 Richards Lane in Liberty Hill in Kershaw county. on May 18, 
1992, that Seizure Warrant was executed and the additional defendant property 
also was seized at that time. On June 9, 1992, an Occupancy Agreement and Order 
allowing Rock & Lida N. Savage to remain in the residence was executed. 
The 20-30 pounds of marijuana is a contro i led substance which was 
manufactured, distributed, dispensed and/or acquired in violation of Section 
44-53-520, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended • 
The assorted ledgers and paperwork relating to marijuana, irrigation 
equipment used to manufacture marijuana, high intensity lights and timers used 
to manufacture marijuana, book and records associated with the manufacturing of 
marijuana, Tribeam scales, plastic PVC pipe, wood frames, assorted hoses, 
fittings, tanks and pumps used for the manufacturing of marijuana in the 
residence are property which has been used or positioned for use, in 
manufacturing, producing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing and/or 
exporting a controlled substance, were used to facilitate production, 
manufacture, distribute, sale, import, exportation and/or trafficking in a 
(p) 22 
controlled substance, and are proceeds traceable to an exchange for a controlled 
substance. 
The Savage residence and adjoining property were used as containers for 
controlled substances and were used to facilitate the production, manufacture, 
distribution, sale and trafficking of controlled substances. The residence and 
adjoining property are also proceeds traceable to an exchange for a controlled 
substance. 
The defendant Honda, Chevrolet Pick-Up, Toyota Land Cruiser and Yanmar 
Tractor were used or positioned for use as containers for a controlled 
substance, were used to facilitate production, manufacturing, distribution, 
sale, importation, exportation and/or trafficking in a controlled substance and 
were conveyances which were used or intended for use unlawfully to conceal, 
contain, transport or facilitate the unlawful concealment, possession, 
containment, manufacture or transportation of a controlled substance, and are 
proceeds traceable to an ~xchange for a controlled substance. 
The defendant lawnmower, alternator, arc welder, electric planer, scoop 
pan, forklift, post hole diggers, utility trailer, fuel tank, air tank, Delta 
shaper and whirlpool jacuzzi are proceeds traceable to an exchange for a 
controlled substance. 
The defendant guns were used to facilitate production, manufacture, 
distribution, sale, importation, exportation and/or trafficking in a controlled 
substance, and are proceeds traceable to an exchange for a controlled substance. 
v. 
Because the 20-30 pounds of marijuana is a controlled substance which was 
manufactured, distributed, dispensed and/or acquired, such Defendant is subject 
to seizure and forfeiture under the provisions of South Carolina Code Ann. 
Section 44-53-520(a)(l). 
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Because the assorted ledgers and paperwork relat i ng t o marijuana, 
irr i gat ion equipment used to manufacture mar ijua na, high i ntensity lights and 
timers used to manufacture marijuana, book and rec ord s assoc i ated with the 
manufactur ing o f marijuana, Tribeam scales, plast i c PVC pipe, wood fr ames, 
assorted hoses, fittings, tanks and pumps used for the manufacturing of 
marijuana in the residence are property which has been used or positioned for 
use, in manufacturing, producing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing 
and/or exporting a controlled substance, were used to facilitate production, 
manufacture, distribute, sale, import, exportation and/or trafficking in a 
controlled substance, and are proceeds traceable to an exchange for a controlled 
substance, such Defendants are subject to seizure and forfeiture under the 
provisions of South Carolina Code Ann . Section 44-53 - 520(a)(2), (a) (4), and 
(a) ( 7). 
The Savage residence and adjoining property were used as containers for 
controlled substances and were used to facilitate the production, manufacture, 
distribution, sale and trafficking of controlled substances. The residence and 
adjoining property are also proceeds traceable to an exchange for a controlled 
substance, such Defendants are sub j P~t to seizure and forfeiture under the 
provisions of South Carolina Code Ann. Section 44-53-520(a)(3), (a)(4), and 
(a) (7). 
The defendant Honda, Chevrolet Pick-Up, Toyota Land Cruiser and Yanmar 
Tractor were used or positioned for use as containers for a controlled 
substance, were used to facilitate production, manufacturing, distribution, 
sale, importation, exportation and/or trafficking in a controlled substance and 
were conveyances which were used or intended for use unlawfully to conceal, 
contain, transport or facilitate the unlawful concealment, possession, 
containment, manufacture or transportation of a controlled substance, and are 
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proceeds traceable to an exchange for a controlled substance, such Defendants 
are subject to seizure and forfeiture under the provisions of South Carolina 
Code Ann. Section 44-53-520(a) (3), (a) (4), (a) (6), and (a) (7). 
The defendant lawnmower, alternator, arc welder, electric planer, scoop 
pan, forklift, post hole diggers, utility trailer, fuel tank, air tank, Delta 
shaper and whirlpool jacuzzi are proceeds traceable to an exchange for a 
controlled substance, such Defendants are subject to seizure and forfeiture 
under teh provisions of South Carolina Code Ann. Section 44-53-520(a)(7). 
The defendant guns were used to facilitate production, manufacture, 
distribution, sale, importation, exportation and/or trafficking in a controlled 
substance, and are proceeds traceable to an exchange f~ : a controlled substance, 
such Defendants are subject to seizure and forfeiture under the provisions of 
South Carolina Code Ann. Section 44-53-520(a)(4) and (a)(7). 
VI. 
By reason of these premises, Defendant property is forfeited to the State 
of South Carolina. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that: 
The Defendant property be declared forfeited to the Kershaw County Sheriff's 
Department and the South Carolina Law Enforcemenet Division (SLED) Governor's 
Raid Team pursuant to Section 44-53-530, et. seq., of the Code of Laws of South 
Carolina (1976), as amended. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
July .l.i_, 1992 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF PICKENS 
State of South Carolina, 
ex re 1 , Joseph J. Watson 
Solicitor, Thirteenth 
Judicial Ci rcuit 
Petitioner, 
-vs-
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
The Contents of All Safe Pawn Shop ) 
located at 4556 Calhoun Memorial Hwy.,) 
Easley, S.C. ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
IN TH E CIRCUIT COURT 
TEMPORARY 
ORDER 
On February 4, 1991, by order of this court, contents of the All Safe 
Pawn Shop were seized by the Pickens County Sheriff's Office. 
On February 14 , 1991, representatives of the Pickens County Sheriff's 
Office, the Department of Consumer Affairs, the 13th Circuit Solic i tors 
Office, as well as Tom Traxler, attorney for Larolyn S. Zylicz, an interested 
party, and David Cantrell, attorney for Lionel F. Zylicz met in Chambers and 
made the following agreement as to pawned items contained within All Safe 
Pawn Shop: 
1. The Pickens County Sheriff's Office with the assistance of the 
Department of Consumer Affairs shall set up a system whereby the pawned 
items can be redeemed by the true owners of the property . . 
2. That Consumer Affairs shall assist in the notification to pawn 
ticket holders by letters and public notices in compliance with South Carolina 
1 aw. 
3. That the Pickens County Sheriff's Office, shall on Tuesday and 
Thursday from 9 a.m. - 12 p.m . , allow pawn ticket holders to redeem pawned 
e items at the Sheriff's Office. That this would continue each week until the 
• 
J 
• 
t 
• 
time limit as provided by law is exhausted. That the ticket holders must 
pay in full to redeem with no extensions granted. 
4. That any proceeds collected from the redemption of pawn items be 
placed in an interest bearing account by the Pickens County Sheriff's Office. 
5. That from the interest bearing account, $175 per week shal l be 
drawn and paid to Larolyn S. Zylicz at 201 Enoree Circle, Greer, S. C. 29650 . 
I find that all parties reserved their rights as to the pawned i tems. 
(q) 1 
)..\ 
,.., 
find that all parties are in agreement as to the disposition of the 
pawned items as set out above. 
WHEREFORE, by agreement of the parties, the pawn shop business, only, 
shall be operated by the Pickens, County Sheriff's Office with the assistance 
of the Department of Consumer Affairs and the proceeds of redempt i on shall 
be placed in an interest bearing account out of which $175 shall be drawn 
weekly for child support payable to Larolyn S. Zylicz. This order sha ll 
remain in full force and effe~t until further order of this court. 
~J Greenville, South Carolina 
Dated: ;2. - f ct -1 I -
\ 
\ 
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THE STATE 0 2 SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF KERSHAW 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fi fth Judicial 
Circu i t, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Approximately 20-30 pounds of mari-} 
juana, 150 marijuana stems, 49 } 
marijuana pods, 31 growing mari- } 
juana plants, Assorted ledgers and } 
paperwork relating to marijuana, } 
Irrigation equipment used to manu- } 
facture marijuana, Hi gh intensity } 
lights and timers used to manu- } 
facture marijuana, Book and records} 
associated with the manufacturing } 
of marijuana, Tribeam scales, } 
Plastic PVC pipe, Wood frames, } 
Assorted Hoses, Fittings, Tanks and} 
Pumps used for the manufacturing } 
of marijuana in residence, All that} 
certain piece, parcel or lot of } 
land lying and being in the County } 
of Kershaw, State of South Carolina} 
containing one (1) acre, more or } 
less, and being bounded as follows:} 
NORTH by the Richards Road; EAST by} 
land of Mrs. F.J. Hay, now or } 
formerly; south by land of Mrs. } 
C.E. Richards now or formerly; and } 
WEST by land of Mrs. C.E. Richards } 
Parcel 2: All that certain piece, } 
parcel or lot of land, lying and } 
being situate in the Liberty Hill } 
Community, Kershaw County, South } 
Carolina, being more particular l y } 
described as follows: BEGINNING at } 
an iron on the northeastern line } 
of right of way for S.C. Highway } 
No. 97, thence N 51-18 E 1,059.07 } 
feet to a stake; thence S 42-38 E } 
1,817.5 feet to a cedar stake; } 
thence s. 54-18 W 603 feet to a } 
cedar; thence N 85-23 W 309.2 feet } 
to a cedar stake; thense S 61-56 } 
W 435.1 feet to an iron on the } 
right of way line for S .C . Hi ghway } 
No. 97; thence continuing with said} 
highway right of way line N 29-06 W} 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
I hereby certify that t he fo regoing i s 
a. true and ez3.d copy nf c r i~ina l on 
file in t hi s office. 1" ~~~ 
y~)~~i ,;r~~ ~ ~--
Ma tilda W. Goodson 
Cl er k of Cour t 
Ker shaw Co unty , S . C. 
(r) 1 
902.3 feet to a point; thence N 31-} 
09 W 102 . 4 feet to a point; thence } 
N 37-30 W 104.7 feet to a point; } 
thense N 43-18 W 104.5 feet to a } 
point; thence N 49-15 W 104.5 feet } 
to a point; thence N 55-03 W 84.8 } 
feet to a point; thence N 60-43 w } 
105.0 feet to the point of begin- } 
ning. The above described Parce 2 } 
is shown and designated as a tract } 
of 42 . 44 acres on plat entitled } 
"Property of Stephen McCrae and } 
Virginia L. McCrae" prepared by } 
Tetterton & Riddick, Surveyors, } 
dated October 12, 1977, recorded } 
in the office of the Clerk of } 
Court for Kershaw County in Plat } 
Book 36, at page 417. Parcel 3: } 
All that certain piece, parcel or } 
tract of land, with improvements } 
thereon, in Flat Rock Township, ' } 
Kershaw County, South Carolina, } 
partly within the unincorporated } 
limits of the Town of Liberty Hill,} 
containing thirty-two and three- . } 
fourths (32 3/4) acres, and being } 
bounded as follows: NORTH by } 
property of Mrs. Fred Hay; EAST by } 
property of John G. Richards } 
Estate; SOUTH by Hancock lands; } 
a nd , WEST by property of Mrs. Lou } 
Johnson. The above described } 
Parcels 1, 2 and 3 are the same } 
conveyed to Rock Savage and } 
Elizabeth Chapman Savage by deed of} 
Virginia L. McCrae, John Richards } 
McRae and Stephen R. McCrae dated } 
April 22, 1985, and recorded in the} 
office of the Clerk of Court for } 
Kershaw County in Book IV, at page } 
1693, on April 22, 1985. Subse- } 
quent thereto on February 2, 1988, } 
Elizabeth Chapman Savage conveyed } 
her interest in said property unto } 
Rock Savage, which deed was } 
recorded in the office of the Clerk} 
of Court for Kershaw County in } 
Book JA, at page 2952, also known } 
as 2305 Richards Lane, Liberty } 
Hill, South Carolina, and Rock } 
Savage and Lida Savage, Interested } 
Parties, } 
} 
Defendant. } 
(r) 2 
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NOW THEREFORE, the State of South Carolina and Reck Savage and Lida 
Savage AGREE that: 
1. Owners shall be permitted to occupy and operate the residence 
described above until such time as a final disposition order is entered by 
the Court . 
2. The Kershaw County Sheriff's Department and the South Carolina 
Raid Team, or its designees, shall have the right to re-enter the property 
and buildings thereon, at reasonable times, for the purposes of inspection 
and appraisal of the property. 
3. Owners shall maintain the above-described property in the same, or 
better, condition and repair as : existed as of the date it was seized, which 
maintenance shall include, but not be limited to, keeping the property free 
of hazard and structural defects, keeping all heating, air conditioning, 
plumbing, electrical, gas, oil, or other power facilities in good work ing 
condition and repair, keeping the property clean and performing necessary 
sanitation and waste removal, keeping the property in conformity with 
responsible needs for lawn mowing, and providing other ordinary and 
necessary items of routine maintenance. Additionally, no fixtures attached 
to the property shall be removed . 
4. Owners shall maintain casualty and fire insurance equal to the J 
full replacement cost of all improvements and furnishings on the premises ~~~ 1 
A..s -n-\~afl..- tAJ'fc~/ tnAc.; 
and naming the State of South Carolina as a loss payee/1aa &Aall ~aiatain ~~~ I 
li&eili1:] iftett!!'&ftee fel!' iRj·.u·iaa QQQ\U'I'iFI~ ga Ql' Qa-.aaa by tAa pra~iaaa or 
aa an additioaal iaa-.•ed. Proof of such insurance shall be delivered to 
the Kershaw County Sheriff's Department no later than the seventh calendar 
day following the execution of this Occupancy Agreement. • 
.J~(_(_ ;f'~ ?t'?e..rt:N 7 ~~~~ 
r~c.t:... ~...-tee..- ,.,~ ..c"'~r.te'/' 
(r) 3 
5. Owners shall continue, or cause to be made, in a timely fashion, 
any mortgage or other lien payments, including, but not limited to, 
property tax payments, and any monthly or other payments, as may be 
necessary to maintain the property in the physical, legal and financial 
condition in which it has been and should be maintained, and in accordance 
• 
• 
• • 
• with any and all applica l e and binding agreements, clauses, rules, bylaws, e. 
laws, codes, covenants, regulations and other stipulations pertaining to 
the care, maintenance, control and use of said property or dwelling. 
6. Owners shall continue, or cause to be made, payment for all other ~ 
• monthly and other periodic bills which may be incurred as a result of the 
occupancy of said premises, including, but not limited to, water, 
electricity, sewer, trash, maintenance of grounds and buildings, and cable 
television. 
7. Owners shall not convey, t r ansfer, sell, lease, rent or encumber 
in any way, title to the above described property. 
8. Owners shall not destroy, alienate, estrange, transfer, give away, ~ 
detract from or in any manner alter, other than through normal wear and 
tear, any fixtures or seized personal property contained within said 
property or dwelling(s) without written permission from the Kershaw County 
Sheriff's Department. 
9. Owners shall not use the property for any type of business or 
other commercial enterprise without specific written authorization from the 
Kershaw County Sheriff's Department and/or South Carolina RAID Team 
10. Owners shall not use the property for any illegal purposes or 
permit the use of the property for such purposes. 
11. Owners agree to provide the Kershaw County Sheriff's Department 
and/or South Carolina RAID Team with thirty (30) days notice, in writing, 
in the event they choose to have said premises vacated. 
(r) 4 
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12. Except in the event of a violation of the terms of Paragraph 10, 
if the owner violates the terms and conditions of this Occupancy Agreement, 
the State of South Carolina, shall, upon giving owner ten (10) days notice 
to correct said violation, and without further order of the court, have the 
right to seize the premises . 
13. The State of South Carolina, its agencies, offices, attorneys , 
agents and employees, shall be held harmless for any and all claims, 
demands, damages, causes of action or suits, of whatever kind and 
description, and wheresoever situated, that may now exist or hereafter 
exist by reason of, or growing out of, or affecting, directly or 
indirectly, the seizure of the above described property, transfer of 
custody of the property to the owner, and the return of the property by the 
State of South Carolina; and the State of South Carolina shall be held 
harmless for any and all claims against it arising out of damage to the 
property or injuries to persons, including occupants' families, invitees, 
licensees or permittees by reason of or incident to the aforesaid use and 
occupancy of the property by the owner. 
14. Owners are aware that violation of the content of this Occupancy 
Agreement as it pertains to the removal or destruction of seized property 
under the care, custody, or control of the Kershaw County Sheriff's 
Department constitutes a violation of state law which provides for 
penalties including fines or imprisonment, or both. It is agreed that a 
hold over period during or following the conclusion of the above-captioned 
action shall be pursuant to the specific terms of this Occupancy Agreement 
unless a modification in writing has been executed by all parties. 
, 1992 . 
(r) 5 
APPR 
• • 
• ~~~~~~~~~~~~/~ . 
~/2::. 
erry L\ orton, 
County Sheriff's Department 
. d.fevf!J /:tu1!/ / JBIJ /i)J ~ 
Steve Smith, S.C. Raid Team 
h-----
CH~~ADMINIST~JUDGE 
FIFlH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF KERSHAW 
} 
} 
} 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as } 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial Circuit, } 
} 
Plaintiff, } 
} 
v. } 
} 
Approximately 20-30 pounds of marl-} 
juana, 150 marijuana stems, 49 } 
marijuana pods, 31 growing marl- } 
juana plants, Assorted ledgers and } 
paperwork relating to marijuana, } 
Irrigation equipment used to manu- } 
facture marijuana, High intensity } 
lights and timers used to manu- } 
facture marijuana, Book and records} 
associated with the manufacturing } 
of marijuana, Tribeam scales, } 
Plastic PVC pipe, Wood frames, } 
Assorted Hoses, Fittings, Tanks and} 
Pumps used for the manufacturing } 
of marijuana in residence, All that} 
certain piece, parcel or lot of } 
land lying and being in the County } 
of Kershaw, State of South Carolina} 
containing one (1) acre, more or } 
less, and being bounded as follows:} 
NORTH by the Richards Road; EAST by} 
land of Mrs. F.J. Hay, now or } 
formerly; south by land of Mrs. } 
C.E. Richards now or formerly; and } 
WEST by land of Mrs. C.E. Richards } 
Parcel 2: All that certain piece, } 
parcel or lot of land, lying and } 
being situate in the Liberty Hill } 
Corcununity, Kershaw County, Sout.h } 
Carolina, being more particularly } 
described as follows: BEGINNING at } 
an iron on the northeastern line } 
of right of way for S.C. Highway } 
No. 97, thence N 51-18 E 1,059.07 } 
feet to a stake; thence S 42-38 E } 
1,817.5 feet to a cedar stake; } 
thence S. 54-18 W 603 feet to a } 
cedar; thence N 85-23 W 309.2 feet 
to a cedar stake; thence s 61-56 
W 435.1 feet to an iron on the 
} 
} 
} 
right of way line for S.C. Highway } 
No. 97; thence continuing with said} 
highway right of way line N 29-06 W} 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
LIS PENDENS 
q 2- CP - 2 f-3 9 f 
-:_ J 
;'" -1 r 
~ ' . ~ """\ ... (_,-. ~ -=- ~-.. 
· ' · , , 
(") 
(s) 1 
902.3 feet to a point; thence N 31-} 
09 W 102.4 feet to a point; thence } 
N 37-30 W 104.7 feet to a point; } 
thence N 43-18 W 104.5 feet to a } 
point; thence N 49-15 W 104.5 feet } 
to a point; thence N 55-03 W 84.8 } 
feet to a point; thence N 60-43 W } 
105.0 feet to the point of begin- } 
ning. The above described Parcel 2} 
is shown and designated as a tract } 
of ·42.44 acres on plat entitled } 
"Property of Stephen McCrae and } 
Virginia L. McCrae" prepared by } 
Tetterton & Riddick, Surveyors, } 
dated October 12, 1977, recorded } 
in the office of the Clerk of } 
Court for Kershaw County in Plat } 
Book 36, at page 417. Parcel 3: } 
All that certain piece, parcel or } 
tract of land, with improvements } 
thereon, in Flat Rock Township, } 
Kershaw County, South Carolina, } 
partly within the unincorporated } 
limits of the Town of Liberty Hill,} 
containing thirty-two and three- } 
fourths (32 3/4) acres, and being } 
bounded as follows: NORTH by } 
property of Mrs. Fred Hay; EAST by } 
property of John G. Richards } 
Estate; SOUTH by Hancock lands; } 
and, WEST by property of Mrs. Lou } 
Johnson. The above described } 
Parcels 1, 2 and 3 are the same } 
conveyed to Rock Savage and } 
Elizabeth Chapman Savage by deed of} 
Virginia L. McCrae, John Richards } 
McRae and Stephen R. McCrae dated } 
April 22, 1985, and recorded in the} 
office of the Clerk of Court for } 
Kershaw County in Book IV, at page 
1693, on April 22, 1985. Subse-
quent thereto on February 2, 1988, 
Elizabeth Chapman Savage conveyed 
her interest in said property unto 
Rock Savage, which deed was 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
recorded in the office of the Clerk} 
of Court for Kershaw County in 
Book JA, at page 2952, also known 
as 2305 Richards Lane, Liberty 
Hill, South Carolina, and Rock 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Savage and Lida Savage, Interested } 
Parties, } 
Defendant. 
} 
} (s) 2 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that, based on forfeiture action that has 
been brought pursuant to Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws 
of South Carolina (1976) as amended, an action has been c ommenced in 
this Court against Rock Savage and Lida Savage for the purpose of 
forfeiture to the State of South Carolina the following property, to 
wit: 
All that certain piece, parcel or lot of land lying and being in the 
County of Kershaw, State of South Carolina containing one (1) acre, 
more or lees, and being bounded as follows: NORTH by the Richards 
Road; EAST by land of Mrs. F.J. Hay, now or formerly; south by land of 
Mrs. C.E. Richards now or formerly; and WEST by land of Mrs. C.E. 
Richards Parcel 2: All that certain piece, parcel or lot of land, 
lying and being situate in the Liberty Hill Community, Kershaw County, 
South Carolina, being more particularly described as follows: BEGINNING 
at an iron on the northeastern line of right of way for S.C. Highway 
No. 97, thence N 51-18 E 1,059.07 feet to a stake; thence S 42-38 E 
1,817.5 feet to a cedar stake; thence s. 54-18 W 603 feet to a cedar; 
thence N 85-23 W 309.2 feet to a cedar stake; thense S 61-56 W 435.1 
feet to an iron on the right of way line for S.C. Highway No. 97; 
thence continuing with said highway right of way lineN 29-06 W 902.3 
feet to a point; thence N 31-09 W 102.4 feet to a point; thence N 37-30 
W 104.7 feet to a point; thence N 43-18 W 104.5 feet to a point; thence 
N 49-15 W 104.5 feet to a point; thence N 55-03 W 84.8 feet to a point; 
thence N 60-43 W 105.0 feet to the point of beginning. The above 
described Parcel 2 is shown and designated as a tract of 42.44 acres on 
plat entitled "Property of Stephen McCrae and Virginia L. McCrae" 
prepared by Tetterton & Riddick, Surveyors, dated October 12, 1977, 
recorded in the office of the Clerk of Court for Kershaw County in Plat 
Book 36, at page 417. Parcel 3: All that certain piece, parcel or 
tract of land, with improvements thereon, in Flat Rock Township, 
Kershaw County, South carolina, partly within the unincorporated limits 
of the Town of Liberty Hill, containing thirty-two and three-fourths 
(32 3/4) acres, and being bounded as follows: NORTH by property of 
Mrs. Fred Hay; EAST by property of John G. Richards Estate; SOUTH by 
Hancock lands; and, WEST by property of Mrs. Lou Johnson. The 
above-described Parcels 1, 2 and 3 are the same conveyed to Rock Savage 
and Elizabeth Chapman Savage by deed of Virginia L. McCrae, John 
Richards McRae and Stephen R. McCrae dated April 22, 1985, and recorded 
in the office of the Clerk of Court for Kershaw County in Book IV, at 
page 1693, on April 22, 1985. Subsequent thereto on February 2, 1988, 
Elizabeth Chapman Savage conveyed her interest in said property unto 
Rock Savage, which deed was recorded in the office of the Clerk of 
Court for Kershaw County in Book JA, at page 2952, also known as 2305 
Richards Lane, Liberty Hill, South Carolina . 
(s) 3 
Columbia, South Carolina 
This tJfk day of January, 1993 
. 
liz eth M. Hancock 
Assistant Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
(s) 4 
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Richard A. Harpootl ian 
Solici tor 
SOLICITOR 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
Warren B. Giese 
Deputy Solici to r 
Phone 
748-4785 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
McQueen Smith 
Post Office Box 281 
Post Office Box 1987 
1701 Main Street 
Columbia, South Carolina 29202 
Columbia, South Carolina 29202 
Dear Mr. Smith: 
June 2 7, 1991 
From January 1, 1990, through May 31, 1991, there were 380 criminal 
instances in and around Roosevelt Village. Among these were 113 drug 
violations, 34 aggravated assaults, 29 breakins, 21 larcenies, 16 robberies, 
and 2 rapes. Two days ago, agents with the Richland County Sheriff's 
Department entered Apartment 24-A of Roosevelt Village. Inside the 
apartment, the agents found crack pipes, cocaine packaging, cooking devices, 
and other drug paraphernalia used in the consumption and manufacturing of 
illegal drugs. It is my understanding that this apartment, like many 
others, is empty but unsecured. 
Section 44-53-520(a), Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended, 
states that property used or positioned for use as a container for or 
property which is knowingly used to facilitate production, manufacturing, 
distribution, sale or trafficking of unlawful controlled substances is 
subject to forfeiture . 
Under Section 44-53-520(a), the illegal drug activities that have occurred 
at Roosevelt Village since January, 1990, constitute violations of this 
statute, as well as the federal forfeiture statute, 21 u.s.c. 88l(a)(7). 
It is my understanding that you are the owner of Roosevelt Village. I am 
compelled to advise you that unless you take immediate action to signifi-
cantly decrease the illegal activities taking place on your property within 
thirty days, the State of South Carolina may be forced to institute 
forfeiture proceedings if further arrests or incidents occur. 
Please consider this letter notification of criminal misconduct involving 
narcotics at the above property. You will no longer be considered an 
innocent owner under applicable statutes . 
I would strongly 1suggest that you take the following steps to ensure that 
the situation at Roosevelt Village is remedied: 
(t) 1 
.... . 
1. Notify tenants of South Carolina eviction laws which allow 
termination of a month-to-month lease with 30 days written notice 
without cause. 
2. Notify tenants that under South Carolina law, they have an 
obligation to keep their dwelling units and other parts of the 
premises used by them reasonably safe and clean or eviction may 
occur. 
3. Get your attorney to restructure your written l eases to 
include a termination clause for any tenant who is convicted of 
violating any felony or controlled substance statute. 
4. Prominently display "NO TRESPASSING" signs throughout the 
village. 
5. Provide adequate lighting throughout the village . 
6. Provide 24-hour on premises security. 
7. Secure premises and limit access to the vi l a ge by either a 
fence or other adequate means. 
To be effective, these measures should be taken immediately. 
RAH/ic 
Yours sincerely, 
Richard A. Harpootlian 
Solicitor 
( t) 2 
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·, 'mqe ~tute of . ~outlr illurolinu 
Richard A. Harpootl ian 
Sol icitor 
Phone 
748-4785 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
Janell and Fred Williams 
Carolina Motel 
2709 Two Notch Road 
SOLICITOR 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
Post Office Box 1987 
1701 Main Street 
Columbia, South Carolina 29202 
Columbia, South Carolina 29204 
Dear Madam and Sir: 
July 25, 1991 
Warren B. Giese 
Depu ty Solicitor 
From January 1, 1989, through July 11, 1991, there were over 83 criminal 
incidences on the Carolina Motel property. Among these were 18 drua 
violations, 33 prostitution violations, 8 robberies, 10 assaults, an~ 2 
murders. It is my understanding that some of these occurrences happened 
inside some of the rooms at the motel. 
Section 44-53-520(a), Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, as amended, 
states that property use or position for use as a container for or property 
which is knowingly used to facilitate production, manufacturing, 
distribution, sale or trafficking of unlawful controlled substances is 
subject to forfeiture. The illegal drug activities that have occurred at 
the Carolina Motel since January of 1989 constitute violations of this 
statute . 
Furthermore, Section 15-43-10, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, as 
amended, states that whosoever shall erect, establish, continue, maintain, 
use, own, occupy, lease or re-lease any building, erection or place used 
for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution in this State is 
guilty of a nuisance, and the building, erection or place or the ground 
itself in or upon which such lewdness, assignation or prostitution is 
conducted, permitted, carried on, continued or exists and the furniture, 
fixtures, musical instruments and movable property used in conducting or 
maintaining such nuisance are also declared a nuisance and shall be 
enjoined and abated as provided. The 33 prostitution violations that have 
occurred since January, 1989, at the motel constitute violations of this 
statute . 
It i~ my understanding that you are the owner of Carolina Motel. I am 
compelled to advise you that unless you take immediate action to 
significantly decrease the illegal activities taking place on your property 
(u) 1 
within 30 days, the State of South Carolina may be forced to institute 
forfeiture and/or nuisance proceedings. 
Please consider this letter notification of criminal misconduct involving 
narcotics at the abov e property. You will no longer be considered an 
innocent owner under applicable statutes. 
RAH/ic 
cc: Sheriff Allen Sloan 
Chief Deputy Fred Riddle 
Yours sincerely, 
!b!:i~ 
Solicitor 
(u) 2 
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RECEIPT FOR CERTIFIED MAIL 
NO INSURANCE COVERAGE PAOVIOEO 
riOT FOR INTERNATIOIIAL MAIL 
(See Reverse} 
5J"J~ell & Fred Williams 
5\;M.Q.ll-<IJ.a Motel 
Ufr2. ..J'NQ. No t c h Rd._ 
P 0 . Scar e .u1d ZIP Code 
Columbia, S. C. 292 04 
Pose age s 
Cert•hed Fe<! 
Spectal Dtl•very Fee 
Resu 1cced llehvery Fee 
At:lurn Rete•pr show•ng 
10 whom and O.J ie Delivered 
Return Aen!•,pl SflOw1ng 10 whom _ 
Dale. and Ad<Jress ol Delivery 
TOTAL Poslage and Fees s 
Posrmark Jr Dare 
• 
• 
~\ 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
Approximately One (1) Pound 
of Marijuana, All that certain) 
piece, parcel or lot of land, ) 
with the improvements thereon,) 
situate lying and being near ) 
the City of Columbia, County ) 
of Richland, State of South ) 
Carolina and being shown and ) 
delineated as Lot 7, Block "A") 
on plat of Rosedale by Barber,) 
Keels & Associates, dated ) 
November 19, 1953 and recorded) 
in the Office of the R.M.C. ) 
for Richland County in Plat ) 
Book 4 at page 174 and having ) 
such shapes, metes, bounds and) 
distances as shown on said ) 
plat. This being the same ) 
property heretofore conveyed ) 
to the Grantors herein by Deed) 
of Arthur T. Grubbs and Donna ) 
Gates Grubbs dated July 30, ) 
1979 and recorded in Office of) 
R.M.C. for Richland County in ) 
Deed Box D 510 at Page 605. ) 
Property also known as 18 Rose) 
Drive, 1987 Ford Bronco, VINJ ) 
JFMCU12T7HUA39005, 1984 Ford ) 
Club Wagon Van, VIN #1FMEE11- ) 
H9EHB56902, 1982 Chevrolet ) 
Truck, VIN# 1GCDC14H9CS127630,) 
Assorted Books, Records, ) 
Photographs, Personal Papers, ) 
Identification Cards and ) 
Records, Video Tapes, Mari- ) 
juana Paraphernalia, Documents) 
in the Name of Randy E. Harper) 
and Various Alias Names of ) 
Randy E. Harper, Kenneth A. ) 
Dussault and Various Alias ) 
Names of Kenneth A. Dussault, ) 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
FOR RICHLAND COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA 
ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM 
92-CP-40~ 
~2/71 
~-~ ,• I .. 
c:·-:.-
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Cameras Used in the Photo-
graphy of Illegal Drug 
Trafficking and Marijuana 
Manufacturing, and Randy E. 
Harper and Kenneth A. 
Dussault, Interested Parties, 
Defendant . 
The Plaintiff and Defendant of the Counterclaim would allege unto this 
Court: 
1. That the Plaintiff denies Paragraph 10 of Defendant's Counterclaim. 
2. That the Plaintiff denies Paragraph 11 of Defendant's Counterc l aim. 
3. That the Plaintiff denies Paragraph 12 of Defendant's Countercla i m. 
4. That the Plaintiff denies Paragraph 13 and further alleges that Randy 
Harper is the owner of the real estate and personal property described in 
Paragraph 2 of the Plaintiff's Complaint, but is not an innocent owner, as she 
has knowl edge concerning the unlawful drugs and drug paraphernalia as described 
in Paragraph 2, and that Randy Harper is the owner of the unlawful drugs and 
drug araphernalia as described in Paragraph 2. 
5. That the Plaintiff denies Paragraph 14 of Defendant's Counterclaim . 
6. As to Paragraph 15, the Plaintiff and Defendant of the Counterclaim 
alleges that Randy Harper is not entitled to the r eturn of the seized items and 
further alleges that these seized items should be forfeited to the State of 
South Carolina pursuant to South Carolina Code Ann. Sect i on 44-530-520 and 
Section 44-530-530, (1976), as amended. 
7 . The Plaintiff and Defendant of the Counterclaim concurs with the 
Defendant's request for a jury trial . 
8 . That the Plaintiff denies Paragraph 17 of Defendant's Counterclaim . 
9. That the Plaintiff and Defendant of the Counterclaim alleges that much 
of the property referred to in Paragraph 18 has been returned to the Defendant, 
(v) 2 
that there were no place settings seized, and that all remaining property in the 
possession of the Richland County Sheriff's Department is forfeitable to the 
State of South Carolina. 
10. That the Plaintiff denies Paragraph 19 of Defendant ' s counterclaLm. 
11. That the Plaintiff denies Paragraph 20 of Defendant's CounterclaLm. 
12. As to Paragraph 21, the Defendant and the Plaintiff of the Counterclaim 
only has been denied the use and possession of her property which is forfeitable 
to the State of South Carolina. 
13. That the Plaintiff 
14. That the Plaintiff 
15. That the Plaintiff 
the defense of laches does 
16. That the Plaintiff 
17. That the Plaintiff 
Columbia, South Carolina 
August _£, 1992 
denies Paragraph 22 of Defendant's Counterclaim. 
denies Paragraph 23 of Defendant's Counterclaim. 
and the Defendant of the Counterclaim alleges that 
not apply. 
denies Paragraph 25 of Defendant's Counterclaim. 
denies Paragraph 26 of Defendant's Counterclaim. 
Respectfully submitted: 
E~~~':.~k f.k_?-C<JcL 
Assistant Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
1701 Main Street, P.O. Box 1987 
Columbia, SC 29202 
(803) 799-9075 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNIY OF RIQlLA.ND 
JA.MES C . ANDERS , as ) 
Solicitor, Fi£~ Judicial ) 
Circuit, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
1988 Chrysler, VIN ) 
1C3BJ45E7JG411524, and ) 
IN UtE COURT ·oF COMMON PLEAS 
FIITH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
~ 
..... 
·-::J 
.'? c;:j 
c-:. :;';~ 
. -i..J- · · ~ 
·' 
.. -o .... 
_,. 
;.) . 
(;, ::,r; 
r., 90-CP-40-0331 
c 
~ 
<:::l 
.::::,. 
-u 
-~ ~
........; 
.::,.. 
':9 Couglas Pinner and John ) 
David Wells, ) ---1 .:-~ O"l 
) 
Defendants. ) 
1'0: David G. Belser, Attorney for the Defendant 
John David Wells, 13 7 Bil tzoore Averrue, Asheville, NC 28801 
-J !1 
-·"'-: 
T""" ~ l J 
0 
YOU WlLL PIL\SE TAKE OOTICE that the State by its undersigned counsel 
will move before the Court as soon as counsel may be heard for an order pur'-
suant to Rule 40(b)(2) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, for a 
continuance of the hearing on the issue of civil forfeiture, not waiving but 
expressly reserving its right to be heard on its previous filed Motion to 
Continue. This Motion is based on the fact that the Sur::IIJOns and Complaint were 
filed on January 18, 1990 and one hundred and twenty (120) days have not lapsec 
since that date. 
~. the State would move for a conti..nuance in the above-captione 
matter until one hundred twenty ( 120) days after the filing of the initial 
pleading. 
Respectfully submitted: 
April _\~l~-· 1990 
Columbia, South Carolina 
(w) 1 
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Sl."ATI: OF SOLTrl CAROLINA 
COUNTY GF C\IGIT....~'ID 
) 
) 
) 
JF~~s C. fu'IDERS, as ) 
Sol ic~:or, Fif:h Judic~l ) 
Ci=c"-li:, 
P~ai..i.c:..£.:, 
-vs-
1988 Cn--ysle~, VIN 
1CJBJ4SE7JG411524, 
Defendant:. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
L.'i TriE COURT OF COMMON PI.i:AS 
PE.IIIIOO 
90-GP-40-0331 
The ~~c~on for Conci..~ce is based on~~ follow~ gr~~ds: 
1. This mac:e~ is a civil forfeit:ure of a "Vehicle and is schedul.:d 
for hearing on Tuesday, April 10, 1990, at: 2:00 P. M. 
•• 
• • 
• • 
2. Joh.."'l David Wells, c.."l.e ticled owne~ of ~"l.e ve..rucle in ques-.:ion, ancl 
Douglas Pi.."'l..--.e::, ~r,e_ drive~ of said vehicle, are derenciancs in a pending c::-.. :;1-i :1a:. 
case fer c:affic...'<i."'lg marijuana. 
3. To CO!llplece discovez:-;, a Subpoena Duces Tec..liil and Nocice of .Depc- I 
sicion were served on John David Wells, Douglas P~e~ and ~"l.eir ac:o~ys. 
4. At:t:orneys for bot:h t1:r. Wells and ~.tr. Pinner have filed ~.ot:ions t:o 
~sh che Subpoenas and have advised .~l,eir clie.."lt:s t:o avail t:hem.sel ves of 
c.."l.eir Fifc..'1. Amendment: privilege. 
5. It: has been alleged til.ac che scheduled Subpoenas W.ces Tec..m1 a..."'l.d. 
.Depositions would prejudice ~~ir client:s in t:he pending c=imi.."'J.al case and 
• • 
t:ha.t: t:he Subpoena Duces Tec..m1 represents a subcerruge and an at:t:empt: co violat:e• • 
~r,e spi=ic and lar15i..lage of c..~e S. C. Rules of Cr:::.m.i."'J.al P=ocedure and co obt:ain 
infor.!lation and evidence not: available under t.Jomse Rules. 
6. The St:ace has cancelled che deposi::icns and t..."'.e Subpoenas Cu.ces 
~ 
Tec..liil co avoid any possible prejudice t:o an :i.mpor-....ant: criminal c:ia.l and i=s e 
( w) 2 
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• 
defendancs. However, the Stat:.: cannot conduc= Disc:Jver-; necessa_ry to tyrepare 
for ~~ civil forfei~ure hear~ and is therefore prejueiced in its quest for 
all w~ relevant faces unc:l the cr~U-~al case :S adjudicated. 
7. Tne State has acc~pced co cooperate wit.."l ~"'le par-:ies :'..'"1. ever-; way 
possible. This ~aring wa£ originally set for Februar; 27, 1990 at 2;00 P.M . 
before the Honorable Judge William T. Howell. There was no appearance at ~~t 
t~ by eic...~r John David 1.-iells or his at-:or..ey, David Belser. A deiault ju.dg-
menc was entered, later vacated, and the matter conc~~d ac ~~ request of 
David Belser. 
8. This hearin5 was conc:irued at the last minute by Mr. wells' motion 
whie-'1 was received by the Clerk's Office the day u.~ heari..."'lg was to take place. 
Tne State wenc to greac expe...T'l.Se to have all its witnesses presenc and to be reac· 
to go forward wich. the case. The State fully cooperated_-w"i.dl t..~ _Rec::uesc_for 
Ccncinuance anci would pecid.on the Court for u.~ same cooperacion ac this time. 
Columbia, Souili Carolina 
April _±_, 1990 
E: izabet:.h'H1. Hancock, Assiscanc 
Fiftil Judicial CirC'..lit 
Atcorney for the Plaintiff 
.( w) 3 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial Circuit 
Plaintiff, 
VB. 
1983 Mercedes Benz, VIN #WDBCB20-
A9DB034040 and all Contents, One 
(1) .357 Caliber Taurus Revolver, 
Serial #5271701, One (1) RCA Color) 
TV, Model XL100, Serial #927636068) 
One (1) Plastic Nail With Whi t e ) 
Powdery Residue, One (1) White ) 
Hardees Bag Containing Green ) 
Residue and Seeds, and Larkin ) 
Campbell, an Interested Party, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
·c··_,·.,· 
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDI NGS 
Civil Action No. 92-CP-4 0- 4992 
·c-; -. 
The State of South Carolina, Plaintiff, by and through its undersigned 
t: j \\\_,l..l..:~c..l·l,. 
1 As~fl e-J...iclt.or, respectfully moves this Court for the entry of an order 
.- -·\ 
' ~ 
staying the proceedings in this forfeiture action until the disposit i on of the 
\-1 a ( ~;. ' ~\\.J... '1 
related criminal case now pending, The State v. Larkin Campbel l , C~rnana~ ca~ 
~ ~GS=40~50~&, for the reasons set forth in the accompany i ng Memorandum in 
Support of said Motion. 
The State of South Carolina affirms that prior to the filing of this Motion 
the undersigned did consult with opposing counsel and attempted in good faith to 
resolve the matter contained in this Motion. 
Columbia, south carolina 
February c2, 1993 
Respectfully submitted, 
Zll ~btt-l pJ. tnM ta:k._ 
Eliza t h M. Hancock t r t)'•y "'(ll r 
. l . . f\ ~ u_..... '-'>o( .J 
.. ~s~~~a t o LCLtor ~ 0 
Fi fth . Judicial Circ-u-i:t· Se..l-i,e..i..,t;or 
1701 Main Street 
Columbia, sc 29202 
. ( X) l 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial Circuit 
I 
Plaintiff, 
VB. 
1983 Mercedes Benz, VIN *WDBCB20-
A9DB034040 and all Contents, One 
(1) .357 Caliber Taurus Revolver, 
Serial 15271701, one (1) RCA Color) 
TV, Model XL100, Serial 1927636068) 
One (1) Plastic Nail With White ) 
Powdery Residue, One (1) White 
Hardeea Bag Containing Green 
Residue and Seeds, and Larkin 
Campbell, an Interested Party, 
Defendant. 
Auc;, I ' 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDI NGS 
Civil Action No. 92-CP- 40-4992 
On December 1, 1992, the Plaintiff, the State of South Carolina, filed a 
verified complaint for forfeiture against the defendant property, subsequently 
' I ( ~ I· ,. ~ ( 
making personal service upon Larkin Campbell, 
On S-<"f-1 ~o, ,q ~ ....._ 
-A-B- Gf F-eb~ua-ry 2, 1993, no answer to the 
L 1 1 Cl ~ 'c c- -{ t r , ,,..._ , ~ :+ 
claimant, on December 7, 1992. ~ <1d..d/..tR.1 
,'D.<.> 1 ~ Ha f•e• 1 
\jJI)...,) /6-Vv> & .. , ) 
Complaint has been filed on behalf v 
L < YJ.4 t-;bfv'1 .$1-)au.J 1 f+Cj w!-?o SvhnuH M 
of La~kin Campbell. On or about February 1, 1993, ser, ' ce -o.£ Notice o--f Tak iJ:lg 1£.-<lt :l (' A J. ~ K~M~Ack ol\tJ- (l[l-~C.CCf'- !Lc.<J.<(t...ll' '(, lA -4-\,..-,< lo ·' 1 
' Dep~k~na of Captain Steve Smith of SLED 1 
~ '} \- D"< It • ~d1 ~ clbf~.;~)o. C)J 
and Captain Charles ~L~Vof the 
~lumbia Police Department was made on the State of South Carolina- seeking 
detailed information about the events surrounding the seizure of the defendant 
property, all of which relate to drug transactions which are the subject of a 
'L 
'7. pending criminal prosecution against -~afkin Campbell. U 
fY\.CU-1 '-(I q) ~· ') I ( ' ; \ 
On October 27, 1992, Larkin Campbell was arrested and subsequently indicted 
fMJ'lJ 0l.Cu, t ,.. <II • c~ ~ ..,.,., • <- r4 1 '· 
for ~ king -in Cocaine- ~al Case No. 91-GS-40~~5 is now pending, 
., I( .rn.:~. a.' '~ s• AA ~A 1.. l •- - ! ....L.r 
'"""'"r- v·, ~ u,5 t ~o:.l ..,.,,<-<:... 
with trial being set as soon as possible pv d b~ ~( \'\eo)+"- :?."""' L.l~ r;. o-f .3 •" 
(x) 2 
The Depositions,~~ arkin @a.mpoe..l-1, are discovery that 
the claimant, a criminal defendant, would not be entitled to obtain in the 
criminal proceedings under Rule S(a)(2) of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and could compromise informants in the criminal prosecution . The 
State of South Carolina is concerned that unless a stay is entered in this 
proceeding pending disposition of the criminal case, the claimant could utilize 
the civil discovery process to circumvent the limitations on discovery in the 
criminal case, to the prejudice of the State of South Carolina. 
Although there is no state provision, 21 u.s.c. Section 881(i) provides for 
a stay of civil forfeiture proceedings when a related indictment is pending. 21 
U.S.C. Section 881(i) provides: 
The filing of an indictment or information alleging 
a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of 
this chapter, or a violation of State or local law 
that could have been charged under this subchapter 
or subchapter II of this chapter, which is also 
related to a civil forfeiture proceeding under this 
section shall, upon motion of the u.s. and for good 
cause shown, stay the civil forfeiture proceeding. 
Ins. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., Congress expounded on t he need for 
this new provision in Section 881: 
the second new subsection to be added to Section 881 
provides for a stay of civil forfeiture proceedings 
when the government has commenced a criminal case 
that involves issues the same as or related to those 
on which the forfeiture action is based. Generally, 
the courts have been willing to grant such stays of 
civil forfeiture proceedings when the government has 
commenced a criminal action concerning the same acts 
that have given rise to the forfeiture. (footnote 
omitted) Absent such a stay, the government may be 
compelled in the context of the civil forfeiture 
action to disclose prematurely aspects of its criminal 
case. 
(x) 3 
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Inasmuch as the forfeiture case here stems from the same transactio ns 
supporting the criminal prosecution, the discovery sought is in fact direct l v 
related to the criminal prosecution. 
A stay of the civil proceedings would best serve the interest of judicial 
economy because the outcome of the related criminal case could substantially 
qiepose of the forfeiture proceeding or narrow the issues to be decided. In 
addition, a stay is necessary to prevent the claimant from circumventing the 
limitations on discovery in the aforementioned criminal case by use or abuse of 
the civil discovery process, which could result in the identification of persons 
whose safety or confidentiality would ·hereby be threatened or compromised. 
Moreover, a stay is necessary to prevent prejudice to the criminal 
defendant's case by reci ~cocal discovery which would be served by the State of 
South Carolina. 
Accordingly, the State of South Carolina respectfully requests that this 
Court Order a Stay of this forfeiture action until completion of the 
aforementioned criminal case now pending against claimant. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
February ~ , 1993 
Respectfully submitted, 
fl1 f. b d-. [6), tb ,r ork 
Eliza eth M. Hancock 
Assistant Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit Solicitor 
1701 Main Street 
Columbia, SC 29201 
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STATE Of SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF DARLINGTON 
T. TRAVIS MEDLOCK, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL, STATE OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA, 
PLAINTIFF, 
-versus-
SIXTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED 
TWENTY DOLLARS AND NO CENTS 
( $16,120.00), UNITED STATES 
CURRENCY, 
DEFENDANT. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 90CP4701022 
COMES NOW THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, by and through its 
undersigned Chief Deputy Attorney General, and moves this Honorable 
Court fc;~ an order granting summary judgment to the Plaintiff 
p~rs~ant to Rule 56 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The basis for this motion is that there ~xist no genuine issues of 
material fact in this in rem actiou fer civil forfeiture of such 
---
mor1ies pursuant to South Carolina CodE Ann. Section 44-53-530, as 
amended. 
The property, United States Curre&cy in assorted denominations 
in the amount of Sixteen Thousand l)ne Eundred Twenty Dollars and No 
.. 
Cents ($16,120.00), was seized by law ~~forcement officers on June 
22, 1989, during the search of a suspected drug trafficker's 
residence pursuant to a valid search warr.tnt. 
As the accompanying affidavit and other exhibits indicate, the 
execution of the search warrant culminat"ed in the arrest of Gary 
Morrell on June 22, 1989, at his resicence in Darlington County. 
On June 22, 1989, agents from tlte fe:deral Drug Enforcement 
I 
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Administration and the State Law Enforcement Division, and 
i nvestigators of the Darlington County Sheriff's Department were 
conducting an ongoing investigation into a narcotics trafficking 
and distribution operation in the Darlington County area. The 
investigation involved probing the cocaine distribution 
organization of one Jack Arnold Mcintyre. In June 1989, Drug 
Enforcement Administration and State Law Enforcement Division 
officers were utilizing undercover operatives to 
participants in the cocaine distribution operation . 
identify 
The law 
enforcement agents were overseeing the purchase of cocaine from 
suspects. 
One Scott Watford was identified by law enforcement officers 
as a suspected drug trafficker, and an associate in the Mcintyre 
organization. On June 21, 1989 an undercover operative met with 
Watford to negotiate the purchase of one ounce of cocaine. The 
undercover operative gave Watford t""'elve hundred fifty dollars 
( $1250.00). Surveillance units who ivere monitoring the meeting 
then followed Watford to an area near Gary Morrell's residence. 
While in ~he vicinity of the Morrell residence, the surveillance 
units lost sight of Watford's vehicle. Visual contact with 
Watford's vehicle was reestablished on secondary road S-16-65, also 
known as Rabbit Box Road, in the immediate vicinity of the Morrell 
residence. After reestablishing contact, the law enforcement 
officers observed Watford meet with the undercover operative. At 
that meeting, Watford turned over a ba~ of white powder, later 
• discovered to contain 27. 9 grams of cocaine, to the undercover 
2 
• (y) 2 
.: ,,, ; 
'..:J 
operative. Watford told the undercover operative that t he cocaine 
came from the Gary Morrell residence. 
Based on Watford's statement concerning the source of the 
cocaine, the law enforcement officers' knowledge that the cocaine 
either came from the Gary Morrell residence or a residence in the 
vicinity, the fact Gary Morrell was known by law enforcement 
authorities to be a distributor of cocaine and had tentatively been 
identified as an associate in the Jack Mcintyre cocaine 
distribution organization, and on other information, law 
enforcement officers obtained a warrant to search the Morrell 
residence. On June 22, 1989, the Morrell residence was searched 
pursuant to the warrant. 
During the course of the search, law enforcement officers 
found cocaine both in the Morrell residence and in Gary Morrell's 
personal vehicle which was parked in the driveway of the residence. 
Significant paraphernalia of the type used in the manufacture and 
distribution of controlled substan:es also was found in the 
residence. A brown plastic bag containing sixteen thousand one 
hundred twenty dollars and no cents in various denominations of 
five, ten, twenty, fifty, and one hundred dollar bills also was 
located. 
Gary Morrell has indicated that his wife did not know about 
the money. Morrell, further, has admitted that some of the money 
is proceeds from the sale of cocaine. 
The Defendant property, United States Currency in the amount 
of Sixteen Thousand one Hundred Twenty Dollars ($16,120.00), was 
3 
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seized pursuant to Section 44-53-520(a) (4), Section 44-53-520(a) (7) 
and Section 44-53-520(a)(8) of the Code of Laws of South Carolina 
(1976), as amended. Those Sections provide, inter alia, that all 
property, including all personal property, which in any manner is 
knowingly used to facilitate distribution, sale, importation, or 
trafficking in controlled substances; and all monies which are 
furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for 
a controlled substance; or which are proceeds traceable to any such 
exchange; and all monies seized in close proximity to for f eitable 
controlled substances and, finally, all monies seized at the time 
of the arrest of a person for a drug offense, are subject to 
forfeiture . 
The Defendant property was seized without warrant, incident to 
a search executed pursuant to a valid search warrant on June 22, 
19.89. See Section 44-53-520(b)(l); Section 44-53-520(b)(4) of the 
e Code of Laws of South Carolina (1979), as amended. The Complaint 
in this action was filed on August 21, 1990, and a Summons and 
Complaint served upon the putative owner, Gary E. Morrell, on 
August 22, 1990. The putative owner filed no answer on behalf of 
• the Defendant property. The property thus stands in default . 
... 
Rule 56 (c) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that a Motion for Summary Judgment "shall be rendered 
• forthwith if the pleadings, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to·a judgment as a matter of 
law." Rule 56(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure . 
• 
4 
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··;) - ; 
.. 
' J 
The Plaintiff in this case is entitled to Summary Judgment as 
a matter of law. As noted above, if money is either used or 
intended for use to buy a controlled substance, or to assist or 
facilitate drug trafficking, or is seized in close proximity to 
controlled substances, or is a proceed traceable to an exchange for 
controlled substances, then it is forfeitable. 
The putative owner of the money, Gary Evans Morrell, further, 
has agreed to give up all his drug related assets. After being 
~ advise of his rights in court, and in conjunction with a plea 
I 
~ 
agreement in which he pled guilty to distribution of cocaine 
charges, Gary Morrell agreed that any and all assets or portions 
thereof acquired or obtained as a result of illegal trafficking in 
drugs or which were directly or indirectly related to the unlawful 
drug activities would be surrendered to the State Law Enforcement 
Division or other law enforcement related organizations in South 
Carolina. 
The drug forfeiture statute must be interpreted in light of 
the evil sought to be remedied. South Carolina Law Enforcement 
Division v. Crook, 273 S.C. 285, 255 S.!.2d 846 (1979). There is 
no dispute as to the events of June 22, 1989. Probable cause 
existed for the issuance of a search warrant for the Morrell 
residence. A search warrant was issued pursuant to the probable 
cause, and the warrant was executed. Drugs, drug paraphernalia, 
and cash in the amount of Sixteen Thousand One Hundred Twenty 
Dollars were seized pursuant to execution of the warrant. The 
Sixteen Thousand One Hundred Twenty Dollars consisted of United 
5 
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States currency in denominations ranging from five dollar bills to 
one hundred dollar bills. The money was found in a brown plastic 
bag located in the pantry in the kitchen of the residence. Two 
people occupy the residence: Gary Morrell, t he putative owner of 
the money, and Sheila Morrell, his wife. Both parties deny that 
Sheila Morrell has any interest in the money, and both parties 
claim tha i: she was unaware of the money's existence. Sheila 
Morrell, further, has signed a statement .acknowledging that she has · 
no interest in the money. 
As a matter of law, any money seized in close proximity to 
controlled substances is forfeitable. Any money which is a proceed 
traceable to an .exchange for any controlled substance is likewise 
forfeitable as a matter of law. The forfeiture in both instances 
occurs at the moment that the property in issue is used in 
contravention of law. See Section 44 - 53-520(d), Code of Laws of 
e South Carolina (1976), as amended, which provides that such 
property "is forfeited and transferred to the government at the 
moment of illegal use. Seizure and forfeiture proceedings confirm 
the transfer." See also United States v. Stowell, 13 3 U. S. 1 
• (1890). 
Based on the currency's close proximity to controlled 
substances, Gary Morrell's statements regarding the source of the 
• money, and Morrell and his wife's indications that the wife lacked 
knowledge of the money's existence, the money is forfeitable under 
Sections 44-53-520(a)(4), (7) and (8). 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff moves the Court to enter an 
• 
0 
• (v) 6 
'· 
' 
Order granting summary judgment to Plaintiff and ordering that: 
1. 
2 . 
The subject property be declared to be forfeited pursuant 
to Sections 44-53-520(4), (7), & (8) and 44-53-530, Code 
of Laws of South Carolina (1 9 7 6), as amended. 
One Thousand Dollars ($1,000) be transferred to the State 
Treasurer, to be distributed by the State Treasurer to 
the three law enforcement agencies effecting the seizure, 
in equal proportion, Three Hundred Thirty-Three Dollars 
and Thirty-Three Cents ($333.33) each to the Darlington 
County Sheriff's Office and the Hartsville Police 
Department, and Three Hundred Thirty-Three Dollars and 
Thirty-Four Cents ($333.34) to the State Law Enforcement . 
Division, each agency to deposit said monies into a 
special account, to be used by the agency for drug 
enforcement purposes. 
3. One Thousand Five Hundred Twelve Dollars ($1,512.00) be 
transferred to the State Treasurer for deposit into the 
State's General Fund. 
4. Thirteen Thousand Six Hundred Eight Dollars ($13,608.00) 
be transferred to the State Treasurer, to be distributed 
by the State Treasurer, to the three law enforcement 
agencies effecting the seizure, in equal proportions of 
Four Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-Six Dollars and No 
Cents ($4536.00) each, to the Darlington County Sheriff's 
Office, Hartsville Police Department, and the State Law 
Enforcement Division, each agency to deposit said monies 
into a special account, to be used by the agency for drug 
enforcement purposes. 
Respectfully submitted. 
Ctk.~rn,~ 
Cameron M. Currie 
Chief Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, State Grand Jury Section 
March ~~ 1991 
Columbia, South Carolina 
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ATTACHMENTS 
• 1) Affidavit of Paul Atencio 2) Affidavit of Joel M. Griggs 
3) Search Warrant for Morrell Residence 
4) Return of Warrant and List of Items Seized 
5) Notice of and Affidavit for Seizure (Joel Griggs) 
6) Plea Agreement (Gary Morrell) 
• 
7) Order and Judgment (Sheila Morrell) 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF DARLINGTON 
T. TRAVIS MEDLOCK, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL, STATE OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA, 
PLAINTIFF, 
-versus-
SIXTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED 
TWENTY DOLLARS AND NO CENTS 
( Sl6,120.00), UNITED STATES 
CURRENCY, 
DEFENDANT. 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
FOR DARLINGTON COUNTY, 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
AFFIDAVIT OF SPECIAL AGENT 
PAUL LOUIS ATENCIO 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 90CP4701022 
I, Paul Louis Atencio, being duly sworn, hereby state and 
depose as follows: 
That I am a Special Agent of the South Carolina Law 
Enforcement Division, Columbia, South Carolina, and have been so 
employed for the last fifteen (15) years. By special training I am 
a law enforcement officer involved in the investigation of complex 
narcotics cases and have participated in numerous undercover 
operations, both as an agent and in a supervisory capacity. I am 
currently assigned to the State Grand Jury, Columbia, South 
Carolina where I investigate defendants operating multi-
jurisdictional drug trafficking organizations. I have actively 
been involved in the investigation of the putative owner of the 
Defendant property. 
On June 22, 1989, agents from the federal Drug Enforcement 
Administration and the State Law Enforcement Division, and 
II (y) 9 
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• 
• 
• 
investigators of the Darlington County Sheriff's Department were 
conducting an ongoing investigation into a narcotics trafficking 
and distribution operation in the Darlington County area. The 
investigation involved probing the cocaine distribution 
organization of one Jack Arnold Mcintyre. In June 1989, Drug 
Enforcement Administration and State Law Enforcement Division 
of:icers utilizing undercover operatives to identify 
participants in the cocaine distribution operation. The law 
enforcement agents were overseeing the purchase of cocaine from 
suspects. 
One Scott Watford was identified by law enforcement officers 
as a suspected drug trafficker, and an associate in the Mcintyre 
organization. On June 21, 1989 an undercover operative met with 
Watford to negotiate the purchase of one ounce of cocaine. The 
undercover operative gave Watford twelve hundred fifty dollars 
( $1250.00). Surveillance units who were monitoring the meeting 
then followed Watford to an area near Gary Morrell's residence. 
While in the vicinity of the Morrell residence, the surveillance 
units lost sight of Watford's vehicle. Visual contact with 
Watford's vehicle was reestablished on secondary road S-16-65, also 
known as Rabbit Box Road, in the immediate vicinity of the Morrell 
residence. After reestablishing contact, the law enforcement 
officers observed Watford meet with the undercover operative. At 
that meeting, Watford turned over a bag of white powder, later 
2 
•' 
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....... / 
discovered to contain 27. 9 grams of cocaine, to the undercover 
• 
operative. Watford told the undercover operative that the cocaine e 
came from the Gary Morrell residence . 
Based on Watford's statement concerning the source of the 
cocaine, the l aw enforcement officers' knowledge that the cocaine 
• either came from the Gary Morrell residence or a residence in the 
vi c i:1ity, the fact Gary Morrell was known by law enforcemen t 
authorities to be a distributor of cocaine and had tentatively been 
identified as an associate in the Jack Mcintyre cocaine • 
distribution organization, and on other information, law 
enforcement officers obtained a warrant to search the Morrell 
residence. On June 22, 1989, the Morrell residence was searched 
• 
pursuant to the warrant. 
During the course of the search, law enforcement officers 
found cocaine both in the Morrell residence and in Gary Morrell's 
personal vehicle which was parked in the driveway of the residence. • 
Significant paraphernalia of the type used in the manufacture and 
distribution of controlled substances also was found in the 
residence. A brown plastic bag containing sixteen thousand one • 
hundred twenty dollars and no cents in various denominations of 
. 
five, ten, twenty, fifty, and one hundred dollar bills also was 
located. 
• 
• 
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Gary Morrell has indicated that his wife did not know about 
t~e money. Morrell, further, has admitted that some of the money 
is proceeds from the 
Sworn to and subscribed before 
me this ~day of March, 1991. 
for South Carolina 
expires: I"-/" -..;li:)"O 
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STATE OF SOUTd CAROL iNA f'x ti-!B; r 3 
ft~-:IDAVIT FOR SEIZURE 
COUNTI OF DAHLJNGTON 
PERSONALLY appeared before me JOCL M. GTII~GS , w-ho, bei::1g 
ciuly :;worn, says - Dc9t · th.:tt he is,:, r r1 vcstiqu.tor,- Du.rl·. co: Sheri.ff and 
c:tat the subject propercy is: cc:-.e-:k appropriate categories) 
1 . c on t r o l l e <l .s t.: o s tan c e ( s ) ~..~hi c ~ 
mar: u £.1 c cure C. , ci is t = i b t.:: e c I dis o ens e ci , or 
violation of Article Jl Chaoce~ 53, Title 
Laws of South Ca=olina (1976), as amended. 
ha-.re bee:-t 
acqui=ed in 
44, Cocie of 
2. ra .. .; materials, p:-oducts, and equipment of any 
kind which are ~sed, or ~hich have been positioned for 
u~e, in manufactu=ing, producing, compounding, process-
ing, delivering, importing, or e~porting ~ny cont=olled 
subst~nces in violation of Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 
44, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as ~mended. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
3. property whic:t is used, or wn~cn has been e 
positioned for use, as a container for property .de-
scribed in items (1) a~c ( 2) above. 
X 
X 
X 
4. property whic:t in any manner"is know~ngly used 
to facilitate p:-odu~tion, manufac t uring, distribution, 
sale, imporca::ion, e~'?orcation, or t=afficking of 
various controlled subsc~nces ~s defined in Article 3, 
Chancer j3, Title 44, CJcie of Laws of South Carolina 
(l9J6), as amenced. 
5. books, records, ~nd research products 
materi~ls, includi.ng fo r=- · -as, microfilm, tapes, 
data which are used, o~ ~n i ch have been positioned 
use, in violation of A=:i.cle 3, Chapter.53, Title: 
Code of La~s of South Carolina (1976), as ~ended. 
and 
and 
for 
44, 
6. a conveyance ;;hie~. ';.las used or intended for 
use unlaw=ully to cot:ceal, contain, or t-ransport or 
facilica:e che unla~ful concealment, oossession, 
concainment, or t=anspor-:ation of cont-rolled sub-
stances, and their compounds. 
7. monies, negotiable instruments, securities, or 
other things of value fur:1ished or intended to be 
fur:1i.shed by any person in exchange for a controlled 
subsc:a.nce. 
8. proce~ds, including, buc not limited to 1 
monies, and real and ge:sonal property traceable t o an 
exchange for controlled substances. 
'' 
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X 9. monies seized in close pro;cimity to forfeit-
able controlled substances, or drug manu.:acturing or 
dist::-il1uting paraohe:rnalia, or monies seized in close 
proxim!.ty to .:or:eitable records of the importation, 
manufacturing, or dist=ibution of controlled sub-
stancen, or monies seiz ed at the time of arrest or 
search involving violation of Article 3, Chapter 53, 
T i t 1 e !, /4 , Cod e o f Laws o f S out h Car o 1 in a ( 1 9 7 6 ) , as 
amended. 
The property is desc=~bed as follows: 
Sl6,l20. 00 in cnsll , various <.1 enominution, 
( 1) one 19 f34 Chevrolet S-10 Pick-UL) truck 
tag ~ Ot!N G99 !L C., Vin. ; ~GCCTl102E21159Gl 
Said property is ~ubject to sei=ure and forfeiture pursuant 
to Sections 4~-SJ-520 and 44-SJ-530 C ce of Laws of South 
Carolina (1976), as amended. 
The deponent says that the following facts are the basis of 
his a llega t: ion that: t:h.a property cie scribed above -;.;as used unla¥1-
fully and is subject to seizure: 
Upo_n the exccut l.on of J. lec;nl !:jearch warrant, aooroxirnatelv 42 
gr:1ms of cocalnn wno founc.1 in vclliclc listed. 1\lso found was 
SlG,l20.00 in cnnh. This wns found in Hr. t1orrell's residence 
and is bclicv~~ to be procc~ds of ~llcgal drug tr3nsactions . 
(y) 14 
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S~ORN To and Subocribeci before me 
this o?(z+Jv day of \~Ytau , 1982. 
!) 
, ifu..t-, A c..J. ;.,"'/ J'U:.rr.l.UI.!/ocUL. s. 1 
'Nh cary]Jub lie .tot: Suu ttf Carolina 
My Commission Expires:~/;~ /9..:;-
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STATE OF SOUTH CAl10LINA 
County of _:L1'H~l1_~-±c 19 . 
\ ' · ,. 
: i . 
~ - . . 
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r- · 
I . 
.. j · .. ., 
I 
c . . · ' f 
SEARCH WARRANT 
'J ._,.,._. ~ . 
. 
·: 
""~ d.d- 't6 Date ______ T_______ _ 
Officer .~ bfl,\~---49-=.J ____ _ 
I ' 
. :· I 
• • 
~ - . 
-· 
· I 
. 
'. 
. 
~ 
I 
• • I 
: -~ -- ' ~ ·~ :, 
. ~·( 
...:· . 
'~ . .. -l ... 
~ · .. ; . . \ 
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) 
f 
' 
• 
> 
' . ' . ') J (' ' • ) • I • ) 1'. . I t , ) l ' ;:. ~ 'i. i ,) • ;.,.' lol. _,;, ., .. ~ 
or ~.rl!~,_\ l!\f1.j, )_,y ____ . 
l'er~nnally ~~~~~~reti hcfore rn•·. one _-::; 1':-\ _b.n..\ 1::,./.:,S . . . 
"'"'· locinJ: rlnly sworn , say. th~t there ; ~ l""haulc c~u~e ln uclir• ve that ccr l:t rro prnpcrty ~u ln cctlo aerwrt umltr 
prHYI5iuns of Section 17 - 13 · 1·10, 1~7G Corle of l . ~ws of Snn lh C:n·nl iM , ~s ~111C1111erl. I! located on the rolluwrng 
l' ' t' nti5e5 in tlti3 County : 
IJESCRII'TION OF r ROI'f.flTY SOUGIIT 
_________ toL~l~~----------------------------------
-----·-----
nr:ASON F'On AF'F'IANT"S nr.Ll8F' THAT Tllr: 
rnorEnTY SOUGHT IS ON TI!F: SUnJEC:r PREMISES 
_w~'<-~1 i~V_ ~ " )- J~ )yr~~-'R~\, ~'e)L_t_,. _ ~ _Jt,,\,·,l...:r::n:-];o,."1~t_o.c......s..v~i.' 
\ t .• ...;_.lrJ::lij·~~rn L(\r\,t.n~ ~-h, f\L-tvrt.\\!lS u:L_Lij)l-•td' d<l_QLCoL .,·, "'" ~(.. 
_:.~\!':!:9_\ _~.,.mn~ ~o"""' "",''h.l_U .~JJb.~__.5o\LJ:tt_O~tpm ... h.,Y. 
~\\·'- ... !>o.-Jct'-=-D.f:...,......):r.~!,.o'C..!:D.·~-:h,'~)_fl~\J.~.t.t....L"\.~\,Q:t'~!")()'~ -0...~=·_,_\-_=:....;._ 
_\\ ~) ~~~!._cl:tm:,_,~ __ ]'y\ \t~·h.:: .. Q~'OL~•-'0 V.!\-c :t.;j;~ r: ~ U&_};,-;o ...-. 
....J:...~;~t'~<;)~ L e 1) F bJ:L) _f /) OCL.t,i '-----------------------------
_ .f!t)y, ""':"-\it» -41,_:_e,~.J, "-1• T'tH._il b ~~,..,._·Lb...:b..b1i~.:L.b ~.l__ 
\ . . . I \ ' 
_D M·t~~~ So" ..-'-t.. o£ I!X\blZ.( 1\').tL.b :e~ Di'U.l.O~~":t:ou::r,t...J.~t,.___ 
.~S.£f>.'·~·t..,· o!! ~t/l.a..c:r.iL,_ThL...).)..t>~.'--tti n~..:.\n..~)v·, 0\lfi)'---"-
-Lr.-:n ~LkL~b!;'-d.t..:atrl'lLI..r..b.~a:£Lr~='d_:r1'.trab· n.d '\-h ~ ... ) d 
_\;)~~~ ... ~;.k'"· .. ~~b~~~~t~~~\..1:~~r-~ ih.I.o~~~~l11i~J ., .. , · ,_,_. 
_ 1 .... );Q.U'O ~i: )-\vd:_· 'nt-j..>!:l hL- P'-~r.Lh~..> ~ d_.S~ i ~ _[.o 1.. -c-.i J>.Jt._k !.Ont....i:k __ 
. 'i'-" ~ ~ L'f.\Lt_ciJ:~~o~r. t..1L.:J\ ~>~_]£~ > btr_ O.~t,., i t.Jt- 1~ ):}__._ 
_L.o:n_\,~d.L..:d:~l\ L-:t~b~~ !\.LO br-" ~d -~)~t~.U-.&-.bC'~!:nt.n..."L_ 
_{\ ~ t .YH.l~...__---------------
•' 
Sworn to ano! Snh:Kribed IM!fore me ) 
lhis~ol:~y of ....:::r....,.~---· 1\J -~~- - ( 
IJ"74;1 /:ff-6--r~/ n .. s.J J ~-· Signature of j,~ 
I 
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Xl'E OF SOUTII CAHOLINA 
cou NTY or ~en.\\ 1\.:l'\\otJ ___ _ ,, SEAitCl! WAitltANT , . ' I, 
I 
TO ANY UQNI>IW LAW ENFOrtCEMI::~T OFF'ICE!t OP TillS STATE Olt COUNTY Oft OF' Tl!C: 
MtiNICIPALITY Of ________ ___:. __ 
It •r•r•<" ill !( fmlll th~ ntl~ch~d >frid:IVil lhal there ore rc"!ollol>le ~:rr"""'~ lo heliev~ lhot c~rt•in prt~perty 
.,. loltC'l ln 5~flltr'f' 1111~ lcr "' ov ISIUI1S or SccliOII 17- I J - I ·IU I ~7U Cot le or 1. :1 \Y ~ uf Suulll C;II'Uiinn , i1S amentl~l . is !O('nled 
,, 11 1r•c fc,/ lowin~: pr erui~cs : ' 
lli~SC!tll'TION Or l'Itio:MISI·:S cn;ItSON, I'LACS Oil Til iNG) · 
'l'U lit:; Sf~AHCIII::IJ 
_1~R.U:.)J~LL-aL.S'n~h~t1 _t:1fL~n.~JLAILpcopt.tt.:L'1-'i .... a.tM.rl on... 
~~_t1...__b2tu.\h_!'l.\L\11',t..)t...}._&-o~tb.ld • .h~~~J_\.o~ 
~t;\."om; h"ll~~-c:bd\e-}..t.1\.d___£e..,j\. P... . fu.u,.J.L~L~~~· __ _ 
_ i h\~~o~ 1>F t)~}\w~r_lil"t~L\h.\.h£'T-t:.B\Al~pz:.otrrd s~±!. . 
_'b.Q\),S_~J.S_al..:i-h ,Jrr;lttlio.V oL~~,~ .... l~t~l~fa:.Jf,tnd..:. , , ,~ 
...QI!Jl~~L..of\...J)~)lldl~tJ~t..L.~Lflff-"•t. 7 T;/._ -/vN~ · R,~J,(e;.k1 -S'i'r ~=:..· j.6 :,;.~~ :.: 
B.Ji.rL.!Sulli\tA\ Rc.,J ')~ff....tD. ... l· l .,.,~ l..s ""'b~;!\ • ._-h...lo~ ;:u-en· -t1,~;1..1:h 
~·J~uha;~-1t.J1~c: __ J~~J..JhntU·.tJJ)~k:..~2n~~.., tn~ . ./o D; ·s.~ 
illc\~ tSLfkLl,::..:tlc.c_J~r.ilrlel.Jt..._;,:::.lru..nlr:d_i f.LtL'..l~.b . 'Br.i.k 'no,..-'1 lft~{.v~ 
Now, th~r~for~. yon are hereby authorized lo search Lhe snbj~cl premises for I he properly described below, :and i 
to seize such properly if found: . . -. ,. , 1 • .: :·: t•· 
OESCrtlrTION OF' rrtOPErtTY ... ·-·· .. ..... ..... . ..;.,.- ........ __ ----.&.-· 
~09lN~--~-----------------------------------------
';·' 
... ; . 
I ' . ' I ; ~ :'I. 
; .. . 
· ·. ,·; t 
. : . . . • . ' '. .. . . : ·' .,. -· · · .~··: } ....... '14 .. ~' 
Tiois Surch Warnn~ 1hall• not be valid for · onore lhon,len days fro1n the. d11~ . o.' 'Mu•nee. : · · ·· •:' ·.c ··~ ·. ·-·. : ':i.. · .. ···• 
A written inventory of all properly sei:r.eol p11r~uant to lhis Seault Warren : shall be made to 
------~;-~)~.h~)-~~)~------------------------------------
within len claye from the elate of this w<UTilnl, such ioOYeulory to be eig11ed by l~e orricer exemllng lhit warnont, ond 1 .·: 
copy o( oneh in•entory oh 11 11 ue h•rulohe<l to the t•er1011 whnao premiao1 arete•rehet.l if clem•K.I for auch COf')" Ia n•..l•: .' .' 
A copy or this Seoreh Warr11 nt '$h:>lll>e tleliv~red 'to th~ p~rson in ch•rg~ ·of l'•e preoni~t'!l search~tlatthe tl~ ol .;i .. . · · 
such lUrch If pncllc:oble, ant.l, if nnt, lo wuch person na anon lheredter u i~ prntt.icnhle: in tho event the identoly .,( .; , :· 
ll · t .. IT · Un .. to !~ate .. 
. •e peraon '" t ""IIIIa ""l known nr if sncn pennn c:onnnl he ronnel afler ren•unau ~' I •~;enct '" allernp • .• 
the l>traon, • copy aholl be 3llache!l to a prorninenl .plnce on such pretni!~S . · , . ·:. : :•· ···,:· ""'L ·-!; · 
i~1~~~U.\ . . .. ' ... . . ' ., ; . . ...... ! :~' :1' ,\ 
..__ __ ......___:., _ __._ _ ·. s. c. 
~-..... _____ , 19..1[\_ 
( y) 18 
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I receivetllhe atlachetl Search Warrant ---------------_14.L""'"'~­ !!) li., nntl 
ve executed it as follows: 
o'clock p M, r searched 
• 
On ______ ~.0~-.Q!o2~~=--. tn!fLnt ---'''"'-5'...._.· ....t...~.=O __ _ 
(the person ) tlescril>ed in the warrant and 
(the premises) 
· I left a copy of the warrant with .fl..a..c)L t1!JCCc:. 
Name of person searched or "at the place of se·-a-rc~h~.:-'. :.>~.w~it-:-:l.J.l.:::...;L.L-.-------------------
Together with a receipt fur the items seized. 
The following is an inventory of p1·operty talten pursuant to the warrant: 'X:~ o...tiA~ ... c::...... d""'---- • 
sJ~~----------------------------------------~---------
• 
. .. · . :~ . . 
--------------~:------------------...;_......:.· · ;,.: · ....;: ·:_· _ . .__:_.:·...::··  . ...,=~...:. ._. ___ __;;:: ··r3..::·: :,. 
i . 
• 
• 
. 
This inventory was made in the presence of ;:s-~·'jJ'...J,.,-------------~--
AND /)a,z,~ t1 e 
I swear that this Inventory is a lrue and detailed account of all the property taken by me on the wan·ant. 
SWORN to before me this the 
day of ------------• 19 __ 
·(Signature of Officer Executing Wan-ant) • (L.S.) 
Signature of Judge 
---~--·-:·- - .'"'--.. . - ;· -.. - ---~--· · -----~ . ..... ---. 
• 
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• . ·.,·j , .  -... ~:·j,. ~·.-:·~·/' ' · ~J.· ---
/:.·:~~::.~~~\/~' ... li'J+ oo 1+-errr:J 3=ior-< ' n, 't \.nQ ~ n.9 tnTte' 1 · ~ . · · .:.·;~,. ... . :,, , -~e 
_:~~~·-:~.~-.: .-·. ;/-5andw;c~ 6a.~..5 Conio . ''";j wh'.~e.. pa~~r . _ 
•;/ ~. . . I -( ..1. • I I . +. d 
.. ~ .. _~~~ ~- ~-- : .. /.~ pf~- t C... .• . JSo.J .. w ,·tJ, .. tw.s.-r: - .. 1e.. .CDrqa.Ct11t1j __ b:.J \1 •. e... por.J . . e..~ .-- .... ·-·-::·----· 
• ~:~:~ :_ ,~7 _ I ~ J ¥ "'":J"''m- ~:Sa pd -::JJ lc.c ~:: }C..Jd:, No .. 8 :J.:S}..l.7.L~:.:.:. :; -:~ .... 
;-~~d~L{L~ /.-:_.5 .-t_LJ_-15.7._ Mo.j rt~1T\.. . . .:.No ... A U .. L_.7f_{g:.~~- Ma~c)~ .. ~~(,_;Jl?.: t/1/ )( 
~<~--~~:~ - - . ~·7- ~ r~.-S., uJ_3.. f-:~f./._G.TG- .. N:, .. G_73-~.No~ .. XS?: 9:X._.fY/oJc_J ~ .,;.7;:3 ··_.sc~::~b, 9/.J/5 
• . . :· .' ·.: : .: .;·. : ~ ; l . . . .J c/ 3 . . . ·. .. .. . . ' . . . ' . . . . . ~--:~:+ .. ~·~ .. : ::_j1 ~J.-3~"'0;7/.~.No._ .. . .. ~Z ..... ~ .. CcJ .. .. ~/,A{,~J JD,~~;J_: ... · . 
.': :~2): :: · , ~:~ ---~ / .. :~LJ;. 0· .. Ch c~ f-~ .. .JO..:.JD .. Je.tJV. .. ocfiott~ ... Mod;__ l_.?,{~::~c.c.?~~:3.JID{ C. S 
. · . . : . . : ~ -- .. . . ~ ... ; ·' : . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . : . . . : . . ~ . . .. ,.. . .. . .. •. ' . : ~ . .' . 
~:.: ~ ;:.~~~~:: 7;.~ .~ : l :.~J?t:.m .in3~1t ... cJ~ .. -:5pe.r:d ma,s +~--MO<:ieL.SS ~-· ,S~,_No._,!.d. ~ .. 9333 
• ~: .. -;~;--~ ....  ·,> ~: /.: .. /.)_ c;a ') ~ .~.s~.~. _)2Jodel-:_//_0 .. ~.·~r_ ..s~~·-:0f.o.·· __ /_~~1~-l~~?7'. : .. 
-~ ~ ~: ~+s· ~ · ~.-:-.I: ~~~Gct~j~~:S~~.LJ:-:.f1~-~f:J_~:-:9~.(~~-~-7s;C/:~·~f!?: ·:~;~ .4f!~t:Jj~.~::J~ .. ..  . 
~: : ~·-:·.: : ::'~ ;.:~ .;:7' f_:~Sfr'a-1 L P./::j .f; :~: ;. .fh _:.~_; _+h;f.'1._;s.t,~_;+;-~-w~;_--IA ... ~J.. :.±e .~~~"!iu; ~·-rp; d t.\~ 
l.:L:· :.~ . .-~~~~~:.::.:=c.:.~ -: P.l~+:c.;~:·s:-frtU..LJs.:: (Co/or:... t,J ),,i/-c., ."f.J.t:...d) u.J_; +J.-< ·~ v.Jh.,'+~~ ~£JldeJ:.:~rc.-5·; dtte.. 
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STA:Z o: SOuTd C.-\ROLHIA 
COU1t"l"f OF D!d\Ll r I C'l'ON 
Darlington County 
) 
) 
) 
Sheriff's Dr.tJartrnrn t ) 
( La~ ~~~orceme~c Agency) ) 
) 
v. ) 
Ga=y E. Morrell ) 
S llelia Mor=cll ) 
S l G, l2 0 . 0 0 ) 
l '.JU!l C11 rvrolct ::-lu ) 
l-'lc lc-uu t ruck, 'l'.~Y-WNN6'~rJ 
c?rope::-cy) ) 
Vin. # lGCCT li\B?.I ; 211S9Gl ) 
I~l inC: CI ?-CUIT COU?.T 
NOTICE OF SC:IZtr~ 
NOTICE IS HEREBY Giv"'EN that: t~e following described prope!:"ty 
has been seizad and is subject to p=~ceeciings for forfeiture to 
\ 
the State of South Carolina purs~'nt to Section 44-53-530, Code 
of La:...;s of South Carolina (19i6), as amended. The prop e::-ty 
a££e:cced by the s.1.id seizure aud forfeiture proceec!ing is de-
sc=ibeci as follo~s: 
$16,120.00 in cnsh various clenominati.:m, (l) -:>ne 1984 Chevrolet 
S-10 Pick-up truck, Tag ffDNN 699 S. C., Vin. ilGCCT14B2Ell5961 
South Cc1.rolina. 
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S7ATZ OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF DARLINGTON 
S7ATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
V . 
GARY 2VAN S MORRELL 
IN THE COURT OF 
GeNERAL SESSIONS FOR 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
CASE NO. 89GS47 0: 004 
PLEA AGREEMENT 
AGREEMENT made this twentieth day of February, 1990, between 
• 
• 
and among the State of South Carolina, as represented by Attorney • 
General T. Travis Medlock and Chief Deputy Attorney General Cameron 
M. Currie; Solicitor c. Gordon McBride; the Defendant, Gary Evans 
Morrell, and his attorney, John C. Lindsay, si~, Es quire. 
IN CONSIDERATION of the mutual promises made herein, the 
parties hereto agree as follows: 
• 
1. The Defendant, Gary Evans Morr ~ ll, agrees to plead guilty ~ 
"\ . . . . (b)(!) ,a..e_~~ • 
-~ .... ~~ o one ( 1) count of v~olat~ng Sect~on 44-52-370re) ( 6) 1 b I !TI (first H' yy\ 
~ offense), Code of .Laws of SouthCarolina 11976), as amended,Je.g. rc \~ -po.s~<:~i0•1 LU•'H"' 11'\i-e,.H- +oct._lsfttbu-le.. .~! t'' : ~. 6, 
t~a£ f ..:.cl<::b!g--in-t:o<::aine-~went-y-eigh.t-grams.-oi:.-Jno .. e.,-but:-±ess-tha~ 
l'Ylore_ 'f-i,an I 0 5ra} n~ of co~a_t ne. .:l.D 
one-hundred-grams·), a lesser ~ncluded offense of Count ~ of the 
Superseding Indictment. The Defendant understands that the offense 
. 
to which he agrees to plead guilty provides for a sentence of not 
.f; If~ -t'h i ,-i-l( 
less than seven years nor more than ~~ £i'"e years imprisonment, 
(7r-
-no-p~t-of-wh~ch-m~e-suspendea-nol probation grante~ Etft4 a fine 
no+ ,.,., ore.. 'H'"Ia...n or bo+h, 
of1Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,00'J.OO)) The Attorneys for the 
State agree to dismiss the r~mainin.g counts of the Superseding 
Indictment against the Defendant at the time of sentencing. 
2. The Defendant, Gary Evans Morrell, agrees to fully and 
truthfully cooperate with the Ofiice of the Attorney General of 
I I 
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• 
South Carolina and local, state and federal law enforcement agents 
in their investigation of the importation, possession, and 
distribution of controlled substances and related unlawful 
act ivities. This cooperation is to include, but is not limited to, 
truthful and .complete debriefings of the Defendant's knowledge 
concerning unlawful drug activities and related unlawful ac-
tivities. Also, the Defendan t understands that he must f ully 
disclose and provide truthful information to the State including 
any books, papers, or documents or any other items of evidentiary 
value to the investigation. The Defendant must also testify fully 
and truthfully before any grand juries and at any trials or other 
proceedings if called upon to do so by the State, subject to 
prosecution for perjury for not testifying truthfully. The failure 
of the Defendant to be truthful or to cooperate at any stage can 
cause the State's obligations under this Agreement to become null 
and void. Further, it is expressly agreed that if the State's 
obligations under this Agre ement become null and void due to the 
lack of truthfulness or cooperation on the part of the Defendant, 
the Defendant understands that: ( 1) the Defendant will not be 
permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty to the offenses described 
above; (2) any and all additional charges known to the State may 
be filed in the appropriate county; (3) the State may argue for a 
maximum sentence for the offenses to which the Defendant has pled 
guilty; (4) the State may use any and all information and testimony 
provided by the Defendant in the prosecution of the Defendant for 
all charges; and ( 5) the State may advise the South Carolina 
2 
( • • \ ')I, 
l, ... 
1'· 
Department of Corrections of the Defendant's status as an un-
cooperative defendant and may accordingly recommend redesignation 
of the Defendant to a higher custodial level. 
3. The Defendant, Gary Evans Morrell, understands and agrees 
that any and all assets or pc~tions thereof acquired or obtained 
as a result of illegal trafficking in drugs shall be surrendered 
to the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED), and/or other 
• 
• 
• 
law enforcement related organizations in South Carolina to be e 
designated by the Attorney General, in portions to be determined 
by the Attorney General. The assets so surrendered will be 
disposed of according to South Carolina law. The assets to be 
~ ' I~ ; 
• 
surrendered include, but are not limited to, · cash, stocks, bonds, 
certificates of deposit, personal property, and real estate. 
Further, the Defendant agrees to fully assist the Office of the 
Attorney General and SLED in the recovery and return to SLED, • 
and / or other designated law enforcement agencies in South Carolina 
of any drug-related assets or portions thereof, either domestic or 
foreign, which have been acquired or obtained either indirectly or e 
directly through unlawful drug activities. The Defendant mus '-
prevent the disbursement and immediately and voluntarily surrender 
to the Office of the Attorney Gener~l, SLED, and/or other desig-
• 
nated law enforcement agencies in South Carolina all other domestic 
and foreign assets in which he has any direct or indirect interest 
or control, if the assets are the proceeds of unlawful drug 
activities or are directly or indirectly related to the unlawful e 
drug activities. The Defendant further agrees to immediately and 
3 
•• 
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voluntarily surrender to the Office of the Attorney General, SLED, 
and / or other designated law enforcement agencies in South Carolina, 
in portions to be determined by the Attorney General, all convey-
ances, including but not limited to, aircraft, vehicles, or 
vessels, which have been used or were intended for use, to 
t=ansport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, 
receipt, possession, or concealment of controlled substances. 
4. The Defendant, Gary Evans Morrell, further agrees to 
submit to polygraph examination(s) by any qualified state polygraph 
examiner should he be requested to do so regarding his knowledge 
of and involvement in drug-related activities, other related 
unlawful activities, and any and all assets and conveyances 
acquired and/or used by the. Defendant or others, whether drug-
related or not. This plea agreement is expressly contingent upon 
succGssful completion, to the State's satisfaction, of the 
polygraph examination(s). 
5. The Attorneys for the State agree not to prosecute the 
Defendant, Gary Evans Morrell, for other offenses committed prior 
to the date of this Agreement in the State of South Carolina which 
are of the same or similar character as those cited herein, or for 
other offenses committed prior to the date of this Agreement in the 
State of South Carolina, which are based on the same act or 
transaction or constitute a part of a common scheme or plan as 
those cited herein. 
6. The Attorneys for the State agree not to take a position on 
what sentence should be imposed; however, the parties hereto 
4 
I I 
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understand that any request by the Defendant, Gary Evans Morrell, 
for a particular sentence shall not be binding upon the Court, and 
that the Defendant has no right to withdraw his plea regardless of 
the sentence imposed by the Court. 
7 . The Attorneys for the State reserv e the right to speak to 
the Court at the time of sentencing. 
8. The Attorneys for the State agree to recorrunend to any 
United States Attorney or other State or local prosecutor that the 
Defendant, Gary Evans Morrell, not be prosecuted for any similar 
crimes occurring in the District of South Carolina or any other 
District or this or other states prior . to the date of this 
Agreement, so long as the Defendant, Gary Evans Morrell, continues 
to cooperate with any law enforcement agency interested in the 
information he possesses. 
9. The Att~rneys for the State r~serve the right to summarize 
all evidence which would have been presented at trial to establish 
a factual basis for the plea. 
10. The Attorneys for the State agree to advise any Court or 
other authority of the extent and value of the Defendant's 
cooperation if called upon to do so by the Defendant. 
11. The Defendant, Gary Evans Morrell, understands that the 
• 
• 
r 
•• ( 
• 
• 
State's obligations under this Plea Agreement are expressly e 
contingent upon the Defendant's abiding by s t ate and federal laws 
and complying with the terms and conditions of any bond executed 
in this case. 
12. The parties hereby agree that this Plea Agreement • 
5 
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• 
• 
• 
supersedes all prior promises, representations and statements of 
the parties; that this Agreement may be modified only in writing 
signed by all parties; and that any and all other promises, 
representations and statements, whether made prior to or after this 
Agreement, are . null and void. 
d- -~o ~ 9o 
DATE 
~- @o -9o 
DATE 
DATE 
DATE 
t(l 
T. TRAVIS MEDLOCK 
Atto/l General· 
By ,G t-tr..L'-<cor-. __ .tf) 1. {{,__<,.. . .,_~C. 
Cameron M. Currie 
Chief Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, State Grand Jury Sectivn 
C. Gordon McBride 
Solicitor, Fourth Circuit 
6 
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COUNTY OF DARLINGTON 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
T. TRAVIS MEDLOCK, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL, STATE OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA, 
PLAINTIFF, 
V . 
0 R D E R SIXTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED 
TWEN~: DOLLARS ($16,120.00) 
UNIT ED STATES CURRENCY, 
A N D J U D G M E N T 
DEFENDANT. 
The State of South Carolina filed the instant Complaint on 
August 21, 1990, seeking forfeiture of Sixteen Thousand One Hundred 
Twenty Dollars ($16,120.00) United States currency. Sheila W. 
Morrell, through counsel, was served with a copy of the Summons and 
Complaint, in that the State had been advised that she was claiming 
an interest in such monies. The attorney for Sheila Morrell, James 
C. Cox, Esquire, has advised that Mrs. Morrell does not have an 
interest in the Sixteen Thousand One Hundred Twenty Dollars 
($16,120.00) United States currency. Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED that this action shall proceed against the Sixteen 
Thousand One Hundred Twenty Dollars ( $16,120.00) United States 
currency and that no claim against such currency shall be filed by 
or on behalf of Sheila Morrell. 
SO ORDERED. 
.. , 
DON S. RUSHING 
CIRCUir JUDGE 
' I 
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e Columbia, South Carolina 
u;:;~ )2/, e~ 
e Cameron M. Currie 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Chief Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, State Grand Jury Section 
I CONSENT: 
) 
2 
I I 
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. ~ 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have, on this 22nd day of March, 1991, 
served the State's MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on the putative 
owner of the defendant property by Placing a copy in the United 
States Mail, first class, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Chuck Lindsay, Esquire 
Post Office Box 250 
Bennettsville, South Carolina 29512 
who is counsel for the putative owner. 
Tracy A. Meyers 
Law Clerk, Attorney General's Office 
State Grand Jury Section 
( y) 31 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
CO UN TY OF RICHLAND 
J ames c. Anders, Sol i citor) 
Fi ft h Judic i a l Circu i t , 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
PLAINTIFFS ANSWER TO DEFENDANT ' S 
INTERROGATORIES 
90-CP-40-5147 
Two Thousand Two Hundred 
Twenty-Five Dollars, 
Taurus 9MM Pistol, Serial 
#TIC6885; ROMO 22 Caliber 
Revolver, Serial i396324; 
.. ) 
H & R 22 Caliber Revolver,) 
Serial #K26398 and Callie ) 
Metze, an Interested Party) 
) 
Defendant . ) 
- · J 
YOU ARE HEREBY served with the following Answers to Defendant's 
I nterrogatories answered separately and in writing, pursuant to and in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 33 of the South Carolina Rules of 
Ci v i l Procedure . 
_.., 
1. Give the names and addresses of persons known to the Plaintiff or 
counsel t o be witnesses concerning the facts of the case and i ndicate 
whether or not written or recorded statements have been taken from the 
witnesses and indicate who has possession of such statements. 
Witnesses known to the Plaintiff are as follows: Agent Ken Porter, 
Richland County Sheriff's Department, written statement in the ~ossession of 
Elizabeth Hancock, Assistant Solicitor; Agent Andy Jones, Richland County 
Sheriff's Department, written statement in the possession of Elizabeth 
Hancock, Assistant Solicitor; David Freels, Richland County Sheriff's 
Department, written statement in the possession of Elizabeth Hancock, 
Assistant Solicitor; Tommy Griffin, Richland County Sheriff's Department, 
(z) 1 
• 
written statement in the possession of Elizabeth Hancock, Assistant 
• Solic i t o r; Dan Lane , Richland County Sheriff's Department, written statement 
i n the possess i on of Elizabeth Hancock, Assistant Solic i tor . 
2. Gi ve t he names and addresses of persons known to the Plaintiff or 
counsel to be wi tnesses who establish the origin or source of the Two • 
~housand Two H ~ndred Twenty-Five Dollars as der i ved from i l legal drug 
transactions. 
Witnesses known to the Plaintiff are as follows: Agent Ken Porter, 
• 
Richland County Sheriff's Depar~ment; Agent Andy Jones, Richland County 
Sheriff's Department; Agent David Freels, Richland County Sheriff's 
Department; Agent Tommy Griffin, Richland County Sheriff's Department; and 
• Agent Dar. Lane, Richland County Sheriff's Department. 
3. Give the names and addresses of persons known to the Plaintiff or 
counsel who establish that the seized/forfeited weapons have been used or 
are connected with illegal drug transactions or were purchased with illegal • 
drug proceeds. 
The names of said persons are as follows: Agent Ken Porter, Richland 
County Sheriff's Department; Agent Andy Jones, Richland County Sheriff's 
• 
Department; Agent David Freels, Richland County Sheriff's De artment; Agen t 
Tommy Griffin, Richland County Sheriff's Department; and Agent Dan Lane, 
Richland County Sher i f f ' s Department. 
• 4. Give the names and addresses of any confidential informants who 
provided any information about the Defendant to law enforcement, or about 
drug transactions on the premises at 2130 Morninglo Lane in Columbia. 
Thi s information is protected under State v. Diamond, 280 S.C. 296, 
• 
312 S.E.2d 550, 1984. 
• 
( z) 2 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
5. Set forth a list of photographs, plats, sketches or other prepared 
doc uments in possession of the Defendant or his counsel that relate to the 
c l aim in this case. 
None . 
6. List the names and addresses of any expert witnesses whom the party 
pr ~poses to use as a witness at the trial of the case. 
None. 
7. For each person known to the parties or counsel to be a witness 
concerning the facts of the case including persons indicated in answers to 
interrogatories 1, 2, 3, or 6, set forth either a summary sufficient to 
inform the other party of the important facts known to or observed by such 
wit~ess, or provide a copy of any written or recorded sta t ements taker. from 
such witnesses. 
See attached . 
1~ /{' 1991 
Columbia, South Carolina 
' Z:~Gr\~ Elizab h M. Hancock 
Assistant Solicitor 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
James C. Anders, Solicitor) 
Fifth Judicial Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
Two Thousand Two Hundred 
Twenty-Five Dollars 
($2,225.00) in U. s. Cur-
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
rency; Taurus 9HM Pistol, ) 
Serial ~TIC6885, ROMO 22 ) 
Caliber Revolver, Serial ) 
#396324; H & R 22 Caliber ) 
Revolver, Serial #K26398 ) 
and Callie Metze, an 
Interested Par~y, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS TO DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
90-CP-40-5147 
. ) 
The Plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 36 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil 
PrGcedure, hereby admits, for the purpose of the pending action only, the 
following: 
l. The State has no witness who can testify of his/her personal 
knowledge that the source of the seized/forfeited Two Thousand Two Hundred 
Twenty-Five Dollars ($2,225.00) is derived from an illegal drug transaction, 
nor that the funds were to be used to purchase illegal drugs. 
Plaintiff admits. 
2. The State has no witnesses who can testify of his/her personal 
knowledge that the seized/forfeited weapons have been used in an illegal 
drug transaction, nor were obtained with illegal drug proceeds. 
The seized/forfeited weapons are tools of the trade used in drug 
transactions with which Callie Metze was charged . 
3. The Defendant made no statement to any law enforcement officer or 
drug agent indicating that the Two Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-Five Dollars 
(aa) 1 
($2,225.00) was from an illegal drug transaction, or was to be used for the 
purchase of illegal drugs. 
Plaintiff admits. 
4. The Defendant made no statement to any law enforcement officer or 
agent indicating that the seized/forfeited weapons were utilized by him in 
any illegal drug transaction or obtained by him from illegal d=ug p=oceeds. 
Plaintiff admits. 
5. Callie Metze was in constructive possession of any of the 
seized/forfeited weapons at the time of the incidents alleged in arrest 
warrants C 666234 and C 666221. 
Plaintiff admits. 
ILk_ s u...L-v--
This ~day of~ 1991 
Columbia, South Carolina 
(aa) 2 
'8u ~ f{))+.k)J crck._ 
Elizab~h M. Hancock 
Assistant Solicitor, 5th Circuit 
P. o. Box 1987 
Columbia, SC 29202 
ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF KERSHAW 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as } 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial Circuit, } 
} 
Plaintiff, } 
} 
-vs- } 
} 
Approximately 20-30 pounds of mari-} 
juana, 150 marijuana stems, 49 } 
marijuana pods, 31 growing mari- } 
juana plants, Assorted ledgers and } 
paperwork relating to marijuana, } 
Irrigation equipment used to manu- } 
facture marijuana, High intensity } 
lights and timers used to manu- } 
facture marijuana, Book and records} 
associated with the manufacturing } 
of marijuana, Tribeam scales, } 
Plastic PVC pipe, Wood frames, } 
Assorted Hoses, Fittings, Tanks and} 
Pumps used for the manufacturing } 
of marijuana in residence, All that} 
certain piece, parcel or lot of } 
land lying and being in the County } 
of Kershaw, State gf South Carolina} 
containing one (1) acre, more or } 
less, and being bounded as follows:} 
NORTH by the Richards Road; EAST by} 
land of Mrs . F.J. Hay, now or } 
formerly; south by land of Mrs. } 
C.E. Richards now or formerly; and } 
WEST by land of Mrs. C.E. Richards } 
Parcel 2: All that certain piece, } 
parcel or lot of land, l y ing and } 
being situate in the Liberty Hill } 
Community, Kershaw County, South } 
Carolina, being more particularly } 
described as follows: BEGINNING at } 
an iron on the northeastern line 
of right of way for S.C. Highway 
No. 97, thence N 51-18 E 1,059.07 
feet to a stake; thence S 42-38 E 
1,817.5 feet to a cedar stake; 
thence s. 54-18 W 603 feet to a 
cedar; thence N 85-23 W 309.2 feet 
to a cedar stake; thense S 61-56 
W 435.1 feet to an iron on the 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
right of way line for S.C. Highway } 
No. 97; thence continuing with said} 
highway right of way line N 29-06 W} 
I I . 
.. 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
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PLAINTIFF'S no ..,· 0 
INTERROGATORIES TO DEFENI:fiUf~~ N :.--o ;z: ~6 
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I heN by certif;r that the foregoing i.s 
a true and e.xa ct copy of original on 
file in this offic-a. . . V ,#A ___ _ ~W• ;t{y(7~--· 
~ Matilda W. Goodson 
Clerk of Court 
Xershaw County, S.C. 
(bb) 1 
902.3 feet to a point; thence N 31-} 
09 W 102.4 feet to a point; thence } 
N 37-30 W 104.7 feet to a point; } 
thense N 43-18 W 104.5 feet to a } 
point; thence N 49-15 W 104.5 feet 
to a point; thence N 55-03 W 84.8 
feet to a point; thence .N 60-43 W 
105.0 feet to the point of begin-
ning. The above described Parce 2 
is shown and designated as a tract 
of 42.44 acres on plat entitled 
"Property of Stephen McCrae and 
Virginia L. McCrae" prepared by 
Tetterton & Riddick, Surveyors, 
dated October 12, 1977, recorded 
in the office of the Clerk of 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Court for Kershaw County in Plat } 
Book 36, at page 417. Parcel 3: } 
All that certain piece, parcel or } 
tract of land, with improvements } 
thereon, in Flat Rock Township, } 
Kershaw County, South Carolina, } 
partly within the unincorporated } 
limits of the Town of Liberty Hill,} 
containing thirty-two and three- } 
fourths (32 3/4) acres, and being } 
bounded as follows: NORTH by } 
property of Mrs. Fred Hay; EAST by } 
property of John G. Richards } 
Estate; SOUTH by Hancock lands; } 
and, WEST by property of Mrs. Lou } 
Johnson. The above described } 
Parcels 1, 2 and 3 are the same } 
conveyed to Rock Savage and } 
:: :-~.·!>,:" Elizabeth Chapman Savage by deed of} 
Virginia L. McCrae, John Richards } 
McRae and Stephen R. McCrae dated } 
April 22 , 1985, and recorded in the} 
office of the Clerk of Court for } 
Kershaw County in Book IV, at page } 
1693, on Apr i l 22, 1985. Subse- } 
quent thereto on February 2, 1988, } 
Elizabeth Chapman Savage conveyed } 
her interest in said property unto } 
Rock Savage, which deed was } 
recorded in the office of the Clerk} 
of Court for Kershaw County in } 
Book JA, at page 2952, also known } 
as 2305 Richards Lane, Liberty } 
Hill, South Carolina, 1987 Honda 4-} 
Door, VIN #JHMEC5827HS001533, 1972 } 
Chevrolet Custom Deluxe/20 Pickup, } 
VIN #CCE232Bl06214, 1982 Toyota } 
Land Cruiser 4WD, VIN #JT3FJ60G5C- } 
(bb) 2 
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0030725, Yanmar Tractor Model IYM2-} 
260, Serial #41770, Tore Riding } 
Lawnmower 8-32 Model 59111, Serial } 
#9001630, Winpower Tractor Driven } 
Aternator, Model #15/10PCTD, Serial} 
#890102-8, Marquette Model 10-120 } 
A.C. _Arc Welder, Serial #63233, } 
Makita Electric Planer Model #2030,} 
Serial t12735E, Lienbach Line Scoop} 
Pan for Tractor, Forklift for } 
Tractor, Post Hell Diggers, 3 Point} 
Hitch, Utility Trailer, Two-Wheel, } 
Fule Tank for Pick-Up Truck, Port- } 
able Air Tank, Delta Shapter 1HP, } 
Serial f86J42797, Whirlpool } 
Jacuzzi, Thompson Center Arms } 
Rochester, New Hampshire, Serial } 
#206887, Sportmaster Model 512-P } 
Remington .22 Short-Long Rifle, } 
Remington 870 Wingrnaster Magnum 12 } 
Gauge, Serial -tT854234M, Armi } 
Tanfoglio Giuseppe Made in Italy } 
Model GT 26, Serial tS10978, and } 
Rock Savage and Lida Savage, } 
Interested Parties, } 
} 
Defendant. } 
YOU ARE HEREBY served with the following interrogatories to be answered 
separately and in writing by the above-named Defendant within thirty (30) days 
from the date of service hereof, pursuant to and in accordance with the 
provisions of Rule 33 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. 
1. Give the names and addresses of persons known to the Defendant or 
counsel to be witnesses concerning the facts of the case and indicate whether or 
not written or recorded statements have been taken from the witnesses and 
indicate who has possession of such statements. 
2. Give the names and addresses of persons known to the Defendant or 
counsel who establish the origin or source of the funds used to purchase the 
Defendant residence, adjoining real property, Defendant vehicles, and other 
Defendant property. 
(bb) 3 
• 
3. Set forth a list of photographs, plats, sketches or other prepared 
documents in possession of the Defendant or counsel that relate to the claim in 
this case. 
4. List the names and addresses of any expert witnesses whom the party 
proposes to use as a witness at the trial of the case. 
5. For each person known to the parties or counsel to be a witness 
concerning the facts of the case including persons indicated in answers to 
interrogatories 1, 2, or 4 set forth either a summary sufficient to inform the 
other party of the important facts known to or observed by such witness, or 
provide a copy of any written or recorded statements taken from such witnesses. 
These interrogatories shall be deemed continuing so as to require 
supplemental answers if the parties see the need arises. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
' E~}z~~ Ha~'!l~fkw e ec& 
Assistant Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
P.O. Box 1987 
Columbia, SC 29202 
(803) 799-9075 
ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
This {a...f\- day of November, 1992 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF KERSHAW 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Approximately 20-30 pounds of mari-} 
juana, 150 marijuana stems, 49 } 
marijuana pods, 31 growing mari- } 
juana plants, Assorted ledgers and } 
paperwork relating to marijuana, } 
Irrigation equipment used to manu- } 
facture marijuana, High intensity } 
lights and timers used to manu- } 
facture marijuana, Book and records} 
associated with the manufacturing } 
of marijuana, Tribeam scales, } 
Plastic PVC pipe, Wood frames, } 
Assorted Hoses, Fittings, Tanks and} 
Pumps used for the manufacturing · } 
of marijuana. in residence, All that} 
certain piece, parcel or lot of } 
land lying and being in the County } 
of Kershaw, State of South Carolina} 
containing one (1) acre, more or } 
less, and being bounded as follows:} 
NORTH by the Richards Road; EAST by} 
land of Mrs. F.J. Hay, now or } 
formerly; south by land of Mrs. } 
C.E. Richards now or formerly; and } 
WEST by land of Mrs. C.E. Richards } 
Parcel 2: All that certain piece, } 
parcel or lot of land, lying and } 
being situate in the Liberty Hill } 
Community, Kershaw County, South } 
Carolina, being more particularly } 
described as follows: BEGINNING at } 
an iron on the northeastern line 
of right of way for S.C. Highway 
No. 97, thence N 51-18 E 1,059.07 
feet to a stake; thence S 42-38 E 
1,817.5 feet to a cedar stake; 
thence s. 54-18 W 603 feet to . a 
cedar; thence N 85-23 W 309.2 feet 
to a cedar stake; thense S 61-56 
W 435.1 feet to an iron on the 
right of way line for S.C. Highway 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
(cc) 1 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
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I hereby certify that ·the foregoing is 
a true and exact copy · of original on '· 
file 'in this office. · 
. ~ ~~ Y'1 a4"a ~ w. ,Ol · -
- M . ,.tild~ W . .. Gc.vd.Soll' · ··- · 
.......... , .. ... •·ctei'k of 'court 
, Kershaw County, S.C . 
No. 97; thence continuing with said} 
highway right of way line N 29-06 W} 
902.3 feet to a point; thence N 31-} 
09 W 102.4 feet to a point; thence } 
N 37-30 W 104;7 feet to a point; } 
thense N 43-18 W 104.5 feet to a } 
point; thence N 49-15 W_ 104.5 feet } 
to a point; thence N 55-03 W 84.8 } 
feet to a point; thence N 60-43 W } 
105.0 feet to the point of begin- } 
ning. The above described Parce 2 } 
is shown and designated as a tract } 
· of 42. 44 · acres ·on plat entitled · ; ·: } . ' 
· "Property of Stephen · McCrae and ··. ··:'' } _:' 
Virginia L. McCrae" prepared by ., · } 
Tetterton & Riddick, Surveyors, 
dated October 12, 1977, recorded 
in the office of the Clerk of 
} 
} 
} 
Court for Kershaw County in Plat } 
Book 36, at page 417. Parcel 3: } 
All that certain piece, parcel or } 
tract of land, with improvements } 
thereon, in Flat Rock Township, } 
Kershaw County, South Carolina, } 
partly within the unincorporated } 
limits of the Town of Liberty Hill,} 
containing thirty-two and three- } 
fourths (32 3/4) acres, and being } 
bounded as follows: NORTH by } 
property of Mrs. Fred Hay; EAST by } 
property of John G. Richards } 
Estate; SOUTH by Hancock lands; } 
and, WEST by property of Mrs. Lou } 
Johnson. The above described } 
Parcels 1, 2 and 3 are the same } 
conveyed to Rock Savage and } 
• Elizabeth Chapman Savage by deed of} 
Virginia L. McCrae, John Richards } 
McRae and Stephen R. McCrae dated } 
April 22, 1985, and recorded in the} 
office of the Clerk of Court for } 
Kershaw County in Book IV, at page } 
1693, on April 22, 1985. Subse- } 
quent thereto on February 2, 1988, } 
Elizabeth Chapman Savage conveyed } 
her interest in said property unto } 
Rock Savage, which deed was } 
recorded in the office of the Clerk} 
of Court for Kershaw County in } 
Book JA, at page 2952, also known } 
as 2305 Richards Lane, Liberty } 
Hill, South Carolina, 1987 Honda 4-} 
Door, VIN #JHMEC5827HS001533, 1972 } 
Chevrolet Custom Deluxe/20 Pickup, } 
(cc) 2 
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VIN ICCE232B106214, 1982 Toyota } 
Land Cruiser 4WD, VIN IJT3FJ60G5C- } 
0030725, Yanmar Tractor Model IYM2-} 
260, Serial #41770, Taro Riding } 
Lawnmower 8-32 Model 59111, Serial } 
19001630, Winpower Tractor Driven } 
Aternator, Model ll5/10PCTD, Serial} 
#890102-8, Marquette Model 10-120 } 
A.C. Arc Welder, Serial #63233, } 
Makita Electric Planer Model 12030,} 
Serial #12735E, Lienbach Line Scoop} 
Pan for Tractor, Forklift for } 
Tractor, Post Hall Diggers, 3 Point} 
Hitch, Utility Trailer, Two-Wheel, } 
Fule Tank for Pick-Up Truck, Port- } 
able Air Tank, Delta Shapter lHP, } 
Serial #86J42797, Whirlpool } 
Jacuzzi, Thompson Center Arms } 
Rochester, New Hampshire, Serial } 
#206887, Sportmaster Model 512-P } 
Remington .22 Short-Long Rifle, } 
Remington 870 Wingmaster Magnum 12 } 
Gauge, Serial #T854234M, Armi } 
Tanfoglio Giuseppe Made in Italy } 
Model GT 26, Serial #510978, and } 
Rock Savage and Lida Savage, } 
Interested Parties, } 
} 
Defendant. } 
The Plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 36 of the South Carolina Rules of 
Civil Procedure, hereby requests the Defendant to admit, for the purpose 
of the pending action only, the following: 
1. The claimant, Lida Savage, had knowledge that her husband, Rock 
Sav age, was growing marijuana in the basement of her residence, the 
Defendant property . 
2. The claimant, Lida savage, has no witnesses who can testify of 
his/her personal knowledge that the Defendant property was purchased with 
funds from a legitimate source. 
3. The claimant, Lida Savage, was in possession of marijuana on May 
11, 1992 • 
(cc) 3 
• 
~J~.DL:ilcweck. 
Assistant Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
1701 Main Street 
P.O. Box 1987 
Columbia, SC 29202 
(803) 799-9075 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
Columbia, South Carolina 
This ~~~ day of November, 1992. 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
COUNTY OF KERSHAW 
Richard A. Harpootlian as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Approximately 20-30 pounds of mari-} 
juana, 150 marijuana stems, 49 } 
marijuana pods, 31 growing mari- } 
juana plants, Assorted ledgers and } 
paperwork relating to marijuana, } 
Irrigation equipment used to manu- } 
facture marijuana, High intensity } 
lights and timers used to manu- } 
facture marijuana, Book and records} 
associated with the manufacturing } 
of marijuana, Tribeam scales, } 
Plastic PVC pipe, Wood frames, } 
Assorted Hoses, Fittings, Tanks and} 
Pumps used for the manufacturing } 
of marijuana in residence, All that} 
certain piece, parcel or lot of } 
land lying and being in the County } 
of Kershaw, State of South carolina} 
containing one (1) acre, more or } 
less, and being bounded as follows:} 
NORTH by the Richards Road; EAST by} 
land of Mrs. F.J. Hay, now or } 
formerly; south by land of Mrs. } 
C.E. Richards now or formerly; and } 
WEST by land of Mrs. C.E. Richards } 
Parcel 2: All that certain piece, 
parcel or lot of land, lying and 
being situate in the Liberty Hill 
Community, Kershaw County, South 
Carolina, being more particularly 
described as follows: BEGINNING at 
an iron on the northeastern line 
of right of way for S.C. Highway 
No. 97, thence N 51-18 E 1,059.07 
feet to a stake; thence S 42-38 E 
1,817.5 feet to a cedar stake; 
thence s. 54-18 W 603 feet to a 
cedar; thence N 85-23 W 309.2 feet 
to a cedar stake; thense s 61-56 
W 435.1 feet to an iron on the 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
right of way line for S.C. Highway } 
No. 97; thence continuing with said} 
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I hereby certify that the roregQing is 
a. true and exact copy of origi!l&l on 
file 1~ this office. ~~~~ Pl~¥1'-'·~----~-
. Uatild"- W-. _Goodson -
... - - · · Clerk -of Court 
Kershaw County, S.O. 
·· . ~-· ... ·-.. 
highway right of way line N 29-06 W} 
902.3 feet to a point; thence N 31-} 
09 W 102.4 feet to a point; thence } 
N 37-30 W 104.7 feet to a point; } 
thense N 43-18 W 104.5 feet to a } 
point; thence N 49-15 W 104.5 feet 
to a point; thence H 55-03 W 84.8 
feet to a point; thence N 60-43 W 
105.0 feet to the point of begin-
ning. The above described Parce 2 
is shown and designated as a tract 
of 42.44 acres on plat entitled 
"Property of Stephen McCrae and 
Virginia L. McCrae" prepared by 
Tetterton & Riddick, Surveyors, 
dated October 12, 1977, recorded 
in the office of the Clerk of 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Court for Kershaw County in Plat } 
Book 36, at page 417. Parcel 3: } 
All that certain piece, parcel or } 
tract of land, with improvements } 
thereon, in Flat Rock Township, } 
Kershaw County, South Carolina, } 
partly within the unincorporated } 
limits of the Town of Liberty Hill,} 
containing thirty-two and three- } 
fourths (32 3/4) acres, and being } 
bounded as follows: NORTH by } 
property of Mrs. Fred Hay; EAST by } 
property of John G. Richards · } 
Estate; SOUTH by Hancock lands; 
and, WEST by property of Mrs. Lou 
Johnson. The above described 
Parcels 1, 2 and 3 are the same 
} 
} 
} 
} 
conveyed to Rock Savage and } 
Elizabeth Chapman Savage by deed of} 
Virginia L. McCrae, John Richards } 
McRae and Stephen R. McCrae dated } 
April 22, 1985, and recorded in the} 
bffice of the Clerk of Court for } 
Kershaw County in Book IV, at page } 
1693, on April 22, 1985. Subse- } 
quent thereto on February 2, 1988, } 
Elizabeth Chapman Savage conveyed } 
her interest in said property unto } 
Rock Savage, which deed was } 
recorded in the office of the Clerk} 
of Court for Kershaw County in } 
· . Book JA, at page 2952, also known } 
as 2305 Richards Lane, Liberty } 
Hill, South Carolina, 1987 Honda 4-} 
Door, VIN #JHMEC5827HS001533, 1972 } 
Chevrolet Custom Deluxe/20 Pickup, } 
VIN #CCE232B106214, 1982 Toyota } 
(tiel) 2 
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Land Cruiser 4WD, VIN #JT3FJ60G5C- } 
0030725, Yanmar Tractor Model tYM2-} 
260, Serial #41770, Taro Riding } 
Lawnmower 8-32 Model 59111, Serial } 
#9001630, Winpower Tractor Driven } 
Aternator, Model t15/10PCTD, Serial} 
_ #.890102-8, Marquette Model 10-120 } 
A.C. Arc Welder, Serial #63233, } 
Makita Electric Planer Model #2030,} 
Serial #12735E, Lienbach Line Scoop} 
Pan for Tractor, Forklift for } 
Tractor, Post Hall Diggers, 3 Point} 
I 
I . 
I • 
-.~-;\ Hitch, ·Utility Trailer, Two-Wheel, } _ 
·:".5}~ Fule Tank : for · Pick-Up Truck, Port- } .. . '," ' '·" ~ .... .. .. . 
',\ . :' able Air Tank, Delta Shapter lHP, } 
~~. '• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Serial t86J42797, Whirlpool } 
Jacuzzi, Thompson Center Arms 
Rochester, New Hampshire, Serial 
#206887, Sportmaster Model 512-P 
Remington .22 Short-Long Rifle, 
Remington 870 Wingmaster Magnum 12 
Gauge, Serial #T854234M, Armi 
Tanfoglio Giuseppe Made in Italy 
Model GT 26, Serial #S10978, and 
Rock Savage and Lida Savage, 
Interested Parties, 
Defendant. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
TO: William Tetterton, Attorney for Lida Savage, Owner of Defendant 
Property: 
THE PLAINTIFF hereby requests that the defendant above-named produce and 
permit the inspection, copying and/or photographing of the following documents 
pursuant to Circuit Court Rule 34. Production is to be made within thirty (30) 
days at the Richland County Solicitor's Office, 1701 Main Street, Columbia, 
South Carolina 29201. 
1. All income tax records you may have in your possession or under your 
control or which you may have access to, such records to include both State and 
Federal Returns and W-2 and/or similar forms, for the years 1991, 1990, 1989, 
and 1988. 
2. Any and all bank records both foreign and domestic in your possession, 
or control or which you may have access to, such records to include but not be 
(dd) 3 
'' ,_-
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I 
limited to, account numbers, b a nk withdrawal and deposit slips, bank s tatements, 
account histories, signature cards, money orders, date and time and location of . . . 
all deposits made by you at any banking or financial institution, or in any 
account, including any account for the business known as the Camden Raw Bar, and 
the date and time and location of all withdrawals made by you at any banking or 
financial institution from any account; copies of any signature card upon which 
you have signed your name or the name of another, such records or documents from 
any banking or financial institution to be from the years 1992, 1991, 1990, 
. 1989, and 1988. 
3. Any and all copies of and/or originals of cancelled checks or mo ney 
orders, which you may have or may have had control over, access to, from any 
account, including an account for the business known as the Camden Raw Bar, in 
. any banking or financial institution, for the years 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989, and 
1988. 
4. Any and all records pertaining to any safety deposit box held, 
maintained or controlled by you, or which you may have access to. 
5. Any and all records pertaining to taxes paid on any property, both real 
and personal, which you may have owned, or do now own or control, for the years 
1992, 1991, 1990 1989, and 1988. 
6. Any and all documentation pertaining to any stocks, bonds and/or 
certificates which you may control or maintain, or which you may have purchased 
or cause to have been purchased. 
7. Title to any property, be it real or personal, which you may own, 
control or which you have purchased or caused to have been purchased, such 
property or titles to include but not limited to improved and/or unimproved 
parcels or lots of lands, automobiles, conveyances, equipment, boats and/or 
planes. 
(dd) 4 
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8. A listing of all places of business that you have been employed by, -. : : .:~::::~ .. ;..-
. ·-,;,. :.;_ ..... -~- :.-.. ... 
such list to include the names and addresses of each respective employer, -place ': ~~S '.': ' 
of employment. 
9. The name of any person, company, venture or enterprise with which you __ 
may have done business, contracted or subcontracted with, all within the past 
five (5) years. 
10. The name of any company, business, venture or enterprise in which you 
may have an i nterest, all within the past five (5) years. 
11. Any and all documentation pertaining to Mortgage 91/265 dated May 15, 
1991, in the amount of $40,000 from Rock and Lida Savage to William s. 
Tetterton, Joseph N. Connell and William F. Nettles . 
12. Any and all documentation pertaining to Assignment 93/269 to James C. 
Anders dated May 27, 1992. 
November ~' 1992 
E£1~,tb m.~ 
Eliza th M. Hancock · 
Assistant Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
1701 Main Street 
Columbia, SC 29201 
(dd) 5 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF KERSHAW 
RICHARD A. 
Solicitor, 
Circuit, 
HARPOOTLIAN, as) 
Fifth Judicial ) 
) 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
--
--' . ~ 
.- l 
'--
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICt C. I 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
.. - . --
--' 
-vs -
Approximately 20-30 pounds) 
of marijuana, et al., ) 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
--< ~- -- . 
~-~~ :~~ ~ 
92- CP- 28 - 394 () -. 
CJ 
I hereby certify that on November 12, 1992, I ma i led a copy of 
the Plaintiff's Interrogatories to Defendant, Plaintiff's Request 
for Admission, and Plaintiff's Request for Production in the above -
referenced actilon by placing a copy of the same in the United 
States mail in Columbia, South Caro l ina, postage prepaid, upon the 
persons named below, at the addresses given below . 
William S . Tetterton, Esquire 
608 Lafayette Avenue 
Camden, SC 29020 
James C. Anders, Esquire 
P.O. Box 7014 
Columbi a, SC 29 202 
}~~ SWORN TO before me this ~ 
day of December, 1992. 
L;} '6drw~ NOTAR~ FOR SOUTH CAROLINA 
My Commission Expires: NoJ d-§ 
1 
I}Si 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
James c. Anders, 
as Solicitor, Fifth 
Judicial Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
1979 Chevrolet Corvette 
VIN 1Z879S403842; 1981 
Chevrolet Truck, VIN 
1GCDC14H7BS184617; 1985 
BMW 318i, VIN WBAAC7409-
F0677021; 1988 Yamaha 
Motorcycle, VIN JYA2VE06-) 
KA019005; 1971 Chevrolet ) 
Corvette, VIN 194371Sll- ) 
9108; and Six Thouand ) 
Fifty Dollars ($6,050.00)) 
in u. s. Currency and ) 
Thomas Lancour, an 
Interested Party, 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant(s). ) 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITim/:;'2 '-0 
... , .... 
CIVIL ACTION No • 
f<'c p . 
r..i? . 
C:.n (fl 
. C • 
(~ 
-~ 
-~ 
TO: WAYNE FLOYD, Attorney for the Defendant 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 27, 1991 at 2:00 
o'clock P.M., the attorney for the Plaintiff will take the deposition 
on oral examination of Thomas Lancour. Said deposition will be taken 
a t t he Richland County Solicitor's Office, 1701 Main Street, Third 
Floor, Columbia, South Carolina, 29201, and will be taken before a duly 
qualified court reporter. The deposition will continue from day to day 
until completed. 
You are invited to be present and take such part as is fit and 
proper. 
(ff) 1 
( . 
Columbia, South Carolina 
March /~ , 1991 
(££) 2 
t~~- m.tkM~tt:h ElizabehM. Hancock 
Assistant Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
James c. Anders as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial) 
Circuit, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
1979 Chevrolet Corvette ) 
VIN 1Z879S403842; 1981 ) 
Chevrolet Truck, VIN ) 
1GCDC14H7BS184617; 1985 ) 
BMW 318i, VIN WBAAC7409- ) 
F0677021; 1988 Yamaha ) 
Motorcycle, VIN JYA2VE06-) 
KA019005; 1971 Chevrolet ) 
Corvette, VIN 194371S11- ) 
9108; Six Thousand Fifty ) 
Dollars ($6,050.00) in ) 
u.s. Currency and Thomas 
Lancour, an Interested 
Party, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
rn 
Docket No. 90-CP-40-49 ?,_4 \..0 
.C? ~S ~ ::;; ~717 :~-,f~· ;;o ("') ~:;::r .,_'Jt~ 
t . :;::. .. co r-Ro p 
:::;) . 
-o rn <:n c.n :;r 
• (""J ry 0 0 
- ; N 
-1 
-
PERSONALLY, appeared before me, Julie Desrochers, who first being 
sworn deposes and says that she is employed as secretary at the Fifth 
Judicial Circuit Solicitor's Office and that on March 18, 1991, she 
served the Attorney for the Defendant Thomas Lancour with a copy of 
the attached Not i ce o f Deposition by United States Mail, postage 
prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Wayne Floyd 
P. o. Box 3972 
w4_~olumbia, sc 29171-3972 
She also says that she is not a party in this action nor does she 
have any interest in it . 
(gg ) 1 
r 
, .J" 
. ~· ·.• 
·· ::.:-:-. 
. _-r,;. 
. ~ . ·_ .. 
. .. , . 
.. ~ - , . 
SWORN before me this / f5 i{. 
day of March, 1991. 
sO~~~ 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR so~6kRoLINA 
My Commission Expires: ')· tX 1f- 9lf 
(gg) 2 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. 
Solicitor, 
Circuit, 
Harpootlian as) 
Fifth Judicial) 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
1979 Chevrolet Corvette 
VIN 1Z879S40382; 1981 
Chevrolet Truck, VIN 
1GCDC14H7BS184617; 1985 
) 
) 
. ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) BMW 318i, VIN 
WBAAC7409F0677021; 1988 ) 
Yamaha Motorcycle, VIN ) 
JYA2VE06KA019005; 1971 ) 
Chevrolet Corvette, VIN 
194371S119108; and Six 
Thousand Fifty Dollars 
($6,050.00) in u.s. 
Currency and Thomas 
Lancour, an Interested 
Party, 
Defendant(s) • 
TOt THOMAS LANCOUR 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
civil Action No. -----------
YOU ARE REQUIRED to appear in person in Courtroom 2E on the Second 
Floor of the Richland County Judicial Center, 1701 Main Street, 
Columbia, South Carolina at 2t00 P.M. on August 13, 1991, and bring 
with you all income tax records you may have in your possession or 
under your control or which you may have access to, such records to 
include both State and Federal ·Returns and W-2 and/or similar forms, 
for the years 1990, 1989, 1988, and 1987; you are also to bring any and 
all bank records both foreign and domestic in your possession, or 
control or which you may have access to, such records to include but 
not be limited to, account numbers, bank withdrawal and deposit slips, 
bank statements, account histories, signature cards, money orders, data 
and time and location of all deposits made by you at any banking or 
(hh) 1 
• 
financial institution, or in any account, and the date and time and 
• location of all withdrawals made by you at any banking or financial 
institution from any account; copies of any signature card upon which 
you have signed your name or the name of another, such records or 
documents from any banking or financial institution to be from the • 
years 1991, 1990, 1989, 1988, and 1987; you are also to bring with you 
any and all copies of and/or originals of cancelled checks or money 
orders, which you may have or may have had control over, access to, 
• 
from any account in any banking or financial institution, for the years 
1991, 1990, 1989 1 1988, and ~987; you are also to bring all records 
pertaining to any safety deposit box held, maintained or controlled by 
• you, or which you may have access to, and all records pertaining to 
taxes paid on any property, both real and personal, which you may have 
owned, or do now own or control, for the years 1991, 1990, 1989, 1988, 
and 1987; you are also to bring any and all documentation pertaining to e 
any stocks, bonds and/or certificates which you may control or 
maintain, or which you may have purchased or cause to have been 
purchased; you are also to bring with you any and all copies of 
• gasoline credit card receipts and any and all gas credit cards which 
you may have or may have had control over, access to, such records to 
be from the years 1991, 1990, 1989, 1988, and 1987; you are also to 
bring with you any and all bank cards and receipts which you may have • 
used while driving a vehicle, such records to be from the years 1991, 
1990, 1989, 1988 and 1987; ydu are also to bring ~he title to any 
property, be it real or p~rsonal, which you may own, control or which 
• you have purchased or caused to have been purchased, such property or 
titles to include but not limited to improved and/or unimproved parcels 
(hh) 2 • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
or lots of lands, automobiles, conveyances, equipment, boats and/or 
planes7 you are also to bring any information pertaining to any other 
automobiles or conveyances which may be owned by any member of your 
family and which may or may not have been used by you. Further, you 
are to bring a listing of all places of business that you have been 
employed by, such list to include the names and addresses of each 
respective employer, place of employment, and you are to bring the name 
of any person, company, venture or enterprise with which you may have 
done business, contracted or subcontracted with, all within the past 
five (5) years. 
This Subpoena Duces Tecum is issued on behalf of the Plaintiff, 
pursuant to Rules 45 and 26 of the South carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure • 
Columbia, South Carolina 
August ____ , 1991 
Elizabeth M. Hancock 
Assistant Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
1701 Main Street 
Columbia, sc 29201 
(hh) 3 
BARBARA A. SCOTT, Clerk of Court 
Richland County 
,. ' .. . . -
• STATE or SOUTH CAROLINA ) ' . IN THE COURT 
) 
.. ' 
or GENERAL SESSIONS 
v. ) NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
) 
) CASE NUHBER: 
) l...::l 
) 
-
C• 
\ • ) -.. 
) \ 
) · :J 
14~ ) ' ) ORDER :. ) . " 
- ) C. '": • ) ·::::l 
) 
' 
) 
) 
" 
) 
' ) 
• ) 
DEFENDANTS. ) ' 
) 
This matter is before the Court on a Rule to Show Cause 
• 
directed to the South Carolina Tax Commission. The 
Solicitor's Drug Strike Force, in conjunction with the 
Charleston County Police Depart~ent has been conducting \ • an inveitigation o:f orgariized narcotics trif!icking in the 
Hollywood area of the Coun-cy o:f Charleston; 
· The primary target~ of -chis investigation are: 
• 
I 
., 
• 
• 
(ii) 1 
. ·/ 
. . / 
. I 
/ 
• 
• 
• 
.. 
. ' 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
All of the above named individuals were . indic~ed by 
the Grand Jury of Charles~on County for trafficking in 
cocaine and all of them have be~n arrested with t~e 
exception of ••••• IJwho remains a fugitive. 
The investigation to date has established that such 
persons have been and are dealing in sums of cash money 
which far exceed any sums which could hav~·been derived from 
legitimate sources. 
It has ~rso been deter=ined that these indivi~~als 
have purchased substan~ial assets such as legitimate 
businesses, real proper~y, automobiles and other personal 
property in the names of nominees and through the use of 
non-recorded property transfers. 
In order to . more fully investigate this aspec~ of the 
crime it is nec~~sary to conduct an investigation into the 
financial affairs of the above-named individuals. 
Consequently, the Solicitor's Office seeks access to 
records of the South Carolina Tax Commission which reflect 
the amounts ot ' income and source. of income reported . by the 
following individuals and for the tax years specified 
belOW! 
I 
I 
Tax Years Name and .a.ddress 
(ii) 2 
/ 
' '\ 
' 
/ 
,, '·; ./ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
., 
I 
The . Solicitor's Office has been informed that the South 
Carolina Tax Commission will release the requested records 
for purposes of the ongoing investigation upon an Order of 
the Court which li:its their use to the instant 
.. investigation; imposes a duty of confidentiality upon those 
. individuals having access to the requested records; and 
absolves the South Carolina Tax Commission of any liability 
for such rel 'ease .· . 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED the South Carolina Tax 
Commission provide 
, requeste~ above. 
WILLIAM L. HOWAR 
CHIEF ADHINISTR 
NINTH JUDICIAL 
Charleston, South Carolina 
Dated:~~ , 1990. 
(ii) 3 
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IN 'mE COURT 
OF GZNERAL SESSIONS 
NINTH JUDI CIA.L CIRCUIT 
CASE NUMBER: 
R'O"L:E TO SHOW CAUSE 
c 
-< 
l 
- · c. 
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.... - · ... 
'' ,, 
' 
- .. -. I 
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Name and ;\ddb'=>Ss 
,. ·· ·: ·~~ ... - --:~..:---··- _.. ... ,. .............-;~ .. ~ . . - ·.-. -:--· 
-· _ .. , __ - -- - ·-------~ .. .. --. --.. . ·: .:; __ _ ,, · .. ... 
· -The Solicitor. of the Ninth . Judicial 
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.- ---·· ~ - -. -·· 
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WILLIAM L. HO/'TARD I \ 
CSIEF ADMINI§~TIVE JUDGZ 
NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
'SOUTH CAROLINA 
IN THE COUR 
OF GENERAL SESSI 
FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
Misc. No. rnt9-.:5G-~-s:-{0 
Investigation SGJ89-004 
PETITION FOR RULE TO SHOW CAUSE 
TO: THE HONORABLE EDWARD B. COTTINGHAM 
Now comes your Petitioner, 
of the State of South Carolina, and petitions the Court for a Rule 
to Show Cause. The •••••• is currently 
conducting an investigation of narcotics trafficking in the 
counties of York and Cherokee. 
The primary targets of this investigation are: 
The nvestigation indicates that there is 
probable cause to believe that the above individuals have been and 
are engaged trafficking in dilaudid, a Schedule II controlled 
substance, and cocaine and marihuana. The investigation to date 
has established that certain of these persons have been and are 
expending sums of cash money which far exceed any sums which could 
have been derived from legitimate sources. 
It is the intention of the o determine 
1 
(ii) 7 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• .1 • 
. . 
whether such sums have been derived from any legitimate source or 
whether such sums are in fact derived from drug trafficking as the 
evidence developed to date suggests . 
Consequently, • ••••• seeks records of the South 
Carolina Tax Commission which reflect the amount of income and 
source of income reported by the following individuals for the tax 
e years . specified below: 
Tax Years 
1983-88 
• 
1983-88 
1983-88 
• 
• 
1983-88 
• 1983-88 
1983-88 
• 
• 
Name and Address 
B acksburg, S. C. 2970~~ 
Gaffney, S. C. 
or 
y, 
or 
. 29702 
~- 29702 
. 29702 
or 
- burg, s. C. 
c. 29702 
or 
Kings Creek, s . c. 29719 
or 
2 
(ii) 8 
Social Security No. 
ATTEST~ 
TRUE • P.- (1~ . ~ 
• 
• 
1982-88 ---..:;:.. 
• 
1982-88 
Bowling Green, s. c. 
proceedings are secret, and disclosure of evidence 
• 
presented to th may only be made in accordance 
with South Carolina Code Ann. § 14-7-1720. 
Petitioner has been informed that the South Carolina Tax 
Commission will release the requested records, if any exist, to the • 
or purposes of the ongoing investigation upon an 
Order of the Presiding Judge of which 
specifically limits their use; imposes a duty of confidentiality • 
in accordance with th and absolves the South 
Carolina Tax Commission of any liability for such release. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court issue its Rule to 
• Show Cause why the South Carolina Tax Commission should not provide 
.. 
to the the records requested above; and Petitioner 
further prays that, in order to prevent disclosure of matters 
occurring before this Petition and the Order • 
for Rule to Show Cause be filed and kept under Seal .. lllllllllllll 
til otherwise ordered by this Court 
_ .. ~ .... 
pursuant to South Carolina Code Ann. § 14-7-1730. 
• Respectfully submitted, 
3 
• 
(ii) ~ 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
. . 
Columbia, South Carolina 
July 27 , 1989 
.• 
4 
(ii) 10 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
IN THE 
OF GENERAL SES 
FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
Misc. No./?] Y9- ~G-T-~ -S-( 
Investigation SGJ89-004 
ORDER FOR RULE TO SHOW CAUSE 
This matter came before me on Petition of 
of South Carolina for a Rule to Show Cause. 
~ of South Carolina is currently conducting an investigation of 
' narcotics trafficking in the counties of York and Cherokee. The 
primary targets of this investigation are: 
eeks access to records of th~ 
ch reflect the amount of income and 
source of income reported by the following individuals and 
businesses for the tax years specified below: 
• Tax Years Name and Address 
1983-88 
Blacksburg, S. C. 29702 
1983-88 
. 29702 
1983-88 
1 
(ii) 11 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
1983-88 
• 
1983-88 
Bowling Green, s. c . 
• secret, and disclosure of evidence 
presented to the y only be made in accordance 
with South Carolina Code Ann. § 14-7-1720. Accordingly, confiden-
• 
tiality of the information is appropriately assured . 
Petitioner has advised the Court that the South Carolina Tax 
Commission will release the requested records to the 
purposes of the ongoing investigation upon an Order of 
e this Court which specifically limits the use of the information; 
2 
• (ii) 12 
imposes a duty of confidentiality in accordance with th~ 
nd absolves the South Carolina Tax Commission of 
any liability for such release. 
Accordingly, it is hereby 
ORDERED that a representative of the 
1989, at Y: Oc) a. ~J and show cause, if any there be, why 
such records should not be ordered released to th 
as requested by the ; and it is 
FURTHER ORDERED that this Order and the Petition of the 
Attorney General be filed and kept under seal by the Clerk of the 
otherwise ordered by this Court pursuant to 
South Carolina Code ' Ann. § 14-7-1730; and it is 
FURTHER ORDERED that the Attorney General shall serve a copy 
of this Order on th hich copy shall 
be maintained in a secure location by counsel for the 
...... and not disclosed to any person except as necessary to comply 
with this Order. 
SO ORDERED. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
July o{ j , 1989 
3 
(ii) 13 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
- - - - - - ----------------------------
• 
• Received by the 
July ..28._, 1989 . 
on~~' 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
4 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF GREENVILLE 
State of South Carolina, 
ex rel, Joseph J. Watson, 
Solicitor, Thirteenth 
Judicial Circuit 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
ORDER RESTORING CASES 
-CP-23-____ _ 
This case was struck from the trial calendar with leave to restore pursuant 
to Ru 1 e 40 (c) ( 3) , SCRCP. 
Upon payment of a filing fee the case shall be restored to the trial 
calendar. It shall be placed at the foot thereof with a new case number assigned. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
CHifF _JUDGE, THIRTEENTH JUQICIAL CIRCUli 
Greenville, South Carolina 
I certify that this case has not been struck more than once under Rul e 
40 (c) (3) and is being restored within one year from the date it was origina ll y 
struck. I further agree to notify all other lawyers and/or parties of this restoration 
within 10 days of todays date. 
ATIORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
DATE ---------
(jj) 1 
• 
• 
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• 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA } 
} 
} 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as } 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial Circuit} 
} 
Plaintiff, } 
} 
v. } 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Defendant. } 
TO: THE DEFENDANT ABOVE NAMED 
RULE TO SHOW CAUSE 
YOU ARE HEREBY ORDERED to appear before the Honorable 
-------------------------------
, Circuit Judge, in courtroom 
Richland County Judicial Center, 1701 Main Street, Columbia, South 
Carolina, on the ____ day of , 1990, at 
------
o'clock .m., or 
as soon thereafter as the following matters might be heard. 
DEFENDANT AND OWNERS ARE ORDERED to show cause, if you can, why an 
Order should not be issued forfeiting the defendant property fully 
described in the attached complaint to the State of South carolina 
pursuant to Section 44-53-530, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976) as 
amended, and why the other relief requested in the attached complaint 
should not be granted • 
LIENHOLDER IS ORDERED to show cause, if you can, why the lien of 
defendant property should survive or continue in force upon forfeiture 
of defendant property. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that defendant property was seized by , on 
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that the Court will inquire whether 
seized money, if any, was provided by law enforcement personnel to 
(kk) 1 
• 
purchase controlled substances and if so determined, will order the 
• money returned to the state or local entity furnishing money. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that forfeiture of defendant property will 
transfer title to the State of South Carolina or an appropriate public 
agency and all rights, privileges and interests in said property of all e 
other persons will be extinguished and ended except certain liens as 
provided in Section 44-53-586, Code of Laws of South Carolina {1976) as 
amended. 
AND IT IS SO ORDERED this ----- day of • 
Columbia, South Carolina 
(kk) 2 
PRESIDING JUDGE 
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
• 
• 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) 
) 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND ) 
James C. Anders, 
Solicitor, Fifth 
Circuit, 
as ) 
Judicial) 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
Eight Hundred Seventy 
Dollars ($870.00) in 
U. S. Currency, 
Defendant . 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL 
90-CP-40-3469 
It appears that no Answer has been filed by the Defendant and 
Plaintiff represents that the currency has been released by agreement. 
Therefore, upon motion of Plaintiff, 
IT IS ORDERED: 
The case, Anders v. Eight Hundred Seventy Dollars ($870.00), 
is hereby dismissed . 
IT IS SO ORDERED . 
Ernest J. Kinard 
Chief Administrative Judge 
Court of Common Pleas 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
Columbia, South Carolina 
This _______ day of January, 1991 
(11) 1 
L/J e 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
RICHARD A. HARPOOTLIAN, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
1980 2-Door Datsun 210, VIN 
KHLB310-599257; and Diane 
Massey, an Interested Party, 
Defendant. 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
ORDER FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
91-CP-40-1947 
This is a suit IN REM brought by the Solicitor for the Fifth Judicial 
Circuit as a civil proceeding under Section 44-53-530, Code of Laws of South 
Carolina, 1976, as amended. The suit asked for forfeiture of a 1980 2-Door 
Datsun 210, VIN KHLB310-599257 to the Columbia Police Department. The vehicle 
was seized by the Columbia Police Department on March 29, 1991, from one 
Diane Massey, believed to have been the owner of the vehicle under circumstances 
relating to illegal drugs. 
By affidavit of Laura Melbourne of the Columbia Police Department, it 
appears that Diane Massey was served by personal service with the Notice of 
Seizure and Hearing, Summons and Complaint on May 31, 1991. This affidavit is 
before me. 
It appears further from the affidavit of Elizabeth M. Hancock, Assistant 
Solicitor, that since the date of personal service by Laura Melbourne, on May 
31, 1991, no appearance, answer or after pleading, response or contact has been 
made by Diane Massey or anyone on her behalf. 
(mm) 1 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
It appears that more than thirty days have elapsed since service was made, 
there is a default, and Plaintiff is entitled to the forfeiture of a 1980 2-Door 
Datsun 210, VIN KHLB310-599257. 
Under Section 44-53-520 and 44-53-530, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 
1976, as amended, the property is subject to forfeiture to the Columbia Police 
Department as follows: 
1980 2-Door Datsun, 210, VIN KHLB310-599257, title and ownership 
to be transferred to the Columbia Police Department • 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment by default. 
2. A forfeiture is hereby declared of the 1980 2-Door Datsun, 210 
VIN KHLB310-599257, to be distributed as set forth above . 
3. Plaintiff may enter judgment accordingly. 
• PRESIDING JUDGE 
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
This day of July, 1991 
Columbia, South Carolina 
• 
• 
• 
• (mm) 2 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
1980 2-Door Datsun 210, VIN 
KHLB310-599257; and Diane 
Massey, an Interested Party, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
FIFTH JUD I CIAL CIRCUIT 
A F F I D A V I -
9 1-CP-40 -194 7 
PERSONALLY appears before me, a Notary Public, Elizabeth M. Hancock, who 
being duly sworn says: 
That she is an attorney serving as Ass i stant Solicitor. Affiant states on 
information and belief that the owner of the veh ic l e seized as shown is Diane 
Massey, that personal service by Laura Melbourne, was made on May 31, 1991, 
as shown in the attached affidavit of the Notice of Seizure and Hearing, 
Summons, and Complaint, and since the date above no Answer, Notice of 
Appearance, contact or other pleading o r response has b e en rece ived eit her by 
the IN REM defendant or by Diane Massey, o r o n their be h a lf , and Diane 
Massey is not a member of the military service. This affidavit states that 
there is a default and that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment by the Court in 
the amount to be distributed upon order of the Court. 
Elizabeth M. Hancock 
Assistant Solicitor 
(mm) 3 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
· '· 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
SWORN TO before me this 
day of July, 1991 . 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR SOUTH CAROLINA 
My Commission Expires: ____________ _ 
(mm) 4 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
Defendant. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
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} 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
CONSENT ORDER 
This IN REM proceeding is a forfeiture action brought pursuant to Article 
3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended. 
Plaintiff is the Solicitor for the Fifth Judicial Circuit. The defendant 
property 
was seized by officers of the Columbia Police Department in Columbia, South 
Carolina. The Defendant property is: 
controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributd, 
dispensed, or acquired in violation of Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 
44, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended; 
raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, 
or which have been positioned for use, in manufacturing, producing, 
compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any 
controlled substance in violation of Article 3; 
property which is used, or which has been positioned for use, 
as a container for controlled substances described in Article 3, 
all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are 
used, or which have been positioned for use, in manufacturing, 
producing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or 
exporting any controlled substances; 
property both real and personal, which in any manner is knowingly used 
to facilitate production, manufacturing, distribution, sale, importation, 
exportation, or trafficking in various controlled substances as defined 
in Article 3; 
books, records, and research products and materials, including 
formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data which are used, or which 
have been positioned for use, in violation of Article 3; 
conveyances including, but not limited to, trailers, aircraft, 
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1. 
motor vehicles, and watergoing vessels which are used or intended 
for use unlawfully to conceal, contain, or transport or facilitate 
the unlawful concealment, possession, containment, or transportation 
of controlled substances and their compounds, except as otherwise 
provided, must be forfeited to the State; 
property including, but not limited to, monies, negotiable 
instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or 
intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled 
substance, and all proceeds including, but not limited to, monies, 
and real and personal property traceable to any exchange; 
monies seized in close proximity to forfeitable controlled 
substances, drug manufacturing, or distributing paraphernalia, 
or in close proximity to forfeitable records of the importation, 
manufacturing, or distribution of controlled substances and all monies 
seized at the time of arrest or search involving violation of Article 3; 
The following facts pertain to the property seized: 
2. The following prescribed property be and hereby is forfeited to the State of 
South Carolina pursuant to Section 44-53-530, Code of Laws of South Carolina as 
amended. 
PROPERTY: 
3. The Columbia Police Department is the seizing agency. 
4. Pursuant to Section 44-53-530(a), disposition of the defendant property may 
be accomplished by consent of the petitioner and the agencies involved. 
5. IF THE AMOUNT FORFEITED IS MORE THAN ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS: 
~ The first One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) of any cash seized and forfeited 
pursuant to this Article remains with and is the property of the law enforcement 
agency which effected the seizure unless otherwise agreed to by the law 
enforcement agency and prosecuting agency. The Columbia Police Department, the 
..(.\~- / '~L:... "'1 (<xl,,~f. Ia· l1u J ')< au 
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seizing agency in this case, and the Fifth Judicial Circuit Solicitor's Office 
have agrei to the following split of the first One Thousand Dollars or less: 
a. Seventy-Five Percent (75%) or Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($750.00) 
is to be transferred to the Columbia Police Department and is to be retained by 
the governing body of the Columbia Police Department and deposited in a 
separate, special account in the name of the Columbia Police Department. This 
accoudt may be drawn on and used only by the Columbia Police Department for drug 
enforcement activities. 
I 
1 b Twenty-Five Percent (25%) or Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) 
i ' to ~e transferred to the Fifth Judicial Circuit Solicitor's Office and 
deposited by the Richland County Treasurer into a separate, special account to 
be drawn on and used only by the Fifth Judicial circuit Solicitor's Office for 
/ matters relat~ng to the prosecution of drug offenses and litigation of 
drug-related matters. 
6. The remaining t;o D · 60 
----~----------------------------------- is to be transferred 
and disposed of as follows: 
a. Seventy-Five Percent (75%) or 31c.J,V:) is to be 
transferred to the Col~Mb\~ Police Department and is to be retained by the 
governing body of the Columbia Police Department and deposited in a separate, 
special account in the name of the Columbia Police Department. This account may 
be drawn on and used only by the Columbia Police Department for drug enforcement 
activities. 
b. Twenty Percent ( 20%) or / 0 0' 00 is to be 
transferred to the Fifth Judicial Circuit Solicitor's Office and deposited by 
the Richland County Treasurer into a separate, special account to be drawn on 
and used only by the Fifth Judicial circuit Solicitor's Office for matters 
relating to the prosecution of drug offenses and litigation of drug-related 
matters. 
c. Five Percent (5%) or z_<, 0 is to be transferred 
to the State Treasurer and deposited by him to the credit of the general fund of 
the State of South Carolina. 
7. IF THE FORFEITED AMOUNT IS LESS THAN ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS: 
a. Seventy-Five Percent (75%) or is to be 
transferred to the Columbia Police Department and is to be retained by the 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
governing body of the Columbia Police Department and deposited in a separate, • 
special account in the name of the Columbia Police Department. This account may 
be drawn on and used only by the Columbia Police Department for drug enforcement 
activities. 
b. Twenty-Five Percent (25%) or is to be 
transferred to the Fifth Judicial Circuit Solicitor's Office and deposited by 
the Richland County Treasurer into a separate, special account to be drawn on 
and used only by the Fifth Judicial circuit Solicitor's Office for matters 
relating to the prosecution of drug offenses and litigation of drug-related 
matters. 
(nn) 3 
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ADDITIONAL REMARKS: 
TYPE AND QUANTITY OF ILLEGAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES THAT WERE SEIZED: 
I, , have given this consent freely and voluntarily 
without fear, threat, promise, or reward, or hope of reward of any kind. I also 
understand that this consent order will not be used against me in a court of 
law, nor will it affect the criminal charges against me, if any, related to the 
seizure of this property by the Columbia Police Department. 
I CONSENT: 
Owner of Defendant Property 
Richard A. Harpootlian, Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
Elizabeth M. Hancock, Assistant Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
(Name, Rank, Agency of Officer) 
Attorney for Owner of Defendant Property 
AND I T IS SO ORDERED . 
PRESIDING JUDGE 
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
Columbia, South Carolina 
This day of 
------------------' 19 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA } 
} 
} 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
I . COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as Solicitor, } 
Fifth Judicial Circuit, · } 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Approximately Two (2) Grams of 
Cocaine, a 1977 Pontiac Firebird, 
VIN #2S87U7N218182, and Sandra Wood, 
an Interested Party, 
Defendant. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
CONSENT ORDER 
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This IN REM proceeding is a forfeiture acti o n brough ~=:~G~J~ nt: · .·.-. ... , 
'·: ..... C ) 
.. , ... ~ 
to Article 3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of La ws of So u t h Caro~tna · 
• -~ \o 
·._·· ~ \ ' I I •' • • •• -~:.' , , ;·. 
for the ; :Fi·r:-th \;:~1 ,::~·' ( 19 7 6) , as amended. Plaintiff ·is the Solicitor 
· ; · r.n 
Judicial Circuit. The defendant property, a 1977 
. I (.) \ 
Fire bird was 
seized by the Richland County Sheriff's Departmen t in Co lumb i a, 
South Carolina. The defendant property is: 
I . 
all property both real and personal, which in any manner 
is knowingly used to facilitate production, ma nufa c turing, 
distribution, sale, importation, exportation, or trafficking 
in various controlled substances as defined i n Ar t i c le 3; 
all property including, but not limited t o , monie s, 
negotiable instruments, securities, o r other things of value 
furnished or intended to be furnishe d by any person i n 
e xchange for a controlled substance, and al l proceeds 
including, but not limited to, moni e s, and rea l and person a l 
property traceable to any exchange; 
all conveyances ihcluding, b~t not limited t o, ne g otiab l e 
instruments, securities, or other things of value furnish e d 
or intended to be furnished by any person in e xchange for 
a controlled substance~ and all proceeds includ in g , but no t 
limited to, monies, . and real and personaly property trac eable 
to any exchange. 
A Default Order was filed in this case on May 20, 1992. The 
Solicitor's Office has agreed to dismiss the Default after 
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conversations with Ms. Woods' attorney, Jack Lynn. Ms. Wood wishes 
to forfeit Fiv~ Hundred Dollars ($500.00) in u.s. Currency to the 
State of South Carolina and the Richland County Sheriff's 
Department agrees to return the Defendant vehicle to Ms. Woods and 
her attorney, Jack Lynn . 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT: 
1. The following prescribed property be and hereby is 
forfeited to the State of South Carolina pursuant to Section 44-53-
530, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended: 
Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) in U.S. Currency. 
( 
2. Richland County Sheriff's Departmentart is the seizing 
agency. 
3 • Pursuant to Section 44-53-530(a), disposition of the 
defendant property may be accomplished by consent of the petitioner 
and the agencies involved. Therefore, the defendant property is to 
be disposed of in the following manner: 
Under Section 44-53-52a and 44-53-530, Code of Laws of South 
Carolina, (1976), as amended, the property is subject to forfeiture 
~~o the
1
.state Agencies as follows: 
\ , The first One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) cf any cash 
seized and forfeited pursuant to this Article remains with and is 
'the property of the law enforcement agency which effected the 
seizure unless otherwise agreed to by the law enforcement agency 
and prosecuting agency. The Richland County Sheriff's Department, 
the seizing agency in this case, and the Fifth Judicial Circuit 
Solicitor's Office have agreed to the following split of the first 
One Thousand Do llars ($1,000.00) or less: 
(nn) 6 
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a. Seventy-Five Percent (75%) or Three Hundred Seventy-Five 
Dollars ($375.00) is to be retained by the governing body of the 
Richland County Sheriff's Department and deposited in a separate, 
special account in the name of the Richland County Sheriff's 
Department. This account may be drawn on and used only by the 
Richland County Sheriff's Department for drug enforcement 
activities. 
b. Twenty-Five Percent (25%) or One Hundred Twenty-Five 
Dollars ( $125. 00) is to be transferred to the Fifth Judie ial 
Circuit Solicitor's Office and deposited by the Richland County 
I 
Treasurer into a separate, special account to be drawn on and used 
• 
• 
• 
• 
only by the Fifth Judicial Circuit Solicitor's Office for matters e 
relating to the prosecution of drug offenses and litigation of 
drug-related matters . 
I, Sandra Wood, have given this consent freely and voluntarily 
• without fear, threat, promise, or reward, or hope of reward of any 
kind. I also understand that this consent order will not be used 
against me in a court of law, nor will it affect the criminal 
charges against me, if any, related to the seizure of this property • 
by the Richland County Sheriff's Department. 
I CONSENT: 
, Attorney for Sandra Wood 
Richard A. Harpootlian, Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
(nn) 7 
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El1za th M. Hancock, Assistant Solicitor 
~i~cui/J ~ }];;JLJ ~-::-''"--::-:~--=-i---=c=e=--r--.,-)--7-t· =----~-=----
• 
• 
Columbia, South Caro~ 
This J ¥ day of ~ --- · '------- ' 19~ 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
Richard A. Harpootlian, as 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
TI-HlEE 14 ().llo.'Z£0 F1 rn/ - ..:-1 t.: E 
Dc-c~.-AI2.S. 1 "-) u..S C""'cru:.N~'/ 
Defendant. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON P'LEAS , 3 
FIFTH JUDI,CIAL CIRCUIT 
CONSENT ORDER 
'T:-
~"J 
:' GJ 
(~ :~~, 
_ .. , -
. .. - -
.. ~----:--\ 
·. " .\ \ 
- ~- . 
. ' 
This IN REM proceeding is a forfeiture action brought pursuant' :to ~icle 
3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as . amended. 
Plaintiff is the Solicitor for the Fifth Judicial Circuit. The deferidan~ 
property ·--rJ-fP..£6 H ~;W DP..£0 r:Jrt· h ~;1( Ot Lu~-<'l.::, {1\J L{_. S ( -.."'-fU2ErJ( · ;i ~ . --- ·" ·· ·-' 
was seized by officers of the Columbia Police Department in Columbia, South 
Carolina. The Defendant property is: 
v/ 
controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributd, 
dispensed, or acquired in violation of Article 3, Chapter 53, Tit le 
44, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended; 
raw materials, products , and equipment of any kind which are used, 
or which have been positioned for use, in manufacturing, producing, 
compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or e xporting any 
controlled substance in violation of Article 3; 
property which is used , or which has been positioned for use , 
as a container for controlled substances described in Article 3, 
all raw materia ls , products, and equipment of any kind wh ich are 
used, or which have been positioned for use, in manufacturing, 
producing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or 
exporting any controlled substances; 
property both real and personal, which in any manner is knowingly u~ed 
to facilitate production, manufacturing, distribution, sale, importation, 
exportation, or trafficking in various controlled substances as defined 
in Article 3; 
books, records, and research products and materials, including 
formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data which are used, or which 
have been positioned for use, in _violation of Article 3; 
conveyances including, but not limited to, trailers, aircraft, 
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j 
motor vehicles, and watergoing vessels which are used or intended 
for use unlawfully to conceal, contain, or transport or facilitate 
the unlawful concealment, possession, containment, or transportation 
of controlled substances and their compounds, except as otherwise 
provided, must be forfeited to the State; 
property including, but not limited to, monies, negotiable 
instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or 
intended to be furnished by any person in e xchange for a controlled 
substance, and all proceeds including, but not limited to, monies, 
and real and personal property traceable to any exchange; 
monies se i zed in clo se prox imity to forfeitab l e controlled 
substances, drug manufacturing, or distributing paraphernalia, 
or in close proximity to forfeitable records of t he importation, 
manufacturing, or distribut i on of controlled substances and all mon ie s 
seized at the time of arrest or search involv ing v iolation of Article 3; 
2 . The following prescribed property be and hereby is forfeited to the State of 
South Carolina pursuant to Section 44-53-530, Code of Laws of South Carolina as 
amended . 
PROPERTY: TrW.st:: 
3 . The Columbia Pol ice Dep artment is t he seizing agency . 
4. Pursuant to Section 44-53-530(a), disposition of t he defendant property may 
be accomplished b y c o nsen t o f the petitioner and the ag e ncies involv ed . 
5. IF THE AMOUNT FORFEITED IS MORE THAN ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS: 
The first One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) of any cash seized and forfei~ed 
pursuant to this Article remains with and is the property of the law enforcement 
agency which effected the seizure unless otherwise agreed to by the law 
enforcement agency and prosecuting agency. The Columbia Police Department, the 
seizing agency in this case, and the Fifth Judicial Circuit Solicitor's Office 
have agreed to the following split of the first One Thousand Dollars or less: 
a. Seventy-Five Percent (75%) or Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($750.00) 
is to be transferred to the Columbia Police Department and is to be retained by 
the governing body of the Columbia Police Department and deposited in a 
(nn) 10 
• 
separate, special account in the name of the Columbia Police Department. This 
account may be drawn on and used only by the Columbia Police Department for drug e 
enforcement activities. 
b. Twenty-Five Percent (25%) or Two Hundred Fifty Dollar s ($250.00) 
is to be transferred to the Fifth Judicial Circuit Solic itor's Office a nd 
deposited by the Richland County Treasurer into a separate, special acco unt to 
be drawn on and used only by the Fifth Judicial circuit Solicitor's Office for 
matters relating to the prosecution of drug offenses and litigation of 
drug-related matters. 
6. The remaining 
and disposed of as follows: 
i s to be trans fe r red 
I 
a. Seventy-Five Percent (75%) or A!itt is t o be 
transferred to the Columbia Police Departmen and is to b e r et a ined by t he 
governing body of the Columbia Police Department and d e posited in a separate , 
special account in the name of the Columbia Police Department. This account may 
be drawn on and used only by the Columbia Police Department for drug enforcement 
activities. 
b. Twenty Percent (20%) or Al/ It is to be 
transferred to the Fifth Judicial Circuit! Solicitor ' s Office a nd depo s i ted by 
the Richland County Treasurer into a separate, spec i al account to be drawn on 
and used only by the Fifth Judicial circuit Solicitor's Office for matters 
relating to the prosecution of drug offenses and litigation of drug-related 
matters. 
c. Five Percent (5%) or 6llct is to be transferred 
to the State Treasurer and deposited y h~m to the credit of the general fund of 
the State of South Carolina. 
7. IF THE FORFEITED AMOUNT IS LESS THAN ONE THOUS AN D DOLLARS: 
a. Seventy-Five Percent (75%) or 24_, ~,. zs· is to be 
transferred to the Columbia Police Department and is to b e re t aine d by the 
governing body of the Columbia Police Department and deposited in a separate, 
special account in the name of the Columbia Police Department. This account may 
• 
• 
• 
• 
be drawn on and used only by the .Columbia Police De par tment fo r drug enforcement tt 
activ~~ie~~enty-Five Percent ( 25 %) or EJS. '7 S is to b e 
transferred to the Fifth Judicial Circuit So licitor's Office a nd d e posited by 
the Richland County Treasurer into a separate, s pe cial accoun t to be d r awn on 
and used only by the Fifth Judicial circuit Solicitor's Off ice f o r matters 
relating to the prosecution of drug offenses and li t igation of drug-related 
matters. 
ADDITIONAL REMARKS: 
TYPE AND QUANTITY OF ILLEGAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES THAT WERE SEIZED: 
2 · 5 § Y {;WY\.~ D f TY\ Cl-1~ (j LU LTV L-
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• 
law, nor will it affect the criminal charge s against me, if any, related to the 
seizure of this property by the Columbia Police Department . 
I CONSENT: 
dwner of Defendant Property 
Richa~ootlian, Solicitor 
Fifth Judicial Circuit 
Solicitor 
Judicial Circuit 
CPO 
(Name, Rank, Agency of Officer) 
J\1 ~A--Attorney for 0 ner of Defendant Property 
AND IT IS SO ORDERED. 
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
Columbia, South 
d 
This 2-0 day 
Carolina 
of ocP-
(nn) .12 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
COURT 
-------------------
vs 
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE 
CASE NO. 
------------------
------------------------------ · 
Plaintiff(s) Defendant(s) 
Jury Verdict. This action came before the court for a trial by jur • 
The issues have been tried and the verdict rendered. 
Decision by court. This action came to trial or hearing before t 
court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered. 
[ ] Action Dismissed. [ 1 Rule 12 (b), SCRCP 
[ ] Rule 41(a), SCRCP (Vol. Nonsuit) [ 
[ ] Rule 40 (c) {3), SCRCP 
Settled • 
[ ] Other, Explain: 
-------------------------------------------------------
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: [ ] See attached order 
[ ] Statement of Judgment by Court 
Dated at COLUMBIA South Carolina, this 
' 19 
------------------
Judge 
day 
• 
• 
• 
This judgment was entered on the day of 19 ____ , and • 
copy mailed first class this day of , 19 , to attorne 
of record or to parties (when appearing pro~) as follows: ---
Attorney(s) for Plaintiff(s) 
SCRCP Form 4 
Rev. r; I R fi 
• 
Attorney(s) for Defendant(s) 
(oo) 1 
----------~~~~~--~--------· Clerk of Court 
• 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND GENERAL RELEASE 
• STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
In consideration of the return of a 1976 Ford Granada, VIN 
#6F81L122177, as is, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I, 
• Christine Gunter, hereby covenant and agree with the Columbia Police 
Department, their heirs, executors, and administrators, that I wil l never 
institute any suit or action at law or otherwise against the Columbia 
• 
Police Department, nor institute, prosecute or in any way aid in the 
institution or prosecution of any claim, demand, action for damages, loss, 
injury, or costs either to person or to the returned property, or both, 
resulting, or to result, known or unknown, which I ever had, now have, or 
• which I, my heirs and assigns, may have by reason of the Columbia Police 
Department seizure, impoundment, and storage of the above-described 
returned property . 
• 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this _____ day of 
-------------------' 1992 . 
• 
Witness Tracey Gunter 
• Witness Christine Gunter 
• 
(pp) 1 
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U.S. Department o( Justlce 
For Federal Use Only 
I. 
Asset If: 
Seizure Date: 
Judicial District: 
Case Type: Adoption 0 Joint 0 (Ch~_dc Oru) 
APPENDIX C 
Date: u___j LULL 
Investigative Agency: l I I 
Case Number: 
Application for Transfer of Federnily Forfeited Property 
(For Uu By Uniud Sraus Law Enforummr Ag~nci~s Only) 
(For Addiriona/ /nfomuuion - Sa !nsrrucrions) 
• All asset3 tra.nSfcrred must be usal for the law enforcement purpose 
stated in the request. 
• Deadline for submission of this request is sixty (60) days fullOYVing 
the seizure. 
• 
• 
• 
• The requesting agency will be responsible for reimbursing the • 
Federal Government its costs and may be responsible, in a single-
asset case, for reimbursing the t'eckral share. 
II. Requesting Agency Name: ----------------------------
Ad~=------------------------------------------------------------------------
NClC COOe: I I I 
Contact Person: --------------------- Telephooe N~: -'----'---------
m. Asset Requested --------------------
Property Description 
IV. Specific Intended Law Enforcement Use: 
0 Other assets in this case. (A.ttach list). 
~est Type 
Oitem 0 ~ I Proceeds _____ % 
0 Salaries 0 Pun:h.a.se of Equipment 
0 PI~ Into Official Use 
(If oriur than Cash) 
0 Other (Pleas~ Erplain): ~-----------
0 Purchase of Vehicles 
V. Contribution (If any an~r ro A thru E is y~s. provid~ d~ails in Pan VJ) 
A. Did your agency originate the information leading to the seizure? 
B. Were any other assets seized under state law? 
c. Were extraordinary expenses incurred? 
D. Did your agency supply any unique or indispensable assistance? 
E. Are there any assets located in foreign countries associated with this case? 
F. HOYV many hours were expended? hours 
18 
(qq) 1 
Yes 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
No 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
F01h4 o..<G -71 
Df.C . .., 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
C.1~c Number: 
C-· US. Department of Ju.Hice · I 
Application for Tr:m~fer of Federally Forfeited Prorcny 
(Pax~ 2J 
\__ 
VI. Additional space for detailed answers (/ndicat( Pan ro which answt:r(s) apply) 
(If more spaa i..r required, uu a .uparau shut of paper and a!Ulch..) Atrncb!Dt"llt 0 Yes 0 No 
VII. Certifications: 
A. The requester certifies that the above infonnation is ttue and accurate. that the property transferred will be used for the law 
enforcement purpose stated, and that all monies received pursuant to this request will be deposited and accounted for consistent 
with applicable state laws. regulations and orders. The requester agrees to report on the actual use of equitably transferred pro-
perty upon request. The requester agrees to pay fees and expenses necessary to effect transfer of title not later than the time 
of tr:lnsfer. The requester underst4nds that if it is unable to pay the necessary fees and expenses at the time of transfer, the 
asset will be sold and the maximum percent of net sale proceeds will be awarded in lieu of the asset. ' 
Signature I 1itle Date 
a As legal counsel, I have ~iewed this Application for Transfer of Federally Forfeited Property and I cenify that the contact 
person identified in Part II has the authority to accept forfeited property and is the official to whom transfer documents and/or 
money should be delivered. · 
Sign:uurc I Title Date 
Address: ____________________________________ _ 
Telephone Number: ..1....---'-----------------------
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Richard A. Harpootlian 
Solicitor 
Phone 
748-4785 
DATE: 
'Urfp~ ~hrl.e of (~outf( CO:nrolinn 
SOLICITOR 
Fif1h Judicial Circuit 
Post Office Box 1987 
1701 Main Street 
Columbia, South Carol ina 29202 
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 
March 18, 1991 
REFERENCE: CIVIL FORFEITURE AGREEMENT ~~ 
Warren B. Giese 
Deputy Solicitor 
Richard A. Harpootlian, Solicitor, Fifth Judicial Circuit, and Chief J. c. 
Rowe of the Forest Acres Police Department, hereby agree that the first One 
Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) cash proceeds of all contested civil 
• 
• 
• 
• 
forfeitures initiated by the Forest Acres Police Department and processed by e 
the Richland County Solicitor's Office will be distributed in the following 
manner: 
1. Seventy-five percent (75%) to the Forest Acres Police Department. 
2. Twenty-five percent (25%) to the Richland County Solicitor's 
Office. 
. 
Richard A. Harpootlian, 
Solicitor, Fifth Judicial Circuit 
(rr) · l 
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CASE LAW INTERPRETING SOUTH CAROLINA AND FEDERAL FORFEITURE LAWS -
THROUGH MAY 1, 1993 
1. Constitutional Issues 
The constitutionality of the forfeiture statue was upheld by 
the South Carolina Supreme Court in Myers v. Real Property at 1518 
Holmes Street (Happy Town Part of Lot 6 Block C), ___ s.c. ___ , 411 
S.E.2d 209 (1991). The court held that the forfeiture statute did 
not violate the taking clause contained in Article I, § 13 of the 
South Carolina Constitution. Forfeiture, further, was found to be 
within the legitimate e xercise o f the State's police power. The 
court also held that the statute did not deny claimant's due 
process rights to the forfeited property e ven though no pre-seizure 
notice was served, nor any opportunity to be heard afforded prior 
to seizure. South Carolina forfeiture law requires that once 
property is seized, the Court issue a rule to show cause to all 
persons with an interest in the property. Thereafter, a hearing is 
held. Moreover, innocent owners may petition for the return of 
property. The Court found the procedures in the statute satisfied 
due process requirements. 
The United States Supreme Court held in U.S. v. Eight Thousand 
Eight Hundred Fifty Dollars ($8,850.00) in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 
555, 103 S. Ct. 2005, 76 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983) that due process 
requires the government to commence a forfeiture action within a 
reasonable time of seizure. To determine reasonableness, the Court 
applied the four pronged test developed in Barker v. Wingo, 407 
U.S. 514 (1972), in the speedy trial context and examined (1) the 
length of delay; (2) the reason for delay; (3) the assertion of his 
right to a prompt adjudication; and (4) prejudice to the claimant. 
The Court held that a delay of eighteen months in the filing of a 
forfeiture action was justified. 
2. Innocent Owner 
a. South Carolina Law 
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that a corporation was 
not an innocent owner of a shrimp boat used to smuggle marijuana, 
since, even if a corporate officer was not acting on behalf of the 
corporation when he hauled marijuana, he was acting on behalf of 
the corporation when he surrendered the boat to himself for his use 
as a drug smuggler. The corporation had knowledge of the boat's 
illegal smuggling activity, and forfeiture was proper. S.C. Law 
Enforcement Division v. The "Michael and Lance", 284 S.C. 368, 327 
S.E.2d 327 (1985). 
b. Other 
There have been several federal cases interpreting 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 
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the 
1970 
(Federal Civil Forfeiture Statute) 21 U.S.C. 881 et seq. which is 
similar to the South Carolina civil forfeiture statute. The 
following is brief a summary of the pertinent case law. 
An owner may assert the defense of innocent owner if he 
establishes that he does not have actual knowledge of the illegal 
activities. U.S. v. $10,694.00, 828 F.2d 233 (4th Cir. 1987). This 
is a subjective, rather than an objective "should have known" 
standard. 
The subjective standard has been upheld in U.S. v. One Parcel 
of Property Located at Rt. 1, Box 137, Chilton County, Alabama, 743 
F. Supp. 802 (M.D.Ala. 1990). The court agreed with the majority 
of courts holding that the claimant bears the burden of demonstrat-
ing only a lack of actual knowledge. Id. at 806, citing u.s. v. 
$10,694.00, 828 F.2d 233, 234 (4th Cir. 1987). 
U.S. v. Certain Property and Premises Known as 171-02 Liberty 
Ave. Queens, N.Y., 710 F. Supp. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). The court held 
that owner could assert the innocent owner defense even though he 
had knowledge of the illegal activities on his property if he did 
not consent to such activity. Id. at 50. Evidence of lack of 
consent included the fact the owner cooperated with the police to 
the extent that he reasonably could and not lose his life. (The 
property was located in a drug infested neighborhood where everyone 
minded their own business and persons cooperating with the police 
had good reason to fear for their life.) See id. at 51. The court 
denied the government's motion for summary judgment, sending the 
case to trial so the owner could present evidence at trial that he 
did not consent to the illegal activity. 
3. Time of Forfeiture 
a. Relation Back Theory 
u.s. v. Parcel of Land Known as 92 Buena Vista Ave., Rumson, 
N.J., 52 Cr. L. 2229, No. 91-781 (2/24/93), the most recent United 
States Supreme Court case dealing with the relation back theory, 
held that the innocent owner provision of 21 u.s.c. 88l(a)(6) 
trumped the relation back provision of the Federal Civil Forfeiture 
Act, provision 881(h). Specifically, the Court held that a 
property owner who claimed to have lacked knowledge of the fact 
that funds received as a gift and used to purchase a residence were 
proceeds traceable to illegal drug transactions involving the donor 
was entitled to assert the "innocent owner" defense to a civil in 
rem forfeiture action commenced by the government against the 
property. The Court found the Drug Act's "relation back" provision 
does not automatically vest title in allegedly forfeitable property 
at the time of the offending conduct but, instead, merely means 
that once forfeiture is decreed, the government's title relates 
back to that time. This case, however, may not be controlling in 
South Carolina since South Carolina's relation back provision, Code 
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Section 44-53-520(d), specifically provides that forfeitable 
property "is forfeited and transferred to the government at the 
moment of illegal use. Seizure and forfeiture proceedings [merely] 
confirm the transfer." 
b. Burden of Proof 
Once the Government establishes "probable cause that the 
property is subject to forfeiture, ... the burden shifts to the 
claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
factual predicates for forfeiture have not been met." U.S. v. 7715 
Betsy Lane Summerfield, N.C., 906 F.2d 110, 111 (4th Cir. 1990). 
"The claimant must prove that the property was not unlawfully used 
or that he did not know about or consent to the illegal use." Id. 
If the claimant cannot produce sufficient evidence, summary 
judgment is properly granted upon the government's showing of 
probable cause. Id . 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that this 
burden shifting aspect of the statute is not violative of due 
process. u.s. v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989). 
The court upheld forfeiture of properties allegedly purchased 
with drug proceeds where claimant failed to produce any affidavits 
containing facts to support her position that she did not know of 
her husband's involvement with drug trafficking. u.s. v. Aiello, 
912 F.2d 4 (2nd Cir. 1990). 
Since South Carolina's innocent owner provision, Section 44-
53-586, specifically puts the burden on the owner of a seized item 
to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence lack of knowledge 
or consent of the use of the property which made it subject to 
seizure and forfeiture, South Carolina courts considering the issue 
may find federal case law persuasive. 
4. Commingling 
Neither South Carolina nor the 4th Circuit has addressed the 
currency commingling issue. The 11th Circuit, however, has held 
that "one who knowingly commingles legitimate funds with the funds 
of a co-investor, where the co-investor's funds are subject to 
forfeiture, is not an 'innocent owner', under the statute and 
subjects the legitimate funds to forfeiture." U.S. v. One Single 
Family Residence Located at 15603 85th Ave. North, Palm Beach 
County, Florida, 933 F.2d 976, 978 (11th Cir. 1991). The court 
concluded that legitimate funds are forfeitable when knowingly 
commingled with forfeitable funds. Id. at 982. 
In U.S. v. $175,918.00, 755 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), a 
Second Circuit district court, in granting the claimant an 
extension to file his response, held that it would be a proper 
defense that some of the money the government was seeking to 
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forfeit represented the claimant's life savings from 30 years 
continuous employment and that the rest came from the sale of a 
business and that he did not trust banks and, therefore, kept all 
of his money in his house. Id. at 6 34. Whether the funds came 
from a legitimate source was held to be a question of fact which 
precluded the granting of the government's motion for summary 
judgment. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that a 
claimant can avoid forfeiture to the extent that he can prove what 
portions of the properties were purchased with legitimate funds. 
U.S. v. One 1980 Rolls Royce, VIN # SRL 39955, 905 F.2d 89 (5th 
Cir. 1990). 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a 
sufficient connection between the home and the illegal activity was 
established to warrant forfeiture of the home and the entire sum of 
$12,585.00 found in a coat pocket. U.S. v. Premises Known as 3639 
2nd St. Minneapolis, Minn., 869 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1989). The 
court found that the government had established probable cause 
where the undercover drug transaction took place in the home, as 
well as the fact that marked money from prior transactions and 
tools of the drug trade were present in the house. The court held 
significant the fact that firearms, scales, glassine bags and 
cutting equipment were found in the home. 
The Court also found that the government had established 
probable cause to forfeit the entire sum of $12,585.00 seized from 
a coat pocket in the house where the money was commingled with 
$250.00 in marked "buy money." The claimant claimed that he 
maintained large sums of cash in his home because he was dyslexic 
and had difficulty in writing checks. The court, however, noting 
that it is highly irregular to store over $12,000 in one's coat 
pocket, together with the other evidence established probable cause 
to forfeit the entire sum. See 896 F.2d at 1097. 
5. Probable Cause 
No South Carolina cases have addressed the "probable cause" 
issue with respect to seized monies. Several decisions of other 
jurisdictions, however, have addressed the issue, finding the 
quantity of money seized to be persuasive in establishing the 
requisite probable cause. u.s. v. $93,685.61 in u.s. Currency, 730 
F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, Willis v. U.S., 469 U.S. 
836, 105 S. Ct. 119, 83 L.Ed.2d 61 (1984); U.S. v. $2,500 in U.S. 
Currency, 689 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom, in 
Aponte v. U.S., 466 U.S. 1099, 104 S. Ct. 1591, 80 L.Ed.2d 123 
(1984); U.S. v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d 192 (3d Cir. 
1984). One court inferred from the "sheer quantity" of currency 
seized a connection with illegal narcotics trafficking for the 
purpose of forfeiture of the currency. u.s. v. $364,960 in U.S. 
Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). 
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The claimant's lack of a legitimate source of income has 
frequently been considered to be a significant factor in demon-
strating the existence of probable cause for belief that a 
substantial connection exists between the property to be forfeited 
and the alleged criminal activity. u.s. v. $83,320 in u.s. 
Currency, 682 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1982); U.S. v. $2,500 in U.S. 
Currency, 689 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom, in 
Aponte v. U.S . , 466 U.S. 1099, 104 S. Ct. 1591, 80 L.Ed.2d 123 
(1984); U.S. v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 
F.2d 895, 904 (11th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 u.s. 1056, 106 
s.ct. 795 (1986). 
Money found in combination with other persuasive circumstan-
tial evidence, particularly drug paraphernalia, is frequently held 
sufficient to establish probable cause for forfeiture. U.S. v. 
$364,960 in u.s. Currency, 661 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); 
u.s. v. Thirteen Thousand Dollars in U.S. Currency, 733 F.2d 581 
(8th Cir. 1984); U.S. v. $93,685.61 in U.S. Currency, 730 F.2d 571 
(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, Willis v. U.S., 469 U.S. 836, 105 S. 
Ct. 119, 83 L.Ed.2d 61 (1984). The court in U.S. v. $319,820 in 
u.s. Currency, 620 F. Supp. 1474, 1477 (D.C. Ga. 1985), noted that 
circumstantial evidence and inferences therefrom can suffice to 
support a finding of probable cause, and that probable cause must 
be judged not with clinical detachment but with a common sense view 
of the realities of normal life. The court further noted that it 
is appropriate to take into account "common experience consider-
ations," such as the fact that the property seized is connected to 
a known center for drug-smuggling and money-laundering. 
Probable cause was established by showing that the owner of 
the home and his now ex-wife regularly had a group of friends come 
to the house and consume cocaine. U.S. v. 7715 Betsy Lane 
Summerfield, N.C., 906 F.2d 110 (1990). The owner was observed 
weighing cocaine on triple beam scales and giving it to his guests. 
A search of the home resulted in the seizure of marijuana, two 
bottles of Inositol, several plastic baggies containing cocaine 
residue throughout the home and triple beam scales with cocaine 
residue. "The fact that only trace amounts of cocaine were found 
in the home did not prevent a finding of probable cause that the 
owner had distributed cocaine or used his house to facilitate a 
violation of Title 21." Id. at 113. 
In order to establish probable cause, the government must show 
a substantial connection between the property and the underlying 
criminal activity. U.S. v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1542 (4th Cir. 
1989). The court found a substantial connection between the 
defendant property where the owner repeatedly used her home as the 
situs for conducting drug sales. Even though the total amount sold 
was relatively small (12.8 grams), the court noted that Congress 
has determined that a single transaction can trigger 21 U.s. c. 
881(a)(7). The statute does not specify what amount of controlled 
substances must be involved to trigger the statute. The court 
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stated that it "cannot sanction a rule that gives favored protec-
tion to drug dealers who choose to deal directly from their homes." 
Id. at 1542-43. 
"Under the substantial connection test, the property either 
must be used or intended to be used to commit a crime, or must 
facilitate the commission of a crime." u.s. v Schifferli, 895 F.2d 
987, 990 (4th Cir. 1990). The property must have more than an 
incidental or fortuitous connection to criminal activity. Id. In 
dicta, the court addressed Schifferli 's argument that the vast 
majority of activity on the defendant property was the legitimate 
practice of dentistry and that only 20% of the illegal prescrip-
tions were written on the premises. The court noted that this 
argument overlooks the fact that most of the property involved in 
forfeiture proceedings has legitimate uses and that section (a) (7) 
would be eviscerated if the presence of any legitimate use for the 
property defeated forfeiture. Id. at 991. 
Evidence that money was found in close proximity to cocaine 
paraphernalia in a search of claimant's home pursuant to a search 
warrant was sufficient to establish probable cause. When the 
claimant was unable to show by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the money was not connected with cocaine trafficking, forfeiture 
was appropriate. Even though the money was obtained from a 
legitimate source in the form of a loan just two days before the 
search, the money was nevertheless intended by the claimant as 
"seed money" for future cocaine purchases and, therefore, was 
forfeitable. u.s. v. $2,355.96, 647 F.Supp. 1460 (E.D.Mo. 1986). 
6. Right to Jury Trial 
In Medlock v. 1985 Ford F-150 Pickup, VIN 1FTDF15YGFNA22049, 
S.C. , 417 S.E.2d 85 (1992), the South Carolina Supreme Court 
held tha~defendant owners of property possess a right to a jury 
trial where the property subject to forfeiture is property usually 
used for lawful purposes. The Court reasoned that because the 
right to a jury trial in a forfeiture action existed prior to the 
adoption of the State Constitution and the Constitution provides 
that the right to a trial by jury is guaranteed in every case where 
the right existed at the time of the Constitution's adoption, the 
right was "preserved inviolate" in forfeiture cases concerning 
property usually used for lawful purposes. To the extent Code 
Section 44-53-530(a), which provided for a trial by judge, denied 
defendant owner's rights to jury trial in the case of normally 
lawful used property, it was held unconstitutional. 
7. Illegal Seizure is No Defense 
There are no South Carolina cases concerning the forfeiture of 
property illegally seized. The federal consensus, however, appears 
to be that if evidence is seized illegally, it does not deprive the 
Court of jurisdiction but the State generally must prove its case 
68 
B-6 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
without regard to the illegally seized evidence. See u.s. v. One 
1978 Mercedes Benz, 711 F.2d 1297, 1302-03, (5th Cir~983); I.N.S. 
v. Lopez Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 3479, (1984)(Illegal 
seizure not bar to civil deportation hearing). 
8. Standing 
A party seeking to challenge forfeiture must demonstrate an 
interest in the seized item sufficient to satisfy the Court of his 
standing to contest forfeiture. U.S. v. One 1978 Pipes Navajo PA 
31 Aircraft, 748 F.2d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1984); u.s. v. Three 
Hundred Sixty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Dollars 
($364,960.00) in U.S. Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 326 (5th Cir. 1981); 
U.S. v. U.S. Currency amounting to the sum of Thirty Thousand Eight 
Hundred Dollars ($30,800.00), 555 F. Supp. 280, 283-84 (E.D.N.Y. 
1983), aff'd mem, 742 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983); u.s. v. Fifteen 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($15,500.00) U.S. Currency, 558 F.2d 
1359 (9th Cir. 1977). 
9. No Fifth Amendment 
While there are no South Carolina cases on point concerning 
whether or not adverse inferences are allowed in civil cases when 
a claimant refuses to take the stand or asserts the Fifth Amend-
ment, several circuits which have addressed the issue have 
concluded that any Fifth Amendment protection available to 
claimants in civil forfeiture cases is severely restricted. See 
u.s. v. Little Al, 712 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1990); u.s. v. One 1975 Ford 
Pickup, 558 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. One 1975 Mercedes 
2805, 590 F.2d 196 (6th Cir. 1978). The claim of a Fifth Amendment 
privilege, by itself, will not serve to forestall the granting of 
summary judgment in a civil forfeiture proceeding. A claimant may 
be involved in a criminal proceeding, yet be forced to respond to 
civil discovery to avoid forfeiture. Id. But see United States v. 
D'Apice, 664 F.2d 75 (claimant has a right to assert Fifth 
Amendment in a civil case. However, the assertion must be based on 
real rather than imagined potential criminal issues). 
10. Attorney's Fees 
The United States Supreme Court has held that assets earmarked 
for attorney's fees are not exempt from forfeiture and pre-
conviction restraint under the federal drug forfeiture statute, 21 
u.s.c. 853, and that there is no constitutional impediment to the 
use of that law to freeze and forfeit property that an accused 
needs to retain counsel. U.S. v. Monsanto, U.S. , 109 s. Ct. 
2657, _ L. Ed. 2d. _ ( 1989); Caplin and Drysdale ,-Chartered v. 
U.S., _U.S. _, 109 S. Ct. 2646, _ L.Ed.2d _ (1989). Though 
the South Carolina forfeiture statute, S.C. Code Ann. Section 44-
53-520, lacks some of the specifically worded protections of 21 
U.S.C. 853, it is loosely intended to operate in the same way as 21 
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u.s.c. 853 and, thus, Monsanto and Caplin arguably could be 
applicable to a case under South Carolina's forfeiture statute. 
11. Acquittal Has No Effect on Civil Forfeiture Cases 
While there is no South Carolina law on point, the burdens of 
proof in civil and criminal cases differ resulting in the conclu-
sion that while some issues conclusively decided in a criminal 
case, i.e., the culpability of an asset, may be collaterally 
estopped from being re-litigated in a related civil proceeding, 
issues concerning the forfeitability of an item and going against 
such forfeitability, not being determined to a civil standard, are 
not precluded from being re-litigated in a civil case. See U.S. v. 
u.s. Currency Amounting to the Sum of Thirty Thousand Eight Hundred 
Dollars ($30,800.00), 555 F. Supp. 280, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); aff'd 
mem. 742 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983); see also, U.S. v. One Assortment 
~89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 104 S~t~99 (1984). In this case 
on appeal from the District Court of South Carolina, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that (1) neither collateral estoppel nor double 
jeopardy bars a civil forfeiture proceeding initiated following an 
acquittal on criminal charges, and (2) a gun owner's acquittal on 
criminal charges involving firearms does not preclude a subsequent 
in rem forfeiture proceeding against those firearms (proceeding 
under the Gun Control Act). 
In Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397, 58 S. Ct. 630, 
632 (1938), the Supreme Court had previously held that acquittal on 
a criminal charge is not a bar to a remedial civil action by the 
government arising out of the same facts on which the criminal 
proceeding was based. The difference in degree of the burden of 
proof in criminal and civil cases precludes application of the 
doctrine of res judicata. 
In One Lot Emerald Cut Stores v. u.s., 409 U.S. 232, 235, 93 
s. Ct. 489 (1975) (per curium), a defendant's acquittal on a 
smuggling charge did not bar a later proceeding to forfeit goods 
allegedly smuggled because of the differing burdens on proof in 
civil and criminal cases. 
Finally, in U.S. v. United States Currency in the amount of 
Two Hundred Twenty Eight Thousand Five Hundred Thirty Six Dollars 
($228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908, 916 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, __ 
U.S. , 110 s. Ct. 2564 (1990), the second circuit explicitly 
noted that a criminal conviction is neither a necessity nor a 
sufficient condition precedent to forfeiture of currency involved 
in an illegal transaction. Under the "relation back" doctrine, the 
currency or other asset is forfeited when the crime is committed, 
NOT upon plea, conviction, or other disposition of the criminal 
case. 
12. Double Jeopardy 
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The double jeopardy clause does not apply to civil forfeitures 
where the property itself has been an instrument of criminal 
activity . The removal of an instrument used in effecting a drug 
offense is not for the purpose of punishment but, rather, to 
deprive offenders of instruments which they might use to commit 
further crimes and to protect the community from continued drug 
dealing using the property. United States v. Cullen, 979 F.2d 992 
(4th Cir. 1992) . 
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COMPARISON OF SOUTH CAROLINA AND FEDERAL FORFEITURE LAWS 
Raw Materials, Products and Equipment. 
South Carolina - Property used or positioned for 
use {44-53-520(a)(2)} 
Federal - Property used or intended for use { 21 
u.s.c. §881(a)(2)} 
Property used as Container for Controlled Substances, Raw 
Materials, Products and Equipment. 
South Carolina - Property used or positioned for 
use {44-53-520(a)(3)} 
Federal - Property used or intended for use {21 
u.s.c. §881(a) (3)} 
Books, Records and Research Products and Materials 
(Including Formulas, Microfilm, Tapes and Data). 
South Carolina - Property used or positioned for 
use {44-53-520(a)(5)} 
Federal - Property used or intended for use { 21 
U.S.C. §881(a)(5)} 
Money, Negotiable Instruments or other things of Value 
Furnished or Intended to Furnish in Exchange for Con-
trolled Substances. 
South Carolina- Same {44-53-520(a)(7)} 
Federal- Same {21 U.S.C. §881(a)(6)} 
Proceeds Traceable from the Sale of Controlled Substanc-
es. 
South Carolina- Same {44-53-520(a)(7)} 
Federal- Same {21 U.S.C. §881(a)(6)} 
Monies (Other than Proceeds) Which are Forfeitable. 
South Carolina - Money seized in close proximity 
to: 
(1) Controlled Substance 
( 2) Manufacturing or distributing parapherna-
lia; or 
(3) Forfeitable records 
{44-53-520(a)(8)} 
Federal - Money, negotiable instruments or securi-
ties used or intended to be used to facilitate drug 
deals 
{21 u.s.c. §88l(a)(6)} 
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Property Knowinqly Used in Production, Manufacturing, 
Distribution, Sale, Importation, Exportation or Traffick-
ing in Controlled Substances. 
South Carolina - Real and personal property know-
ingly used to facilitate {44-53-520(a)(4)} 
Federal - Real property used or intended to use if 
violation punishable by one year or more {21 u.s.c . 
§88l(a)(7)} 
Conveyances Used or Intended for Use to Conceal, Contain 
or Transport or Facilitate the Concealment, Possession, 
Containment or Transportation. 
South Carolina - All conveyances including but not 
limited to, trailers, aircraft, motor vehicles, and 
watergoing vessels which are used or intended for 
use to conceal, contain, transport, or facilitate 
concealment, containment, possession, manufacture, 
or transportation. Motor vehicles forfeited under 
this item, 44-53-520(a)(6) must meet minimum 
requirements: 
Marijuana - 1 pound or more 
Hashish - 1 pound or more 
Opium - More than 4 grains 
Heroin - More than 2 grains 
Morphine - More than 4 grains 
Cocaine - More than 10 grains 
LSD or its compounds More than 50 
micrograms 
Crack - More than 10 grains 
Ice or Crank - More than 1 gram 
{44-53-520(a)(6)} 
Federal- Any such property {21 u.s.c. §881(a)(4)} 
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• 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF CHEROKEE 
T. TRAVIS MEDLOCK AS 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF 
SOUTH CAROLINA, 
PLAINTIFF, 
v. 
1.83 ACRES OF REAL PROPERTY 
LOCATED IN CHEROKEE COUNTY, 
SOUTH CAROLINA, AND ALL 
BUILDINGS, APPURTENANCES AND 
IMPROVEMENTS THEREON DEEDED TO 
CHARLES MARTIN ON FEBRUARY 
29, 1988, 
DEFENDANT. 
A'ITACHMENT 23 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
FOR CHEROKEE COUNTY, 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
CONSENT ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 89CP4704016 
Counsel for the parties have advised the Court that as part of 
the settlement set forth in Civil Action Number 89CP4704011, the 
State of South Carolina has agreed to dismiss the instant action 
with prejudice. Accordingly, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the instant action is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
------------------
E. C. BURNETT, III 
CIRCUIT JUDGE 
, South Carolina 
------------------' 1991 
I so move: 
Cameron M. Currie 
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Chief Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, State Grand Jury Section 
I consent: 
Robert c. Lake, Jr. 
Attorney for Charles E. Martin 
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SOUTH CAROLINA STATE GRAND JURY 
REAL PROPERTY SEIZURE WORKSHEET 
ATTACHMENT 6 
BASIS FOR SEIZURE OF REAL PROPERTY IS SECTION 44-53-520(4), 
WHICH STATES: 
(A) THE FOLLOWING ARE SUBJECT TO FORFEITURE; 
(4) ALL PROPERTY, BOTH REAL AND PERSONAL, WHICH 
IN ANY MANNER IS KNOWINGLY USED TO FACILITATE 
PRODUCTION, MANUFACTURE, DISTRIBUTION, SALE, IM-
PORTATION, EXPORTATION, OR TRAFFICKING IN VARIOUS 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES AS DEFINED IN THIS ARTICLE. 
CASE NAME & NO. 
CASE AGENT 
ADDRESS OF PROPERTY/RESIDENCE 
DATE OF SEARCH/SEIZURE OF PROPERTY I I 
NAME OF DEFENDANT 
OWNER OF PROPERTY 
LIENHOLDER OF PROPERTY 
CRIMINAL CHARGES 
ESTIMATED TYPE/WEIGHT OF DRUGS 
CHECK THE FOLLOWING APPLICABLE STATEMENTS: 
DRUGS WERE SEIZED IN RESIDENCE. 
DRUGS WERE BOUGHT OUT OF THE RESIDENCE. 
NO. OF TIMES. 
UNDER COVER AGENT BOUGHT DRUGS OUT OF RESIDENCE. 
INFORMANT BOUGHT DRUGS OUT OF RESIDENCE. 
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RECORDS OF DRUG DISTRIBUTION WERE SEIZED FROM PROPERTY. 
WEAPONS WERE SEIZED FORM PROPERTY . 
OWNER HAS PRIOR ARRESTS/CONVICTIONS FOR DRUG VIOLATIONS. 
CASH WAS SEIZED FROM RESIDENCE. 
MARKED OR RECORDED MONEY WAS SEIZED FROM RESIDENCE . 
DRUG DISTRIBUTION PARAPHERNALIA WAS SEIZED. 
PHONE CALLS WERE MADE BY INFORMANT OR AGENT TO 
RESIDENCE. 
PHOTOGRAPHS OR VIDEO TAKEN AT SCENE . 
SEARCH WARRANT SERVED ON RESIDENCE. 
OWNER WAS ARRESTED AT TIME OF SEARCH OF RESIDENCE. 
BRIEF NARRATIVE ABOUT THE CASE AND HOW THE RESIDENCE WAS USED TO FACILITATE 
DRUG TRANSACTIONS: ____________________________________ __ 
LIST ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES INVOLVED: 
RETURN THIS REPORT TO THE ASSET AGENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ASSIST IN 
ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR SEIZURE. ALL OTHER DOCUMENTS 
RELATED TO THIS SEIZURE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE ASSET AGENT ALONG WITH THIS 
REPORT . 
B-15 
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ATTACHMENT 7 
SOUTH CAROLINA STATE GRAND JURY 
PERSONAL PROPERTY SEIZURE WORKSHEET 
BASIS FOR SEIZURE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY IS SECTION 44-53-520, AND SUBSECTIONS 
( 3) AND ( 4) . 
(A) THE FOLLOWING AND SUBJECT TO SEIZURE: 
(3) ALL PROPERTY WHICH IS USED, OR HAS BEEN POSITIONED FOR USE, AS A 
CONTAINER FOR PROPERTY AS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 44-53-520(1) AND 
(2), BEING ALL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, RAW MATERIALS, PRODUCTS, OR 
EQUIPMENT OF ANY KIND, WHICH ARE USED OR INTENDED FOR USE IN THE 
MANUFACTURING, PRODUCTION, COMPOUNDING, PROCESSING, DELIVERING, 
IMPORTING OR EXPORTING ANY CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN VIOLATION OF 
THIS ARTICLE: 
( 4) ALL PROPERTY, BOTH REAL AND PERSONAL, WHICH IN ANY MANNER IS 
KNOWINGLY USED TO FACILITATE PRODUCTION, MANUFACTURING, DISTRIBU-
TION, SALE, IMPORTATION, EXPORTATION, OR TRAFFICKING IN VARIOUS 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, AS DEFINED IN THIS ARTICLE; 
EXAMPLES OF THIS TYPE OF PROPERTY: 
(1) SAFES, LOCK BOXES, FILE CABINETS, REFRIGERATORS, FREEZERS, FOOT 
LOCKERS, LUGGAGE, AND OTHER CONTAINERS USED TO CONCEAL AND STORE 
DRUGS. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
(2) PROPERTY USED BY THE DRUG OFFENDER TO FACILITATE DRUG TRAFFICKING 
AND DISTRIBUTION, SUCH AS TELEPHONES {BOTH REGULAR & CELLULAR), • 
MOBILE RADIO AND WALKIE TALKIES, COMPUTERS, FAX MACHINES, WEAPONS, 
AND OTHER PROPERTY. 
NOTE: MANY OTHER ITEMS NOT INCLUDED IN THIS LIST MAY BE FORFEITABLE. 
=========================================================================== 
• 
CASE NAME & NO. 
CASE AGENT -------------------------------------------------------------------
DEFENDANT 
• DATE OF ARREST/SEIZURE 
--------------------
CHARGES OF SEIZURE 
ESTIMATED TYPE/WEIGHT OF DRUGS 
• 
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LIST ALL ITEMS SEIZED: 
BRIEF NARRATIVE RELATING HOW ITEM( S) RELATE TO ILLEGAL DRUG CHARGES OR 
TRANSACTION: 
LIST ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES INVOLVED: 
RETURN THIS REPORT TO THE ASSET AGENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ASSIST IN 
ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR SEIZURE. ALL OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THIS 
SEIZURE SHOULD BE TO THE ASSET AGENT ALONG WITH THIS REPORT . 
B-17 
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A'ITACHMENT 8 
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION 
CONVEYANCE SEIZURE OR IMPOUNDMENT REPORT 
CASE NAME & NO. 
CASE AGENT 
DEFENDANT 
DATE OF ARREST/SEIZURE/IMPOUNDMENT 
CONVE YANCE WAS SEIZED OR IMPOUNDED FROM 
ADDRESS/LOCATION 
OF SEIZURE/IMPOUNDMENT 
CHARGES 
ESTIMATED TYPE/WEIGHT OF DRUGS 
(WHERE APPLICABLE) 
CONVEYANCE DESCRIPTION: 
MAKE YEAR 
TAG NO./YEAR/STATE 
V. I.N. 
MILEAGE AT TIME OF SEIZURE 
REGISTERED OWNER 
ADDRESS OF REGISTERED OWNER 
LIENHOLDER OF CONVEYANCE 
I 
CONDITION OF CONVEYANCE EXCELLENT 
CONVEYANCE STORED AT 
CHECK APPLICABLE STATEMENTS BELOW: 
I I 
MODEL 
I 
COLOR 
GOOD 
WAS THE CONVEYANCE USED TO TRANSPORT DRUGS? 
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WERE DRUGS SOLD OUT OF THE CONVEYANCE? 
WAS THE CONVEYANCE USED AS A DECOY OR ESCORT IN A DRUG DEAL? 
WAS THE CONVEYANCE USED TO MEET AN AGENT OR INFORMANT TO SET UP A 
DRUG DEAL? 
WAS THE CONVEYANCE USED TO TRANSPORT MONEY FOR A DRUG DEAL? 
WAS RECORDED OR MARKED MONEY FOUND IN THE CONVEYANCE? 
DOES THE OWNER HAVE A PRIOR RECORD FOR A DRUG 
OFFENSE? 
WAS THE DRIVER OR OCCUPANT USING THE CONVEYANCE ARRESTED 
IN A REVERSE STING OPERATION, OR AN ATTEMPTED POSSESSION 
CASE? 
WAS THE CONVEYANCE USED AS A LOOK OUT OR COUNTER SURVEILLANCE? 
DID AN INFORMANT SAY THE CONVEYANCE WAS BOUGHT WITH DRUG PROCEEDS? 
IS THE CONVEYANCE REGISTERED TO A PARENT OR RELATIVE OF THE 
DEFENDANT? 
HAS THE DEFENDANT DRIVEN THE CONVEYANCE OFTEN, AS 
OBSERVED BY AGENTS? 
HAS THE DEFENDANT HAD THE CONVEYANCE REPAIRED, MODIFIED, 
OR RECEIVED ANY PARKING TICKETS IN IT? 
BRIEF SUMMARY OF CASE TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE FOR SEIZURE OR REASON FOR 
IMPOUNDMENT: 
LIST ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES INVOLVED: 
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SOUTH CAROLINA STATE GRAND JURY 
CASH SEIZURE WORKSHEET 
CASE NAME & NO. 
CASE AGENT 
DEFENDANT 
DATE OF ARREST/SEIZURE I I 
CHARGES 
ESTIMATED TYPE/WEIGHT OF DRUGS 
AMOUNT OF CURRENCY SEIZED 
LOCATION CASH WAS SEIZED FROM 
CHECK APPLICABLE STATEMENTS BELOW: 
ATTACHMENT 9 
WAS MONEY FURNISHED OR INTENDED TO BE FURNISHED IN 
EXCHANGE FOR A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (BUY-BUST OR REVERSAL)? 
WAS MONEY SEIZED AT TIME OF ARREST? 
WAS MONEY FOUND NEAR DRUGS OR RECORDS OF DRUG TRANSACTIONS? 
• 
• 
• 
WAS MONEY SEIZED NEAR DRUG DISTRIBUTION OR MANUFACTURING PARAPHER- 4P 
NALIA? 
DOES THE OWNER HAVE A PRIOR DRUG RECORD OR ARREST? 
WAS DRUG DETECTION DOG USED TO CHECK CASH FOR DRUG ODOR? 
DID THE DOG "HIT" ON THE CASH? 
DID THE OWNER GIVE FALSE INFORMATION, SUCH AS NAME, 
ADDRESS, PHONE NO., D.O.B., ETC ... ? 
IS THE OWNER EMPLOYED? 
DID THE OWNER EXHIBIT EVASIVE BEHAVIOR OR SUPPLY 
INCOMPLETE ANSWERS CONCERNING OWNERSHIP OF THE MONEY? 
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WAS THE CASH HIDDEN IN AN UNUSUAL LOCATION? 
WAS THE MONEY BANDED IN STACKS WITH RUBBER BANDS? 
WAS THE MONEY IN SMALL DENOTATIONS? 
DOES THE OWNER CLAIM A LEGITIMATE SOURCE OF INCOME? 
WAS THE DEFENDANT "HOLDING" THE MONEY FOR SOMEONE ELSE? 
DID THE DEFENDANT FURNISH INFORMATION ON HOW TO CONTACT 
OWNER? 
WAS THE MONEY FOUND IN A CONTAINER SUCH AS A SHOE BOX, DUFFEL BAG, 
OR LIQUOR BOTTLE BAG? 
• BRIEF SUMMARY OF CASE TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE FOR SEIZURE: 
• 
.. 
LIST ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES INVOLVED: 
RETURN THIS REPORT TO THE ASSET AGENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ASSIST 
IN ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR SEIZURE. ALL OTHER DOCUMENTS 
RELATED TO THIS SEIZURE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE ASSET AGENT ALONG WITH THIS 
REPORT . 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF CHEROKEE 
T. TRAVIS MEDLOCK AS 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE 
OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 
PLAINTIFF, 
vs. 
ONE 1985 FORD BRONCO WAGON 
VIN 1FMDU15HOFLA34551, 
DEFENDANT. 
ATTACHMENT 12 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
FOR CHEROKEE COUNTY 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
SUMMONS 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 9 1CP47 15086 
TO: THE DEFENDANT ABOVE NAMED; AND TAMMY OR RICKEY COLEMAN: 
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to answer the Complaint 
in this proceeding, a copy of which is herewith served upon you, 
and to serve a copy of your Answer to the said Complaint on T. 
Travis Medlock, Attorney General, State of South Carolina, at 1000 
Assembly Street, Columbia, South Carolina, within thirty (30) days 
after service hereof, exclusive of the date of such service, and if 
you fail to answer the Complaint within the time aforesaid, 
judgment by default will be rendered against you for the relief 
demanded in the Complaint. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
November , 1991 
T. TRAVIS MEDLOCK 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
BY: 
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TRACY A. MEYERS 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
POST OFFICE BOX 11549 
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29211 
(803) 734-3693 
B-22 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
.. 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COUNTY OF CHEROKEE 
T. TRAVIS MEDLOCK AS 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE 
OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 
PLAINTIFF, 
vs. 
ONE 1985 FORD BRONCO WAGON 
VIN 1FMDU15HOFLA34551, 
DEFENDANT . 
) 
) 
) 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
FOR CHEROKEE COUNTY 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
) COMPLAINT FOR FORFEITURE IN REM 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) CIVIL ACTION NO. 91CP4715086 
) 
) 
) NON-JURY 
) 
______________________________ ) 
Plaintiff would respectfully show the Court: 
I. 
Plaintiff is the Attorney General of the State of South 
Carolina and is authorized by Section 44-53-530, Code of Laws of 
South Carolina (1976), as amended, to initiate this Complaint for 
forfeiture of the Defendant property. 
II. 
The Defendant property is a red & white 1985 Ford bronco 
wagon, South Carolina license tag number ECE 151, VIN# 1FMDU15HOFL-
A34551. At the date of the seizure the registered owner and title 
holder of Defendant property, as listed in the records of the South 
Carolina Highway Department, was Tammy or Rickey Coleman, Rt. 8, 
Box 609, Gaffney, South Carolina 29340. 
III. 
On November 15, 1991, Defendant property was seized by the 
South Carolina Law Enforcement Division in the County of Cherokee. 
125 
B-23 
Defendant property was seized pursuant to a valid seizure warrant. 
On July 31, 1991, defendant property was used by Rickey Dean 
Coleman to transport 13.721 grams of cocaine to an undercover agent 
of SLED. Later, on August 7, 1991, Defendant property was used to 
transport 55.906 grams of cocaine for purposes of a drug transac-
tion. On this occasion, an undercover agent of SLED purchased 
55.906 grams of cocaine delivered to the site by Rickey Dean 
Coleman in the defendant vehicle. 
IV. 
Defendant property is a motor vehicle which was used unlawful-
ly to conceal, contain, or transport or to facilitate the unlawful 
concealment, possession, containment, or transportation of 
controlled substances and their compounds in violation of Article 
3, Chapter 53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as 
amended. Defendant property was used in a manner in violation of 
South Carolina Code Annotated Section 44-53-370(a), as more than 
ten grams of cocaine were delivered in and dispersed from the 
vehicle. The vehicle, further, was used in a manner which 
facilitated a violation of Section 44-53-370(e). 
v. 
Defendant property was knowingly used to facilitate the 
production, distribution, trafficking in, or sale of controlled 
substances and their compounds in violation of Article 3, Chapter 
53, Title 44, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended. 
VI. 
Because Defendant property was intended for use and used 
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unlawfully to conceal, contain, or transport, or to facilitate the 
unlawful concealment, possession, containment, or transportation of 
controlled substances and their compounds in violation of said 
title, and because the defendant property, furthermore, was 
knowingly used to facilitate the production, distribution, and 
trafficking in of controlled substances, the defendant property is 
subject to seizure and forfeiture under the provisions of South 
Carolina Code Annotated Section 44-53-520 . 
VII. 
By reason of these premises, Defendant property is 
forfeited to the State of South Carolina. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Defendant property be 
declared forfeited to the State of South Carolina pursuant to 
Section 44-53-530, Code of Laws of South Carolina ( 1976), as 
amended . 
Columbia, South Carolina 
November ' 1991 
T. TRAVIS MEDLOCK 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
By: TRACY A. MEYERS 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE GRAND JURY SECTION 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
POST OFFICE BOX 11549 
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29211 
(803) 734-3693 
B-25 
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ATrACHMENT 13 
CASE NUMBER: 
CASE SUBJECT: 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
RECEIVED 
BY SERVER 
SERVED 
SERVED ON: 
DATE 
DATE 
NAME 
CURRENT ADDRESS 
TELEPHONE # 
SERVED BY: 
NAME 
TITLE 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
PLACE 
PLACE 
DECLARATION OF SERVER: 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the 
State of South Carolina that the foregoing information 
contained in the Return of Service is true and correct. 
Executed on 
Date Signature of Server 
Address of Server 
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ASSET FORFEITURE SEMINAR: 
11 FOR THE PROSECUTOR .. 
.-:=: .-.: _-_-_ :·:=::;=rrrrrrrt~=~========--
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DISCOVERY 
' by 
' Kenneth M. Suggs, Esquire 
, Suggs & Kelly P. A. 
SECTI ON C 
' 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
• 
• 
KENNETH M. SUGGS 
Born 9-24-46, Greenville, S.C. 
Graduated T.L. Hanna H.S., Anderson, S.C. 1964 Graduated Clemson 
University, B.A. in Economics, 1968 
Student Body Secretary 
South Carolina State Student Legislature President, Kappa Sigma 
Nu social fraternity 
United States Navy, 1968 - 1972 
Communications Technician, 2d Class Navy Achievement Medal with 
Combat "V" Vie tnamese Honor Medal 
Vietnamese Campaign Ribbon 
Vietnamese Campaign Medal 
Combat Action Ribbon 
Meritorious Unit Citation 
National Defense Medal 
Graduated University of South Carolina Law Center, 1975 
Graduated cum laude 
Order of Wig and Robe 
Moot Court Board 
President South Carolina Trial Lawyers Association, 1981 
President, Young Lawyers Division, South Carolina Bar, 1980 
Board of Governors, South Carolina Bar, 1981 
House of Delegates, South Carolina Bar, 1982 
Board of Governors, South Carolina Trial Lawyers 
Association, current 
Board of Governors, Association of Trial Lawyers of America, 
current 
Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers 
Advocate, American Board of Trial Advocates 
Author, "The New Heart of Darkness: The Modern Nursing 
Home", S.C.T.L.A. Bulletin, September, 1986 
Author, "Failure Analysis of a Plastic Boat Seat", American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers, Pub. 87-DE-8 
Author, "Recovery for Emotional Distress", S.C.T.L.A. 
Bulletin, January, 1984 
Co-author, South Carolina Appellate Practice Handbook 
Co-author, Evaluating and Settling Personal Injury Claims 
in South Carolina 
Co-author, The Law of Automobile Insurance in South Carolina 
Member, South Carolina Judicial Standards Commission 
Founding Fellow, Southern Trial Lawyers Association Advocate, 
American Board of Trial Advocates 
Named in 1991 to "The Best Lawyers in America." 
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Forfeitures must be accomplished by petition to the Court of 
Common Pleas for the jurisdiction where the i terns were seized. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-530 ( Supp. 1992) . Therefore, the South 
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable. (Rules 1 and 81 
SCRCP). 
Rule 7(b)(1) -Form of Motions 
Unless a motion is made during a hearing or trial in open court 
with a court reporter present, the mot i on shall be made in writing, 
shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set 
forth the relief or order sought. The requirement of writing is 
fulfilled if the motion is stated in a written notice of the 
hearing of the motion. (See Form 1, infra) . 
Rule 7(b)(2) 
Rules applicable to captions [Rule lO(a)], signing [Rule 
1l(a)], and other matters of form of pleadings apply . 
Rule 6(d) - Time 
A written motion shall be served not later than ten ( 10) days 
before the time specified for the hearing. When a motion is to be 
supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the 
motion. Additional or opposing affidavits may be served not later 
than two (2) days before the hearing, unless the court permits them 
to be served at some other time. The moving party may serve reply 
affidavits at any time before the hearing commences. · 
Rule 5(a) & (b) - Service 
Motions shall be served upon each of t he parties . The service 
shall be made upon the attorney for the party unless service upon 
the party himself is ordered by the court. 
Rule 5(d) - Filing 
The motion shall be fil e d with the court within five (5) days after 
service thereof. Upon failure of a party to file a mo tion, the 
court may permit filing or proceed as though the motion had not 
been served. 
!J - 1 
Rule ll(a) 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by 
him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to 
the best of his knowledge there is a good ground to support it; and 
that it is not interposed for delay. 
All motions filed shall contain an affirmation that the movant's 
counsel prior to filing the motion has communicated, orally or in 
writing, with opposing counsel and has attempted in good faith to 
resolve the matter contained in the motion, unless the movant's 
counsel certifies that consultation would serve no useful purpose, 
or could not be timely held. There is no duty of consultation on 
motions to dismiss, for summary judgment, for n ew tr ial , or 
judgment NOV, or with pro se litigants. 
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed or does not 
comply with this Rule, it shall be stricken unless it is signed 
promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the 
pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed 
in violation of this Rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented 
party, or both, an appropriate sanction. 
Motions Against the Complaint (Defensive Motions) 
Rule 12(e) - Motion for More Definite Statement 
If a pleading is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot be 
reasonably required to frame a response he may move for a more 
definite statement before responding. The motion shall point out 
the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion 
is granted, the defects must be cured within fifteen (15) days or 
such other time as the court may affix. Otherwise, the court may 
strike the pleading to which the motion was d i rected or make such 
order as it deems just. 
Rule 12(f) - Motion to Strike 
A motion pointing out the defects complained of must be made before 
responding to a pleading or if no responsive pleading is required 
within thirty (30) days after the service of the pleading upon him 
and is directed to striking insufficient defense or redundant, 
immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter. The court upon its 
own initiative at any time may order such matter stricken. 
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Rule 12 (b) allows certain defenses to be made by way of motion 
before pleading or they may be included in a responsive pleading. 
They are: 
(1) Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; 
(2) Lack of jurisdiction of the person; 
(3) Improper venue; 
(4) Insufficiency of process; 
(5) Insufficiency of service of process; 
(6) Failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause 
of action; (See Form 1, infra). 
(7) Failure to join a party under Rule 19; and, 
(8) Another action is pending between the same parties for 
the same claim. 
Rule 12(c) - Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
Any party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the 
pleadings are closed. 
Both 12(b)(6) and 12(c) motions can be treated 
as summary judgment motions if matters outside 
the pleadings are presented to and not 
excluded by the court. (See Form 2, infra). 
Time for Hearing: 
Motions pursuant to 12(b), 12(c), and for summary judgment under 
Rule 56 shall be heard and determined before trial on application 
of any party, unless the court orders that the hearing and 
determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
Rule lS(a) - Motions to Amend 
A party may amend his pleading once at any time within thirty (30) 
days after a responsive pleading is served or, if no responsive 
pleading is required he may so amend at any time within thirty (30) 
days after the pleading which is to be amended is served. 
Otherwise, a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or 
by written consent of the adverse party. 
Rule 15(d) - Supplemental Pleadings 
Upon motion of a party the court may permit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth events which have happened 
since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. 
Motions Related to the Discovery Process 
Rule 26(c) - Motion for Protective Order 
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is 
sought, and for good cause shown, the court may make any order 
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden by expense including one 
or more of the following: 
(1) That the discovery not be had; 
(2) That the discovery may be had only on specified terms and 
conditions including a designation of the time or place; 
( 3) That the discovery may be had only by a method of 
discovery other than selected by the party seeking 
discovery; t 
(4) That certain matters not be inquired into or that the 
scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; 
( 5) That the discovery be conducted with no one present 
except persons designated by the court; 
(6) That a deposition after being sealed be opened only by 
order of the court; and/or, 
(7) [n/a] I 
( 8) That the parties simultaneously filed specified documents 
or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened 
as directed by the court. 
(See Form 3, infra). 
Some discovery avenues are generally not available unless the • 
amount in controversy meets a certain minimum. The applicable 
minimums are: 
Depositions $ 10,000.00 [Rule 30(a)(2)] 
Video Depositions 100,000.00 [Rule 30 ( h)] 
Interrogatories in excess 
of the standard seven 
but not more than fifty 25,000.0 0 [ Ru 1 e 3 3 (b) ( 8 ) ] 
However, these minimums can be waived by agreement of the parties 
or by the court upon good cause shown. 
Rule 30(d) - Motion to Terminate or Eliminate Examination 
A party may, during the taking of a deposition, make a motion to 
terminate the deposition if the deposition is being conducted in 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
b? ~. £:.=>. i t: l: or in such a manner as to unreasonably annoy, embarrass, 
or oppress the deponent or party. Upon demand of the objecting 
party or deponent, the deposition shall be suspended for the time 
necessary to make a motion for an order. 
Rule 37 - Motion to Compel Discovery 
If answers to discovery requests are not made or if 
evasive or incomplete, the court can order discovery. 
infra). 
Rule 56 - Motion for Summary Judgment 
they are 
(Form 4, 
If the pleadings, depositions, answers to i nterrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any materia l fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a mat ter of law, summary 
judgment shall be entered. (Form 5, infra). 
Rule 56(e) 
If affidavits are used, they must be made on personal knowledge, 
set forth facts which would be admissible in evidence, and show 
affirmatively that the affiant is confident to testify to the 
matters stated therein. 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If 
he does not so respond, summary judgment if appropriate shall be 
entered against him . 
Motions in limine (See Form 6, infra). 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) 
) 
COUNTY OF CHESTER ) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
C/A NO.: 93-CP-12-
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF MOTION 
AND MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT 
TO RULE 12(b)(6), S.C.R.C.P. 
Defendants. ) ------------~~====~----
TO: 
------------------' ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Defendants, by and 
through their undersigned counsel, will move the Court on the lOth 
day after service hereof, or as soon as counsel may be heard, for 
' 
• 
an order granting the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to • 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. This 
motion will be based upon South Carolina law, upon the applicable 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Memorandum of Law which will be 
• filed in support hereof at a later date. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Columbia, South Carolina 
--------------------' 1993 
Form 1 
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• 
• 
S~ATE OF SOUT~ CA?OLI~A 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND 
) 
) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
!N THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
C/A NO.: 93-CP-40-____ _ 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION 
FOR DISMISSAL OR FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants. ) --------------~~====~~----
TO: I ESQUIRE, AND -------------------' ESQUIRE, 
ATTORNEYS FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Defendants, by and 
through their undersigned counsel, will move the Court on the lOth 
day after service hereof, or as soon as counsel may be heard, for 
an Order granting a Motion for Dismissal or for Partial Summary 
Judgement pursuant to Rule 12 (b) ( 6) or Rule 56 of the South 
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion will be based upon 
South Carolina law, upon the applicable Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and the Memorandum of Law filed in support thereof. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Columbia, South Carolina 
May 
-------' 1993 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) 
) 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND ) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) --------------~~====~~---
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
DOCKET NO.: 93-CP-40-______ __ 
DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF MOTION 
AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE 
ORDER STAYING DISCOVERY 
TO: 
--------------------' ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the defendants, by and 
through their undersigned counsel, will move the Court, within ten 
• 
I 
days after service hereof or as soon as counsel may be heard, for • 
a Protective Order Staying Discovery in this matter until such time 
as Defendants' pending Motion for Summary Judgment has been heard 
and adjudicated. 
• Said motion shall be based upon the pleadings in this matter, 
applicable case law and statutes, the attached Memorandum of Law in 
support of this motion, and Rule 26(c) of the South Carolina Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Columbia, South Carolina 
-------------------' 1993 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) 
) 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
COUNTY OF RICHLAND ) FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
C/A NO.: 91-CP-40-
) 
) 
) 
) 
---
Plaintiffs, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) -------------~~~~~-----
TO: I ESQUIRE, AND 
ATTORNEYS FOR THE PLAINTIFF: ----------------' ESQUIRE, 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Defendants, by and 
through their undersigned counsel, will move before the honorable 
judge of the Court of Conunon Pleas, Fifth Judicial Circuit, 
Richland County, South Carolina, as soon as counsel may be heard, 
for an Order pursuant to Rule 37(a)(2) and 37(a)(3) of the South 
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, compelling the plaintiff in this 
matter to fully and fairly respond to the defendants' discovery 
requests, made in the form of Defendants' First Set of 
Interrogatories to Plaintiff and Defendants ' First Request for 
Production of Documents to Plaintiff. (Defendants' First Set of 
Interrogatories to Plaintiff and Defendants ' First Request for 
Production of Documents to Plaintiff attached hereto as Exhibits A 
and B, respectively.) This motion is also made pursuant to Rule 
37(a)(4), S.C.R.C.P., for an Order requiring the plaintiff to pay 
to these defendants the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in 
Form 4 D-9 
obtaining the Order, including attorney's fees, and for such other 
and further relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and 
proper. 
Such motion shall be based upon the applicable South Carolina 
Rules of Civil Procedure and any affidavits, statements, and 
exhibits filed herewith. 
Rule 37(a)(2) states in pertinent part: 
If ... a party fails to answer an interrogatory 
submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in 
response to a request for inspection submitted 
under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection 
will be permitted as requested or fails to 
permit inspection as requested, the discovering 
party may move for an order compelling an 
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling 
inspection in accordance with the request. 
Rule 37(a)(2), S.C.R.C.P. 
Similarly, Rule 37(a)(3) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure states that " ... an evasive or incomplete answer is to be 
treated as a failure to answer." 
Rule 37(a)(4) grants the requesting party reasonable costs in 
pursuing and obtaining an Order compelling compliance with 
discovery requests by declaring: 
If the motion is granted, the court shall, after 
opportunity for hearing, require the party or 
deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion 
or the party or attorney advising such conduct 
or both of them to pay the moving party the 
reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the 
order, including attorney's fees ... 
Rule 37(a)(4), S.C.R.C.P. 
Defendants would show that on December 20, 1991, Defendants' 
First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff and Defendants' First 
2 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
' 
• 
Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiff were served upon 
plaintiff's attorneys, receipt of which was acknowledged by 
on January 3, 1992. (See letter of service and acceptance of 
service card attached hereto as Exhibits C and D, respectively.) 
On February 11, 1992, counsel for the defendants spoke with 
by telephone. Among other things discussed, 
attorney for the defendants reminded plaintiff's attorney that 
discovery requests were submitted to him on Decembe r 20 , 1991 , but 
agreed to allow him to delay his responses pending receipt of his 
demand in the case and subsequent potential settlement 
negotiations. (See affidavit of defendants' attorney, attached 
hereto as Exhibit E.) 
On February 13, 1992, plaintiff made a written demand in this 
action, to which defendants responded in writing on February 27, 
1992. Defendants' response unequivocally stated defendants' 
position on settlement and made a request for responses to 
defendants' discovery requests, some sixty-seven days after service 
thereof. (See letter dated February 13, 1992, from plaintiff to 
defendants, and letter dated February 27, 1992, from defendants to 
plaintiff, attached hereto as Exhibits F and G, respectively.) 
Additionally, on February 27, 1992, def endants specif i cally 
requested of plaintiff a copy of the transcripts of t h e p r eliminary 
hearing and trial in the criminal action underlying the present 
civil lawsuit. Further, a request was made at that time to 
schedule the deposition of plaintiff. (See Exhibit G.) 
Plaintiff's deposition in this matter was ultimately scheduled 
3 
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and taken on August 20, 1992. Prior to the deposition, defendants' 
counsel contacted plaintiff's counsel to inquire as to the status 
of obtaining a copy of the requested criminal trial transcript. 
Two days prior to the deposition, defendants' counsel was notified 
by plaintiff's counsel that defense counsel could pick up a copy of 
the transcripts at their offices, barely allowing counsel adequate 
time to review the documents in preparation for the deposition. At 
the time of the deposition, defendants had still not received 
• 
responses to their discovery requests submitted on December 20, • 
1991. 
Five days after the deposition, on August 25, 1992, defense 
counsel received the answers to their discovery requests, some 
eight months and five days after their initial request. (See 
Plaintiff's Answers to Defendants' Interrogatories, attached hereto 
• 
as Exhibit H. ) In responding to Defendants' First Request for 
Production of Documents, plaintiff submitted a hand-written list of I 
documents which was made during the deposition, along with the 
documents listed thereon. (See hand-written list, attached hereto 
as Exhibit I . ) The court will note that many of plaintiff's 
responses to 
deposition of 
defendants' 
plaintiff." 
interrogatories 
(See Exhibit 
merely state, 
H.) For example, 
defendants' interrogatory number twenty-two was answered in this 
fashion even though the area of inquiry was not explored in the 
deposition. 
In reviewing the plaintiff's responses, defendants noted 
several responses which were vague or incomplete. Defendants 
4 
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• 
I 
' 
• 
att9mpted to address these inadequac i e s in a letter to plaintiff's 
counsel, dated September 10, 1992. (See letter dated September 10, 
1992, attached hereto as Exhibit J.) This letter precisely 
addresses the incomplete answers and requests the specific 
documents which defendants feel have been requested but not 
provided. Defendants asked that they receive a response to their 
letter within ten days; to date, plaintiff has not responded to 
defendants in any manner . 
For all of the foregoing reasons, defendants respectfully 
request that they be granted an Order compelling the plaintiff to 
respond fully and fairly to all discovery requests thus far, for an 
Order instructing plaintiff to pay defendants the reasonable costs 
incurred in obtaining such an Order, and for such other and further 
relief as this Honorable Court deems just and proper. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Columbia, South Carolina 
--------------------' 1992 
I hereby affirm that prior to filing this Motion to Compel, I 
consul ted with opposing counsel in writing (see Exhibit K) and 
attempted in good faith to resolve the matter contained therein. 
It appears that further consultation would serve no useful pur pose 
in that plaintiff has failed to respond to defendants ' letter of 
September 10, 1992 (Exhibit K). 
Columbia, South Carolina 
--------------------' 1992 
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
) 
COUNTY OF HAMPTON ) FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
• C/A NO.: 92-CP-25-
) 
) 
) DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF MOTION 
Plaintiff, ) AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) 
v. ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
• ) Defendants. ) 
TO: , ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT the Defendants, by and 
• through their undersigned counsel, will move before the Presiding 
Judge of the of the Court of Common Pleas, Hampton County, within 
ten ( 10) days of service hereof, or as soon as counsel may be 
heard, for an Order pursuant to Rule 56 of the South Carolina Rules • 
of Civil Procedure, granting these defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and for such other and further relief as this Honorable 
Court may deem just and proper. 
• Such Motion shall be based upon the applicable South Carolina 
Rules of Civil Procedure, case law, and the memorandum of law 
together with attachments which is being filed contemporaneously 
with this motion or as will be argued at a hearing before the Court 
on this Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Columbia, South Carolina 
-------------------' 1993 
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TO: 
v. 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
COLUMBIA DIVISION 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
C/A NO. : 0:92-
-----
) DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND 
) MOTION FOR EXCLUSION OF TESTIMONY 
) 
) 
) 
ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Defendant, 
-----' by 
and through his undersigned counsel, will move before the Presiding 
Judge of the United States District Court, Columbia Division, South 
Carolina on the 15th day after service hereof or as soon as counsel 
may be heard for an Order excluding testimony pursuant to Rules 
402, 403, 404(b), and 802 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, upon the 
grounds that plaintiff's proposed testimony is irrelevant, that it 
is an improper attempt to attack defendant's character, and that it 
is hearsay. Alternatively, if relevant, the testimony should be 
excluded because the prejudicial effect of the evidence is 
outweighed by its probative value. Therefore, defendant is 
entitled to an Order excluding the proposed testimony. 
Said motion will be based upon the pleadings in this matter, 
such depositions and/or affidavits as may be submitted herewith or 
at the hearing of this motion, upon any memorandum of law in 
support of this motion for exclusion of testimony and upon the 
Form 6 
D-15 
Federal Rules of Evidence and case law applicable thereto. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Columbia, South Carolina 
April 
------' 1993 
I certify that in my opinion, consultation with opposing counsel 
would serve no useful purpose and that such a consultation could • 
not be timely held. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
May _______ , 1993 • 
, 
• 
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• 
• 
DISCOVE~~ IN CIVIL CASES 
A. What is Discovery? 
In a civil lawsuit, discovery is a process used fey two basic 
purposes. First, what is the other side's evidence. How will they 
prove their case. Second, what information is in the possession 
of the other side that I can use to prove my case? 
Discovery in state civil cases is governed by the South 
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 26-37 . 
the following forms: 
Discovery takes 
* Depositions; 
* Written interrogatories; 
* Production of documents; 
* Inspection of land or other property; 
* Physical and mental examinations; and 
* Requests for admission . 
Generally speaking, discovery is not limited to strictly 
admissible evidence. Rather, discovery may be obtained about any 
matter that is relevant to the acticn, and which is "reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of 3.dmissible evidence." Even 
so, not everything in possession of the party is discoverable. For 
example, there may be documents or information which are 
privileged. 
1. 
2. 
The privileges recognized 1n South Carolina are: 
Husband-Wife Privilege See S.C. Code Ann. §19-
11-30; State v. Motes, 26~ S.C. 317, 215 S.E.2d 190 
(1975) . 
Attorney-Client Privilege See Drayton v. 
Industrial Life & Health Ins. Co., 205 S.C. 98, 31 
C-1 
S.E.2d 148 (1944) i State v. Hitooonlos, 279 S.C. 
549, 309 S.E.2d 747 (1983). 
3. Priest-Penitent Privilege - See S.C. Code Ann. § 19-
11-90. See also Rivers v. Rivers, 292 S.C. 21, 354 
S.E.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1987) 
4 . State's Privilege to Withhold the Name of an 
Informant - See State v. Hill, 24 5 S. C. 76, 1 38 
S.E.2d 829 (1964). See also State v . Di amond , 280 
S.C. 296, 312 S.E.2d 550 (1984) i State v . Blyther, 
287 S.C. 31, 336 S.E.2d 151 (Ct. App. 1985) 
5. Patient's Privilege in Connection with Mental 
6. 
Illness - See S.C. Code Ann. §19-11-95. 
Privilege against Self-Incrimination u.s. 
Constitution, Fifth Amendmenti S.C. Constitution, 
Article I, §12. 
South Carolina also recognizes that there is a category of 
prepared in limited discoverability. For example, matters 
anticipation of litigation or for trial by anot her party, or by 
someone representing that party, can only be obtained if the party 
who wants the materials ''has substantial need of the materials in 
the preparation of his case and ... is unable withou t undue hard s h i p 
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other 
means. 11 
Notwithstanding the special showing necessary for the 
aforementioned trial preparation materials, parties are allowed to 
obtain discovery of facts known and opinions held by opposing 
(C) Page 2 
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• 
• 
• 
parties' experts. An exception is made for experts who have been 
retained but are not expected to be called at trial. Facts known 
by or opinions r.eld by those experts car. or.ly be obtai~ed upon a 
showing that the party seeking discovery cannot get the information 
any other way. Sometimes experts are informally consulted. Those 
experts do not have to be disclosed at all in discovery. 
B. Depositions. 
A deposition is an examination of a witness under oath. Rules 
27, 28, 30, 31, and 32 deal with depositions. Rule 31 deals with 
depositions upon written questions, at little used procedure in 
South Carolina. 
Most depositions are depositions on oral examination . 
Typically the person whose deposition is to be taken (called the 
deponent) is required to come to the office of one of the lawyers 
involved in the case. All other lawyers involved in the case are 
invited to attend, and a court reporter is present. The party 
noticing the deposition then proceeds to ask questions of the 
witness, under the same limitations as for discovery generally, 
i.e., that the information be relevant and reasonably calculated 
to lead to admissible evidence. Once the party noticing the 
deposition has asked his or her questions, the other parties are 
entitled to question the witness. There is no time limit on the 
questioning. 
A non-party witness must be subpoenaed to come to the 
deposition. Sometimes, the witness will be required, under the 
provisions of Rule 45, to produce documents or other tangible 
(C) Page 3 
evidence along with oral testimony. A person may only be deposed 
once in connection with a particular case except by agreement or 
the parties or by court order. The witness may not be compelled 
.. 
to attend a deposition except in the county of his residence of 
business, except by court order. An exception to this is an expert 
witness, who may be compelled to attend in the county where the 
case is pending. However, an expert witness is also entitled, by 
rule, to a reasonable fee and travel expenses for attending the 
deposition. 
• A deposition cannot be taken, except by agreement or court 
order, in a case involving less than $10,000.00. 
Where it is a corporation or partnership or other business 
entity which has the information needed in a deposition, the party • 
needing the information can serve a notice under Rule 30(b) (6}. 
That allows the party to designate the subject matters into which 
inquiry will be made. It is then the responsibility of the , 
corporation or other entity to provide witnesses who can answer 
questions on those subjects. It may be required to provide more 
than one witness in order to cover all of the subject matter. 
• Depositions can, and often are, taken by telephone. In that 
situation, the court reporter would be at the location of t he 
person to be deposed. 
Depositions are often also videotaped. Videotaped depositions 
require a special notice that the deposition is to be taken by 
videotape. South Carolina does not allow any tricks with cameras 
or fancy production in videotaped depositions, but requires that 
(C) Page 4 
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the camera be focused on the witness' ~~~~ , u~less t~e witness is 
showing a document or other tangible item. 
Obviously, chere is not a judicial officer present at a 
deposition to rule on objections. Therefore, evidence is usually 
taken subject to any objections which are stated, and may be edited 
out of the deposition if objections are later sustained. It is the 
common practice in South Carolina to stipulate that all objections 
are reserved until the time of trial, except as to the form of the 
question. Rule 32(d) (3) provides essentially the same; that is, 
that objections are not waived if not stated at the deposition, 
except for things that could be cured if the objection was stated 
at the time . 
A witness who is deposed is entitled to have a copy of his or 
her deposition to read for accuracy. The witness is then required 
to sign the deposition. Witnesses can, of course, waive this 
right, and often do. Witnesses are entitled to change anything in 
the deposition as long as the witness is able to give a reason for 
the change . 
C. Interrogatories. 
Interrogatories are written questions from one party to 
another. The number of interrogatories which can be served is 
limited by the amount in controversy. If the amount in controversy 
is less than $25,000.00, the parties are limited to standard 
interrogatories which elicit the following information: 
1. Names and addresses of fact witnesses; 
2. Identification of documentary evidence; 
(C) Page 5 
3. In personal injury cases, the names of the treating 
physicians and costs of treatment; 
4. Insurance companies which have insurance related to 
the claim; 
5. 
6 . 
7. 
An itemized statement of all damages; 
Identification of expert witnesses to be used; and 
A summary of the facts to which each witness is 
going to testify. 
In cases where the amount on controversy is $25, 000.00 or 
more, the parties may serve any other additional interrogatories 
that are designed to lead to relevant or material information, up 
to 50. I f necessary, a party may apply to the court for leave to 
serve more than 50 interrogatories. 
Sometimes, interrogatories are served which can be answered 
merely by producing business records; and if so, the party 
questioned has the option to make the business records a v ailable 
for inspection and copying instead of serving written answers . 
Interrogatory answers, if otherwise relevant and admiss i ble, 
can be used as substantive evidence at trial. The party seeking 
to use an interrogatory can simply read it to the jury. 
D. Requests for Production. 
Rule 34 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Proc e dure 
provides that parties may obtain production of documents or 
tangible things and may enter another's land for inspection. This 
rule allows a party to inspect and copy any designated documents 
or categories of documents, or to obtain samples of materials and 
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test them, or to photograph, survey, test, or sample real property 
or things. 
E. Examinations 
The Rules also provide that when the amount in controversy in 
a case exceeds $100,000.00 in actual damages, a party may require 
the adverse party to submit, if the physical or mental condition 
of the party is an issue, to a physical and mental examination by 
a physician designated by the requesting party. The rule allows 
the physician of the party to be present during the examination. 
The examination must be conducted in the County where the person 
to be examined or his doctor lives. The requesting party must 
furnish a copy of the report of the examination to the party who 
was examined. 
F. Requests for Admission 
A request for admissions is a request that your adversary 
admit certain matters of fact without further proof. The rule 
allows only specific denials and does not allow general objections. 
For example, an objection that the party lacks sufficient 
information is not enough unless the party has made a reasonable 
inquiry into the matter. Once the matter is admitted pursuant to 
a request for admission, it is conclusively established for 
purposes of the litigation at hand. The number of requests for 
admissions cannot be more than 20, except requests to admit the 
genuineness of documents are not limited. If a party denies a 
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request for admission or the genuineness of a document, and the 
requesting party thereafter proves the truth of the matter, the 
court may issue an order requiring the refusing party to pay the 
prevailing party the reasonable expenses involved in proving the 
fact which was sought to be admitted. This can include lawyers 
fees. • 
G. Failure to Cooperate in Discovery. 
Failure to cooperate with discovery can result in a number of 
sanctions imposed by the court. Failure to answer a request for 
admission is deemed to be an admission. Failure to answer other 
discovery requires that a motion be made to the appropriate court 
compelling the discovery. The court has the option of awarding the 
moving party attorneys fees and expenses unless opposition to the 
discovery was justified. Failure to answer deposition questions 
can result in a citation for contempt of court. 
Once a court has issued an order compelling discovery, the 
sanctions escalate. The court has several options: 
a. The court can order that certain facts be taken as 
true for the purposes of the pending litigation; 
b. The court can refuse to allow the disobedient party 
to introduce certain matters into evidence or to 
present certain claims or defenses; 
c. The court can strike the offending party's pleadings 
or parts of his pleadings; 
d. The court can order a default judgment against the 
disobedient party; 
(C) Page 8 
• 
I 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
e . The court can hold the disobedient party in contempt 
and punish it accordingly. 
In addition to all those remedies, the court can again require 
payment of expenses and attorneys fees caused by the failure to 
submit to discovery . 
H. Discovery from Non-Parties. 
Discovery from non-parties is conducted generally by 
deposition. Rule 45 provides that a non-party may be subpoenaed 
for a deposition and may be served a subpoena for documents (called 
a Subpoena Duces Tecum) . Non parties may be required to attend 
depositions only in the county of their employment or residence, 
except by order of court. Non parties who are subpoenaed are 
required to be paid $25.00 per day and mileage. A non-party who 
feels that she should not have to submit to discovery may apply to 
the Court for relief . 
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MEETING DEFENSES 
INTRODUCTION 
A civil in rem forfeiture is a proceeding in which the property is 
proceeded against as the "guilty" party. Calera-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). Therefore, constitutional and legal 
principals which apply to criminal cases almost always are not 
applicable. United States v . Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Walker, 889 F.2d 1317 (4th Cir. 1989). 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
A. Fourth Amendment 
1. Not applicable in civil forfeiture cases. 
a. Fourth amendment protects people, not property, and 
forfeiture cases are in rem. 
b. Forfeiture cases are remedial. The government is only 
going after tools of the trade. 
c. Calera-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing co., supra 
One 1988 Ford Mustang, 728 F.Supp. 495 (N.D. Ill. 
1989) . 
2. Illegal seizure is no defense. 
a. Even if the property was illegally seized and the 
evidence surrounding its seizure is inadmissible, 
forfeiture may be sustained based on other untainted 
evidence. 
b. United States v. One 1987 Mercury Marquis, 909 F.2d 
167 (6th Cir. 1990) . 
U.S. v . One 1978 Mercedes Benz, 71 1 F.2 d 1297 (5 th 
Cir. 1983). 
B. Double Jeopardy 
1. Neither double jeopardy nor collateral estoppel based on a 
criminal acquittal bars or affects the forfeiture proceeding . 
U.S. v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 u.s. 354 (1984 ) ; 
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. 232 ( 1972). 
2. However, loss of a forfeiture proceeding mi ght have 
collateral e stoppel consequences in a subsequent criminal 
prosecution. u.s. v. Mumford, 630 F.2d 1023 ( 4t h Cir. 
1980) . 
3. A prior criminal conviction can be used to bar 
relitigation of issues determined by the criminal case. 
u.s. v. All Right, Title and Interest {etc.}, 901 F.2d 288 
(2nd Cir. 1990). 
4. Civil forfeiture proceedings are completely independent 
of any criminal action so no criminal arrest or conviction 
is necessary. U.S. v. A Parcel of Real Property, 913 
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990). 
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5. The failure to advise a claimant pleading guilty that 
forfeiture may be pursued does not prohibit the state 
from seeking forfeiture. The courts have ruled that 
this assertion by the claimant as a defense is not 
valid because forfeiture is not a direct result or 
consequence of a guilty plea. U.S. v. U.S. Currency 
in the Amount of $228,536,895 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1990). 
6. The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment does 
not apply to a civil forfeiture proceeding. U.S. v. One 
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 u.s. 354 (1984). 
7. Fifth Amendment double jeopardy applies to civil penalties. 
a. u.s. v. Halper, 490 u.s. 435, 109 s.ct. 1892, 104 
L.Ed.2d 287 (1989) - civil penalty may be so divorced 
(or totally disproportionate) from government's actual 
damages as to violate double jeopardy clause of fifth 
amendment. 
b. However, if any remedial purpose of forfeiture statute 
can be shown, can avoid Halper result. In the 
Matter of a Parcel of Real Property Known as 1632 
N. Santa Rita, Tucson, Arizona, 801 P.2d 432 (Arizona 
App. 1990). 
C. Fifth Amendment: Self-Incrimination 
1. It is not clear whether an answer which might tend to 
subject a person's property to forfeiture is the equivalent 
of an answer which might tend to incriminate. Allen v. 
Illinois, 478 u.s. 364 (1986); Warford v. Medeiros, 
160 Cal. App. 3d 1035 (1984), ("the self-incrimination 
privilege is not applicable to matters that will subject a 
witness to (civil) liability.") 
2. The Fifth Amendment does not protect responses which reveal 
income even if from an illegitimate source. U.S. v. Turk, 
722 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1983). 
3. A "blanket" assertion is not recognized. The burden is on 
the claimant to show that an answer might tend to 
incriminate. Nation Life Insurance Co. v . Hartford Ace. & 
Indem. Co., 615 F.2d 595 (3rd Cir. 1980). 
4. A Fifth Amendment assertion may be "diluted" by striking a 
claim, having it commented on at trial, posing a bar to 
testimony at trial and giving rise to an adverse inference. 
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 u.s. 308 (1979); u.s. Thomas, 
913 F.2d 1111 (4th Cir. 1990); and u.s. v. Parcels of 
Land (Laliberte), 903 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1990). 
5. A claimant has no privilege not to be called as a witness. 
Kastigar v. U.S., 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
6. The Fifth Amendment right to disclosure of an informant does 
not apply in a forfeiture proceeding. That the disclosure 
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is "essential" or "vital to a fair determination of the 
claim" must be shown by the claimant. u.s. v. One 1986 
Chevrolet Van, 927 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1991) . 
D. Fifth Amendment - Due Process 
1. Notice and Hearing 
a. It has been the general rule that pre-seizure notice 
and hearing are not required if a post-seizure hearing 
is held within a reasonable time. U.S. v. One 1980 
Red Ferrari, 875 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1989); Gonzales 
b. 
v. Rivkind, 858 F.2d 657 (11th Cir. 1988). 
However, the Second Circuit has held that pre-seizure 
notice and hearing may be dispensed with only when there 
is a threat that the seizure may be thwarted. If 
exigent circumstances do not exist, the Court held pre-
seizure notice and hearing are required by due process . 
U.S. v. The Premises and Property at 4492 South 
Livonia Road, 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1989). Later 
the Second Circuit held that pre-seizure notice and 
hearing are required only in residential property 
seizures. U.S. v. 14lst St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870 
(2d Cir. 1990) . 
c. The u.s. Supreme Ct. recently has agreed to hear the 
government's appeal from a Ninth Circuit decision which 
ruled that Fifth Amendment due process requries pre-
seizure notice before any real estate seizure is made. 
2. Attorney Fees 
a. A defendant is not entitled to pay counsel with property 
or funds which are proceeds of drug activities, and such 
property or funds are subject to forfeiture. u.s. v. 
Monsanto, 491 u.s. 600, 105 L.Ed.2d 512 (1989). Also 
see U.S. Department of Justice Guidelines on Forfeiture 
of Attorney Fees . 
b. This also applies to bail. U.S. v. $250,000 in U.S. 
Currency, 808 F.2d 895 (1st Cir. 1987). 
E. Sixth Amendment 
F. 
1. Protections generally do not apply to civil forfeitures. 
2. There is no right to confrontation. u.s. v. Property 
Known as 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618 (3rd Cir. 1989). 
3. There is no right to have appointed counsel. U.S. v. 
$55,518.05 in u.s. Currency, 728 F.2d 192. 
4. There is no right to be present at trial. u.s. v. 
$64,000 in U.S. Currency, 722 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1984) • 
Eighth Amendment does not apply to civil forfeitures. 
U.S. v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989); U.S. 
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v. Tax Lot 1500 TP 389 So., Range 2 East, 861 F.2d 232 
(9th Cir. 1988). 
G. Although South Carolina's forfeiture statute did not entitle 
a claimant to the right to a jury trial, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court has held S.C. Code Ann. 44-53-530(b)(1) to be 
"unconstitutional to the e xtent that it denies a defendant owner 
the right to a trial by jury in those cases where the property 
subject to forfeiture normally is used for lawful purposes." 
Medlock v. 1985 Ford Pick-Up, et al., South Carolina Supreme 
Court Op. No. 23626 (April 13, 1992). 
H. Wa r rantless Seizures 
1 . A warrant is not required to seize property but the Fourth 
Amendment requires that any seizure be reasonable. The 
seizing officer must have probable cause to believe the 
property is subject to forfeiture. U.S. v. Kemp, 690 
F .2d 397 (4th Cir. 1982). 
2. A seizure warrant is always advisable. Without exigent 
circumstances problems may arise if constitutional issues 
are raised by the claimant. 
3. Even if the property is seized without a warrant, the 
civil suit must be brought within a reasonable time. 
4. An unreasonable delay between seizure and the forfeiture 
hearing may be a valid defense. (See the attached Order of 
Dismissal by the Honorable E.C. Burnett, Holman c. 
Gossett, Jr., as Solicitor, v. Phillips and $2,640.00.) 
5. The amount of time which constitutes an unreasonable delay 
is uncertain. 
a. Greater than a year without valid reason is excessive. 
States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146 
(4th Cir. 1974). 
b. Eighteen (18) months is not excessive. 
U.S. v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty 
Dollars, 461 U.S. 555 (1983). 
II. Bankr uptcy 
A. Property subject to forfeiture usually was e xempt from the 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court because of the "Relation 
Back" Doctrine. In re James, 
Cir. 1991). 
F.2d (3rd 
B. However, this may not be the case in light of the new Supreme 
Court ruling in U.S. v. A Parcel of Land, ... Known as 92 
Buena Vista Avenue, Rumson, N.J., et al., No. 91-781. 
III. "Relation Back" Doctrine 
A. The Doctrine is a general rule of civil forfeiture which states 
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that title to property vests in the government at the moment the 
property is illegally used or acquired and that the judgement of 
forfeiture only "confirms" the acquisition of ownership by the 
state and "relates back" to the date of the criminal act. 
B. The Relation Back Doctrine holds that all gains from illegally 
used or acquired property are forfeitable. U.S. v. "Monkey", 
725 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1984). 
c . No one other than the state acquires 
i l legally used or acquired property. 
1317 (4th Cir. 1989). 
an interest in the 
U.S. v. Walker, 889 F.2d 
D. Exception 
Bona f ide purchaser or lienholder who had no knowledge _that 
property was illegally used or obtained. u.s. v. One 1976 
Cessna Model 210, 890 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1989) . 
E. U.S. v. Buena Vista Avenue 
1. Extends the bona fide purchaser or lienholder exception 
to anyone who has standing to claim innocent ownership. 
2. Contains a detailed examination of the Relation-Back 
Doctrine which may render the rule obsolete. The court 
states that there is no "secret transfer" of title to the 
state at the time the property is used illegally and that 
the doctrine only applies after judgment of forfeiture by 
the court. 
IV. THIRD PARTY CLAIMS ("Innocent OWners") 
A. Definition 
A claimant who asserts an interest in the property but claims 
no knowledge of or involvement in the criminal activity which 
made the property subject to forfeiture. 
1. Pre-existing OWners 
Owners who had an interest in the property before its 
illegal use - u.s. Reckmeyer, 836 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 
1987); u.s. v. $10,694.00 in u.s. Currency, 828 F.2d 233 
( 4th Ci r. 198 7). 
2. Subsequent Purchasers/Donees 
Interest acquired after the property illegally used or 
obtained . 
B. Burden of proving absence of knowledge or consent is on the 
claimant. U.S. v. $10,694.00 in u.s. Currency, supra. 
c. Claimant alleging innocent ownership can apply to the court of 
common pleas for return of the property. Section 44-53-586(a) . 
D. Leasing company must prove that its owner, employees and agents 
had no knowledge of the illegal use which gave rise to the 
forfeiture. Section 44-53-586(a). 
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E. Knowledge by an agent (e.g., a property manager or employee) 
can be imputed to an owner. S.C. Law Enforcment Division v. 
the "Michael and Lance", 284 S.C. 368, 327 S.E. 327 (1985); 
and u.s. v. 41st St. corp. 911 F.2d 870 (2nd Cir. 1990). 
F. Claimant who knowingly mingles legitimate funds with tainted 
money is not an innocent owner of any interest in the resulting 
asset. U.S. v. One Single Family Residence, 933 F.2d 976 
(11th Cir. 1991). 
G. Innocent Owner test is no different for a spouse. U.S. v. 
Parcel of Real Property, 3201 Caughey Road, 715 F. Supp. 131 
(W.D. 1989). 
H. Marital property - see u.s. v. 127 Shares of Stock, 758~ 
F.Supp 581 (E.D. Cal. 1990); In re 1979 Lincoln Continental, 
405 So.2d 249 (Fla. App. 1981); U.S. v. Lot 9, 919 F.2d 994 
(5th Cir. 1990). 
I. Notice of illegal activity to the owner by the authorities can 
"create" knowledge. U.S. v. 418 57th St., 737 F.Supp. 749 
(E.D.N.Y. 1990). 
J. Constructive knowledge is sufficient. If the claimant was 
aware or should have known of circumstances or past drug 
activity which made the property subject to forfeiture, 
forfeiture is still viable. Owner's knowledge of the 
specific offense is not necessary. U.S. v. One Parcel of 
Property L. at Black Ledge, 897 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1990); 
U.S. v. 60 Acres Located in Etowah County, 727 F.Supp. 1414 
(N.D. Ala. 1990). 
K. Owner has a duty to prevent its property from being used 
illegally. U.S. v. One 1980 Cadillac Eldorado, 603 F.Supp. 
853 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); S.C. State Law Enforcement Division v. 
Crook, 273 S.C. 285, 255, S.E.2d 846 (1979). 
v. Unreasonable Delay 
A. Between seizure and forfeiture hearing discussed, supra. 
B. An Initial Report of Seizure must be received by the prosecuting 
agency "within ten (10) days or a reasonable period of time 
after the seizure" from the seizing agency. Section 
44-53-520(j). In determining what is a reasonable delay after 
the ten (10) day requirement has expired, a prosecutor should 
take into consideration the reason for delay given by the 
seizing agency. If no explanation for the delay is given, 
the prosecutor should not bring the forfeiture action. 
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